Class-Action

Federal Court Dismisses Certain State Law Claims in Multidistrict Litigation Case Alleging ATM Overdraft Fee Fraud

July 26, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

A federal judge denied most of a motion to dismiss brought by multiple banks in a consolidated case alleging overdraft fee fraud. In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 694 F.Supp.2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2010). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) consolidated multiple claims into a single matter in the Southern District of Florida in order to deal efficiently with common pretrial matters. The plaintiffs asserted causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (“GFFD covenant”), and many individual causes asserted common law breach of contract claims and state law consumer protection claims. The defendants filed an omnibus motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted in part and denied in larger part. The court dismissed claims under certain state consumer statutes, as well as claims based on the laws of states in which no plaintiffs lived.

The central issue of the litigation was the ordering of ATM transactions from highest to lowest, regardless of the order in which the account holder performed the transaction. This allegedly reduced the account holder’s total account balance more quickly, garnering more overdraft fees for the defendants. At the time the court rendered its order on the omnibus motion to dismiss, the litigation consisted of fifteen separate complaints, each brought against an individual bank. All of the fifteen complaints pending at the time of the court’s order involved breach of GFFD covenant claims. Five complaints were filed in California as putative class actions on behalf of California customers. Eight complaints were filed outside California, putatively on behalf of nationwide classes excluding California. One complaint was filed by a California resident and sought to represent a nationwide class. The final complaint was filed by a Washington resident on behalf of a class of Washington customers. According to the JPML, the consolidated litigation has involved one hundred separate complaints since 2009, with forty-four still involved as of March 5, 2013.

U.S. Supreme Court Rules that Arbitration Agreement Bars Class Action and Class Arbitration Claims – AmEx v. Italian Colors Restaurant

July 25, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that federal law does not permit a court, based on a finding that individual arbitration is cost-prohibitive for a plaintiff, to strike a class arbitration waiver clause in a contract. American Express Co., et al. v. Italians Colors Restaurant, et al (“AmEx”), 570 U.S. ___, No. 12-133, slip op. (Jun. 20, 2013). The decision builds on prior decisions that have generally affirmed the enforceability of mandatory arbitration clauses, class arbitration waivers, and class action waivers, even in contracts where the bargaining power between the parties is far from equal.

The plaintiffs in AmEx are businesses that accept payments using American Express credit cards. The contract between the plaintiffs and American Express includes clauses requiring submission of all disputes to arbitration and waiving class arbitration procedures. The plaintiffs brought a federal antitrust class action lawsuit against American Express, claiming that the company engages in various monopolistic practices. The defendant brought a motion to compel arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. In response, the plaintiffs offered an economist’s declaration stating that the cost of arbitration for an individual merchant asserting a federal antitrust claim would exceed any possible recovery.

Class Action Bans Found Improper By Massachusetts’ Highest Court But New Supreme Court Decision Under Cuts that Ruling

July 13, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

With the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion having left many judges and class action attorneys frustrated with the current state of class action lawsuits, a new decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has reawakened hope for plaintiffs to achieve justice in a court of law. According to the new decision by the Court, a class action ban, as part of an arbitration agreement, is only enforceable if the plaintiff cannot provide compelling evidence that the ban on class actions would prevent them from obtaining a remedy under state law.

The Court recently ruled in two cases where the plaintiffs tried to prove that the class action bans in the relevant arbitration agreements were unenforceable. In Feeney v. Dell Inc., the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, having found that they provided sufficient evidence that the ban on class actions would prevent them from pursuing their claims. In another case, Machado v. Systems4 LLC, the Court upheld the class action ban present in the arbitration agreement, having found that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence that the ban prevented them from obtaining a remedy under state law.

In its decision in Feeney v. Dell Inc., the Court stated that the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion did not provide for a general public-policy-based prohibition on class-actions. Instead, the Court decided that the fact that arbitration procedures must not prevent plaintiffs from attaining justice in a court of law remains despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion.
The Court further denied that this interpretation applies only to federal statutory rights. Instead, it argued that the Federal Arbitration Act does not deny any remedies available under state law. As a result, a state court cannot prevent the Federal Arbitration Act from achieving its intended goals, simply by deciding that certain provisions of an arbitration agreement are unenforceable if those provisions prevent the assertion of claims provided by relevant state laws.

The court therefore decided that the enforceability of class action bans as part of arbitration agreements would be dependent upon “case-specific factual showings” that the ban would prevent plaintiffs from obtaining remedies which are granted to them by state law. In Feeney v. Dell Inc., a case involving small-dollar claims, the court determined that the class action ban would effectively prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing their claims, as individuals are unlikely to pursue lengthy and often costly litigation for insubstantial amounts. The case of Machado v. System4 LLC, on the other hand, consisted of significantly larger monetary claims, of the sort that individuals are likely to pursue in court, even without the added power of a class action. The court, therefore, determined that, in such a case, the class action ban present in the arbitration agreement remained valid.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is not alone in this interpretation of the law. The Missouri Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have also recognized that circumstances exist in which a class action ban cannot be upheld in a court of law. However, the Second Circuit’s decision in Amex that a class action ban which prevents the attainment of rights granted by federal law is unenforceable was just reversed by the Supreme Court. The decision that the Supreme Court has reached in Amex undercuts the reasoning using by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and allows class-action bans in arbitration agreements all over the nation to preclude class actions from proceeding, even if they are the only means of providing a means for protecting the rights at issue. The Supreme Court has provided businesses with a means of protecting themselves from expensive class action litigation.

Court Denies Motion to Dismiss Appeal of Class Decertification, Finding that Plaintiffs Who Already Settled Still Had Standing – Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA

July 12, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

In an appeal of the decertification of a class action lawsuit, a federal appeals court denied a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs/appellants, who settled with the defendants after decertification, still had a stake in the litigation. Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 688 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to an “incentive award” or “enhancement fee” for serving as class representatives, but only if the case was certified as a class action. Id. at 874-75. This gave them an ongoing stake in the litigation, they argued, and therefore gave them standing to appeal decertification. The court agreed, finding that dismissing their appeal on standing grounds would not serve judicial economy, as another class member could simply step in and appeal.

Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court, does not say much about the underlying lawsuit, except that it consists of both class action and collective action claims. The three named plaintiffs brought collective action claims against the defendant for alleged violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, and class action claims for supplemental state law claims. The difference between a class action and a collective action under federal law, the court notes, is not particularly relevant to the question at hand.

Illinois Court Dismisses Putative Shareholder Class Action, Finding Lack of Alleged Injuries – Noble v. AAR Corp.

July 10, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

An Illinois federal court granted a motion to dismiss in a putative shareholder derivative class action, having already denied the plaintiff’s application for a temporary restraining order (TRO). Noble v. AAR Corp., et al, No. 12 C 7973, memorandum and order (E.D. Ill., Apr. 3, 2013). The plaintiff asserted causes of action for various alleged breaches of fiduciary duty on behalf of the corporation, but the court found that the lawsuit was a direct action, primarily for the plaintiff’s benefit as a shareholder, rather than a derivative one.

The dispute related to a recommendation by the Board of Directors to the shareholders of AAR Corporation, a publicly-traded company, regarding an executive compensation plan. The Board made a unanimous proposal regarding the corporation’s “say on pay” plan, which allowed the shareholders to vote on executive pay as required by Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1. In a seventy-page proxy statement, the Board asked the shareholders to approve an advisory resolution regarding executive compensation at the corporation’s annual shareholder meeting, which was scheduled for October 10, 2012.

The plaintiff filed suit against the corporation and individual Board members, alleging that the Proxy Statement failed to disclose various details about what the Board considered before making its proposal. Noble, memorandum at 5. He claimed that the individual defendants breached their fiduciary duties of good faith, care, and loyalty to the shareholders, and that the corporation aided and abetted these breaches. Id. at 5-6. The defendants removed the case to federal court on October 4, 2012. The following day, the plaintiff filed a motion for a TRO, asking the court to stop the shareholder vote. The court held a hearing on October 9 and denied the motion. On October 10, the shareholders approved the Board’s proposal, with seventy-seven percent of the shares voting in favor. Id. at 1-2.

Class Actions Filed Against Monsanto for GMO Wheat Spreading in the Northwest

July 7, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

There are multiple reasons why so many people are up in arms against the rising prevalence of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in our crops. Aside from the debate as to whether consuming food that has been genetically modified is safe, the issue of contamination is potentially a very serious problem.

Recently, Monsanto has been prominent in the news and in the courts, often depicted as an evil corporation putting the health of the public at risk for the sake of profit. Now the company is facing several lawsuits from farmers who claim that they have suffered financial harm as a result of Monsanto’s genetically modified wheat having been found in a wheat field in Oregon. In late May, the U.S. Department of Agriculture announced that a wheat farmer in Oregon had discovered Monsanto’s genetically modified wheat growing on his farm alongside his conventional wheat.

The announcement was followed by European and Asian buyers quickly backing out of buying American wheat when they heard of the contamination. Consumers in Europe and Asia have much stronger feelings against GMOs than American consumers. Both South Korea and Japan have suspended certain purchases of American wheat. The European Union has said it will increase the testing of produce coming in from the United States.

The announcement made by the Department of Agriculture and the ensuing loss of overseas buyers for American wheat has led to a series of lawsuits against Monsanto. Clarmar Farms, Inc., farmer Tom Stahl, and the Center for Food Safety have filed a lawsuit against Monsanto in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The lawsuit is seeking class-action status on behalf of other farmers it alleges have been harmed by the lower wheat prices, which have resulted from overseas buyers backing out of buying American wheat.

A similar lawsuit was filed a few days prior by a wheat farmer in Kansas who alleges that he and other farmers have been financially harmed by lower wheat prices as a result of the discovery of Monsanto’s genetically modified wheat in American crops. Two other farmers have also filed similar lawsuits in federal court for the western district of Washington state.

The experimental wheat was initially developed by Monsanto in order to withstand treatments of its Roundup weed killer. The product was never commercialized though, due to widespread industry opposition. International buyers were already threatening to stop buying American wheat if the GMOs ever entered the marketplace. The decision to end attempts at commercializing the wheat was announced in 2004.

The field testing of the genetically modified wheat that Monsanto did in many states was supposed to have kept the experimental wheat from contaminating conventional wheat supplies.
Following the most recent onslaught of lawsuits, Monsanto has said that, when it ended testing on the genetically modified wheat, it ordered the wheat to be destroyed or shipped to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s seed storage facility in Colorado. Company officials have denied knowing how their wheat could have made its way into a wheat farm in Oregon.

Kyle McCain, an attorney for Monsanto, has called the lawsuits premature. He claims that the wheat “is limited to one field in Oregon, and no such wheat has entered the stream of commerce”. However, the genetically modified wheat has been found in one farm of conventional wheat, it takes no stretch of the imagination to think that the modified wheat has made its way, undetected, onto other farms and into the marketplace. When this possibility is taken into consideration, especially given the claims of GMOs’ potentially harmful effects, it is no wonder buyers overseas are hesitant to buy American wheat.

Monsanto insists that it followed “a government directed, rigorous, well-documented and audited” program when conducting experiments on the genetically modified wheat.
The lawsuit filed in Spokane, Washington, alleges that Monsanto’s failure to contain genetically modified wheat qualifies as “wrongful conduct” which has potentially contaminated “the entire wheat farming and production chain” and puts many wheat farmers at continued risk of harm by cross-pollination with and contamination of their crops. The lawsuit has not named a number for specific monetary damages, but it is seeking compensatory, as well as punitive damages. It also asks that Monsanto be made to decontaminate equipment, storage, and transportation facilities.

Wisconsin Class Action Against Insurance Company Remanded to State Court Because of State Law Claims – LaPlant v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.

July 5, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Our Chicago class action attorneys note that a class action claim against an insurance company, which the defendant had removed to federal court, fell within an exception to the federal jurisdiction statute, according to a federal district judge in LaPlant v. The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, No. 11-CV-00910, slip op. (E.D. Wis., Aug. 20, 2012). The court remanded the case to Wisconsin state court under the corporate governance exception to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). It held that the plaintiffs’ claims related exclusively to the defendant’s “internal affairs,” based on Wisconsin law.

The defendant issued an annuity insurance policy to the lead plaintiff. As a mutual insurance company, the defendant was “owned cooperatively by its policyholders,” LaPlant, slip op. at 1, and paid dividends to policyholders out of its profits. In 1985, it moved policyholders’ money into a separate fund and began paying dividends based on interest generated by the fund. Id. The amount of the payments received by the policyholders allegedly decreased as a result of this change. Wisconsin law gives policyholders the right to participate in annual profit distributions. Wis. Stat. § 632.62(2).

The lead plaintiff brought a class action lawsuit for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of a class of policyholders in Wisconsin. The class prevailed at trial, and the lead plaintiff moved to expand the scope of the class to include policyholders in other states. The defendant removed the case to federal court under CAFA, which confers jurisdiction to federal courts over class actions with more than one hundred class members, more than $5 million in controversy, and diversity of citizenship between the defendant and at least one class member. The plaintiff moved to remand the case to Wisconsin state court based on the “corporate governance exception,” which applies when a class action’s claims solely relate (1) “to the internal affairs or governance of a corporation” (2) based on the laws of the state of incorporation. LaPlant, slip op. at 2, citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(9)(B), 1453(d)(2).

Court Retains Most of a Deceptive Business Practices Putative Class Action Against a Bank for Overdraft Fees – White v. Wachovia Bank

June 28, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

A federal court allowed most causes to proceed in a putative class action against a bank for allegedly fraudulent overdraft fees. White, et al v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 1:08-cv-1007, order (N.D. Ga., Jul. 2, 2008). The plaintiffs, who alleged that the bank had recorded transactions out of chronological order to maximize overdraft fee liability, claimed violations of state deceptive trade practice laws and several claims related to breach of contract. The court denied the defendant bank’s motion to dismiss as to all but two of the plaintiffs’ claims.

The two lead plaintiffs opened a joint checking account with Wachovia Bank in 2007. They signed a Deposit Agreement that stated that the bank could pay checks and other items in any order it chose, even if it resulted in an overdraft. It also stated that the bank could impose overdraft charges if payment of any single item exceeded the balance in the account. The plaintiffs alleged in their lawsuit that Wachovia ordered its posting of transactions in a way that would cause their account to incur overdraft fees, even when they had sufficient funds to pay the items. They also alleged that the bank imposed overdraft fees when no overdraft had occurred.

The lawsuit, originally filed in a Georgia state court in February 2008, asserted violations of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (FBPA), O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-390 et seq., and breach of the duty of good faith. The plaintiffs also claimed that the clause of the Agreement related to the ordering of transaction was unconscionable, that the bank had engaged in trover and conversion, and that it had been unjustly enriched. The defendant removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), which allows defendants to remove certain class actions to federal court. It then moved to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows a court to dismiss a lawsuit that “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To defeat such a motion, a plaintiff must show a plausible factual basis for their claims.

Chicago Class Action and Consumer Fraud Attorneys DiTommaso Lubin Bring Alleged Counterfeit Rare Wine Lawsuit Against Famed Chicago Chef Charlie Trotter

June 21, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

The Chicago class action attorneys and consumer fraud lawyers at DiTommaso Lubin filed a lawsuit alleging consumer fraud on behalf of our clients against famed Chicago Chef Charlie Trotter claiming that he sold what the specially retained expert concludes is a counterfeit bottle of rare wine. Trotter denies our client’s claims and asserts that they simply have “buyer’s remorse” according to a report in the Chicago Tribune. Our clients, a small family of wine enthusiasts, very much wanted to add the rare wine to their collection. They believed it was a magnum-size bottle of 1945 Domaine de la Romanée-Conti. They sought to have it insured but their carrier required them to get it authenticated. The expert concluded in the report attached to the lawsuit that the bottle was not authentic. After trying to get their money back, the client believed that they had no choice but to file suit so that they could get their over $46,000 investment back. They retained our Chicago fraud attorneys and we filed suit alleging consumer fraud and magnuson moss warranty claims on their behalf. We based the suit on the expert report that the wine was unmerchantable and that Charlie Trotter should have known based on his claimed expertise that it was not authentic. Charlie Trotter denies the claims according to the Chicago Tribune report and has not yet responded to the suit formally so it will now be a matter of proving the case in court before a jury which will decide the merit of the claims. The Complaint only states our clients’ claims which they need to prove.

The Complaint filed by our Chicago class action lawyers and Chicago consumer fraud attorneys alleges the following:

13. … A Charlie Trotter’s employee negotiated the price – $46,227.40 – with Benn and Ilir. Based on Defendants’ representation of the rarity and value of the DRC magnum, Benn and Ilir agreed to purchase it. Ben and Ilir paid Charlie Trotter’s $40,000 in cash and $6,227.40 by credit card for the DRC magnum.

14. On June 17, 2012, Defendants shipped the DRC magnum to Benn’ New York residence.

15. Upon receiving the DRC magnum, Benn contacted his insurance carrier. He notified the carrier that he wanted to list the DRC magnum on his homeowners insurance. Benn’s carrier informed Benn that 1945 bottles of Domaine de la Romanee-Conti are often counterfeited and that Benn would need to authenticate the DRC magnum through an expert before it would provide coverage.

16. On or about September, 2012, Benn retained Maureen Downey, DWS, CWE, FWS of Chai Consulting to authenticate the DRC magnum. Ms. Downey determined that the DRC magnum was counterfeit and valueless based on the physical attributes of the DRC magnum, the provenance provided by Charlie Trotter’s, and her discussions with experts on Domaine de la Romanee-Conti wines. See Exhibit 1. Ms. Downey visited the estate of Domaine de la Romanee-Conti after preparing her report. She spoke with Jean-Charles Cuvelier, the estate director of Domaine de la Romanee-Conti, regarding the production of large format bottles. The information Ms. Downey received from Jean-Charles Cuvelier confirmed the accuracy of her report.

The Complaint’s claims have been denied by Charlie Trotter according to the Chicago Tribune report and Defendants have denied the allegations.

Below is a video about famed Chef Charlie Trotter:

Court Reverses Class Certification in Case Alleging Wrongful Withholding of Bonus Compensation – InPhyNet Contracting Services v. Soria — Our Chicago Class Action Attorneys Defend Businesses in Class Cases

June 10, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

A Florida appellate court reversed an order certifying a class of doctors claiming breach of fiduciary duty and other causes of action against their employer. InPhyNet Contracting Services v Soria, 33 So.3d 766 (Fl. Ct. App. 2010). The case began as a suit alleging breach of a covenant not to compete against one physician, leading the physician to counterclaim on behalf of a putative class with regards to a bonus compensation plan. After separating the physician’s individual claims from the class claims, the trial court certified a class. The appellate court reversed, finding that the class claims did not meet the requirements of commonality or predominance over class members’ individual claims.

InPhyNet Contracting Services (ICS) places physicians in hospitals around the state of Florida on a contractual basis. It offers incentives to physicians to work in hospital emergency rooms through a Physician Incentive Plan (PIP), which pays doctors out of a “bonus pool” associated with a hospital based on performance and similar factors. Id. at 768. ICS placed Dr. David Soria in the emergency room of Wellington Regional Medical Center, where he worked as Medical Director. The dispute between Soria and ICS began when Wellington terminated its contract with ICS and contracted with a competitor, and Soria began working for the competitor.