Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

As Illinois mediation and arbitration lawyers, we were interested to see a decision confirming that parties may invoke their contractual rights to arbitrate even after some participation in the other side’s lawsuit. TSP-Hope Inc. v. Home Innovators of Illinois, Inc., No. 1-07-1028 (Ill. 4th June 26, 2008) pits a Springfield housing nonprofit, TSP-Hope Inc., against residential construction company Home Innovators of Illinois. The two made a contract in July of 2005 for the construction of houses. In the summer of 2006, construction stopped. Shortly after, TSP-Hope sued for breach of contract and other causes.

About a month later, the defendant filed for an extension of time to plead, saying the plaintiff had served a demand three days before for the defendant to file suit to enforce its liens. Another month later, the defendant filed an answer and counterclaims, including duress in contract formation, breach of contract and enforcement of the liens. After a series of motions and counter-motions, the defendant in July of 2007 filed to dismiss all claims and compel arbitration. In this motion, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had verbally agreed to mediation before the lawsuit. The parties’ contract specified that they should use mediation at first, and then binding arbitration with a specified arbitration company, to resolve disputes. The trial court eventually granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss a breach of contract claim, saying it had not been waived by participation in the litigation. After a motion to reconsider failed, the plaintiff appealed.

Unusually, the Fourth said, the defendants did not file a brief in the appeals case. However, the court said it had sufficient evidence from the plaintiffs’ brief. That brief argued that defendants had waived their right to arbitration by waiting almost 11 months to assert it, and by submitting arbitrable issues to the trial court in the meantime. To determine whether this is true, the Fourth wrote, it needed to determine whether the defendant had acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. Under Cencula v. Keller, 152 Ill. App. 3d 754, 757, 504 N.E.2d 997, 999 (1987), this can include submitting arbitrable issues to the court.

The Fourth then ran down a list of past cases in which a party was found to have waived its right to arbitration. In all of those cases, the court noted, parties had conducted discovery and made pleadings that were more than just responses to the other side. Neither of these was true in this case, it said. It is true that the defendant’s counterclaims could have waived its right to arbitration, the court said, but this is not automatic. In this case, the counterclaim “appeared to be responsive to plaintiff’s complaint” as well as the plaintiff’s demand to enforce its liens. Under those circumstances, the Fourth concluded that the defendant had not acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate. Thus, the appeals court affirmed that trial court was correct to find that there was no waiver.

Continue reading " Filing Counterclaims Does Not Waive Contractual Right to Arbitration, Fourth District Rules " »

A recent decision by the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals will have important implications for our practice as Illinois class action attorneys. In American Honda Motor Company Inc. v. Allen et al., No. 09-8051 (7th Cir. April 7, 2010), the Seventh ruled that trial courts must conclusively rule on the admissibility of expert testimony before certifying a class -- when the testimony is essential to the class certification decision. The case is a proposed class action filed in the Northern District of Illinois by people who bought Honda’s Gold Wing GL1800 motorcycle. The plaintiffs claim there is a defect creating unusual amounts of “wobble,” or oscillation of the front steering assembly.

To support a motion for class certification, the plaintiffs used a report prepared by motorcycle engineering expert Mark Ezra. Ezra used a standard of his own devising to support his opinion that the Gold Wings’ wobble was beyond what was reasonable to avoid overcorrections or fear by the rider. He tested one such motorcycle, found it insufficient and suggested that Honda could fix the problem by using a different shape of ball bearings. Honda moved to strike this report, claiming it was unreliable and that the testing based on one motorcycle was not reliably applied.

The district court agreed that Honda had raised some important concerns, and that class certification rested largely on Ezra’s report, but declined to exclude the report entirely so early in the case. It dismissed Honda’s motion without prejudice and certified two classes. Honda appealed the class certification decision, and the Seventh found the appeal appropriate, because the issue is “heavily contested” and has not been addressed at the appellate level.

The Seventh wrote that the district court started off correctly by starting an analysis of the expert testimony as provided by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Despite the detail in its analysis and the several troubling flaws it noted, however, the district court declined to exclude the report entirely “at this early stage of the proceedings.” By ruling in this way, the district court left an open question about which aspects of the report would be excluded, and ultimately, whether the plaintiffs met the standards for class certification. That was so insufficient that it was an abuse of discretion, the appeals court said.

Furthermore, the court wrote, the record shows “exclusion [of Ezra’s report] is the inescapable result when the Daubert analysis is carried to its conclusion.” The record shows Ezra’s report fails several tests laid out in Daubert and is “unreliable,” the Seventh wrote, which means it should not be admitted. And without admission of that testimony, the plaintiffs do not have enough evidence to show that their class meets standards of class certification. Thus, the Seventh vacated the lower court decision to grant class certification and remanded the case for further proceedings. In general, the court wrote, when the testimony is essential to the class certification decision, as it is here, a district court must conclusively rule on any challenge to the expert’s submissions or qualifications.

Continue reading " Courts Must Decide Admissibility of Questionable Expert Testimony Before Certifying Class " »

As a firm that focuses on class-action litigation, and wage and hour class-actions in particular, our attorneys are always mindful of judicial rulings that may affect our clients. Early this year, a case in Federal Court in the Northern District of Illinois' Eastern Division addressed a couple of issues that are important to both employers and employees. The opinion from Collazo v. Forefront Education, addressed questions surrounding a motion to certify a class action under under 29 USC 216(b) for violations of Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) flowing from the Defendant’s failure to pay overtime wages to the Plaintiff class members. The Court also commented on the effect of employee-signed releases on an employee's rights under FLSA.

Plaintiffs are former Illinois admissions representatives of Defendant Forefront Education, a for-profit educational institution with campuses in Illinois and Florida. Plaintiffs sought to certify a class including all current and former admission reps at both locations who did not receive overtime pay from October 20, 2005 – present. Defendants argued that:

1) Plaintiffs provided no basis for sending notice to Florida employees;
2) Plaintiffs failed to show that notice was warranted for the Illinois class members;
3) Plaintiffs failed to identify an adequate class representative; and
4) the language in the class notice was deficient.

To conditionally certify a class under 216(b), Plaintiffs must make a “modest factual showing sufficient to demonstrate that they and potential plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.” The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to make the required showing as to the Florida employees. The only evidence provided by the Plaintiffs was copies of job descriptions pulled from the Florida location's website, which the Court deemed insufficient. The judge also noted that Plaintiffs had no affiant with personal knowledge of the work schedules or conditions of admissions reps at the Florida locations in ruling against certifying the Florida employees as class-members.

The Court granted the motion as to the Illinois admissions reps due to the less stringent standard under 216(b) as compared to the requirements for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Court found that the class representatives were able to make 216(b)'s “modest factual showing” because: the named Plaintiffs were all employed at the Illinois campus, they each submitted a declaration to the court detailing their respective work schedules and the schedules of coworkers, and they provided documentary evidence that employees were required to work Saturdays.

The Court found one Plaintiff to be an adequate class representative despite the Defendant's argument that Plaintiff had signed a post-employment release of all claims, including any claims under the FLSA. The Court found that “rights under the FLSA cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived,” and the release in question was impermissibly broad as it purported to waive rights under the FLSA. Lastly, the Court required that the class definition be amended to include only those admissions reps who actually worked more than forty hours per week and were not paid overtime.

The ruling in Collazo has something for everyone. The Court makes it clear to potential Plaintiffs that they will not rubber-stamp class certifications under the FLSA, despite the fact that certification requirements under the Act are less burdensome than in other federal class-action lawsuits. For business owners, the ruling means that while a release may effectively remove the threat of some legal claims, they cannot contract away an FLSA wage and hour lawsuit in the same manner.

Continue reading " Class Certification Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Section 216(b) " »

Our Illinois covenant not to compete attorneys were interested to see a ruling in a long-running contract dispute between three Madison County doctors. The Fifth District Court of Appeals has given a green light to a lawsuit over a covenant not to compete. The Madison St. Clair Record reported July 1 that the court allowed Dr. Tina Gingrich to pursue a non-compete lawsuit against her former business partner, Dr. Christina Midkiff. At issue is a covenant in the stock purchase agreement of their former corporation, Tina M. F. Gingrich, M.D., P.C., doing business as Maryville Women’s Center, an ob-gyn practice. The covenant said Midkiff and a third partner, Dr. Marlene Freeman, were not permitted to open a competing ob-gyn practice within 20 miles of Maryville Women’s Center for five years.

The underlying facts are complicated. Midkiff and Freeman joined Gingrich’s practice in the late 1990s, entering into a stock purchase agreement that gave them one-third of the shares each. That agreement also contained the covenant not to compete at issue here, as well as a provision giving Gingrich veto power. The three doctors later disagreed over issues not specified, and in 2002, Midkiff and Freeman sued Gingrich for several causes of action, including shareholder relief and a declaratory judgment that the covenant not to compete was unenforceable. Gingrich countersued and later filed a notice of stock sale offering to buy out the shares owned by the other two. That offer used a formula rather than a dollar amount to determine what she would pay for the shares. For that reason, the trial court granted a motion to strike her notice.

Gingrich filed an interlocutory appeal, and the resulting 2005 Fifth District opinion established that a formula is a valid way to offer to buy stock under the Business Corporations Act. The case was sent back to trial court, but before the court could complete its bench trial, Midkiff and Freeman sold Gingrich their shares. Midkiff started her own practice in Maryville on the first day of 2007, bringing her staff from the Maryville Women’s Center. Later that January, the trial court determined how much Gingrich should pay for Midkiff’s shares. It also refused to enforce the covenant not to compete against Midkiff, as to work she had done at a local hospital. Shortly afterward, Gingrich filed the instant lawsuit, seeking to enforce the covenant not to compete as to both the hospital and Midkiff’s new office in Maryville. The trial court dismissed the case, saying the issue had already been decided, and Gingrich appealed to the Fifth District again.

According to the Record, the Fifth District reversed that trial court ruling in June. For the majority, Justice Wexstten wrote that Gingrich’s breach of contract claim had not been decided in the prior suit, which he said had to do with the valuation of the stock shares Gingrich was trying to purchase. The decision did not enforce the non-compete clause, and in fact, the justices specifically said they made no ruling as to whether the clause was reasonable. Instead, their ruling sends the case back down to the trial court for a decision.

Continue reading " Fifth District Allows Non-Compete Lawsuit by Madison County Doctors to Go Forward " »

The website Can My Boss Do That sets down in plain english your rights as an employee. The website has a great section on http://www.canmybossdothat.com/category.php?id=6. It explains when you are entitled to get paid.

This website is a great resource for finding out your legal rights as a employee.

Continue reading " Best Websites on the Internet for Class Action and Consumer Law Issues -- "Can My Boss Do That" Website Spells Out Worker Employment Rights in Plain English " »

Slate published an excellent article handicapping that the Supreme Court in the AT&T case will vote in favor of consumer class actions continuing. The article explains in in plain English what is at stake in the case and the arcane legal issues on which the decision will turn. You can view the entire article by clicking here. This article like most of those written by the major newspapers, media outlets and blogs, such as the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, ADR Blog, predicts a consumer victory based on deference to state's rights and California's right to invalidate an unconscionable class action ban in an arbitration agreement.

The Slate article states:

In plain English, the Supreme Court needs to decide whether Corporate America can make ordinary slobs like us, who sign take-it-or-leave-it contracts, give up our right to file class-action suits. And in case you're wondering why class-action suits matter to us ordinary slobs, consider this: Not a lot of lawyers are willing to take on AT&T for $30.32. Sometimes the only way to police misconduct—particularly small differentials in pay (based on, say, race or gender) or itsy bitsy fraudulent representations—is by pooling litigants together and suing together as a class.

Our Elmhurst, Illinois consumer rights private law firm handles individual and class action predatory lending, unfair debt collection, lemon law and other consumer fraud cases that government agencies and public interest law firms such as the Illinois Attorney General may not pursue. Class action lawsuits our law firm has been involved in or spear-headed have led to substantial awards totalling over a million dollars to organizations including the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Consumer Law Center, and local law school consumer programs. The Chicago consumer rights attorneys at DiTommaso-Lubin are proud of our achievements in assisting national and local consumer rights organizations obtain the funds needed to ensure that consumers are protected and informed of their rights. By standing up to consumer fraud and consumer rip-offs, and in the right case filing consumer protection lawsuits and class-actions you too can help ensure that other consumers' rights are protected from consumer rip-offs and unscrupulous or dishonest practices.

Our Evanston, Highland Park, and Deerfield consumer attorneys provide assistance in fair debt collection, consumer fraud and consumer rights cases including in Illinois and throughout the country. You can click here to see a description of the some of the many individual and class-action consumer cases our Chicago consumer lawyers have handled. A video of our lawsuit which helped ensure more fan friendly security at Wrigley Field can be found here. You can contact one of our Waukegan consumer protection attorneys who can assist in consumer fraud, consumer rip-off, lemon law, unfair debt collection, predatory lending, wage claims, unpaid overtime and other consumer, or consumer class action cases by filling out the contact form at the side of this blog or by clicking here.

Our Illinois arbitration attorneys noted an appellate decision reminding parties to arbitration contracts to ensure that their language is clear as to what exactly should be arbitrated. In Peterson v. Residential Alternatives of Illinois, No. 3-09-0743 (Ill. 3rd June 7, 2010), Rachel Peterson, as the administrator of the estate of Jacob H. Terhorst, sued Terhorst’s former nursing home. Terhorst died at a home run by Residential Alternatives of Illinois, and the estate had sued the nursing home company for wrongful death and violations of the Illinois Nursing Home Care Act. The home succeeded in compelling arbitration at the trial court level, but the Third District Court of Appeal reversed, saying the language of the arbitration agreement was unclear.

Terhorst was 92 when he entered Hawthorne Manor in Peoria. He was a resident from Nov. 29, 2006 to June 2, 2007, the day of his death. On Jan. 7, 2009, his estate’s executor, Ann Bonono, filed a lawsuit against Hawthorne Manor’s parent company, Residential Alternatives. That claim alleged that Residential Alternatives failed to provide adequate care to Terhorst and neglected and abused him, resulting in injuries, pain, mental anguish, financial costs and eventually, his death. It sought more than $100,000 for wrongful death and violations of the Nursing Home Care Act. The defendant filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint.

But less than a month later, the defendant also moved to dismiss the claim and compel arbitration. In support, it included a contract and a separate arbitration agreement, both dated Nov. 29, 2006 and signed by legal representatives for the company and for Terhorst. Neither document mentioned the other, and the contract indicated that it contained seven pages, all seven of which were the contract itself. The arbitration agreement stated that “any and all disputes arising hereunder shall be submitted to binding arbitration and not to a court for determination.” The next paragraph stated that in the event that a dispute was determined not covered by the agreement, the parties agreed that the dispute should be heard by a judge rather than a jury, and that the prevailing party had the right to recover its costs.

In response to the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, the plaintiff argued that no enforceable agreement existed; that the defendant had waived its right to arbitration by answering the complaint; and that Illinois public policy is against waiving any rights under the Nursing Home Care Act. Ultimately, the trial court agreed with the defendant that the arbitration agreement controlled the dispute and sent the case to arbitration. This appeal followed. During its pendency, plaintiff Rachel Peterson was granted leave to replace plaintiff Ann Bonomo.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable; that it was void pursuant to the Act, caselaw and public policy; that the defendant had waived its rights; and that the wrongful death claim should not be arbitrated because its plaintiffs were not parties to the agreement. The Third noted that there was no dispute over the contract. However, the defendant argued that it and the arbitration agreement should be considered one unified document, whereas the plaintiff argued that they should be considered separate documents.

Caselaw shows that some courts have chosen to interpret separate documents executed on the same day by the same people as the same document, the court noted. However, it said, these were documents that referred to or expressly incorporated other documents. Furthermore, the court said, it is well established in Illinois law that parties may not incorporate one agreement into another without expressly indicating an intention to do so, and there is a presumption against interpreting contracts in a way that adds conditions that could easily have been explicitly added in writing. In this case, the Third said, the parties could easily have added an arbitration agreement to the contract itself, but they did not -- in fact, the seven-page contract states that it is complete within those seven pages. The court found that this choice was deliberate and consistent with case law, so it rejected the argument that both documents should be considered one document.

Next, the Third looked at whether the arbitration agreement itself creates an independent contractual obligation to arbitrate all controversies arising out of the nursing home care. The court concluded that it could not interpret the agreement that way. The agreement called for arbitration with this language: “Without limiting any rights set forth in other provisions of this AGREEMENT, any and all disputes arising hereunder shall be submitted to binding arbitration and not to a court for determination.” This is circular language, the court said, and it does not reference the nursing home care contract at all. A later reference to “any other document signed or initialed in connection with this AGREEMENT” also does not adequately indicate any intention to connect with the contract. For that reason, the court wrote, it cannot agree that the two documents should be treated as one. Thus, the court found that the case should not go to arbitration because the nursing home contract was not subject to the arbitration agreement. The trial court’s decision was reversed.

Continue reading " Nursing Home Cannot Compel Arbitration Under Unclear Contract, Third District Rules " »

Our Illinois mediation and arbitration attorneys were interested in a court ruling on the controlling legal authority in a dispute over whether an issue is arbitrable. R.A. Bright Construction Inc. v. Weis Builders Inc., No. 3-09-0910 (Ill. 3rd June 9, 2010) pits construction company Weis Builders against its subcontractor, R.A. Bright Construction. A dispute later arose in which Bright claimed Weis owed it $765,701 under two contracts the parties had signed. Bright sued and Weis moved to dismiss, or alternatives, to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, but two judges from the Third District Court of Appeal reversed that decision under the Federal Arbitration Act. A third dissented, saying the FAA cannot apply because no interstate commerce was involved in the dispute.

Weis, a Minnesota company with offices in four states, was originally hired to build a Wal-Mart in Lockport, Ill. Weis in turn hired Bright to do concrete work for $2.93 million, and later, underground utilities work for $679,567. Neither party alleged fraud or misrepresentation in those contracts. For reasons the opinion does not discuss, Bright alleged that Weis owed it $765,701 on those two contracts, which Weis denied. Bright sued and Weis filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, or alternatively, to stay and compel arbitration, under the Federal Arbitration Act. Before that motion could be heard, Bright filed an amended complaint seeking to enforce a mechanic’s lien against Wal-Mart for the money. The trial court later denied the motion from Weis and this appeal followed.

In its appeal, Weis argued that section 2 of the FAA compels arbitration because the Illinois Supreme Court has found that the FAA mandates judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements “in any ... contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” Bright disagreed for two reasons. It argued that the FAA does not apply because no interstate commerce was involved in this transaction. And even if it does, Bright said, the clause in question violates the Illinois Building and Construction Contract Act.

The Third started with the issue of whether the contract between Weis and Bright was interstate commerce. The U.S. Supreme Court has found that the FAA preempts state laws hostile to arbitration and is intended to exercise power over interstate commerce to the fullest, the court noted. To interpret this situation, it relied in part on Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.265, 278, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753, 767, 115 S. Ct. 834, 841 (1995), in which the Supreme Court overturned the Alabama Supreme Court on a motion to compel arbitration. In that case, a homeowner was suing a pest control company for inadequate work, and the pest control company argued that the FAA applied because it had a “slight nexus” with interstate commerce. While the work was contracted and performed locally, the companies were multistate and some materials came from out of state.

Despite the intention of the parties to stay local, the Supreme Court wrote, a strict reading of the facts showed that the commerce was in fact interstate. Similarly, the Third wrote, the transaction between Bright and Weis was an interstate transaction in fact. Weis is a multistate corporation and Bright bought some materials from a Wisconsin company. Thus, their contract was interstate commerce within the meaning of the FAA and that law applied.

The Third next disposed of Bright’s argument that the clause violates the Illinois Building and Construction Contract Act, because the FAA allows consideration of contract defenses “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” While this is valid, the court said, a defense based on the Act is not grounds to contest “any contract”; it is grounds only to contest construction and building contracts. It noted that the state Supreme Court had recently made a similar ruling in Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., No. 106511 (Il April 15, 2010). Finally, the Third rejected a forum non conveniens defense, saying this is not a general contract defense but a procedural mechanism. Thus, a two-judge majority reversed the trial court and remanded the case with orders to stay and compel arbitration. The dissenter, Justice McDade, disagreed that the contract between Bright and Weis was a transaction involving interstate commerce, and thus argued that the FAA does not apply to this case. “Nothing beyond ‘the multistate nature of one of the parties’ (slip order at 8) demonstrates that the transaction ‘in fact’ involved interstate commerce.”

Continue reading " Federal Arbitration Act Controls Dispute Between Construction Companies, Third District Finds " »

Our Chicago non-compete agreement attorneys have defended high level executives in covenant not to compete and trade secret lawsuits. A case in which our firm defended a former Motorola executive was covered in Crain's Chicago business. You can view that article by clicking here.

DiTommaso-Lubin handles litigation over non-compete clauses for individuals and businesses of all sizes, including small or closely held businesses for whom competition from an ex-employee can be a serious threat. Our Chicago business lawyers have substantial experience in restrictive covenant and breach of contract cases, and we are proud of our record of strong results.

DiTommas-Lubin a Chicago business law firm represent both plaintiffs and defendants in such cases, and can also help stop litigation before it starts by reviewing contracts to look for covenants and clauses that could create problems later. Based in Oakbrook Terrace and downtown Chicago, our Schaumburg noncompete clause lawyers take cases from Naperville, Keniworth, Aurora, Lake Forest, and many other cities throughout Illinois, as well as in Indiana, Wisconsin and the entire United States. To learn more or set up a free consultation, please contact us through the Internet or call toll-free at 1-877-990-4990 today.

Our Chicago automobile fraud attorneys focus on bringing suit for auto-fraud claims. We recently settled a suit involving purchase of $9,000 used car that was in reality 3 different cars welded together for $100,000. Our fees come from the recovery and we only get paid if we win or settle your case. We have has similar large six figure or near six figure settlements for clients who purchased certified used cars that in fact were rebuilt wrecks.

If you believe you purchased a motorcycle, car, rv or other product that is a lemon, have been a victim of auto fraud, auto dealer fraud, auto repair fraud or have been deceived into buying a flood car, rebuilt wreck or salvage vechicle DiTommaso-Lubin may be able to help rectify the problem. We or experienced co-counsel are prepared to file suit in the right case in the Chicago area or anywhere in the country. For a free consultation on your rights as an employee, contact us today.

Our Auto Dealer Fraud, Auto Repair Fraud Auto Fraud, RV Fraud, Motorcycle Fraud and Boat Fraud private law firm and our affliated co-counsel handle individual and class action consumer rights, lemon law, and autofraud lawsuits that government agencies and public interest law firms may decide not pursue. Class action lawsuits our law firm has been involved in or spear-headed have led to substantial awards totalling over a million dollars to organizations including the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Consumer Law Center, and local law school consumer programs. DiTommaso-Lubin is proud of our achievements in assisting national and local consumer rights organizations obtain the funds needed to ensure that consumers are protected and informed of their rights. By standing up to employee and consumer fraud and rip-offs, and in the right case filing employee or consumer protection lawsuits and class-actions you too can help ensure that consumers' rights are protected from unscrupulous, illegal or dishonest practices.

Our Wilmette, and Evanston consumer law, auto fraud and lemon law lawyers and attorneys provide assistance in car, RV and automobile and consumer fraud and consumer rights cases including in Illinois and throughout the country. You can click here to see a description of the some of the many individual and class-action consumer cases we have handled. A video of our lawsuit which helped ensure more fan friendly security at Wrigley Field can be found here. You can contact one of our Chicago area consumer rights, predatory lending or consumer protection lawyers who can assist in auto dealer fraud, auto repair fraud, lemon law, auto fraud, RV fraud, wage claim, lemon law, unfair debt collection, junk fax, prerecorded telephone solicitations, and other consumer fraud or consumer class action cases by filling out the contact form at the side of this blog or by clicking here.

Our Chicago lemon law attorneys focus on bringing suit for auto-fraud claims. We recently settled a suit involving purchase of $9,000 used car that was in reality 3 different cars welded together for $100,000. Our fees come from the recovery and we only get paid if we win or settle your case. We have has similar large six figure or near six figure settlements for clients who purchased certified used cars that in fact were rebuilt wrecks.

If you believe you purchased a motorcycle, car, rv or other product that is a lemon, have been a victim of auto fraud, auto dealer fraud, auto repair fraud or have been deceived into buying a flood car, rebuilt wreck or salvage vechicle DiTommaso-Lubin may be able to help rectify the problem. We or experienced co-counsel are prepared to file suit in the right case in the Chicago area or anywhere in the country. For a free consultation on your rights as an employee, contact us today.

Our Auto Dealer Fraud, Auto Repair Fraud Auto Fraud, RV Fraud, Motorcycle Fraud and Boat Fraud private law firm and our affliated co-counsel handle individual and class action consumer rights, lemon law, and autofraud lawsuits that government agencies and public interest law firms may decide not pursue. Class action lawsuits our law firm has been involved in or spear-headed have led to substantial awards totalling over a million dollars to organizations including the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Consumer Law Center, and local law school consumer programs. DiTommaso-Lubin is proud of our achievements in assisting national and local consumer rights organizations obtain the funds needed to ensure that consumers are protected and informed of their rights. By standing up to employee and consumer fraud and rip-offs, and in the right case filing employee or consumer protection lawsuits and class-actions you too can help ensure that consumers' rights are protected from unscrupulous, illegal or dishonest practices.

Our Naperville, Hinsdale and Waukegan consumer law, auto fraud and lemon law lawyers and attorneys provide assistance in car, RV and automobile and consumer fraud and consumer rights cases including in Illinois and throughout the country. You can click here to see a description of the some of the many individual and class-action consumer cases we have handled. A video of our lawsuit which helped ensure more fan friendly security at Wrigley Field can be found here. You can contact one of our Chicago area consumer rights, predatory lending or consumer protection lawyers who can assist in auto dealer fraud, auto repair fraud, lemon law, auto fraud, RV fraud, wage claim, lemon law, unfair debt collection, junk fax, prerecorded telephone solicitations, and other consumer fraud or consumer class action cases by filling out the contact form at the side of this blog or by clicking here.

A thoughtful opinion piece appeared in the LA Times on the upcoming oral argument before the Supreme Court in the case which will decide if corporations can take away consumers' rights to file class actions through take it or leave it form contracts.

The opinion piece which appeared in the LA Times states in part:

"The marketplace is fairer for consumers and workers because there's a deterrent out there," said Deepak Gupta, an attorney for the advocacy group Public Citizen who will argue on consumers' behalf before the Supreme Court on Tuesday.

"Companies are afraid of class actions," he said. "This helps keep them honest."

The case is AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion. The basic question before the court is whether companies can bar class actions in the fine print of their take-it-or-leave-it contracts with customers and employees.

High courts in California and elsewhere have ruled that class-action bans are unconscionable and contrary to public policy.

You can read the full piece by clicking here.

Our Hinsdale, Illinois consumer rights private law firm handles individual and class action predatory lending, unfair debt collection, lemon law and other consumer fraud cases that government agencies and public interest law firms such as the Illinois Attorney General may not pursue. Class action lawsuits our law firm has been involved in or spear-headed have led to substantial awards totalling over a million dollars to organizations including the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Consumer Law Center, and local law school consumer programs. The Chicago consumer lawyers at DiTommaso-Lubin are proud of our achievements in assisting national and local consumer rights organizations obtain the funds needed to ensure that consumers are protected and informed of their rights. By standing up to consumer fraud and consumer rip-offs, and in the right case filing consumer protection lawsuits and class-actions you too can help ensure that other consumers' rights are protected from consumer rip-offs and unscrupulous or dishonest practices.

Our Waukegan, Joliet, and Elmhurst consumer attorneys provide assistance in fair debt collection, consumer fraud and consumer rights cases including in Illinois and throughout the country. You can click here to see a description of the some of the many individual and class-action consumer cases our Chicago consumer lawyers have handled. A video of our lawsuit which helped ensure more fan friendly security at Wrigley Field can be found here. You can contact one of our Wilmette consumer protection attorneys who can assist in consumer fraud, consumer rip-off, lemon law, unfair debt collection, predatory lending, wage claims, unpaid overtime and other consumer, or consumer class action cases by filling out the contact form at the side of this blog or by clicking here.

Our Illinois consumer protection attorneys were pleased to see a recent victory in an Illinois appeals court for consumers concerned about the effects of mandatory binding arbitration. In Artisan Design Build, Inc. v. Bilstrom, No. 2-08-0855 (Ill. 2nd Sept. 22, 2009), David and Jody Bilstrom of Hinsdale, Ill., hired Artisan Design Build of Wisconsin to remodel their home. Their contract provided, among other things, an arbitration clause saying disputes “shall be subject to and decided by mediation or arbitration.” The repairs required eight changes to the original contract, significantly increasing the overall price of the work. The Bilstroms paid the first six bills, but refused to pay the seventh despite multiple requests. On Sept. 20, 2006, they locked Artisan out of the project and told it they had hired someone else to finish the job. Artisan claimed they owed $208,695.69.

In April of 2008, Artisan sued the Bilstroms to foreclose its mechanic’s lien; for breach of contract; and for unjust enrichment. The Bilstroms filed a motion to dismiss, claiming Artisan had violated the Illinois Home Repair and Remodeling Act by failing to finish its work within the contracted time; failing to carry insurance; and failing to provide them with a consumer rights pamphlet. The parties continued the case several times while they tried without success to reach a settlement. When that proved fruitless, Artisan filed a complaint with the American Arbitration Association. The Bilstroms moved to stay the arbitration, saying Artisan had voided that part of the contract by suing first, and by violating the Home Repair and Remodeling Act. The trial court agreed with them, prompting an amended complaint from Artisan. The trial court dismissed that and Artisan appealed, arguing that it did not violate the Act or waive the arbitration clause.

On appeal, the Second District first considered whether Artisan had violated the Act by failing to furnish a consumer rights pamphlet. The Bilstroms had argued that the Act’s language makes any violation an unlawful act that nullifies the contract. Artisan countered that the Act does not require courts to dismiss an otherwise valid claim just because a contractor fails to provide the pamphlet. The appeals court agreed, finding that the plain language of the Act provides no remedy other than a Consumer Fraud Act lawsuit. Furthermore, the court wrote, the legislature could not possibly have intended to allow consumers to void contracts for failure to provide the pamphlet, because allowing this would allow consumers to essentially steal from contractors. Thus, the appeals court found that the trial court was wrong to dismiss Artisan’s amended complaint.

Artisan had less luck on the question of whether it had waived its right to arbitration by filing a lawsuit first. Section 15.1 of the Act also requires contractors to advise clients of binding arbitration and waiver of jury trial clauses, which consumers should be able to reject or accept.

Failure to advise, or to obtain acceptance, explicitly voids the clause. Artisan clearly failed to do so in this case, the Second District wrote, because there are no signatures or “accept” or “reject” notations in the appropriate place on the contract. This argument does not reach the issue of whether Artisan waived its right to binding arbitration, the court said, but it can affirm on any grounds in the record. It did affirm the trial court’s decision on the arbitration clause, and remanded the case for further proceedings on Artisan’s amended complaint.

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