Breach of Contract

Illinois Plaintiffs Can Recover Under Promissory Estoppel, Illinois Supreme Court Rules

October 26, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Promissory estoppel is an affirmative cause of action in Illinois, the Illinois Supreme Court decided April 2. Newton Tractor Sales v. Kubota Tractor Corporation, Ill. Sup. Co. No. 106798, (April 2, 2009). In this Illinois business lawsuit, the court allowed plaintiff Newton Tractor Sales to continue its lawsuit against defendants Kubota Tractor Corporation and Michael Jacobson for allegedly reneging on a promise to make Newton an authorized dealer of Kubota farm equipment.

Newton, a farm equipment dealership in Fayette County, purchased competitor Vandalia Tractor & Equipment (VTE) in July of 2003. As a condition of that sale, the contract specified that the deal could be canceled if Newton did not get permission to sell several makes of equipment, including Kubota. Kubota asked Newton to apply to their local representative, defendant Michael Jacobson. Jacobson required VTE to first cancel its relationship with Kubota, which it agreed to do only if it was assured that Newton would be authorized to sell Kubota products. Jacobson said it would, and both dealerships relied on that statement in signing those papers. Newton further relied on it when it began selling and servicing Kubota products.’

Unfortunately, Kubota’s corporate office denied Newton’s application, as well as a later appeal for reconsideration. Newton sued Kubota for promissory estoppel, common-law fraud and negligent misrepresentation. A Fayette County court granted Kubota summary judgment on all three counts, and after an appeal, the appellate court affirmed that judgment. On the promissory estoppel count, both courts found that Illinois appellate decisions said promissory estoppel is not a recognized cause of action in Illinois. Newton appealed as to the promissory estoppel claim to the Illinois Supreme Court.

Appeals Court Upholds Injunction Enforcing Salesman’s Covenant Not to Compete

October 16, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

A recent decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal caught the eyes of our Illinois non-compete agreement attorneys because it created a split with other Courts of Appeal that only the Illinois Supreme Court can resolve. In September, the Fourth ruled that a trial court was correct to grant a preliminary injunction to a company suing over a covenant not to compete. Sunbelt Rentals Inc. v. Neil N. Ehlers III and Midwest Aerials & Equipment, Inc., No. 4-09-0290 (Ill. 4th Sept. 23, 2009). Sunbelt sued former sales employee Neil Ehlers and his new employer, Midwest, alleging Ehlers violated restrictive covenants when he took the new job, and Midwest tortiously interfered with the agreement when it hired him.

Sunbelt sells and rents industrial equipment for business and individual use. Ehlers was a salesman there responsible for maintaining a customer base and relationships. When he took the job in 2003, he signed a contract agreeing that he would not, for a year after leaving the job, provide services or solicit business from customers that had used Sunbelt in the preceding 12 months, or customers with whom he had had “contact, responsibility or access to confidential information.” It also forbade him from joining or starting a business “substantially similar” to Sunbelt’s. Both clauses were restricted to designated geographic areas. The contract specifically said Sunbelt would be entitled to an injunction against any breach or threatened breach of the restrictive covenants.

Ehlers quit at Sunbelt in January of 2009 to join Midwest, which rents and sells aerial platforms to construction and industry. Four days after Ehlers left, Sunbelt sent him and Midwest a “cease and desist” letter alleging that Ehlers had breached his agreement. The next month, Sunbelt sued for breach of the covenant and tortuous interference and asked for a preliminary injunction to keep Ehlers from working for Midwest. Finding that the time and geographic scope of the agreement was reasonable, the trial court granted the injunction. Ehlers and Midwest appealed, arguing that Sunbelt had not shown that it had a legitimate business interest test first set forth in Nationwide Advertising Service, Inc. v. Kolar, 28 Ill. App. 3d 671, 673, 329 N.E.2d 300, 301-02 (1975), and thus failed to follow precedent.

The Fourth District disagreed. It started by examining the question of whether the “legitimate business interests” test was valid under Illinois Supreme Court precedent, particularly the recent Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 225 Ill. 2d 52, 866 N.E.2d 85 (2006). Although every Illinois appellate court has embraced the test, the Fourth District wrote, its analysis was flawed and the Illinois Supreme Court had never embraced it. In fact, in Mohanty and several other decisions, that court never actually used the test. Instead, the Fourth said, precedent says the validity of a covenant not to compete should be based only on time and territory restrictions in the contract.

The court next took up the argument by Ehlers that the restrictive covenant should be declared invalid because it is overly broad. Ehlers argued that the restrictions were so broad that he is precluded from working for any competitor in a Midwestern city, causing him undue hardship. The court interpreted the language of the contract differently; it said the restriction meant Ehlers could not work for a competitor within 50 miles of a branch of Sunbelt where Ehlers had worked, for a year after leaving. This is consistent with previous time-and-territory decisions on restrictive covenants, the court said. Thus, the contract was valid, meaning that the trial court’s decision to issue an injunction was not unreasonable.

First District Strikes Verdict Against Partners But Leaves Firm Liable in Partnership Dispute

August 9, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

In a partnership dispute and breach of fiduciary duty claim, the First District Court of Appeal has ruled that an attorney may sue his former firm, but not his former partners. In Kehoe v. Harrold, Wildman, Allen & Dixon, No. 1-07-0435 (Ill. 1st Dec. 23, 2008), Robert Kehoe, a former partner in the firm, sued after partners voted to change him from equity partner to nonequity partner. That is, they voted to end his part ownership of the firm and make him a salaried employee.

In 1995, after Kehoe had been a partner in Harrold Wildman for sixteen years, the firm renegotiated its financing with its bank, a deal that required every equity partner to execute a personal guaranty acceptable to the bank. Kehoe objected to the proposed guaranty and was unable to find a compromise, despite offers to draft his own version. The bank allowed the firm to take out its loan anyway. Later, the firm amended its loan agreement with the bank to eliminate the guaranty requirement but specify that partners without a guaranty are personally liable for the full amount of the debt. A few months later, partner Eisel approached Kehoe about his lack of a guaranty, and Kehoe replied that the amendment made it unnecessary.

The firm’s management committee then met and adopted a resolution allowing a two-thirds vote of partners to change the status of any partner who failed to execute a guaranty. Kehoe was present and objected, and rebuffed later advice to sign the guaranty. The partners later voted to remove his equity status per the resolution. Over the next two days, Kehoe moved his clients to a law firm of his own; he also requested his equity be paid out and was denied. He sued individual partners, claiming they breached their fiduciary duty by advocating the resolution, and the firm as a whole for breaching their obligation to pay his equity share.

Continued Employment for a Short Time Is Not Adequate Consideration for Post-Employment Restrictive Covenant, Appeals Court Decides

July 29, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

DiTommaso Lubin’s Illinois breach of contract litigation attorneys were pleased to see a split Illinois Third District Court of Appeal decision clarifying the circumstances under which a post-employment restrictive covenant is valid. The decision came in Brown & Brown v. Patrick Mudron, No. 03-CH-1363 (Ill. 3rd March 11, 2008), in which a Florida insurance company sued a former employee for breaching a restrictive covenant in her employment agreement.

Diane Gunderson, the employee, worked for a Joilet, Ill. company that was taken over by Brown & Brown. Brown asked Gunderson to sign a new employment agreement with them, and in fact, fired an employee who refused to do so. The agreement said Gunderson’s employment could be terminated any time for any reason and prohibited her from soliciting or servicing any of Brown’s employees for two years after ending her employment with the company. She signed the agreement, but resigned seven months later and went to work for a competitor. Brown sued, alleging that Gunderson had breached the restrictive covenant at her new job. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Gunderson because it couldn’t find any evidence that she had breached the covenant, and Brown appealed.

The majority started by disposing of a “choice of law” provision in the contract requiring all disputes to be resolved in Brown’s home state of Florida. Illinois law applies anyway, the court wrote, because Illinois has a greater interest in the case and moving it to Florida would be against Illinois public policy interests. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Pioneer Life Insurance Co. of Illinois , 209 Ill. App. 3d (1990).

Appeals Court Dismisses Chiropractor’s Class Action Lawsuit Against Insurer for Alleged Underpayment and Breach of Contract

June 22, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

In a proposed class-action insurance fraud lawsuit, the Illinois Third District Court of Appeal has ruled that a chiropractor may not sue a workers’ compensation insurer. In Martis v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company, No. 3-08-0004 (Ill. 3rd March 27, 2009), chiropractor Richard Martis sued Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company after Grinnell’s billing employees incorrectly paid Martis too little for treating an injured worker.

In February of 2006, Martis began treating an employee of Water Management Corp. of Illinois who had been injured on the job. He was to be paid by Water Management’s workers’ compensation policy, issued by Grinnell. When he submitted his bills to Grinnell, the insurer’s outside billing firm applied PPO discounts to those bills even though Martis did not have a PPO agreement with Grinnell. Thus, Grinnell underpaid Martis. He responded with a proposed class-action lawsuit encompassing all Illinois health care providers who had been underpaid by Grinnell in the same way, through incorrect PPO discounts.

The complaint by Martis alleged conspiracy, unjust enrichment, breach of contract and violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The trial court granted Grinnell’s motion to dismiss the conspiracy and unjust enrichment counts. However, it certified the class of health-care providers as to the breach of contract claim. Grinnell appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim and the class certification to the Third District.

Company Must Have Trial on Whether It Breached Golden Parachute Contract With Termination of CEO, Appeals Court Rules

June 17, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

In a breach of contract and Illinois Wage Payment Act case, the First District Court of Appeal has ruled that a company and its former executive must have a trial to determine whether it breached the executive’s employment contract. Covinsky v. Hannah Marine Corporation, No. 1-08-0695 (Ill. 1st. Feb. 17, 2009). At issue in the case is a severance clause in Jeffrey Covinsky’s employment contract with Hannah Marine Corp., for which he served as president, CEO and CFO from 1998 to 2006.

Covinsky’s contract specified that he was entitled to a “golden parachute” of 18 months’ salary if there is “…a change in the present ownership which results in the termination of the Employee’s employment…” This agreement was executed in 2004, when Hannah Marine was jointly owned by three people, including Donald Hannah. Hannah sued the other shareholders in 2005 for financial mismanagement, and ended up buying out the other two shareholders. Covinsky told Hannah in 2005 that he assumed Hannah would want to let him go after the change; in 2006, Covinsky told Hannah he did not intend to resign and wanted to finish the contract, which was set to expire in 2006.

A month later, when the takeover was final, Hannah told Covinsky that he was terminated and that Hannah “accepted” Covinsky’s resignation. Covinsky protested that he never resigned, but was not paid the severance. He sued Hannah Marine and Donald Hannah for breach of the employment contract and violating the Illinois Wage Payment Act. Hannah countersued Covinsky for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted summary judgment to Covinsky on both counts as to Hannah Marine, but dismissed the Wage Act claim against Hannah personally. It also dismissed the company’s counterclaim. Both sides appealed, resulting in the consolidated instant appeal.

Material Breach of Contract Invalidates Covenant Not to Compete, Illinois First District Rules

May 27, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Our firm’s Illinois non-compete agreement litigation lawyers were pleased to note a ruling by the First District Court of Appeal that a doctor may not bring a lawsuit against his former business partner for breaching a non-compete agreement. Bisla v. Parvaiz, No. 1-07-1647 (Ill. 1st., Feb. 21, 2008), arose out of a soured employment arrangement between Dr. Virenda Bisla and Dr. Akhtar Parvaiz, both doctors in Chicago. Bisla hired Parvaiz as an employee in 1998, under an agreement specifying that Parvaiz would have the opportunity to become a 50% partner in Bisla’s medical company after three years, if he met certain criteria. It also specified that Bisla would provide medical insurance for Parvaiz and his family, and malpractice insurance in Indiana for Parvaiz.

Neither type of insurance was provided to Parvaiz, according to the First District. And when the three years in the agreement had passed, Bisla did not offer Parvaiz a 50% share of the company, as agreed. Instead, he offered Parvaiz a 45% share, spread over five years, and presented him with a new employment contract and stock purchase agreement. Bisla told Parvaiz that it was in his best interests to sign these papers, but Parvaiz refused because they did not comply with the original employment agreement. He continued working for Bisla’s company for the next five years, but believed that they were using an oral contract since the first employment contract had expired.

The next year, Bisla’s company was temporarily dissolved by the State of Illinois for nonpayment of a filing fee. Bisla did not tell Parvaiz about the dissolution, which automatically terminated their employment agreement. However, in 2005, Parvaiz began working for a competing medical company. When Bisla found out, he demanded a share of the proceeds, then fired Parvaiz and eventually brought a lawsuit seeking to stop him from competing. Parvaiz countered that he believed the agreement was over. The trial court agreed, finding that their agreement was invalid because the employment agreement was breached by both the temporary dissolution and Bisla’s refusal to make Parvaiz a partner. It denied the injunction Bisla sought against Parvaiz, and Bisla appealed.

GMAC ‘Unfairly’ Repossessed Vehicle Under Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, Appeals Court Decides

May 6, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

DiTommaso Lubin’s auto fraud, lemon law, and consumer fraud trial lawyers were impressed by a recent First District Court of Appeals ruling against the credit arm of General Motors for a wrongful repossession. The court said a trial court was correct to rule that General Motors Acceptance Corporation acted unfairly when it repossessed a truck in violation of its agreement with the owner. In Demitro v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, No. 1-06-3417 (Ill. 1st. Feb. 9, 2009), the appeals court declined to overturn a Cook County trial court ruling that GMAC violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.

Demitro purchased a Chevrolet Suburban in 2002 and had no trouble making payments until 2003, when he underwent surgery and went on disability in May of 2003. His payment checks for June and July of that year bounced, and in August, he spoke with a GMAC representative who told him so. The next day, Demitro called GMAC and authorized about one month’s payment to be deducted from his checking account. The GMAC representative then called a repossession agency that had already been authorized to take Demitro’s truck and put the repossession on hold. The representative sent Demitro a letter giving him seven days to make the back payments and keep his account current. After that time expired, it said, GM could exercise its right to repossess the truck.

On the very next day, Demitro awoke to discover that his truck had been repossessed. The GMAC representative was notified. He acknowledged that the repossession was a mistake and a violation of the seven-day extension in the letter, but nonetheless recommended to management that they keep the truck. They did, and informed Demitro that he was now liable for repossession charges of $39,695.04 as well as the outstanding balance on his account. Unable to get to the bank, Demitro informed GMAC that his telephone payment would bounce. GMAC later withdrew that payment from his account after he had added more money, but failed to credit him for the payment.

Small Entrepreneurs Turn to Litigation After Falling Victim to Alleged ‘Franchise Fraud’

April 22, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

DiTommaso Lubin has an active practice in franchise litigation, especially representing franchisee in disputes with franchisors they believe have not been completely honest. Because we work in this area, our Chicago franchise litigation attorneys were pleased to see a cover story on just that situation in the March/April 2009 issue of Mother Jones magazine. The article discusses allegations of “franchise fraud” — the practice by franchisors of cheating the franchisees they sign up by failing to disclose important information, writing onerous financial requirements into contracts and adding after-the-fact legal requirements franchisees didn’t agree to and can’t refuse without being sued.

The article focuses on the Coffee Beanery, a chain of cafes, and one Maryland couple’s experience when they started a Coffee Beanery franchise in Annapolis. At their initial meeting with the franchisor, Coffee Beanery vice president Kevin Shaw allegedly told them they could clear $125,000 a year in the right location. Not only did this allegedly violate a federal law that forbids franchisors from predicting future earnings, but it wasn’t quite true — the magazine said 40 franchises had already failed at the time. Another 60 have since died.

But a bigger problem was the expense of the equipment that the Coffee Beanery said they were contractually obligated to accept. The franchisor allegedly sent them expensive equipment that didn’t work, was unnecessary or wasn’t appropriate for their business. It also allegedly demanded that they abide by contractual obligations they didn’t remember signing up for, such as a gift card program. All of this cost tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars — and refusing would have opened them up to a lawsuit.

Appeals Court Upholds Finding Against Breach of Contract Because No Contract Existed

April 5, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

A recent Illinois appeals court ruling caught the eyes of our Naperville business litigation attorneys. On December 22, the Illinois First District Court of Appeal ruled that a trial court was correct in finding no breach of contract between an individual and an investment firm. CFC Investment v. McLean, No. 1-08-0161 (Ill. 1st Dec. 22, 2008). Defendant Daniel McLean was a real estate developer and investor doing business through a group of companies the appeals court collectively called River East. Plaintiff CFC Investments was an investor in River East.

CFC offered to sell its interest in 2001, and part owner Craig Duchossois, through phone calls and written negotiations with McLean, agreed on a price of $16.7 million. McLean wrote in a signed letter that he was “willing to arrange for the purchase of your interest in River East” and that after CFC’s written agreement, he would “commence to secure the capital.” Duchossois signed to signal his acceptance and sent it back in September of 2001. McLean then wrote a letter specifying that River East needed 90 days to complete the buyout. However, no action was taken until March of 2002, when Duchossois wrote to demand that McLean finish the deal. He received no response. In early April of 2003, River East investors sold their interests to Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company. CFC’s share of the proceeds was $2.5 million.

In 2004, CFC sued McLean for breach of contract. The trial turned partially on the issue of whether McLean had offered to buy the shares himself, as Duchossois believed, or merely find investors to do it, as McLean contended. The trial court barred evidence favorable to CFC several times, rejected a proposed jury instruction from the company and answered a question from the jury over CFC’s objections. CFC appealed of all these decisions.