Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

Class Action Lawsuits for Water Contamination – Osarczuk v. Associated Univs. Inc.

March 8, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Toxic contamination class actions often include claims by plaintiffs asserting a whole host of problems, from serious health and medical conditions to wide-scale property damage. In Osarczuk v. Associated Univs. Inc., the New York Supreme Court for Suffolk County considered the additional economic damages caused when drinking water is contaminated.

The plaintiffs, a number of people living near the Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, New York, brought an action against the defendant, the laboratory’s owner and operator, alleging that the defendant unlawfully emitted toxic substances such as trichloroethane, tritium, strontium-90, uranium, argon-41 and cesium-137 into the air, soil and ground water near the lab. This, according to the plaintiffs, caused health problems, including cancer, nausea, headaches, and various immune conditions, to people living in the surrounding area as well as property damage and economic damage as a result of being forced to switch water sources. The plaintiffs sought both compensatory and punitive damages for the injuries incurred.

The plaintiffs also asked the court to certify a plaintiff class (broken into various sub-classes) consisting of people who live or work within a 10-mile radius of the lab and who have suffered personal injury or property damage as a result of the alleged pollution.

Class certification allows one or more members of a class of similarly situated plaintiffs to sue on behalf of all class members. Under New York law, a class may be certified only where: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) the class shares common questions of law or fact which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; (3) the class representatives’ claims are typical of those of the class; (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and (5) a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. A plaintiff seeking class certification bears the burden of proving that these requirements have been met, but need not prove that it is likely to succeed on the actual merits of the lawsuit.

The court determined that the plaintiffs satisfied each of the requirements for class certification, but limited the class to those persons living in the proscribed radius who allege to have suffered either property damage as a result of the contamination or financial loss when they were forced to switch from free local well water to that provided by the local water authority when the wells allegedly became contaminated. In so doing, the court noted that these class members share common questions regarding both their damages, including the costs attendant with switching to another water source, as well as the defendant’s legal liability for these and other injuries.

Illinois Appellate Court Denies Request for a New Trial After $1.2 million Verdict for Fraudulent Misrepresentation in Commercial Property Transaction

February 23, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Most businesses are of the brick and mortar variety, meaning that they have a physical location where they conduct operations, and as a result these business have to either buy or rent properties to acquire the space they need. At DiTommaso Lubin, our Elgin business attorneys have handled many commercial and industrial building sale disputes, and are always researching the law in that area to better serve our clients. Napcor Corporation v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA is one such case about material misrepresentations made in the sale of a commercial property.

In Napcor Corporation v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, Plaintiff purchased a large commercial building from Defendants. Prior to the sale, the building’s roof allegedly began to leak significantly, and the building’s broker performed an inspection to determine the extent of the damage. The broker allegedly concluded that the existing roof needed to be removed and replaced to fix the problems. Instead of replacing the damaged roof, Defendant constructed a second roof over the first because it was a cheaper option. This second roof was constructed in spite of the fact that Defendant was allegedly warned that the new roof would be susceptible to being torn off by winds. Additionally, the original leakage problem allegedly remained after the new roof’s construction.

The building was then listed for sale, and the pertinent part of the listing stated that the building had a “new roof in 1994 (tear off).” In 1996, Plaintiff purchased the building for $1.309 million through a contract where Plaintiff agreed to accept the building “as is”, and had a 30-day due diligence period. Plaintiff was allegedly not made aware of the leaks, and relied upon Defendant’s alleged representation that the old roof had been torn off. Upon moving into the building, Plaintiff allegedly found the leakage problem and over several years three sections of the roof blew off on three different occasions. Plaintiff then filed suit for fraudulent misrepresentation, and was awarded a $1.2 million judgment after a trial by jury.

Defendant appealed the decision and asked for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial based upon faulty jury instructions and the exclusion of evidence that Plaintiff agreed to accept the building in its “as is” condition. Defendant contended that the jury instruction failed to state that Plaintiff had the burden of proof to show all the elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion.

The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial. The Court made its decision because the ‘as is’ language in the purchase agreement did not preclude Plaintiff from claiming it relied on the alleged misrepresentations, and the clause also did not serve as a defense to fraud. As such, the Court decided, the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finally, the Court denied the request for a new trial because the lower court used an IPI civil jury instruction that accurately stated the law, and in doing so, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Business Owners Beware, Make Sure Your Employment Agreements are Clearly Written and Reasonable

February 2, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Every business has employees, and as business litigators, the attorneys at DiTommaso Lubin pride ourselves on being knowledgeable about all the areas of law that affect our clients, including employment laws. Our Orland Park business attorneys recently discovered a case that has an impact on companies who utilize employment non-competition agreements with their employees.

Reliable Fire Equipment Company v. Arredondo pits an employer against two former employees, Defendants Arredondo and Garcia, who worked as fire alarm system salesmen for Plaintiff. Each Defendant signed an employment agreement where Defendant’s would allegedly earn commissions of varying percentages of the gross profits on items or systems sold. After working for Plaintiff for several years, Defendants created Defendant High Rise Security Systems, LLC., which was allegedly a competitor to Plaintiff’s business. Plaintiff eventually became aware that Defendants were starting an alleged competitor company, and asked Defendants if in fact they had created a fire alarm business. Defendant Arredondo allegedly denied that he was starting such a business, and resigned shortly afterward, with Defendant Garcia tendering his resignation two weeks after Arredondo.

Plaintiff then filed suit alleging breach of the duty of fidelity and loyalty, conspiracy to compete against Plaintiff and misappropriation of confidential information, tortious interference of prospective economic advantage, breach of the employment agreements, and unjust enrichment. The trial court held that the employment agreements were unenforceable because of unreasonable geographic and solicitation restrictions and the fact that language of the agreements was unclear. A trial on the issues unrelated to the employment agreement ensued, and Defendants successfully moved for a directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence that Defendants competed with Plaintiffs prior to Arredondo’s resignation.

Plaintiff then appealed the trial court’s ruling that the employment agreements in question were unenforceable and the directed jury verdict. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s directed verdict, stating that the lower court had properly weighed the evidence in finding a total lack of competent evidence. The Court then analyzed the restrictive covenants under the legitimate business interest test and found that the geographic restrictions were not reasonable and therefore the trial court did not err in ruling that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable.

Reliable Fire Equipment Company v. Arredondo illustrates why it is so important for business owners to keep an eye on their employees, and serves as a warning for companies wanting to sue former employees based upon non-competition agreements. Furthermore, the case shows that courts frown upon the use of vague language in such agreements, and it is always in your best interests to keep the terms of employment agreements reasonable.

Appellate Court Applies 10 Year Statute of Limitations in Construction Indemnity Case

January 12, 2012 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

DiTommaso Lubin represents clients all over the Chicago-land area, and because Chicago is a growing metropolis, land comes at a premium. This means that there is constant property development going on all over our fair city, and with that development comes unique legal problems. Water Tower Realty Company v. Fordham is a case that was decided in the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division that addresses some of the problems that arise when companies perform construction in close proximity to neighboring businesses.

In Water Tower Realty Company v. Fordham, Defendant Fordham constructed a building on a parcel of land in Chicago, and prior to its construction, Defendant agreed to indemnify Plaintiff Water Tower for losses suffered due to the erection of the edifice. Five years after the building was finished, Plaintiff filed suit alleging that during construction Defendant had “so used its property as to make it impossible to lease” an adjacent property. Plaintiff claimed that it had lost over $75,000 in rental business as a result and that Defendant had refused to indemnify Plaintiff for this loss. Plaintiff filed for a dismissal of the action, and the trial court dismissed the claims because they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations as set forth in 735 ILCS 2-619(a)(5). Defendant then appealed the trial court’s dismissal.

The Appellate Court analyzed whether the trial court was correct in applying the four year statutory period or whether a ten year period was appropriate. The Court found that the nature of the injury was determinative in making such a decision, with the four year term applying if the injury was due to a construction-related activity, and the ten year term applying if the harm was caused by a breach of contract. In reversing the lower court’s dismissal, the Appellate Court concluded that the appropriate statute of limitations was the ten year term because the Plaintiff’s injury was caused by Defendant’s failure to honor the indemnity agreement. The Court went on to hold that the agreement’s indemnity provisions applied to both first party and third party claims, and that it contained no language that could hold Defendant’s agents personally liable for Plaintiff’s damages.

Illinois Appellate Court Dismisses Lawsuit Between Truck Manufacturer and Franchisee

December 22, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

DiTommaso Lubin represents clients from many industries who operate all kinds of businesses, including both franchisors and franchisees. Our Aurora business attorneys came across an appellate decision from the Fourth District here in Illinois that involves a dispute that arose out of a franchise agreement between a heavy-duty truck manufacturer and a truck dealer.

Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp. is a disagreement that came about after the two parties entered into a sales and service agreement where Plaintiff Crossroads had the right to purchase Sterling Trucks and vehicle parts from Defendants and Defendants “reserved the right to discontinue at any time the manufacture or sale” of their parts or change the design or specs of any products without prior notice to Plaintiff. Several years after entering the agreement, Defendants allegedly announced that they were discontinuing the production of Sterling trucks and that Detroit Diesel Corporation (the truck’s engine manufacturer) would cease accepting orders as well. Defendant sent written notice of these decisions to Plaintiffs. Defendants decided to discontinue manufacture of the Sterling vehicles allegedly because they were duplicative of other vehicles manufactured by Sterling’s parent company.

In response to this notice, Plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, fraud, and tortious interference with contract. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on all counts, which was granted in part by the trial court because Defendants’ discontinuance and re-branding of the Sterling brand constituted good cause for terminating the contract. Plaintiff then filed an interlocutory appeal for the trial court’s partial dismissal.

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the violations of sections 4(d)(1) of the Franchise Act because Plaintiffs failed to allege specific facts supporting each element of violation under the Act and instead merely made conclusory allegations for each violation. The Court also found that the allegations under section 9 of the Act were improperly plead, as Plaintiff’s allegations contained only conclusions without the specific facts required by the Act. The Court then upheld the lower court’s ruling as to the allegations under section 9.5 of the Act because the sales and service agreement remained in effect and had not been terminated. Next the Court found the dismissal of the fraud claims to be proper because Plaintiff failed to allege a misrepresentation of a present fact and dismissed the claims under section 4(b) of the act because Defendant’s conduct was neither arbitrary nor in bad faith. Finally, the Court did not address the alleged 4(d)(6) violations due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as such violations are within the purview of the Review Board under section 12(d) of the Act.

Federal Court Indicates Equitable Tolling Only Available in FLSA Cases When There is Evidence of Deception by Defendants

December 1, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

DiTommaso Lubin handles wage and hour class action litigation on a regular basis, and many of our clients’ claims are based upon violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Our Schaumburg unpaid overtime attorneys were interested to see a recent class-action brought by restaurant workers alleging violations of the FLSA.

Cao v. Wu Liang Ye Lexington Rest., Inc. is a suit filed by twenty-four employees of two restaurants in New York City. The employees worked as waiters, delivery workers, and a food packer for Defendants and filed suit for unpaid minimum and overtime wages, illegal tip deductions, expense reimbursement for the purchase and maintenance of bicycles and uniforms. Plaintiffs also sought statutory liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs filed for default, which was granted by the Court. Plaintiffs subsequently submitted their damages calculations and Defendants opposed Plaintiffs’ application for damages on the basis that Plaintiffs’ calculations were inflated and Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were not willful.

The Court addressed Defendants’ arguments by first discussing the applicable law. The limitations period for FLSA claims is generally two years, but is three years for defendants that willfully break the law. The Court then ruled that the three year statute of limitations was applicable because Defendants defaulted and therefore admitted Plaintiffs’ willfulness allegations. The Court also found the longer statute of limitations applied because Defendants admitted that they did not try to learn about the FLSA’s requirements until just prior to the commencement of the lawsuit. Plaintiffs argued that they should receive unpaid wages for the entirety of their employment under the doctrine of equitable tolling due to the fact that Defendants failed to post a notice explaining the FLSA in plain view of employees. The Court saw no reason to extend Plaintiffs’ claims beyond the statutory three year period because Defendants’ had not engaged in any sort of deception or other exceptional activity, and prior case law held that equitable tolling only applies in unusual circumstances. The Court finished by granting Plaintiffs damages for unpaid minimum wage, overtime wages, unlawful tip deductions, reimbursement for bicycle expenses, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, and attorneys’ fees.

The Court denied reimbursement for uniform expenses because most of the clothing worn by employees could be “worn as a part of the employees’ ordinary wardrobe.” Plaintiffs did also wear a red vest that could be considered outside an ordinary wardrobe, but there was no evidence in the record that Plaintiffs’ incurred expenses obtaining or cleaning the red vests.

Cao v. Wu Liang Ye Lexington Rest., Inc. provides future wage and hour litigants with several lessons when it comes to preparing damages applications. First and foremost, courts are unlikely to apply equitable tolling to extend the FLSA’s statute of limitations in the absence of intentional deception or fraud by defendants. Additionally, this case serves as a reminder that employees should keep accurate records of work related expenses if they wish to recover damages under the FLSA.

Appellate Court Rules that Adding an Arbitration Clause to an Insurance Agreement Does Not Constitute a Change in Coverage under Illinois Law

November 10, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Workers’ compensation insurance is a necessary part of doing business for many companies, so the attorneys at DiTommaso Lubin are always on the lookout for emerging legal issues in that area. Our Naperville business attorneys recently discovered a decision rendered by the Appellate Court of Illinois that is significant for current and potential clients who have workers’ compensation insurance agreements that contain an arbitration clause.

All-American Roofing, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Company pits Plaintiff All-American Roofing against its Defendant insurer, Zurich American in a lawsuit that arose from alleged unpaid deductibles and retrospective insurance premiums. The five-year insurance agreement was based upon retrospectively rated premiums that required Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant after the end of a policy year for claims that arose during that year. After the fourth year, the policy exchanged the retrospectively rated premiums for a larger deductible. The dispute began when Defendant summoned Plaintiff to arbitration regarding the aforementioned unpaid sums pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause contained within the parties’ agreement. In response to the arbitration summons, All-American Roofing filed for declaratory judgment along with claims for breach of contract, fraud, and related causes of action. Plaintiff requested that the trial court declare that the mandatory arbitration clause was unenforceable and sought damages for their other claims. The trial court stayed the arbitration, dismissed most of Plaintiffs claims through summary judgment and ordered the parties to arbitrate the remaining issues. Plaintiff then appealed the trial court’s rulings regarding the arbitration clause, contract, and fraud claims.

On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the arbitration clause was added to their policy after the first year of coverage and that the clause constituted a material alteration to the policy’s coverage. Furthermore, Plaintiff argued that the Illinois Insurance Code required Defendant to give notice that it was not renewing the original coverage. Because Defendant failed to give such notice, the arbitration clause did not legally take effect. The Appellate Court disagreed, stating that the addition of an arbitration clause did not constitute a change in coverage, and cited the plain language of the statute for their reasoning. The Court went on to hold that the agreements and subsequent addenda to it for the first two years were valid because the parties lawfully entered into the agreements and there was sufficient consideration on both sides. The Court also upheld the trial courts granting of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s fraud claim because there was not sufficient evidence in the record of fraud nor had Plaintiffs identified any material issue regarding Defendant’s alleged violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The Court held that the arbitration clause was not operative for the final two year of the agreement because Plaintiffs never signed the amended policy documents for those years. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court on this issue because they disagreed with the trial court’s ruling that Plaintiff’s payment and acceptance of coverage signified acceptance of the new terms.

All-American Roofing, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Company provides a valuable lesson to business owners who utilize arbitration clauses in their contracts. Namely, this case tells us to read the fine print in any contract before signing it, as you may be getting more (or less, depending on your point of view) than you originally bargained for.

The Commonality and Numerosity Requirements in Missouri Class Action Certification – Doyle v. Fluor Corp.

October 20, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

“Commonality” and “Numerosity” are two of a handful of factors that most courts consider in deciding whether to allow a toxic dumping lawsuit to proceed as a class action. In Doyle v. Fluor Corp., a Missouri appellate court explains these requirements and how they should be applied in a particular matter.

Plaintiffs brought the action alleging that Defendants, owners and operators of a smelting (the process by which metal is extracted from ore) business in Herculaneum, Missouri, released lead, heavy metals and other toxic substances into the air, which in turn caused damage to real property in the surrounding area. Plaintiffs sought damages under theories of negligence, private nuisance, strict liability, and trespass. The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the matter as a class action with the class representatives suing on behalf of nearly 400 people who “own and occupy” residential real property in the area near Defendants’ operation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for Missouri’s Eastern District upheld the decision to certify the class. A class may be certified under Missouri law where: 1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 2) common questions of law or fact exist among the class; 3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of that of the class; and 4) the representative parties are able to fairly and adequately protect the class’ interest. In addition, a court considering certification must also determine that the common factual or legal questions “predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” and that a class action is more suitable than other methods to fairly and efficiently adjudicate the issue.

In affirming the trial court’s decision, the court noted that the “commonality” requirement does not mean that all issues in a particular action be common to all class members, but instead that the common issues predominate over the others. “A single common issue may be the overriding one in a matter, despite the existence of numerous remaining individual questions,” the court ruled. In this case, several of the action’s central issues were shared among the class, including whether Defendants were responsible for emitting toxic metals in to the air; whether such an act constitutes negligence; and whether the pollution caused property in Herculaneum to be contaminated.

llinois Appellate Court Rules that a Relocation Provision in a Commercial Lease Must Abide by State Regulations

October 20, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Earlier this year, the Appellate Court of Illinois handed down an opinion that has implications for businesses with leased premises. Our Aurora business attorneys found Bright Horizons Children’s Centers LLC v. Riverway Midwest LLC, which is a dispute regarding a commercial lease that was initially filed in Cook County.

Bright Horizons is a company that operates day care facilities across the state of Illinois. The company entered into a ten year commercial lease agreement with Riverway for a property in Rosemont, Illinois. The lease agreement contained restrictive language allowed for the building to only be used for a child-care center. The agreement also contained a relocation provision which gave Riverway the right to relocate Bright Horizons, upon 180 day written notice, to a different property of equal quantity and quality to the original premises. The dispute between these two parties arose when Riverway sought to invoke the relocation clause less than one year into the lease.

Riverway attempted to exercise the relocation provision on three occasions. The first attempt was unsuccessful because the alternative premises allegedly presented to Bright Horizons did not meet the requirements of the lease agreement. Bright Horizons accepted the second space offered by Riverway, but Riverway withdrew their notice before renovating the new facilities to meet the requirements of the lease. Riverway then proposed a third relocation premises, and allegedly informed Bright Horizons that if they were unable to agree on an alternative space, Riverway would terminate the lease in 180 days from the date of the notice. This third property allegedly ran afoul of state licensing standards for child care facilities and the Illinois Administrative Code. Bright Horizons informed Riverway that the third property did not meet Illinois’ licensing standards and could not be legally used as a child care facility. In response, Riverway informed Bright Horizons that they were in default of the lease and that Bright Horizons could cure their default by relocating to the third alternative premises.

Bright Horizons then filed for declaratory judgment requesting that the trial court find: 1) that they were not in breach of the lease, 2) that Riverway could not terminate the lease, and 3) that Riverway had failed to properly exercise the relocation clause of the lease agreement. Bright Horizons then filed for summary judgment on these issues, which was granted by the trial court. Riverway then appealed the trial court’s ruling. On appeal the Appellate Court agreed with the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Bright Horizons. In so ruling, the Court held that the lease allowed for one permitted use of the premises and required that Bright Horizons comply with all laws and regulations, including the state child-care licensing standards. The Court held that Bright Horizons’ relocation to the proffered space would violate state regulations and cause Bright Horizons to be in breach of the lease due to their inability to operate a child-care. As such, the Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Bright Horizons.

Consideration in Illinois Noncompete Agreements: How Much Is Enough? LKQ Corporation v. Thrasher

October 15, 2011 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

In order to hold an employee or former employee liable under an agreement not to compete, an employer must offer the employee some form of consideration in exchange for the employee’s promise not to compete with the employer. The Northern District of Illinois tackles the difficult question of how much consideration is enough in LKQ Corporation v. Thrasher.

Plaintiff LKQ Corporation is a national automobile parts supplier. In January 2010, Plaintiff hired Defendant Corey Thrasher as a Sales Representative, handling accounts in the Northwest United States. Defendant signed a noncompete agreement shortly after he was hired, allegedly stating that he would not compete with Plaintiff nor solicit Plaintiff’s customers during his employment and for one year following the end thereof. The noncompete agreement also included a forum selection clause designating that any actions related to the contract be raised in Illinois and considered under Illinois law.

One year later, Defendant resigned from his position, effective February 2011. On the day he resigned, Defendant allegedly contacted a number of Plaintiff’s customers via email, telling them that he had taken a similar position with B&R Auto Wrecking, Inc. and that he was looking forward to continuing to work with these customers. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has continued to solicit LKQ customers to purchase B&R merchandise and that several LKQ clients have decreased their business with LKQ as a result.

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Defendant breached the non-compete agreement. The court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss the action, in which he argued that the agreement lacked sufficient consideration to be enforceable. The court concluded that Plaintiff received continued employment for a “substantial period” following the execution of the agreement, which constituted adequate consideration, and therefore the agreement was enforceable.
In order for a contract to be enforceable, the promises therein must be given in exchange for consideration. Typically, consideration is anything of value received in exchange for a promise. In the employment context, however, a party seeking to enforce an noncompete agreement must prove that sufficient consideration was given in exchange for the promise not to compete because the simple benefit of continued employment is illusory: employment is at will and a person who signs a noncompete agreement can still be fired at any time. Thus, only continued employment for a “substantial period” or some other form of consideration is sufficient to support a noncompete agreement.