Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

In a ruling that clarified laws important to our Chicago and Wheaton internet trademark infringement and business trial lawyers, the Eleventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled July 9 that actual damages for service mark infringement under the Lanham Act do not duplicate statutory damages under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. In St. Luke’s Cataract and Laser Institute v. Sanderson, No. 08-11848 (11th Cir. July 9, 2009), the court also found that a lower court did not err in denying a motion for a new trial on copyright claims by the clinic and a motion for judgment as a matter of law by Dr. James Sanderson.

Sanderson worked at St. Luke’s, a private clinic, as its only cosmetic eye surgery specialist between 1995 and 2003. In 1998, they launched a Web site advertising Sanderson’s services at St. Luke’s, at lasereyelid.com and laserspecialist.com, using LaserSpecialist.com as a logo and service mark. Both the doctor and the clinic contributed content to the site, and a copyright notice attributed the site to the clinic. St. Luke’s paid directly for the site’s creation and maintenance, although Sanderson testified that these costs were deducted from his pay as “overhead,” which St. Luke’s disputed. The clinic’s webmaster provided backup disks to Sanderson.

Sanderson left St. Luke’s in June of 2003 to start a solo practice. The webmaster transferred ownership of the domain names into Sanderson’s name at his request. Sanderson later testified that he did not ask anyone else at St. Luke’s for permission to take ownership of the site. A few months later, Sanderson relaunched the site without references to St. Luke’s or links to its main site. The clinic noticed this in 2005 and removed links from its own site to Sanderson’s site. In January of 2006, it registered a copyright to a version of the site from 2003, claiming ownership of all of the content.

A month later, it sued Sanderson for copyright infringement, Lanham Act and Digital Millennium Copyright Act claims, Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) claims, unfair competition, unfair business practices and misappropriation of the domain names. Sanderson counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the copyright was unenforceable. The jury found that the copyright was indeed unenforceable, but found for St. Luke’s on all other counts, awarding $150,000 in damages and about $587,000 in attorney fees and costs. The court later reduced the damages award to $98,000, saying the statutory damages under the ACPA duplicated the actual damages awarded for service mark infringement. Both parties appealed on multiple grounds. The Eleventh took up the questions of the duplicative damages; the issue of whether Sanderson should have succeeded on his motion for a judgment as a matter of law on the unfair competition and service mark claims; and the issue of a new trial for St. Luke’s on the copyright claims.

The Eleventh affirmed the trial court on every issue but the duplicative damages, which it found were not duplicative, for several reasons. The Anti-Cyberpiracy Act explicitly says that damages should be awarded in addition to any other civil action or remedy available. Furthermore, the court argued, the laws allow damages for different purposes -- the ACPA awards them as sanctions against bad faith conduct, while the Lanham Act awards them as compensation for losses. The Lanham Act allows plaintiffs to choose a statutory damages award rather than an award of actual damages, the court noted. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 278 (5th Cir. 2002). Thus, it remanded that part of the case, with instructions to reinstate the cyberpiracy damages award.

However, it affirmed the trial court on the new trial issue and the judgment as a matter of law issue. Citing extensive evidence from the trial, it found that the jury had good reason to find that the clinic’s copyrights to the site may not be valid. One copyright was not registered until months after the clinic filed its suit, the court noted, which violates well-established precedent saying that a valid copyright is a necessary prerequisite for suing. The other copyright was registered beforehand, it said, but with overly broad claims that attempted to copyright stock photos, material Sanderson provided and copy from Botox manufacturers. The court noted that intentional misrepresentations and omissions can render a copyright invalid. Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1982). Because there was evidence that St. Luke’s may have intentionally misrepresented information on its application for the earlier copyright, the court found that it was not entitled to a new trial on that claim.

Finally, the court denied Sanderson’s claim that the trial court should have granted judgment as a matter of law on the service mark infringement and unfair competition claims. There was sufficient evidence to show that the name “LaserSpecialist.com” was a service mark for St. Luke’s, the opinion said, and that it was worthy of protection. Furthermore, the court said, there was sufficient evidence to show that the term had acquired a secondary meaning, as the law requires. St. Luke’s had advertised it extensively for several years, and evidence showed that patients both used it and were referred to it frequently. Thus, there was a clear likelihood of confusion, as required by the law -- meaning that the trial judge did not err in denying judgment as a matter of law.

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Statements in an advertisement for a men’s clothing retailer may have been in poor taste, but they are still protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled. In Imperial Apparel Ltd. v. Cosmo's Designer Direct Inc., Ill., No. 103331 (Feb. 7, 2008), retailer Imperial Apparel sued Cosmo’s after the latter retailer ran an advertisement insulting a competitor that was widely understood to be Imperial. Objecting to Imperial’s appropriation of Cosmo’s signature “3 for 1” sales policy, the Cosmo’s ad disparaged Imperial’s quality and business practices. The ad also used references to the Jewish heritage of the family that owned Imperial, the Rosengartens.

The Rosengartens and Imperial sued Cosmo’s and the Chicago Sun-Times, the newspaper that ran the advertisement. They made claims against both defendants for defamation per se, defamation per quod, false light invasion of privacy, commercial disparagement and violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The Cook County trial court in the case dismissed all of their complaints, with prejudice, on the grounds that the advertisement was protected free speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. That court used a fact versus opinion test -- were the statements intended as opinion? It concluded yes.

The Rosengartens appealed and had better luck with the appellate court, which reversed the false light, consumer fraud and commercial disparagement claims as to all plaintiffs. It also reversed the defamation per quod claim as to the Rosengartens personally, but not Imperial, because the Rosengartens could not show that they personally were financially harmed. However, it upheld the dismissal of the defamation per se count. Citing a paragraph in which Cosmo’s accused Imperial and the Rosengartens of “inflat[ing] prices and compromis[ing] quality,” it found that a reasonable reader could interpret those statements as facts. Cosmo’s and the Sun-Times then made the instant appeal.

The Supreme Court started its analysis of the case by saying the trial court used the wrong test. Whether a statement deserves First Amendment protection is not a question of opinion versus fact, the court said, but the trial court was right that the type of speech at issue matters. Instead, the justices wrote, the test is whether the statements in the ad could reasonably be interpreted as fact. In addition, because the Sun-Times is a media defendant with special protections, Imperial would also have to prove that the statements were actually false.

In any case, the court found, the Cosmo’s ad could not be reasonably interpreted as stating facts:

The text is artless, ungrammatical, sophomoric and sometimes nonsensical. It is also a shameless appeal to ethnic prejudice, extolling, as it does, the supposed superiority of Italians over those of Jewish ancestry, at least “when it comes to fine clothing.” We do not believe, however, that an ordinary reader would perceive it as making objectively verifiable assertions about plaintiffs’ business.

Even racial and religious epithets qualify for First Amendment protection. This issue is fatal to all of Imperial’s claims, the Supreme Court said, and thus there is no need to address other legal issues at hand. Thus, the trial court was upheld and the case was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety.

DiTommaso-Lubin’s Chicago commercial and business trial attorneys have a growing practice in commercial disparagement and false defamation of businesses and their products. We handle Illinois commercial disparagement lawsuits for businesses of all sizes, both plaintiffs and defendants. Based in Oakbrook Terrace, near Wheaton, and Chicago, we represent clients throughout Illinois and the Midwest. To speak to our Chicago commercial defamation lawyers about your own case, please contact us through our Web site to set up a confidential consultation.

As Chicago shareholder dispute attorneys, we noted with interest a recent decision on calculating fair market value of stock owned by a dissenting shareholder. Brynwood Company v. Schweisberger, No. 02-06-1178, (Ill. 2nd Dist. July 23, 2009) pitted a corporation against its co-founder and majority shareholder. The Brynwood Company, which is now dissolved, was an Illinois C corporation organized in 1979. It existed only for the purpose of owning and administering an office building in Rockford, Ill. Stuart Schweisberger was a founder of Brynwood, the president, a member of the board of directors until 2000 and a tenant with an accounting firm in the building. He was also the accountant for Brynwood until 1994.

Schweisberger retired in 1996 with 26% of the company’s stock. In 1999 and 2000, the Brynwood board began to consider ways to change the corporation, including selling the building and dissolving the corporation. In 2001, Schweisberger negotiated with Brynwood to sell his shares, but negotiations ultimately faltered. In 2002, Brynwood notified Schweisberger that it had an offer to sell the building to a third party, but wanted to convert to an S corporation to avoid income tax liability instead and hold on to it for 10 more years. Schweisberger did not consent to the conversion, in part because it would require changes to his IRA. When Brynwood failed to get his consent, it held a meeting at which shareholders agreed to sell the building and dissolve the corporation.

The building was sold for $1.4 million, with $959,282 in capital gains. The mortgage of $353,080 was paid from the proceeds, and another $446,593 was paid in taxes, professional fees and other costs. A bit more than a week after the sale, Schweisberger filed a notice objecting to the sale and demanding payment of the “fair value” of his shares under the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983. When Brynwood dissolved, it estimated fair value of the shares at $30.08; Schweisberger estimated fair value at $66.31 and also demanded 6.75% interest, which was the former mortgage’s interest rate. In October, Schweisberger surrendered his shares in exchange for the $30.08 price plus a much lower interest rate based on the interest earned on the certificate of deposit holding the proceeds of the sale. However, in December of 2002, Brynwood filed for a judicial determination of the fair value of Schweisberger’s stock and interest due to him.

At trial, the basis for the difference between Schweisberger’s and Brynwood’s valuations became clear. Schweisberger testified as his own expert witness, saying he came to the $66.31 valuation by excluding the costs of capital gains taxes, fees and costs. Because he objected to the sale, he said, he thought his shares should be calculated without those costs. Brynwood’s expert, accountant Gary Randle, testified that the fair valuation should be calculated according to what each individual shareholder eventually received from the liquidation, which he put at $36.15 per share. He said if Schweisberger had actually received his requested $66.31 per share, other shareholders would have received about $25 a share. Another expert witness for Schweisberger, accountant Mark Patterson, testified that he believed the value could also be calculated as a “going concern,” cutting out the taxes, fees and costs from the sale.

Before and during trial, Brynwood objected to Patterson’s presence and testimony. It said Patterson was unqualified to give testimony because he had admittedly never valued this type of company before. It also contended that his testimony was nothing more than a definition of the legal term “fair value.” The court twice dismissed these objections.

The trial court found that Schweisberger timely exercised his right to dissent and that the board knew the sale would trigger taxes, fees and costs. Because of that, and because the only reason for the sale was the majority’s preference, it found that Schweisberger’s shares should be calculated without taking those costs into account. It also found that the interest rate should be the 6.75% interest Schweisberger had requested, giving rise to a share value of $60.68. This gave Schweisberger a judgment of $181,130.45. Brynwood appealed.

The Second District started by addressing Brynwood’s concerns at trial: that Patterson should not have been allowed to testify as an expert because he had never valued this type of company, and that admitting his testimony was an abuse of discretion because he was doing nothing more than interpreting the words “fair value.” The appeals court disagreed. Valuation is part of the business of accounting, it said, and experience in valuing a particular type of business is unnecessary. Furthermore, a review of Patterson’s testimony shows that it included reasons for his opinions, not just the definitions of terms. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony, the Second said.

Brynwood had more luck with its argument that the trial court’s valuation decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The company argued that by subtracting taxes, costs and fees, the court artificially inflated the value of Schweisberger’s shares at the expense of the majority of shareholders. The court agreed, saying that excluding those costs did not meet the Business Corporation Act’s goal of fair and equal treatment for all shareholders. Capital gains taxes and other costs are intrinsically tied to the value of a closely held real estate company like Brynwood, the court wrote, and thus to its stock’s value. This made the trial court’s decision against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, the appeals court overturned that decision and sent it back to trial court for a new determination of value, taking taxes, costs and fees into account.

Continue reading " Second District Reverses Trial Court’s Judicial Determination of Fair Market Value in Shareholder Dispute " »

Our Chicago partnership dispute attorneys noted with interest a recent ruling strictly limiting how creditors may hold individual partners liable for the judgment debts of their partnerships. In Sunseri v. Moen, No. 3-07-0468 (Ill. 3rd May 15, 2008), the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that creditor Jack Sunseri and his company, Consolidated Partners Ltd., may not enforce a New York state ruling against Janet Moen, a partner of Macro Cellular Partners. The appeals court said a foreign judgment is unenforceable against an individual partner unless the judgment was against that partner, or the creditor makes a case establishing the partner’s liability.

In the underlying lawsuit, Sunseri successfully claimed that Macro’s general partner took actions designed to deprive Sunseri of partnership distributions. Sunseri was awarded nearly $6 million in damages against Macro in 2005, in New York state court. That court entered judgment against Macro, and later in the same year, an attorney for Sunseri petitioned a Rock Island County court to enter judgment against Moen individually as a partner of Macro. The matter was set for a hearing in early 2006, but on the day before, Moen filed a motion to stay judgment because she was not an individual defendant in the New York case, and because an appeal in that case was pending.

After a series of motions and hearings, a Rock Island County judge ruled that Sunseri could continue discovering the partnership’s assets, but that enforcement against Moen’s personal assets must fail because the original action did not name her as an individual, as required by Johnson v. St. Therese Medical Center, 296 Ill. App. 3d 341, 345 (1998). Sunseri then petitioned for leave to amend his complaint to add Moen as an individual. This was granted, but Moen successfully moved to dismiss it with prejudice under the Illinois statute of limitations. In granting that motion, the court also noted that Sunseri may not, under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, enforce judgment against Moen individually when the New York judgment named only the partnership. After a motion to reconsider was denied, Sunseri filed the instant appeal.

On appeal, the Third District first considered whether the trial court erred when it stopped Sunseri’s citation proceedings against Moen’s personal assets. The controlling law is the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, the court wrote, which is “unequivocal” about its limited scope. Under the Act, the judgment debtor may only be a party named in the foreign court’s judgment order -- and a judgment against a partnership is enforceable only against property actually in the partnership’s name. Sunseri’s counsel improperly expanded the scope of the original judgment when they named Moen as an individual partner, the Third District said, causing confusion in the trial court. In fact, the court wrote, “The record indicates Sunseri ... desired to expand the New York decision to reach Moen without judicial approval or further court order.”

Sunseri further argued that his right to collect against Moen is settled under res judicata. It’s undisputed that creditors may use a valid foreign judgment against a partnership to establish individual partners’ liability, the court said -- but it is not automatic. Sunseri should have registered the judgment against the partnership rather than Moen, the court said, then sought to establish Moen’s individual liability on the grounds that Macro’s assets were insufficient (because it was insolvent). However, he registered it only against Moen. Thus, not only did the trial court properly vacate the citation against Moen’s individual assets, the appeals court said, but it should have vacated the one against Macro as well.

Finally, the court considered the issue of whether the trial court property dismissed Sunseri’s amended complaint, or should have allowed his motion to reconsider that ruling. The parties brought up issues of statute of limitations, the Third wrote, but these are irrelevant -- because, again, there was no foreign judgment against Moen. Illinois law won’t allow creditors to collect on foreign judgment debts that don’t exist, so the trial court acted properly when it dismissed Sunseri’s amended complaint with prejudice. Thus, the Third District upheld that decision and the decision to vacate orders, but also reversed the trial court’s decision to allow the citation against partnership assets.

Continue reading " Company May Not Enforce Judgment Against Individual and Partnership Not Named in Original Claims, Third District Finds " »

A trial court was correct to find for defendants in a breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud lawsuit, the First District Court of Appeal ruled March 20. In Prodromos v. Everin Securities Inc., No. 1-06-3685 (1st. Dist. March 20, 2009), plaintiff John Prodromos sued Everin Securities, Inc., its predecessor company, Daniel Westrope and Dennis Klaeser over an allegedly stolen opportunity.

Prodromos was a former president and CEO of Howard Savings Bank, a family business. He was fired by his sister in 1994 after he was fined by the FDIC for failing to waive a fee and for violations of state law. In 1998, he wanted to purchase Home Federal Bank, which was looking for an investor, but needed help. He approached his broker at Everin, who connected him to Westrope, an investment banker there. After a meeting attended by all three, Westrope agreed to contact shareholders at Home Federal about voting for Prodromos in a proxy vote, but no agreement was signed and no fees were paid.At the time, Westrope had already been hired away from Everin by State Financial Services Corporation, something he did not disclose to Prodromos.

After Prodromos submitted some follow-up information to Westrope, the latter man was not responsive to messages from Prodromos. About a month after the meeting, Westrope moved to State Financial. His replacement at Everin, Klaeser, told Prodromos that Everin would not support his purchase attempt because it would be bad for the firm’s investment banking business. Prodromos met with several other banks and an attorney, but did not follow up with most. He did strike a deal for financing through Success Bank, but that deal fell through when one of the Success officials involved died suddenly. His efforts ended. A few months later, State Financial acquired Home Federal and installed Westrope as CEO and president of the bank.

Prodromos sued Everin, its predecessor, Westrope and Klaeser for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. The defendants were granted partial summary judgment, but Prodromos appealed and the First District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded that decision. On remand, Prodromos requested and did not receive a jury trial because the law does not require one for breach of fiduciary duty claims. After Prodromos presented his case at a bench trial, the court granted defendants’ motion for a directed finding. Prodromos now appeals both that decision and the decision to deny him a jury trial.

The First District Court of Appeal affirmed those decisions. It first considered the motion for a directed judgment, which Prodromos argued should not have been granted without requiring the defendants to prove that the State Financial-Home Federal transaction was fair and equitable. The court disagreed, noting that nothing in its first decision (Prodromos I) or Illinois caselaw requires that a court consider every element of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court did not find that the defendants’ conduct proximately caused Prodromos to lose the opportunity to buy Home Federal, they wrote, and that was enough to defeat the breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Furthermore, the court wrote, Prodromos did not make his case because he was unable to show that he would have been able to close the deal if it weren’t for the defendants’ actions. And undisputed testimony shows that he did not enter into an agreement with Westrope, so he was free to pursue the acquisition opportunity elsewhere. He did not, despite evidence that the time to make such a deal was running out.

The court then took up the jury trial issue. Under Illinois law, plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial if that right existed in English common law at the time the Illinois Constitution was written. Breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud are both equitable claims, the First District pointed out -- and equitable claims were not tried with the right to a jury. None of the caselaw Prodromos cited effectively contradicted the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding on that subject, the court said. Thus, the trial court was correct to deny Prodromos a right to a jury trial, and both rulings were affirmed.

The experienced business litigation attorneys at DiTommaso-Lubin have substantial experience on both plaintiff and defense sides of breach of fiduciary duty, stolen corporate opportunity, corporate freeze out and squeeze out cases and partnership and shareholder disputes involving closely held businesses or family businesses. Our Chicago and Oak Brook business trial attorneys and commercial litigation lawyers handle all types of business and commercial disputes, including stolen corporate opportunities, breach of contract and business fraud litigation. From offices in Chicago and Oak Brook, Illinois, our business litigation lawyers represent clients throughout the state of Illinois and the Midwest, in state and federal courts. To learn more about our experience and your own legal options, please contact DiTommaso-Lubin online or call us toll-free at 1-877-990-4990.

A trial court may have personal jurisdiction over a defendant outside Illinois, but only if it can determine that the defendant’s alleged tort was motivated for personal reasons, the First District Court of Appeal has ruled. Femal v. Square D Company, No. 1-07-1990 (Ill. 1st Jan. 29, 2009). The ruling came in a complex Illinois business dispute between Michael Femal, a former employee at electrical equipment manufacturer Schneider Electric, and James O’Shaughnessy, a lawyer for a company accused of violating a Schneider patent.

Femal patented a process for his employer, Square D, which was bought by Schneider Automation, Inc. Schneider sold the patent to Solaia Technologies, which was to enforce the patent and give Schneider a percentage of its earnings. Schneider agreed to let Femal help Solaia enforce the patent, for which he was to get 2% of Solaia’s earnings.

Among the alleged infringers Solaia sued was Wisconsin-based Rockwell International, which countersued Solaia for bad faith patent enforcement. The sides had a settlement conference in Illinois that included O’Shaughnessy, Rockwell’s attorney. At this meeting, Rockwell raised allegations that Femal could best refute, leading Solaia to cancel its percentage arrangement with Femal and put him on a much less lucrative hourly wage to serve as a witness. Schneider then hired outside counsel to look into the propriety of Femal’s percentage arrangement with Solaia, and eventually fired him for misuse of compay assets, gross misrepresentations and gross failure of professional judgment.

Femal sued O’Shaughnessy, among others, alleging that O’Shaughnessy told Square D’s lawyer that Femal’s percentage arrangement was a gross violation of professional ethics. He also claims that O’Shaughnessy made inappropriate factual allegations to get the percentage arrangement canceled. The alleged intent, Femal said, was to save Rockwell money by harming the business relationships between Femal and the companies. Perhaps more importantly, he alleged that O’Shaughnessy was also personally motivated to cover up for bad judgment in telling Rockwell not to pay for the patent, thus incurring many times the patent’s price in legal fees.

O’Shaughnessy, who lives and works in Wisconsin, moved to dismiss because Illinois lacks personal jurisdiction over him. He was acting solely in his capacity as an employee during the Illinois meeting, he said, an assertion that Femal disputes. The trial court dismissed the motion without a hearing, a ruling that O’Shaughnessy appealed to the First District Court of Appeal and then to the Illinois Supreme Court, which ordered the appeals court to resolve it in the instant action.

In its analysis, the First District quoted at length from Rollins v. Ellwood, 141 Ill. 2d 244 (1990), which found that employees are covered by the fiduciary shield doctrine when their employers order them into another state. It was unfair for Illinois to assert personal jurisdiction in that case, the Illinois Supreme Court said, because the defendant could have been fired for refusing to enter the state. In later cases, however, courts found exceptions to that doctrine when the actions at issue were discretionary. It also noted that it saw no reason why alleged personal interest must be pecuniary in nature.

Applying that test to the case at hand, the First District noted that Femal and O’Shaughnessy have submitted affidavits that contradict one another -- Femal claiming O’Shaughnessy had a personal interest in defaming him and O’Shaughnessy claiming he did not. This is an issue of fact that will decide whether Illinois courts have personal jurisdiction over O’Shaughnessy, the court wrote. Thus, the First District reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded it with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing on the personal motivation issue and make written findings of fact.

DiTommaso-Lubin’s Chicago business litigation lawyers handle all kinds of business disputes in Illinois, including claims of defamation of a businessperson or a product. Based in Chicago and Oak Brook, Ill., we represent clients in the Chicago area including cities in DuPage and Lake Counties including Wheaton, Naperville and Waukegan and throughout the Midwest in federal and Illinois business dispute lawsuits. You can click here to look at a summary of some of the cases our Chicago business trial lawyers have handled. If you are in a similar situation and you would like to explore your options, please contact us online or call 1-877-990-4990 to set up a confidential consultation.

As Illinois Internet trademark infringement attorneys, we have kept track of the series of lawsuits filed against Google for selling advertisements using trademarked names and phrases. So we were not surprised to see an article in BusinessWeek July 13 announcing that Rosetta Stone, a maker of language-learning software, has sued Google for allowing competitors to buy its name for use in its Google AdWords advertisements. This was the ninth such lawsuit against Google for the same practices, although some have since been resolved.

Under the program, competitors to Rosetta Stone may bid for the right to have their own advertisements appear on the page of search results when a user searches for “Rosetta Stone.” The company contends that this is an illegal use of its trademark that forces it to spend thousands of dollars bidding on the keywords, so that competitors cannot have them. According to the article, the lawsuit was inspired by the loosening of Google’s AdWords restrictions. Until June 15, companies could not put the competitor’s name in their advertisements, although they could purchase the right to appear when users search for competitors. Now they may do either. This is tantamount to allowing competitors benefit from the goodwill and name recognition Rosetta Stone has invested in building, the company’s general counsel said.

The lawsuit’s chances are unclear. As the article points out, the case will likely hinge on whether consumers are legitimately confused by Google’s practices. No court has clarified this, making it an unsettled area of the law. However, in a different case, the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated a software company’s lawsuit against Google, saying selling trademarks as keywords counts as a “use in commerce” under trademark law. While trial courts in other circuits, including our own Seventh, are free to disagree, our Chicago Internet trademark litigation lawyers believe this is a promising sign that courts will allow a jury to consider the likelihood of consumer confusion.

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