The internet, which is still a new phenomenon to many areas of the law, has greatly expanded the potential for infringement of trademarks and personal names. The act of registering someone else’s trademark or personal name as an internet domain name without authorization is known as “cybersquatting.” While proving a case of cybersquatting presents challenges, some plaintiffs have succeeded in court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed part of an Arizona federal court’s decision last year awarding $6.6 million to a plaintiff claiming cybersquatting and other causes of action. Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, et al, No. 10-16196, slip op. (9th Cir., Mar. 12, 2012).

The plaintiff, Skydive Arizona, operates one of the world’s largest and best-known skydiving centers in Eloy, Arizona. It has used the “SKYDIVE ARIZONA” mark since 1986. The defendants operate SKYRIDE, which the court called “a third-party advertising and booking service for skydiving centers” around the country. Id. at 2921. SKYRIDE had numerous websites that it used to advertise skydiving events and opportunities in various locations, including several that specifically referenced Arizona, such as PhoenixSkydiving and TempeSkydiving. It also had websites for its own business, including skydivearizona.net and arizonaskydive.com. SKYRIDE had no facilities in Arizona., and it did not do business with the plaintiff.

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With the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion having left many judges and class action attorneys frustrated with the current state of class action lawsuits, a new decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has reawakened hope for plaintiffs to achieve justice in a court of law. According to the new decision by the Court, a class action ban, as part of an arbitration agreement, is only enforceable if the plaintiff cannot provide compelling evidence that the ban on class actions would prevent them from obtaining a remedy under state law.

The Court recently ruled in two cases where the plaintiffs tried to prove that the class action bans in the relevant arbitration agreements were unenforceable. In Feeney v. Dell Inc., the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, having found that they provided sufficient evidence that the ban on class actions would prevent them from pursuing their claims. In another case, Machado v. Systems4 LLC, the Court upheld the class action ban present in the arbitration agreement, having found that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence that the ban prevented them from obtaining a remedy under state law.

In its decision in Feeney v. Dell Inc., the Court stated that the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion did not provide for a general public-policy-based prohibition on class-actions. Instead, the Court decided that the fact that arbitration procedures must not prevent plaintiffs from attaining justice in a court of law remains despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion.
The Court further denied that this interpretation applies only to federal statutory rights. Instead, it argued that the Federal Arbitration Act does not deny any remedies available under state law. As a result, a state court cannot prevent the Federal Arbitration Act from achieving its intended goals, simply by deciding that certain provisions of an arbitration agreement are unenforceable if those provisions prevent the assertion of claims provided by relevant state laws.

The court therefore decided that the enforceability of class action bans as part of arbitration agreements would be dependent upon “case-specific factual showings” that the ban would prevent plaintiffs from obtaining remedies which are granted to them by state law. In Feeney v. Dell Inc., a case involving small-dollar claims, the court determined that the class action ban would effectively prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing their claims, as individuals are unlikely to pursue lengthy and often costly litigation for insubstantial amounts. The case of Machado v. System4 LLC, on the other hand, consisted of significantly larger monetary claims, of the sort that individuals are likely to pursue in court, even without the added power of a class action. The court, therefore, determined that, in such a case, the class action ban present in the arbitration agreement remained valid.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is not alone in this interpretation of the law. The Missouri Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have also recognized that circumstances exist in which a class action ban cannot be upheld in a court of law. However, the Second Circuit’s decision in Amex that a class action ban which prevents the attainment of rights granted by federal law is unenforceable was just reversed by the Supreme Court. The decision that the Supreme Court has reached in Amex undercuts the reasoning using by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and allows class-action bans in arbitration agreements all over the nation to preclude class actions from proceeding, even if they are the only means of providing a means for protecting the rights at issue. The Supreme Court has provided businesses with a means of protecting themselves from expensive class action litigation.

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Our client David Bates was sued by Chicago Motor Cars for criticizing the used car dealership online. We represented him in federal court and arbitration where he prevailed. He continues to exercise his First Amendment rights to criticize the dealership and is seeking to expose what he believes are unethical business practices and to support his position with evidence and judgments from court cases against the dealership. There are a number of court judgments finding that the dealer engaged in consumer fraud as to customers other then David Bates which we uncovered in our investigation.

In the federal court case the dealer filed a false affidavit claiming that it had never even been sued for fraud even though, in truth, these fraud judgments had entered against it relating to customers other than David Bates. The federal judge hearing the case entered a rule to show cause against the dealer requiring it to demonstrate why it should not be sanctioned for filing an allegedly false affidavit. The Court indicated that it might consider entering the sanction of dismissing the case along with sanctions against the dealer.

At that point, the dealer facing the impossible task of explaining why it had filed a false affidavit. Chicago Motor Cars decided to drop the case. It settled the federal court case by releasing all of its money damages claims against David Bates and his girl friend.

We then headed to arbitration where the Arbitrator, a retired judge, ruled that Bates’s videos,which were the subject of the arbitration, did not defame Chicago Motor Cars and were essentially true with any minor inaccuracies being irrelevant. Given Chicago Motor Cars’s documented history of fraud judgments entered against it and Chicago Motor Cars’s admissions in deposition and arbitration testimony regarding those judgments for fraud, the Arbitrator ruled against Chicago Motor Cars. He held that all of Bates’s many videos, which were the subject of the arbitration hearing, could remain posted on the internet. Mr. Bates’s First Amendment right to speak his mind and voice his opinions, even using harsh language, was vindicated. Consumers have a right to know that the business they are dealing with has a history of fraud judgments and to take that information into account in making a major purchase decision for a luxury, high priced car. Chicago Motor Cars’s owners admitted when we cross examined them that Bates had a First Amendment right to publish on the internet facts about the fraud judgments entered against Chicago Motor Cars.

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In an appeal of the decertification of a class action lawsuit, a federal appeals court denied a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs/appellants, who settled with the defendants after decertification, still had a stake in the litigation. Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 688 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to an “incentive award” or “enhancement fee” for serving as class representatives, but only if the case was certified as a class action. Id. at 874-75. This gave them an ongoing stake in the litigation, they argued, and therefore gave them standing to appeal decertification. The court agreed, finding that dismissing their appeal on standing grounds would not serve judicial economy, as another class member could simply step in and appeal.

Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court, does not say much about the underlying lawsuit, except that it consists of both class action and collective action claims. The three named plaintiffs brought collective action claims against the defendant for alleged violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, and class action claims for supplemental state law claims. The difference between a class action and a collective action under federal law, the court notes, is not particularly relevant to the question at hand.

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While an offer of reward might not be viewed as a contract (much less a reward offered via social media sites such as Twitter and YouTube), such an offer can still be considered binding. That is the claim made by Armin Augstein who found and returned the laptop belonging to the “Diamond Girl” singer, Ryan Leslie.

The laptop went missing in October 2010 from the back of a Mercedes S350 that was briefly left unattended when Leslie was escorted by security into a nightclub in Cologne, Germany. The bag containing the laptop also held $10,000 in cash and Leslie’s passport. But it was the computer and the hard drive, which contained the rapper’s music, that Leslie was anxious to have returned to him. He initially offered a $20,000 reward for the return of the MacBook. Then he took to Twitter and YouTube to announce that the reward had been increased to $1 million.

52-year-old German Armin Augstein said he found the laptop on a park bench while walking is dog in Stommelerbusch, Germany, about a month after the laptop went missing. The rapper allegedly reneged on his promise of the $1 million reward, claiming he couldn’t retrieve his recording sessions from the hard drive. Augstein then sued the Harlem-based musician for backing out of his promise of a reward to whomever should return the laptop. Michael Fischman, Augstein’s U.S.-based attorney, was quoted at the time as saying that it was “unfortunate that my client has to go to such lengths to recover the reward.” The lawsuit, which was filed in U.S. District Court in Manhattan and sought the $1 million reward, plus interest and listed Ryan Leslie and his company, NextSelection, as defendants.

A New York federal jury ruled in favor of Augstein’s claim for the reward in 2012 and ordered Leslie and NextSelection to pay Augstein $1.18 million. Leslie has still refused to pay up though, and Augstein is now accusing the R&B artist of hiding funds in order to avoid paying him the court-ordered reward. Augstein has recently asked state judges to order Leslie to pay the promised reward from funds held by Les is More, the corporation that pays all of Leslie’s personal bills. The lawsuit, which was filed in Manhattan Supreme Court, alleges that “Les is More was formed to replace NextSelection and thereby shield (Leslie’s) assets.”

While many people insist on having certain promises made in writing for fear that, otherwise, there will be no way to make sure the person making the promise comes through on their end of the deal, such lengths are not always necessary. Many courts recognize verbal contracts and, in a scenario such as this one, where there is a digital record of the promise, a case can easily be made that a contract was entered into. Leslie’s tweet and YouTube video led Augstein to reasonably believe that he would receive a substantial reward in return for returning the musician’s MacBook and hard drive, regardless of whether anything could be retrieved from them.

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An Illinois federal court granted a motion to dismiss in a putative shareholder derivative class action, having already denied the plaintiff’s application for a temporary restraining order (TRO). Noble v. AAR Corp., et al, No. 12 C 7973, memorandum and order (E.D. Ill., Apr. 3, 2013). The plaintiff asserted causes of action for various alleged breaches of fiduciary duty on behalf of the corporation, but the court found that the lawsuit was a direct action, primarily for the plaintiff’s benefit as a shareholder, rather than a derivative one.

The dispute related to a recommendation by the Board of Directors to the shareholders of AAR Corporation, a publicly-traded company, regarding an executive compensation plan. The Board made a unanimous proposal regarding the corporation’s “say on pay” plan, which allowed the shareholders to vote on executive pay as required by Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1. In a seventy-page proxy statement, the Board asked the shareholders to approve an advisory resolution regarding executive compensation at the corporation’s annual shareholder meeting, which was scheduled for October 10, 2012.

The plaintiff filed suit against the corporation and individual Board members, alleging that the Proxy Statement failed to disclose various details about what the Board considered before making its proposal. Noble, memorandum at 5. He claimed that the individual defendants breached their fiduciary duties of good faith, care, and loyalty to the shareholders, and that the corporation aided and abetted these breaches. Id. at 5-6. The defendants removed the case to federal court on October 4, 2012. The following day, the plaintiff filed a motion for a TRO, asking the court to stop the shareholder vote. The court held a hearing on October 9 and denied the motion. On October 10, the shareholders approved the Board’s proposal, with seventy-seven percent of the shares voting in favor. Id. at 1-2.

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Despite the fact that some state laws have been working against non-compete clauses in employee contracts, companies continue to find ways around them. While California has been the least tolerant by banning non-compete clauses altogether, other states, such as Massachusetts, have taken more moderate approaches by seeking merely to limit the scope of such contracts.

Non-compete agreements usually exist as part of a contract between an employee and her employer. The non-compete clause states that the employee will not work for one of the company’s competitors for so many months after termination of her employment with her current employer. Such clauses are usually limited by geography as well as time and the idea is to protect the trade secrets of the employer.

Non-compete clauses are usually included in an employee’s initial contract or (if she doesn’t sign an individual contract) in the employee handbook or manual. If a company wants to change its policy regarding existing employees, then it is subject to the requirement of consideration. This requirement means that both the employer and the employee must gain something from the new or altered contract in order for it to be enforceable in a court of law.

Our Chicago non-compete agreement lawyers observed that in its recent attempt to bypass these new restrictions, Best Buy Co. Inc., (which employs about 5,200 people at its corporate headquarters in Richfield, MN) has offered future stock considerations to hundreds of mid-level executives, including the vice presidents and directors.

These stock considerations are to be in exchange for the executives signing new employment contracts with Best Buy, which include a non-compete clause. The clause prohibits the employees from working for any of Best Buy’s competitors anywhere in the world for 12 months after termination of their employment with Best Buy. By offering something of value to the employees in exchange for signing the new contract, Best Buy gets around the consideration requirement.

If an employee were to dispute this new non-compete clause, most state courts would consider the benefit of the clause to the employer as far as protecting intellectual property, confidential business practices, etc. against the employee’s interests in pursuing other employment. The balance struck between these two will, ideally, result in a determination of the clause’s “reasonableness”. There are two key factors which are normally used to determine reasonableness: time and geography.

While some courts have upheld non-compete clauses which extend for a year or more, Best Buy’s geographical limitation prevents the employee from working for any of Best Buy’s competitors anywhere in the world. This may not meet the requirements for reasonableness as it inordinately benefits Best Buy over the employee.

Another argument an employee could use to challenge the clause is to question whether Best Buy has anything of value to protect. As a retailer, Best Buy does not create anything of its own; it merely resells products made by other companies. Even the services that Best Buy offers, such as installation and repair, are not the kinds of services which typically consist of any kind of confidential information recognized by the courts.

This is just one instance of a company’s response to the changes in law regarding non-compete clauses. No doubt we will see many more before long.

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Despite all of the patents and trademarks out there, one might assume that, at the very least, one’s own family history would be safe. However, according to Georgette Mosbacher, the owner of Borghese Inc., that is not the case.

The Borghese family is a noble Italian family, which has included royalty, rulers, philosophers, and a pope. In the 1950s, Borghese Inc. was started by Princess Marcella Borghese and Revlon and has since been developed into a well-known cosmetics brand. In 1976, Revlon bought the rights, title, and interest to the Borghese cosmetics brand. According to the court papers, this included “the words BORGHESE, MARCELLA BORGHESE”, and “PRINCESS MARCELLA BORGHESE”.

In 1992, Revlon sold Borghese Inc. to Ms. Mosbacher, who then became its chief executive. She then reached an agreement with the family regarding final payments, although those have also been disputed.

Since then, Princess Marcella’s descendants have made their own mark on the beauty industry. Her son, Francesco, started his own line of beauty products in the early 1980s under names such as Orlane, Perlier, and Elariia. Beginning in the 1990s, the family (including Francesco, his wife, Amanda, and their son, Lorenzo) started making appearances on the home shopping channel QVC and, after that, HSN.

While none of the products are sold under the Borghese name, their marketing does include the noble lineage of the Borghese family. However, Borghese Inc. argues that that heritage is no longer theirs to capitalize on.

According to Mark N. Mutterperl, the attorney representing Borghese Inc., the lawsuit “is not different than if any other brand name with a surname like Lauder, McDonald, Heinz, Gallo, Ferragamo were to take steps as they do to stop others from using their intellectual property rights”.

Mark Evens, the attorney for the Borghese family, argues that Borghese Inc. “has suffered no harm. No dilution of their mark. No counterfeiting. No palming off.”

For decades, the Borghese family coexisted peacefully with Borghese Inc. It wasn’t until 2006, when Lorenzo entered into discussions with ABC to possibly appear on “The Bachelor” that things started to get heated. It was then that ABC mentioned Lorenzo’s grandmother as the woman who “started the famed self-named cosmetics line, Borghese Inc.” Although there is nothing factually incorrect about this assertion, Ms. Mosbacher nevertheless appeared to feel that her toes were being stepped on. She wrote to Mr. Borghese to warn him not to “cause any false impression in the marketplace that there is a connection or relationship between yourself and Borghese Inc. and our cosmetics products.”

In 2008, Lorenzo applied for a federal trademark for a line of pet shampoos and conditioners called “La Dolce Vita by Prince Lorenzo Borghese” for PetSmart. Borghese Inc. contested the trademark and, as the trademark approached approval in 2010, Borghese Inc. filed a lawsuit against the family.

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There are multiple reasons why so many people are up in arms against the rising prevalence of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in our crops. Aside from the debate as to whether consuming food that has been genetically modified is safe, the issue of contamination is potentially a very serious problem.

Recently, Monsanto has been prominent in the news and in the courts, often depicted as an evil corporation putting the health of the public at risk for the sake of profit. Now the company is facing several lawsuits from farmers who claim that they have suffered financial harm as a result of Monsanto’s genetically modified wheat having been found in a wheat field in Oregon. In late May, the U.S. Department of Agriculture announced that a wheat farmer in Oregon had discovered Monsanto’s genetically modified wheat growing on his farm alongside his conventional wheat.

The announcement was followed by European and Asian buyers quickly backing out of buying American wheat when they heard of the contamination. Consumers in Europe and Asia have much stronger feelings against GMOs than American consumers. Both South Korea and Japan have suspended certain purchases of American wheat. The European Union has said it will increase the testing of produce coming in from the United States.

The announcement made by the Department of Agriculture and the ensuing loss of overseas buyers for American wheat has led to a series of lawsuits against Monsanto. Clarmar Farms, Inc., farmer Tom Stahl, and the Center for Food Safety have filed a lawsuit against Monsanto in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The lawsuit is seeking class-action status on behalf of other farmers it alleges have been harmed by the lower wheat prices, which have resulted from overseas buyers backing out of buying American wheat.

A similar lawsuit was filed a few days prior by a wheat farmer in Kansas who alleges that he and other farmers have been financially harmed by lower wheat prices as a result of the discovery of Monsanto’s genetically modified wheat in American crops. Two other farmers have also filed similar lawsuits in federal court for the western district of Washington state.

The experimental wheat was initially developed by Monsanto in order to withstand treatments of its Roundup weed killer. The product was never commercialized though, due to widespread industry opposition. International buyers were already threatening to stop buying American wheat if the GMOs ever entered the marketplace. The decision to end attempts at commercializing the wheat was announced in 2004.

The field testing of the genetically modified wheat that Monsanto did in many states was supposed to have kept the experimental wheat from contaminating conventional wheat supplies.
Following the most recent onslaught of lawsuits, Monsanto has said that, when it ended testing on the genetically modified wheat, it ordered the wheat to be destroyed or shipped to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s seed storage facility in Colorado. Company officials have denied knowing how their wheat could have made its way into a wheat farm in Oregon.

Kyle McCain, an attorney for Monsanto, has called the lawsuits premature. He claims that the wheat “is limited to one field in Oregon, and no such wheat has entered the stream of commerce”. However, the genetically modified wheat has been found in one farm of conventional wheat, it takes no stretch of the imagination to think that the modified wheat has made its way, undetected, onto other farms and into the marketplace. When this possibility is taken into consideration, especially given the claims of GMOs’ potentially harmful effects, it is no wonder buyers overseas are hesitant to buy American wheat.

Monsanto insists that it followed “a government directed, rigorous, well-documented and audited” program when conducting experiments on the genetically modified wheat.
The lawsuit filed in Spokane, Washington, alleges that Monsanto’s failure to contain genetically modified wheat qualifies as “wrongful conduct” which has potentially contaminated “the entire wheat farming and production chain” and puts many wheat farmers at continued risk of harm by cross-pollination with and contamination of their crops. The lawsuit has not named a number for specific monetary damages, but it is seeking compensatory, as well as punitive damages. It also asks that Monsanto be made to decontaminate equipment, storage, and transportation facilities.

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