Articles Posted in Business Disputes

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Summary: Law firms and professional companies are businesses too. When lawyer‑owners divert funds, freeze out a co‑owner, or weaponize firm control, a derivative suit or oppression claim can be the right tool—if you respect both corporate law and the professional‑ethics overlay.

Typical patterns we see:

  • Unilateral transfers disguised as “distributions” or “draws.” Bank statements and ACH histories are the first stop; courts expect contemporaneous paper (or pixels) to back up allegations.

  • Access choke‑points. Changing login credentials to trust accounts, practice‑management billing, or accounting software is a hallmark of a freeze‑out. Immediate injunctions can restore access and stop dissipation.

  • Mixing direct and derivative claims. A lawyer‑member’s “personal” grievance is often the company’s harm in disguise. Keep the derivative and individual lanes clean to survive motions to dismiss.

  • What to plead and prove:

  • Derivative standing (and demand/futility). Say who controls the firm, why a demand would be futile, and what records you sought before filing.

  • Statutory backbone. For LLC law practices, cite 805 ILCS 180/40‑1 (derivative actions) and the LLC Act’s fiduciary duties and information rights (15‑1, 15‑3, 15‑5). For PC/corporate forms, remember the oppression statute (12.56) and corporate records rights.

  • Remedies that actually help. Courts can impose constructive trusts on misdirected funds, order real‑time access to trust‑accounting and billing systems, and enjoin further unilateral withdrawals while the case proceeds.

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The elements required to establish a joint venture are broadly consistent across the search results. They include:

1. An express or implied agreement to carry on an enterprise (805 ILCS 206/202), (Ambuul v. Swanson, 162 Ill.App.3d 1065 (1987)), (Yokel v. Hite, 348 Ill.App.3d 703 (2004)).

2. A manifestation of intent by the parties to be associated as joint venturers (805 ILCS 206/202), (Ambuul v. Swanson, 162 Ill.App.3d 1065 (1987), (O’Brien v. Cacciatore, 227 Ill.App.3d 836 (1992)).

3. A joint interest as shown by the contribution of property, financial resources, effort, skill, or knowledge by each joint venturer (805 ILCS 206/202), (Ambuul v. Swanson, 162 Ill.App.3d 1065 (1987)), (Yokel v. Hite, 348 Ill.App.3d 703 (2004)).

4. Some degree of joint proprietorship or mutual right to exercise control over the enterprise (805 ILCS 206/202), (Ambuul v. Swanson, 162 Ill.App.3d 1065 (1987)).

5. Provision for the joint sharing of profits and losses (805 ILCS 206/202), (Ambuul v. Swanson, 162 Ill.App.3d 1065 (1987)), (O’Brien v. Cacciatore, 227 Ill.App.3d 836 (1992)).

It is important to note that all four criteria must be established or a joint venture does not exist (Fogt v. 1-800-Pack-Rat, LLC, 2017 IL App (1st) 150383 (2017)).

The obligation of a joint venturer to account to another member of the joint venture arises from the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The relationship between joint venturers, like that existing between partners, is fiduciary in character and imposes upon the participants an obligation of loyalty and good faith in their dealings with each other with respect to the enterprise (Ambuul v. Swanson, 162 Ill.App.3d 1065 (1987)). In the case of a sale of joint venture property by one joint adventurer, the other is entitled to an accounting on principal and interest profit, if any, received by the seller on the purchase money mortgage received when the joint venture property was liquidated (Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 83 Ill.App.3d 525 (1980)).

However, it’s important to note that whether or not a joint venture exists is a question for the trier of fact as they are in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses (Ambuul v. Swanson, 162 Ill.App.3d 1065 (1987)), (Thompson v. Hiter, 356 Ill.App.3d 574 (2005)), (Andrews v. Marriott Intern., Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 122731 (2016)). Continue reading ›

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In Illinois, there are several circumstances under which a partner can sue another partner (Battles v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 240 Ill.App.3d 550 (1992)), (In re Ascher, 141 B.R. 652 (1992), (Hux v. Woodcock, 130 Ill.App.3d 721 (1985)):

1. A partner can sue another for a breach of fiduciary duty, such as if a partner sells partnership property to a third party without approval from all partners (Battles v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 240 Ill.App.3d 550 (1992)), (Nussbaum v. Kennedy, 267 Ill.App.3d 325 (1994).

2. A partner or partnership can bring an action against a co-partner if the plaintiff’s claim can be decided without a full review of the partnership accounts. This means that if the issue between partners can be resolved without an accounting, one partner can sue the other. However, if such an issue requires an accounting, that is the proper remedy to seek under the Illinois Partnership Act (In re Ascher, 141 B.R. 652 (1992)).

3. The capacity to sue is determined under Illinois law, and a partnership must sue in the name of all its partners (Stotler and Co. v. Reisinger, Not Reported in F.Supp. (1987). In other words, to sue a partnership, it is necessary to sue and serve all of the partners (Gerut v. Poe, 11 F.R.D. 281 (1951)).

4. A partner may not sue individually to recover damages for injury to the partnership (Hux v. Woodcock, 130 Ill.App.3d 721 (1985)), (Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186 (1996)). The lawsuit must be filed on behalf of the partnership and not the individual partner.

5. In cases involving a limited partnership, a limited partner can sue the general partners for alleged breaches of fiduciary and contractual duties arising under a written limited partnership agreement (Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Dickman, 167 Ill.App.3d 113 (1988)). However, limited partners do not have a cause of action for damages to their interest in a limited partnership as long as the partnership exists and has not been dissolved or liquidated (766347 Ontario Ltd. v. Zurich Capital Markets, Inc., 249 F.Supp.2d 974 (2003)).

6. A partner may maintain an action against a co-partner absent an accounting in certain situations, including upon claims involving express personal contracts between the partners, and also upon claims involving the failure to comply with an agreement constituting a condition precedent to the formation of a partnership (Hux v. Woodcock, 130 Ill.App.3d 721 (1985)).

7. Illinois courts may imply rights of action from Illinois statutes under certain circumstances. These include instances where the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the Illinois legislature enacted the statute; implication of the right is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; the plaintiff’s claimed injury is one which the Illinois legislature designed the statute to prevent; and a private right of action is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the statute (Bane v. Ferguson, 707 F.Supp. 988 (1989)). Continue reading ›

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Extensive Experience in Partnership, LLC Member, and Shareholder Disputes

At DiTommaso Lubin, we understand the complexities of business disputes in closely held companies. Whether you are facing a partnership disagreement, LLC member conflict, or shareholder dispute, our experienced attorneys are here to provide you with the guidance and representation you need to protect your interests.

Personalized Attention for Closely Held Companies

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In Illinois, the elements of tortious interference with prospective business relationships are as follows:

1) A reasonable expectation of the plaintiff entering into a valid business relationship.
2) The defendant’s knowledge of this expectancy.
3) The defendant’s intentional and unjustifiable interference, causing a breach or termination of the expectancy.
4) The plaintiff suffering damage as a result of the defendant’s interference.

Several notable cases have detailed and applied these principles. In Titan Intern., Inc. v. Becker, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants interfered with their prospective business relations with various entities, causing economic harm. In Force Partners, LLC v. KSA Lighting & Controls, Inc., it was highlighted that commercial competitors can interfere with each other’s prospective business relationships as long as the intent is not solely motivated by malice or ill will. Doctor’s Data, Inc. v. Barrett clarified that a reasonable expectancy requires more than the mere hope of a business relationship – a plaintiff must identify a reasonable business expectancy with a specific third party. In Labor Ready, Inc. v. Williams Staffing, LLC, it was established that a company can state a claim against a competitor for tortious interference by alleging that the competitor purposely interfered with prospective business relations through various means, causing the company to lose future business. Lastly, in Giant Screen Sports LLC v. Sky High Entertainment, it was emphasized that a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s interference prevented the expectancy from being fulfilled.

Additional case law includes Buckley v. Peak6 Investments, LP, which explained that even when an employer’s statement is deemed privileged from a tortious interference claim, the plaintiff can still prevail by showing that the defendant acted with malice. This can be achieved by showing that the defendant made unjustified statements, excessively published statements, or made statements in conflict with the interest which gave rise to the privilege. Furthermore, the terms “tortious interference with prospective economic advantage”, “business expectancy”, and “business relations” are used interchangeably under Illinois law, as noted in Allstate Insurance Company v. Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. Finally, Butler v. Holstein Association, USA, Inc. clarified that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant purposefully interfered, preventing the plaintiff’s legitimate expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship. These cases collectively provide a comprehensive view of tortious interference with prospective business relations under Illinois law.

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Illinois has two rules that can be used to dismiss cases which allows for more flexibility in defending some actions then in federal court where there is only one means to seek dismissal of an action.

A Section 2-615 motion to dismiss and a Section 2-619 motion to dismiss under Illinois law are two distinct legal tools, each serving specific purposes.

A Section 2-615 motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint by challenging whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. This motion is concerned with defects appearing on the face of the complaint and does not rely on matters outside the complaint. It admits all well-pleaded facts and attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint [5], [7], [12]. The court, in ruling on a 2-615 motion, considers only the allegations in the pleadings.

On the other hand, a Section 2-619 motion to dismiss acknowledges the legal sufficiency of the complaint but asserts that there are certain external defects or defenses that defeat the claims. It admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim but asserts ‘affirmative matter’ outside of the pleading that defeats the claim. This motion is sometimes referred to as a ‘Yes, but’ motion because it essentially says, ‘Yes, the complaint was legally sufficient, but an affirmative matter exists that defeats the claim’.

The two types of motions can be combined under Section 2-619.1, but it is important to maintain procedural distinctions between them. Each part of a combined motion should be limited to and specify that it is made under one of Sections 2-615, 2-619, or 2-1005, and should clearly show the points or grounds relied upon under the Section upon which it is based.

In dealing with these motions, the court interprets all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Furthermore, dismissals pursuant to sections 2-615, 2-619, and 2-619.1 are reviewed de novo. Continue reading ›

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In Illinois, tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with prospective business relations are two distinct torts with different pleading requirements.

To establish a case for tortious interference with contract, the plaintiff must show the following [7]:
1) Existence of a valid and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and another party
2) The defendant’s awareness of this contractual relationship
3) The defendant intentionally and unjustifiably induced a breach of the contract, which results in a subsequent breach by the other contracting party
4) The plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach. Continue reading ›

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Diversity of citizenship cannot be asserted merely on information and belief when it comes to the members of a Limited Liability Company (LLC). For diversity jurisdiction purposes, the citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenship of each of its members. A simple declaration of diversity of citizenship is not enough. The court needs to understand the identity and citizenship of each member. In case any member is an unincorporated association, such as an LLC or partnership, the citizenship must be traced through all layers of ownership to ensure no member shares a common citizenship with the opposing party.

Merely claiming that all members are citizens of a certain state or that no members are citizens of a certain state is insufficient. It is also not enough to claim that an LLC was organized under a specific state’s laws, maintains its principal place of business in a certain state, or that an LLC has a parent corporation. The citizenship of an LLC must be proven by underlying facts, not merely alleged on information and belief. If the members of an LLC have members, the citizenship of all those members must also be set forth. Continue reading ›

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In 2023, there were several significant developments in Illinois civil case law.

The case of “PPP-SCH Inc. v. SVAP Hoffman Plaza, L.P.” clarified that a voluntary dismissal disposing of all remaining claims in a case makes appealable those orders preceding the voluntary dismissal that were “final in nature”. However, this ruling was later modified and superseded on denial of rehearing by the same case.

In “Disability Services of Illinois v. Department of Human Services”, the court allowed the transfer and consolidation of a civil rights case and an administrative review case for the sake of convenience and efficiency due to the similarity of legal and factual issues in both cases.

“Wilson v. Estate of Burge” highlighted that claims under Illinois law for intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy were subject to a one-year statute of limitations under the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. Furthermore, the court found that a suspect who was wrongfully convicted based on a confession procured by torture, sufficiently pleaded that an assistant state’s attorney engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct, as required to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The “City of Chicago v. SBR Revocable Living Trust” case was notable for the dismissal of an appeal as moot due to a subsequent order.

Additionally, the court’s interpretation of jurisdiction in “In re K.F.” gave clarity on appeals from final judgments in civil cases and cases arising under the Juvenile Court Act. In “Hernandez v. Illinois Institute of Technology”, the court provided guidance on how to apply Illinois law to unprecedented circumstances like the disruption of traditional university operations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Finally, “Doe v. Burke Wise Morrissey & Kaveny, LLC” resulted in the reversal of an appellate court judgment and affirmation of a circuit court judgment, demonstrating the Supreme Court’s role in shaping Illinois civil case law. Continue reading ›

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Recent Illinois law regarding the defense of officers and directors of corporations and LLCs encompasses several key factors:

1. Fiduciary Duties: Officers and directors of corporations and LLCs are fiduciaries, holding duties of good faith, loyalty, and honesty to the corporation. They are not permitted to enhance their personal interests at the expense of the corporation’s interests, and should not be in a position where their own individual interests might interfere with their duties to the corporation.

2. Business Judgment Rule: Under the business judgment rule, a presumption exists that corporate decisions made by an officer or director are made on an informed basis and with an honest belief that the action was in the corporation’s best interests. This presumption can be rebutted by allegations that a director acted fraudulently, illegally, or without sufficient information to make an independent business decision [3].

3. Contractual Obligations: Illinois law provides officers of a corporation with a qualified privilege against liability for tortious interference with a contract with the corporation. To overcome this privilege, the plaintiff must assert and plead that the corporate officers acted with malice and without justification.

4. Piercing the Corporate Veil: Generally, corporate officers and directors are not personally liable for the corporation’s actions, as corporations are considered distinct legal entities separate from their officers, shareholders, and directors. However, under certain circumstances, the corporate veil can be pierced to hold officers and directors personally responsible, such as when there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, or adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction fraud or promote injustice.

5. Specifics for LLCs: In the context of LLCs, allegations that officers and directors disguised equity contributions as loans, enabling the company to make interest payments to insiders during a time when the company was either insolvent or undercapitalized, could be sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Illinois law.

These principles form the foundation of a defense for corporate officers and directors in Illinois. Continue reading ›

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