Consumer Fraud/Consumer Protection

Best Websites to Learn About Consumer Law Issues — Our Chicago Consumer Attorneys Can Assist You in Your Lemon Law, Predatory Lending, Auto and RV Fraud, Unfair Debt Collection, Unfair Wage Practices Claims and Other Consumer Rights Lawsuits

January 4, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

One of the best websites to obtain information about consumer law topics and purchase consumer and lawyer oriented publications and books about consumer rights issues is the website of the National Consumer Law Center.

A particularly well done book offered by the National Consumer Law Center is called Surviving Debt. It is a “how to” book that consumers can use to learn about their rights regarding matters such as unfair debt collection practices. The National Consumer Law Center provides a detailed description of the book.

The National Consumer Law Center describes Surviving Debt as follows:

Dealer Implied Warranty Applies to Manufacturer When They Have an Agency Relationship, U.S. District Court Rules

January 1, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

As Illinois and Chicago area consumer rights attorneys with a substantial auto dealer fraud and lemon law practice, we were pleased that a federal district court ruled in October that a manufacturer can be sued for a dealer’s alleged implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Semitekol v. Monaco Coach Corporation, No. 06 C 6424 (Oct. 21, 2008), is an RV warranty case pending in the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs, a married couple, purchased a Monaco motor home from an RV dealer. The motor home turned out to have the following alleged problems: electrical problems, a malfunctioning air-conditioner and heating problems. Numerous attempts to fix it were allegedly unsuccessful, and the motor home allegedly spent 180 of the 341 days the couple owned it in repair shops before the couple allegedly revoked acceptance of the motor home.

The couple sued Monaco, among others, alleging that it breached its own written warranty, the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the implied warranty of merchantability created by Illinois law. Monaco moved to dismiss the implied warranty allegation, arguing that Illinois law requires direct contact between a buyer and seller to create an implied warranty. In this case, the manufacturer pointed out, the dealer was the actual seller of the Monaco motor home. The plaintiffs responded by arguing that direct contact in this case was established by BMS’s advertising and actual status as an “authorized Beaver Monaco dealership”; the fact that Monaco allegedly referred customers to the dealer to deal with problems and customer service concerns; consumers’ ability to find and contact the dealer through Monaco’s Web site; BMS’s authorization to distribute Monaco publications; and the fact that plaintiffs had the option of picking up their new motor home at either company.

In its analysis, the district court agreed for purposes of a motion to dismiss that the dealer was acting as Monaco’s agent. It dismissed arguments that past caselaw does not support such a finding, pointing out that unlike the current plaintiffs, none of the plaintiffs in the cases the defense cited showed any evidence for an agency relationship. The court did not agree that there actually was an agency relationship, or even that an agency relationship is enough to establish the direct contact necessary to prove an implied warranty under Illinois law. Rather, it pointed out that these are questions of fact that are improper to resolve with a motion to dismiss. Thus, the motion was denied. Dismissal motions by the dealer and two parts manufacturers also failed.

Federal District Court Certifies Class in Overtime Class Action Lawsuit

December 25, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Our Chicago class action attorneys recently noted that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has conditionally certified a wage and hour class action alleging that Illinois Bell Telephone failed to pay overtime to its hourly employees. In Russell v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 08 C 1871 (filed April 1, 2008), Constemecka Russell alleges that Illinois Bell regularly required her and other hourly employees to work off the clock, and sought to conditionally certify these employees as a class and notify them of the action. Several of her colleagues have joined and submitted affidavits supporting her allegations. The case is pending, but the judge granted those motions Sept. 15 over most of Illinois Bell’s objections.

U.S. District Judge Matthew Kennelly’s opinion granting certification and notice repeats many of Russell’s allegations about the unpaid overtime. Russell worked in sales for the company at a call center, and she alleges that she was paid only for time she spent logged into the call center’s computer system. However, there were certain work tasks that she had to perform without being logged in, during lunch and rest breaks, including tasks like filling orders as well as time spent logging onto the computers and opening software programs. She estimated that she spent between 15 minutes and an hour per day doing this unpaid work, which sometimes would have entitled her to overtime.

In response to Russell’s request for class certification and notice, Illinois Bell argued that class certification is inappropriate because it doesn’t use the phone system to keep time, and thus there is no common policy or practice linking the proposed plaintiffs. The court was unimpressed by this argument. It pointed to multiple assertions by Russell that company practice was to require unpaid work before and after time on the phone, as well as affidavits by joining plaintiffs stating that managers explicitly instructed them to work off the clock. It also dismissed arguments that written policies were evidence that Illinois Bell complied with the law.

First District Rules Auto Dealer Committed Fraud By Misrepresenting Car’s History

December 18, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

A statement that a car has not been involved in an accident and “it’s fine” can constitute common-law fraud and a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the First District Court of Appeal has ruled. In Hanson-Suminski v. Rohrman Midwest Motors, Inc., 1-07-0755 (Nov. 7, 2008), a customer successfully sued after she discovered that her used car had been in an accident, even though the dealer who sold it to her had told her it was not. The appeals court rejected the dealership’s arguments that both the decision and the financial award were erroneous.

The plaintiff, Traci Hanson-Suminski, bought a used 2002 Honda Civic from defendant Arlington Acura in Palatine, Ill. On the test drive, she asked the salesman if the car had been in an accident, to which he replied “No, it’s fine.” She did not take the car to an independent mechanic or get a Carfax sheet, nor did the salesman advise her that she could do so. She discovered that the car had indeed been in a rollover accident causing “moderate or severe” damage the following year, when she tried to trade it in. At trial, witnesses testified that the car had a “green light” at the auction where the dealership bought it, indicating no title problems, but that a car in good condition should have been more expensive. The plaintiff prevailed on her common-law fraud claim at a jury trial and on her Consumer Fraud Act claim at a bench trial. To avoid an illegal double recovery, the judge ruled that the Consumer Fraud Act claim would be satisfied with the jury’s common-law fraud verdict.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiff should not have prevailed on her Consumer Fraud Act claim, in part because she failed to show that fraud could have been avoided with reasonable prudence, and because the salesman’s statement was mere “puffery.” In its opinion, the appeals court cited Harkala v. Wildwood Reality, Inc., 200 Ill. App. 3d 447, 453 (1990), to show that the plaintiff had no obligation to double-check the salesman’s statement that the car had not been in an accident. Furthermore, it said, a car’s accident history is not a matter of public knowledge, as that case required. “Puffery” is a legal term for exaggerations used in advertising, which no reasonable person would believe. Because it was reasonable to believe the salesman was not lying, and it is not reasonable to think that car salespeople always claim cars are accident-free, the court said, it dismissed the puffery claim as without merit.

Illinois Tenants Entitled to Interest on Security Deposit, Fifth District Rules

December 4, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

As Chicago class action attorneys, our firm has been able to help many Illinois tenants protect their rights under a special state law that not every renter knows about. The Illinois Security Deposit Interest Act requires many Illinois landlords to pay their renters the interest on security deposits. The law applies to landlords of buildings with 25 or more rental units, and to deposits held six months or more. Under those circumstances, the law requires landlords to pay interest on security deposits once a year, after the end of the yearly rental agreement, except when the renter owed unpaid rent. Landlords who willfully fail to do this can be sued for the amount of the withheld interest, as well as attorney fees and court costs.

That was the case in Wang v. Williams and Royal Rentals, 343 Ill.App.3d 495, 797 N.E.2d 179, 277 Ill.Dec. 832 (Sept. 10, 2003). Zhiyuan Wang of Carbondale sued his landlord, Royal Rentals, for failing to return his security deposit, failing to pay interest during the two years he rented from Royal, consumer fraud and breach of contract. The trial court dismissed his interest claim and his breach of contract claim, both of which were based on the Security Deposit Interest Act, because Wang’s lease included a provision stating “TENANTS agree to waive right to interest on security deposit.” Wang appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeal.

On appeal, Royal Rentals argued that legal rights, including Wang’s rights under the Security Deposit Interest Act, can be waived when the right in question is conferred only for the benefit of individuals rather than the public. The court found this unconvincing. It pointed out that the Security Deposit Interest Act protects the rights of renters, a class of people. In support, it cited several cases, including Gittleman v. Create, Inc., 189 Ill. App. 3d 199, 545 N.E.2d 237, 240 (1989), a similar case in which tenants sued their landlord for a security deposit refund and interest. That lease had a provision reading “It is understood that the security deposit is net of security deposit interest, if any.” That court found for the tenants, saying the provision was intentionally vague about how interest should be paid and suggesting that the landlord used that vagueness to try to circumvent the Security Deposit Interest Act.

Tenants Do Not Need to Prove Willful Violation of Chicago Ordinance to Recover Security Deposit Interest, First District Rules

November 20, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

As Chicago class action attorneys with a focus on consumer rights and consumer protection law, we know that renters in Chicago are fortunate to be protected by a law requiring landlords to pay interest on the renters’ own security deposits once a year, as long as the tenant stays for more than six months. Section 080 of the Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (PDF) also specifies that landlords must return security deposits, minus unpaid rent or reasonable costs of repairs, within 45 days of the tenant’s departure. Unlike with the corresponding state law, this is true regardless of the number of units the landlord owns. If a landlord fails to comply, the tenant has the right to sue for twice the amount of the deposit, plus interest and attorneys’ fees.

The ordinance also applies even if the landlord did not willfully (that is, intentionally) withhold the payment. That provision was established by the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, 307 Ill.App.3d 155, 717 N.E.2d 443, 240 Ill.Dec. 350 (1999). In that case, Aurelia Lawrence sued her landlord for withholding interest on a pet deposit. At trial, the court decided that a pet deposit is a security deposit for the purposes of the law (rather than a fee or charge). But because the landlord didn’t willfully refuse to pay interest on that pet deposit, it declined to impose the penalty of twice the deposit plus interest and attorney fees. Lawrence moved for a new trial, which was denied, and appealed to the First District.

In its analysis, the appeals court noted that it did not need to decide whether the landlord actually did willfully fail to pay; what mattered was whether the ordinance required willfulness in the first place. In order to require willfulness, the court wrote, a law must be penal (intended to punish) rather than remedial (intended to make the victim whole). Both sides agreed that the case turned on the issue of penal versus remedial. The court first decided that its decision should not be controlled by Szpila v. Burke, 279 Ill. App. 3d 964, 665 N.E.2d 357 (1996), in which the appeals court decided that a tenant was entitled to damages once rather than for each separate violation of the ordinance. In that case, the First District said, it found willfulness because to do otherwise would give a result that was out of proportion to the violation and unjust. A similar case, Namur v. Habitat Co., 294 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 691 N.E.2d 782 (1998), was dismissed because it did not address the question at issue here.

Chicago Federal District Court Strikes Down Mandatory Arbitration Clause

October 28, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

A consumer fraud case here in Chicago met an interesting end in late September. In Trujillo v. Apple Computer, No. 07 C 4946, 2008 WL 4368937 (N.D.Ill., Sept. 22, 2008) lead plaintiff Jose Trujillo filed a proposed class action against Apple and AT&T Mobility, the iPhone’s service provider. Trujillo contended that Apple and AT&T did not disclose a de facto service fee of $79 plus shipping for the iPhone’s battery, which must be replaced after 300 charges. That claim failed when the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to Apple and AT&T on Sept. 23 on the merits of Trujillo’s claims. However, as Chicago, Naperville and Oak Brook consumer rights and consumer fraud attorneys, we are very interested in a decision from the same court on the day before handing a victory to consumers. The court decided to not compel the mandatory binding arbitration required in Trujillo’s contract with AT&T, finding that contract procedurally unconscionable under Illinois state law.

According to court documents, AT&T was the only wireless phone carrier for the iPhone when Trujillo purchased the phone in 2007. (Without a service provider, the iPhone’s telephone function will not work.) Trujillo activated a service plan with AT&T online, through Apple’s iTunes software, which directs the user to AT&T’s Web site. In order to sign up, the user must click a box indicating that he or she has read and agrees to AT&T’s service agreement. The service agreement is many pages, and in fact, displays as multiple separate pages on AT&T’s Web site. If the user does not check the box indicating that he or she has read this agreement, that user cannot sign up and will not have access to all of the iPhone’s functions.

In court papers filed earlier in the case, AT&T argued that Trujillo had the opportunity to read the service agreement when he signed up for service through iTunes. It also said he had access to the service agreement before this, in two separate ways: in paper booklets at the Apple store and online, on the AT&T Wireless Web site. But in later supplementary papers, it admitted that neither of those statements was true. The paper booklets, it turned out, were not available in the Apple store, though they may have been available in an AT&T store that Trujillo later visited to have a credit check done. The court’s opinion also noted that a footnote in the new papers said the applicable terms of service were not available online after all, though an obsolete version was available through the Web site’s search function. The true terms of service were available when Trujillo signed up through iTunes, it said, but in a small window, with the language relevant to arbitration about two-thirds of the way through.

Class Certification Allowed Even in Cases With Small Damages

October 27, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Chicago and Oak Brook-based DiTommaso Lubin has recently been working on a proposed class action consumer protection case with national reach, in tandem with colleagues in Maryland. Our case alleges violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a federal law regulating when and how credit reporting agencies may provide information about consumers to third parties like marketing companies. The FCRA requires that credit agencies may only give out consumers’ information if they have written permission or to companies that will extend a “firm offer of credit” to the consumers.

Our proposed lead plaintiff received a flyer offering him an automotive loan from a company that turned out to allegedly have nothing to do with the offer. That is, there was no firm offer of credit, in violation of the FCRA. It’s important that our plaintiff suffered no actual financial damage due to this privacy violation, fortunately. However, under the FCRA, he doesn’t need to if the violation of the law was “willful.” Instead, he may sue for “statutory damages,” an amount of money set by law, as well as the cost of attorneys’ representation and any punitive damages the court decides to impose to punish illegal or very unethical behavior by the defendant.

The statutory damages authorized by the FCRA are very small by the standards of modern litigation — $100 to $1,000 per person. In fact, this amount is so small that it might discourage both plaintiffs and their lawyers from pursuing a case, given the small reward. However, a proposed class action changes that landscape dramatically. In a class action, plaintiffs with the same complaint share the same lawyers, in essence pooling their resources. In doing so, they also pool the money they stand to win, from which the lawyers are paid. This allows them to move forward with a claim they might otherwise have had to abandon — giving them greater access to justice.

Protect Yourself from Abusive Bill Collectors With the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

October 14, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

We have watched with dismay as report after report rolls in with bad financial news. Just like other Americans, many individuals and families here in the Chicago area are having more trouble making ends meet right now and may be at risk of losing their homes. Because our consumer rights and debt collection abuse prevention lawyers handle consumer litigation in Chicago, Oak Brook, Naperville and other parts of Illinois, we are particularly concerned about unfair and abusive practices by bill collectors, who many people may be hearing from more and more these days. Many consumers don’t realize it, but we are actually protected under federal law from some of the worst excesses of collection agencies by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

The FDCPA prohibits abusive and deceptive conduct by companies that collect debts. This covers a wide variety of practices, including misleading statements and outright lies, threats, abusive or foul language, attempts to embarrass the consumer publicly, bypassing the consumer’s lawyer and tacking on fees or interest the consumer never agreed to. Under the law, debt collectors may not harass you with repeated unnecessary phone calls, call you names, use a raised voice or curse words, or call you at work after you’ve explained in writing that your employer does not allow it. If they threaten lawsuits, wage garnishments or other legal actions, those actions must be possible and they must follow through.

In addition, the law requires debt collectors to follow certain rules, including:

Fallen Investment Bank Socked With Fair Debt Collection Practices Lawsuit

October 13, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Given all of the more recent high-profile financial failures, it might be easy to forget the fall of Bear Stearns, the first investment bank to go down in our current economic downturn. But we were interested to read recently that the firm recently settled charges that it violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a federal law our Chicago, Naperville and Oak Brook debt collection abuse prevention lawyers work with often in our Chicago consumer rights litigation practice. According to the Chicago Tribune, Bear Stearns and its mortgage debt collection subsidiary, EMC Mortgage, settled multiple FDCPA charges with the Federal Trade Commission for $28 million in September, and also agreed to change its loan servicing policies.

As with so much other economic news in 2008, the problem started with subprime and other non-standard mortgages. Bear Stearns was heavily invested in these (by buying them from the original lenders), a choice that is largely blamed for its failure. EMC serviced those mortgages, and according to the FTC, committed multiple violations of the FDCPA in its dealings with mortgage holders. The FTC complaint charged EMC with failing to check into the information provided by the original lenders on the mortgages, which led to incorrect charges and incorrect reports to credit bureaus that hurt the homeowners’ credit. EMC was also charged with:

• Charging fees homeowners never authorized, including a $500 fee for “loan modification”