A trial court may have personal jurisdiction over a defendant outside Illinois, but only if it can determine that the defendant’s alleged tort was motivated for personal reasons, the First District Court of Appeal has ruled. Femal v. Square D Company, No. 1-07-1990 (Ill. 1st Jan. 29, 2009). The ruling came in a complex Illinois business dispute between Michael Femal, a former employee at electrical equipment manufacturer Schneider Electric, and James O’Shaughnessy, a lawyer for a company accused of violating a Schneider patent.

Femal patented a process for his employer, Square D, which was bought by Schneider Automation, Inc. Schneider sold the patent to Solaia Technologies, which was to enforce the patent and give Schneider a percentage of its earnings. Schneider agreed to let Femal help Solaia enforce the patent, for which he was to get 2% of Solaia’s earnings.

Among the alleged infringers Solaia sued was Wisconsin-based Rockwell International, which countersued Solaia for bad faith patent enforcement. The sides had a settlement conference in Illinois that included O’Shaughnessy, Rockwell’s attorney. At this meeting, Rockwell raised allegations that Femal could best refute, leading Solaia to cancel its percentage arrangement with Femal and put him on a much less lucrative hourly wage to serve as a witness. Schneider then hired outside counsel to look into the propriety of Femal’s percentage arrangement with Solaia, and eventually fired him for misuse of compay assets, gross misrepresentations and gross failure of professional judgment.

 

As Illinois Internet trademark infringement attorneys, we have kept track of the series of lawsuits filed against Google for selling advertisements using trademarked names and phrases. So we were not surprised to see an article in BusinessWeek July 13 announcing that Rosetta Stone, a maker of language-learning software, has sued Google for allowing competitors to buy its name for use in its Google AdWords advertisements. This was the ninth such lawsuit against Google for the same practices, although some have since been resolved.

Under the program, competitors to Rosetta Stone may bid for the right to have their own advertisements appear on the page of search results when a user searches for “Rosetta Stone.” The company contends that this is an illegal use of its trademark that forces it to spend thousands of dollars bidding on the keywords, so that competitors cannot have them. According to the article, the lawsuit was inspired by the loosening of Google’s AdWords restrictions. Until June 15, companies could not put the competitor’s name in their advertisements, although they could purchase the right to appear when users search for competitors. Now they may do either. This is tantamount to allowing competitors benefit from the goodwill and name recognition Rosetta Stone has invested in building, the company’s general counsel said.

The lawsuit’s chances are unclear. As the article points out, the case will likely hinge on whether consumers are legitimately confused by Google’s practices. No court has clarified this, making it an unsettled area of the law. However, in a different case, the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated a software company’s lawsuit against Google, saying selling trademarks as keywords counts as a “use in commerce” under trademark law. While trial courts in other circuits, including our own Seventh, are free to disagree, our Chicago Internet trademark litigation lawyers believe this is a promising sign that courts will allow a jury to consider the likelihood of consumer confusion.

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In a case of first impression, the Illinois First District Court of Appeal has ruled that copy shop Kinko’s may not be held liable under the Illinois Notary Public Act for misconduct by a notary it employed, but may be held liable for common-law negligence. In Vancura v. Katris, No. 1-06-2750 (Ill. 1st. Dec. 26, 2008) , the appeals court found that Kinko’s did not consent to the misconduct and vacated $233,000 in jury awards.

Plaintiff Richard Vancura helped fund a real estate investment by defendant Glenn Brown, who had trouble reselling the property. A mutual acquaintance, Randall Boatwright, agreed to give Vancura shares in his company in exchange for Brown’s debt to Vancura, which he agreed to lower. Brown then struck a related deal giving defendant Peter Katris an interest in the property and arranged a real estate closing at which all of these deals would be sealed. Boatwright and his business partner had Vancura sign some papers on the day before the closing, but then realized that some would have to be notarized. They visited a local Kinko’s for that purpose, but without Vancura. One of the documents they left with had purported signatures from Vancura and Gustavo Albear, the notary.

Several months later, Vancura called Brown and discovered that Brown believed the debt was resolved. Vancura, who had not been paid, did not agree, and eventually sued a variety of defendants, including Albear and Kinko’s; Brown and Katris also sued those defendants, along with Boatwright. After a bench trial, the trial court found Kinko’s liable to Vancura, Brown and Katris for violations of the Notary Public Act as well as negligent supervision and training of Albear. Kinko’s appealed both.

A trial court was correct to find a breach of fiduciary duty in a real estate partnership, the First District Court of Appeal ruled March 27. In 1515 North Wells LP v. 1513 North Wells LLC, No. 1-07-1881 (Ill. 1st. Dist. March 27, 2009), the appeals court also upheld the lower court’s rulings that one partner had breached his contract and that denied him a chance to amend his complaint to pierce the corporate veil.

The case grows out of a real estate development deal struck in 1997. Thomas Bracken, Mark Sutherland, Alex Pearsall and an uninvolved fourth partner formed 1515 North Wells LP, a limited partnership, to develop a condominium with retail space. Sutherland and Pearsall then created SP Development Corporation to serve as the general partner of 1515 North Wells LP. Bracken separately created 1513 North Wells LLC to own space in the building that was to be a health club. Bracken borrowed $250,000 to pay for his part of the property, and signed a note saying he agreed to pay it back no later than 15 days after receiving a financial statement from 1515 North Wells. He further agreed to pay it even if there was a dispute, then wait for a refund later.

To begin development, SP, the general partner, solicited bids for a general contractor. It hired yet another Sutherland and Pearsall company, Sutherland and Pearsall Development, even though its bid was the only one received that failed to state a maximum price for the project. The same general contractor, not 1515 North Wells, later received the profits from condominium upgrades.

In a Chicago legal malpractice lawsuit, the First District Court of Appeal has ruled that the defendant is not barred from certain defenses because the plaintiff improperly joined the malpractice claim with its underlying action. Preferred Personnel Services, Inc. v. Meltzer, Purtill & Stelle, LLP, No. 1-08-0389 (Ill. 1st. Jan 23, 2009).

Preferred is a staffing company with a claim against insurance broker Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Gallagher told Preferred that it had secured malpractice insurance for the company and accepted payment for those services, but Preferred later discovered that it had no insurance. Preferred hired Illinois law firm Meltzer, Purtill & Stelle to sue Gallagher, but the firm never started its case. More than two years later, Preferred and its new lawyers sued Gallagher for breach of contract, negligence and fraud. In the same suit, it also sued Meltzer and one of its attorneys, Thomas Palmer (collectively “Meltzer”), for malpractice.

Gallagher moved to dismiss because the statute of limitations had passed in 2001, a motion that was granted by the trial court and upheld by the appellate court. While that motion was pending, Meltzer moved to dismiss the claims against it, saying the malpractice claims were premature because the underlying claim was still viable until the appeals court had ruled. This motion was denied. After the appellate decision on the Gallagher dismissal, Preferred moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to foreclose arguments by Meltzer that the statute had not run on the Gallagher claims. The trial court granted this motion, but also certified three questions for the First District Court of Appeal to answer:

In a partnership dispute and breach of fiduciary duty claim, the First District Court of Appeal has ruled that an attorney may sue his former firm, but not his former partners. In Kehoe v. Harrold, Wildman, Allen & Dixon, No. 1-07-0435 (Ill. 1st Dec. 23, 2008), Robert Kehoe, a former partner in the firm, sued after partners voted to change him from equity partner to nonequity partner. That is, they voted to end his part ownership of the firm and make him a salaried employee.

In 1995, after Kehoe had been a partner in Harrold Wildman for sixteen years, the firm renegotiated its financing with its bank, a deal that required every equity partner to execute a personal guaranty acceptable to the bank. Kehoe objected to the proposed guaranty and was unable to find a compromise, despite offers to draft his own version. The bank allowed the firm to take out its loan anyway. Later, the firm amended its loan agreement with the bank to eliminate the guaranty requirement but specify that partners without a guaranty are personally liable for the full amount of the debt. A few months later, partner Eisel approached Kehoe about his lack of a guaranty, and Kehoe replied that the amendment made it unnecessary.

The firm’s management committee then met and adopted a resolution allowing a two-thirds vote of partners to change the status of any partner who failed to execute a guaranty. Kehoe was present and objected, and rebuffed later advice to sign the guaranty. The partners later voted to remove his equity status per the resolution. Over the next two days, Kehoe moved his clients to a law firm of his own; he also requested his equity be paid out and was denied. He sued individual partners, claiming they breached their fiduciary duty by advocating the resolution, and the firm as a whole for breaching their obligation to pay his equity share.

A client list and information on clients’ computer networks do not qualify as trade secrets under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided April 13 in a business trade secrets lawsuit. In System Development Services v. Haarman, No. 04-CH-30 (Ill. 5th 2009), System Development Services (SDS) sued four former employees who left to start a competing business offering networking services to businesses in Effingham County. A trial court found that the defendants had misappropriated a list of clients and potential clients, as well as information on SDS clients’ networks, but the Fifth District Court of Appeal overturned that decision.

SDS sets up and maintains computer networks for local businesses. It maintains a database of clients and potential clients, and stressed to employees that both the list and the clients’ network information should be kept private. Defendants Timothy Haarman, Jason Repking, Rick Hoene and Terry Oldham left SDS after a bad financial year and started a competing business, Technical Partners. None had signed a restrictive covenant limiting their right to compete with SDS. However, when starting out, they sent out a mailing to potential clients that SDS thought was suspiciously similar to addresses in its client database. They also relied on former SDS customers during their first month inbusiness. SDS sued them for violations of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act and breach of fiduciary duty.

At a bench trial, the plaintiff testified that some of the addresses at issue contained information not found in the telephone book, and that work orders and emails were deleted from their system shortly before defendants left. However, the company’s owners told the court that they had no personal knowledge that a client list was stolen. The defendants testified that they made their mailing list using the phone book, the Internet and a chamber of commerce listing. They also relied on client relationships formed at SDS and personal connections. One defendant testified that no special knowledge other than the ordinary knowledge of a network technician was necessary to serve SDS and Technical Partners clients.

DiTommaso Lubin’s Illinois breach of contract litigation attorneys were pleased to see a split Illinois Third District Court of Appeal decision clarifying the circumstances under which a post-employment restrictive covenant is valid. The decision came in Brown & Brown v. Patrick Mudron, No. 03-CH-1363 (Ill. 3rd March 11, 2008), in which a Florida insurance company sued a former employee for breaching a restrictive covenant in her employment agreement.

Diane Gunderson, the employee, worked for a Joilet, Ill. company that was taken over by Brown & Brown. Brown asked Gunderson to sign a new employment agreement with them, and in fact, fired an employee who refused to do so. The agreement said Gunderson’s employment could be terminated any time for any reason and prohibited her from soliciting or servicing any of Brown’s employees for two years after ending her employment with the company. She signed the agreement, but resigned seven months later and went to work for a competitor. Brown sued, alleging that Gunderson had breached the restrictive covenant at her new job. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Gunderson because it couldn’t find any evidence that she had breached the covenant, and Brown appealed.

The majority started by disposing of a “choice of law” provision in the contract requiring all disputes to be resolved in Brown’s home state of Florida. Illinois law applies anyway, the court wrote, because Illinois has a greater interest in the case and moving it to Florida would be against Illinois public policy interests. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Pioneer Life Insurance Co. of Illinois , 209 Ill. App. 3d (1990).

In a case based on the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that a victim of a bait-and-switch scheme for title insurance may sue his lender. Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., No. 07-2400 (7th Cir. Dec. 24, 2008). Charles Doss refinanced his mortgage in 2004, using a company called The Loan Arranger that did indeed arrange a loan for Doss with Franklin Financial Company. Franklin asked Doss to get title insurance, which he did through Clearwater Title Company.

Clearwater turned out to be an unlicensed company with a secret affiliation with The Loan Arranger. Doss was told via closing documents that the title insurance cost was $500, but was actually charged $1,470. In late 2006, Doss sued all three companies plus JP Morgan Chase, which held his mortgage, and Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc., which serviced it. However, Chase and Saxon had filed for foreclosure against Doss earlier in that year, and in response to the lawsuit, filed papers claiming that Doss had no claim because he had already sold his home. Doss replied that their quitclaim deed was a forgery and that indeed, he had filed documents showing he was still the owner. The trial court sided with Chase and Saxon and dismissed the homeowner’s claims.

Doss appealed; while the appeal was pending, an Illinois trial court found that the property had not changed hands. The Seventh Circuit first examined the claim by Chase and Saxon that the trial court had no jurisdiction under the TILA because Doss had sold the property. That was irrelevant, the court said, because the question was whether Doss had actually sold the property. On the dismissal itself, the Seventh found that the trial court should have treated the sale allegations by Chase and Saxon as a motion for summary judgment, which would have given Doss a chance to present and support his own assertions. This would have led the trial court to conclude that there was indeed a genuine issue of material fact in the case and continued the litigation, the opinion said.

 

The Federal Reserve Board has prepared an excellent summary of consumer rights available under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) in an online handbook on the FDCPA. You can view the handbook by clicking here.

Our consumer rights private law firm handles individual and class action unfair debt collection and other consumer fraud cases that government agencies and public interest law firms such as the FTC may not pursue. Class action lawsuits our law firm has been involved in or spear-headed have led to substantial awards totalling over a million dollars to organizations including the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Consumer Law Center, and local law school consumer programs. DiTommaso Lubin is proud of our achievements in assisting national and local consumer rights organizations obtain the funds needed to ensure that consumers are protected and informed of their rights. By standing up to consumer fraud and consumer rip-offs, and in the right case filing consumer protection lawsuits and class-actions you too can help ensure that other consumers’ rights are protected from consumer rip-offs and unscrupulous or dishonest practices.

Our Naperville, Aurora, Waukegan, Joliet, Elgin, Highland Park, Northbrook, Wilmette, Wheaton, Oak Brook, and Chicago consumer civil litigation lawyers provide assistance in fair debt collection, consumer fraud and consumer rights cases including in Illinois and throughout the country. You can click here to see a description of the some of the many individual and class-action consumer cases we have handled. A video of our lawsuit which helped ensure more fan friendly security at Wrigley Field can be found here. You can contact one of our Chicago area consumer protection lawyers who can assist in lemon law, unfair debt collection, junk fax, prerecorded telephone solicitations, and other consumer, consumer fraud or consumer class action cases by filling out the contact form at the side of this blog or by clicking here.

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