Articles Posted in Class-Action

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Preemption is familiar battleground for class-action litigants prosecuting or defending product mislabeling claims concerning the labels of federally regulated products. Plaintiffs asserting state law mislabeling claims must contend with the fact that federal laws often expressly preempt state law claims out of a desire to prevent states from imposing requirements different from or stricter than those found in federal statutes or regulations.

Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the issue of federal preemption in a case involving the labeling of poultry products. In the case of Cohen v. ConAgra Brands, the plaintiff filed a putative class-action lawsuit alleging that that ConAgra’s “natural” and “preservative-free” claims on its frozen chicken product labels and website advertising were false and misleading under California state law.

In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that ConAgra had been using synthetic ingredients in its products, despite claims to the contrary on its labels and website. This practice, the complaint alleged, ran afoul of California state law. A federal district court judge dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by the Poultry Products Inspection Act, which preempts state law claims challenging the Department of Agriculture’s application of federal labeling standards for poultry products. Specifically, the court held that the DOA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service had approved the very statements being challenged on ConAgra’s poultry labels and advertising. The plaintiff appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with ConAgra that if the “evidence shows that ConAgra’s label was approved by [the Food Safety and Inspection Service], then plaintiff’s claims are preempted.” However, the Court noted that the record lacked any evidence regarding whether the ConAgra label at issue was actually reviewed and approved by the Food Safety and Inspection Service. Consequently, it remanded the claim for further development of the record on this point. Continue reading ›

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Recently the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a much-anticipated decision in Cothron v. White Castle, concerning whether claims asserted under Sections 15(b) and 15(d) of the Illinois Biometric Information Protection Act (“BIPA”) accrue only once upon the initial collection or disclosure of biometric information or whether a new claim accrues each time biometric information is collected or disclosed. In lieu of answering the question, however, the Seventh Circuit punted the question to the Illinois Supreme Court at the plaintiff’s request.

The plaintiff, a manager at a White Castle restaurant, alleged that the restaurant chain introduced a system that required employees to scan their fingerprints to access pay stubs and work computers. The plaintiff alleged that each scan is sent to a third-party vendor that authenticates it and gives the employee access to the restaurant’s computer system. The plaintiff alleged that based on its use of that system, White Castle violated Sections 15(b) and 15(d) of the BIPA.

Under Section 15(b), a private entity may not “collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain” a person’s biometric data without first providing notice to and receiving consent from the person. Under Section 15(d), a private entity may not “disclose, redisclose, or otherwise disseminate” biometric data without consent of the owner of the biometric data. The plaintiff brought suit not only individually but on behalf of a class of other White Castle employees.

White Castle defended against the lawsuit by seeking judgment on the pleadings. In support of its motion, the company argued that the claims were untimely since they accrued in 2008 when the plaintiff’s first fingerprint scan occurred after the BIPA came into effect. The plaintiff responded that every unauthorized collection or disclosure of biometric data constituted a separate violation of the statute, meaning a new claim accrued with each fingerprint scan. This meant, the plaintiff argued, that each scan started the clock on its own limitations period. The distinction is no small issue as the BIPA allows a successful plaintiff to recover the greater of actual damages or statutory damages of $1,000 for each negligent violation and $5,000 for each reckless or willful violation. The District Court ultimately denied White Castle’s motion but thought the issue important enough to warrant an interlocutory appeal. Continue reading ›

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Federal law allows schools to collaborate on their formulas for determining the amount of financial aid to award students, but they are not allowed to consider an applicant’s need for aid when determining whether to accept their application to become a student. A recent class-action lawsuit against 16 major U.S. universities alleges that, not only were the universities collaborating on their financial aid formulas, but that they did so in order to fix their prices, and that their actions unfairly limited the financial aid students were able to receive. The federal lawsuit also alleges that the defendants do factor an applicant’s need for aid in their admissions decisions and is therefore claiming they should not be eligible for the antitrust exemption.

Not only did this allegedly cheat undergraduate applicants out of financial aid, but if the allegations are true, they also would have made it more difficult for underprivileged candidates to gain admission to the universities.

The lawsuit is seeking a permanent injunction against the schools’ ability to collaborate on financial aid formulas, as well as damages to five former students who attended some of the schools.

But the five named plaintiffs are just the tip of the iceberg. The financial aid lawsuit currently names 16 of the biggest universities in the U.S. as defendants, including Georgetown University, Northwestern University, and Yale University. With so many schools listed as defendants in the federal financial aid lawsuit, the attorneys representing the plaintiffs think more than 170,000 undergraduate students who received at least partial financial aid from those schools over the past 18 years could be eligible to participate in the federal class-action lawsuit. Continue reading ›

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Recently, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District issued a significant decision on the question of which statute of limitations govern claims for violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”). In its opinion, the Court ruled that claims for unlawful profiting from or disclosure of biometric data, those brought under sections section 15(c) and (d) of the BIPA, are subject to a one year limitations period while claims involving violations of the notice, consent and retention requirements, those brought under sections 15(a), (b), and (e) of the BIPA, are subject to a limitations period of five years. This decision should bring much needed clarity to class-action plaintiffs and defendants alike.

The BIPA, one of the most robust privacy statutes in the country, imposes various obligations on anyone that collects, stores or uses biometric identifiers such as fingerprints, retina or iris scans, voiceprints, or face geometry from Illinois residents. Failure to comply with the BIPA’s requirements can be costly as violations of the statute entitle successful plaintiffs to statutory damages ranging from $1,000 to $5,000 for each violation (plus attorney fees). This can add up quickly as claims for violations of the BIPA are frequently brought as a class action as we have seen in recent years.

The underlying case was brought by two former drivers for Black Horse Carriers, a trucking and logistics company. The plaintiffs filed the case as a class action. In their lawsuit, the former drivers alleged that Black Horse failed to obtain consent to use drivers’ fingerprints or to institute a retention schedule. They also accused the company of unlawfully disseminating their biometric data by sharing fingerprints with a third-party vendor that processed timekeeping records for the company. Continue reading ›

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In a putative class-action lawsuit filed against Apple concerning alleged violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), the parties disputed the scope of discovery to which the plaintiffs were entitled. The plaintiffs sought to compel Apple to produce certain identifying information for Illinois residents with Apple devices containing the Photos App. The plaintiffs also issued document subpoenas to major resellers of Apple products for the personal data of individual customers. The district court ultimately denied the request to compel and quashed the subpoenas, citing concerns about how personal information would be protected given the increase in cyber attacks and hacking incidents.

The suit centers on the Photo App contained on Apple devices that displays photos stored on the devices. According to the plaintiffs, the Photo App collects biometric identifiers and biometric information, including scans of facial geometry and related biometric information, of the individuals in the photos. Apple collects these biometric identifiers, the plaintiffs allege, without first notifying the individuals in writing and obtaining their informed consent. The plaintiffs further allege Apple possessed biometric identifiers and biometric information without creating and following a written, publicly available policy with retention schedules and destruction guidelines. According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, these actions violate the BIPA. Continue reading ›

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In a class-action filed against Champion Petfoods alleging that the pet food company misrepresented the quality of its dog food and ingredients, the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Champion. In doing so, the Court reiterated to future litigants that “summary judgment is the proverbial put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit.” The lesson of the case for class-action plaintiffs is that evidence concerning the merits of the plaintiff’s case is just as important as evidence concerning class certification.

According to the plaintiff in the case, Champion advertised on its packaging that its dog food was “biologically appropriate” and made with “fresh regional ingredients” prepared in its “award-winning kitchens.” These claims were false and misleading, according to the plaintiff, because: (1) Champion uses frozen ingredients, regrinds refreshed ingredients, and includes ingredients that are past their expiration date; (2) the ingredients are sourced from all over the world; and (3) there is a risk that the dog food contains BPAs and pentobarbital.

Champion moved for summary judgment while the plaintiff moved for class certification. The District Court granted Champion’s motion on all counts. On appeal, the Court found that the plaintiff failed to present evidence to support his claims. The Court reminded the plaintiff of its oft-repeated refrain that at summary judgment the plaintiff “may not rest upon mere allegations” but must “go beyond the pleadings and support his contentions with proper documentary evidence.”

The plaintiff in the case relied almost entirely on his own testimony to oppose summary judgment. The Court found that this was insufficient to stave off summary judgment. Because the case was a deceptive advertising claim that did not involve patently misleading claims, the Court explained that the plaintiff had the burden of producing evidence to support the contention that the average consumer would be misled by the advertising. The plaintiff’s own testimony could not do this. The Court found of particular note that the plaintiff did not provide either consumer survey evidence or expert testimony to support his claims. Continue reading ›

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It is not at all uncommon for a company to require individuals to agree to its Terms of Use when they sign up for an online service or when creating an account on a website or mobile app. It is also not uncommon for that service, website, or app to incorporate technology from multiple different providers. Such was the case in a case recently decided by the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit rebuffed arguments by a technology company that it should be entitled to enforce certain arbitration provisions in a user agreement between OfferUp and its users.

Onfido owns and licenses the TruYou facial recognition software, which is marketed as software aimed at helping online resellers verify their identity. OfferUp, an online marketplace for buying and selling used items, uses the TruYou software in its mobile app to verify the identities of its users.

One of OfferUp’s users, Fredy Sosa, sued Onfido, alleging that its TruYou software violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). Sosa signed up to become a verified user on OfferUp’s mobile app. The identity verification process involved uploading photographs of his driver’s license and face. OfferUp’s verification process allegedly involved using Onfido’s TruYou software to extract and store biometric identifiers contained in the uploaded photos to verify that the face in the photograph matches the face on the driver’s license. Sosa subsequently filed a putative class action lawsuit against Onfido alleging that the company violated the BIPA by failing to provide him with a biometric data retention policy or to advising him whether and when it will permanently delete the biometric identifiers that it derived from his face. Sosa additionally alleged that Onfido violated the BIPA by failing to require him to sign a written release allowing it to “collect, use, or store his biometric identifiers derived from his face.”

After Onfido removed the case to an Illinois federal court, it sought to have the lawsuit dismissed and to compel arbitration of Sosa’s claims. The company relied on an arbitration provision in OfferUp’s Terms of Service which Sosa agreed to when signing up as a user of the OfferUp marketplace as the basis for seeking to compel arbitration of Sosa’s claims. The district court denied Onfido’s motion to stay Sosa’s complaint and compel individual arbitration, finding that Onfido cannot enforce the arbitration provision because it wasn’t a party to the agreement between OfferUp and its users. Continue reading ›

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Amazon is facing a class-action lawsuit filed in the Madison County Circuit Court alleging that Amazon’s Alexa violates the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). In setting out its case against Amazon, the Complaint quotes an interview with former Amazon senior editor James Marcus in which he said that “It was made clear from the beginning that data collection was also one of Amazon’s businesses. All customer behavior that flowed through the site was recorded and tracked. And that itself was a valuable commodity.”

The Complaint details the near ubiquity of Amazon’s voice-based virtual assistant Alexa by alleging that Alexa is embedded in numerous Amazon devices such as Echo speakers, Fire tablets, and others. The Complaint goes on to allege that Alexa can additionally be integrated into other devices such as phones, TVs, thermostats, appliances, lights, and many more consumer products.

The Complaint alleges that after Alexa responds to a request, Amazon collects and subsequently stores “voiceprints” of the user, and “transcriptions” of the voiceprints. These voiceprints and transcriptions constitute biometric identifiers or biometric information regulated by BIPA, according to the Complaint. The suit goes on to allege that Amazon does not delete the voiceprint or transcription after Alexa has responded. Instead, the Complaint alleges, Amazon uses these recordings to collect biometric information which it uses to improve the speech and voice recognition capabilities of Alexa.

Although Alexa is supposed to activate only after hearing its “wake word,” the Complaint alleges that Alexa-enabled devices frequently capture conversations by accident without being triggered. The Complaint cites a study conducted by Ruhr-Universität Bochum and the Bochum Max Planck Institute for Cyber Security and Privacy that allegedly discovered more than 1,000 sequences of words that incorrectly trigger smart speakers, such as Alexa. According to the Complaint, the study found that Alexa was inadvertently activated by the words “unacceptable” and “election.” Continue reading ›

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In one of its final decisions of the term, the United States Supreme Court issued one of the most significant class-action decisions in recent years. The decision tightened the requirements for showing standing in class action lawsuits and has the potential to significantly affect class action litigation. Building on its 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Supreme Court held that, to recover damages in a class action, every class member must satisfy the standing requirement of Article III, at least when the requested relief involves recovery of money damages.

The plaintiff in the case, Sergio Ramirez, obtained a credit report from TransUnion in the course of purchasing a car, as countless consumers do each year. Ramirez’s credit report stated that his name was a possible match for a name on the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) watch list, a list of individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries that typically contains the names of known terrorists, drug traffickers, and other individuals prohibited from conducting business in the U.S. for national security reasons.

Because of this alert on his credit report, the car dealership refused to sell Ramirez a vehicle. When he contacted TransUnion and requested a copy of his credit file, TransUnion first sent him his credit file and the statutorily required summary of rights. This first set of documents omitted any mention of the OFAC alert. TransUnion then sent Ramirez a second mailing, which included the OFAC alert but did not include the required summary of rights.

Based on these events, Ramirez filed suit alleging three violations of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). First, he alleged that TransUnion did not implement and follow “reasonable procedures” to ensure the accuracy of his credit file. Second, he claimed that TransUnion violated the FCRA by failing to provide him with all the FCRA-required information in his credit file in connection with the first mailing he received which did not mention the OFAC alert. Finally, he alleged that TransUnion failed to provide him with the required summary of his rights “with each written disclosure” because the second mailing he received from TransUnion did not include a summary of his rights. Ramirez filed the case as a class action seeking to represent a class of similarly situated individuals. Continue reading ›

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The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) gives consumers crucial protections against predatory debt collection practices, such as calling late at night, using harassing language, pursuing individuals for debts they don’t owe, and using misleading communications in debt collection attempts. The FDCPA governs the practices of third-party debt collectors, those who buy a delinquent debt from original creditors, like medical providers or credit card companies.

A common practice of these third-party debt collectors is to outsource parts of its debt-collection operations to various vendors. In an apparent issue of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the FDCPA applies to communications between a third-party debt collector and its vendors. The FDCPA prohibits debt-related communications about a consumer with third parties without the consumer’s consent or a court order. Thus, the issue for the Eleventh Circuit was whether communications between a debt collector and its vendors constituted debt-related communications about a consumer in violation of the FDCPA. In a decision that has the potential to upend the debt collection industry, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that such communications were in fact governed by the FDCPA. A likely result of this decision will be a wave of FDCPA class action lawsuits, particularly in the states within the Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida and Georgia). Continue reading ›

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