Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

Shareholders Cannot Sue Bank One Officers, Appeals Court Decides

July 22, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

In a shareholder derivative action related to 2004’s merger between Bank One and J.P. Morgan Chase, the Illinois First District Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal with prejudice of a complaint filed by Bank One shareholders. Shaper v. Bryan, No. 1-05-3849 (March 8, 2007).

The dispute grew out of the high-profile merger of Bank One with J.P. Morgan Chase. As part of the deal, J.P. Morgan agreed to issue stock to each Bank One shareholder worth 14% more than the Bank One shares’ closing price on the day of the merger. In other words, Bank One shareholders received extra value as part of the deal. Bank One CEO James Dimon would serve as president and COO of J.P. Morgan Chase for two years, after which he would take over for the existing CEO. These two men negotiated both the premium and the succession plan themselves.

Media reports soon appeared, suggesting that Bank One shareholders could have gotten a much larger premium from another company or through another negotiator. The media also reported that Dimon was eager to move to New York and take over as the leader of J.P. Morgan Chase, offering to do the deal for no premium at all if he could start as CEO without waiting the two years.

Will Executor’s Bad Faith Trumps Shareholder Stock Redemption Agreement By Decedent

July 21, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

In a shareholder and breach of fiduciary duty dispute arising from a probate case involving a closely held corporation with two shareholders, the Illinois Third District Court of Appeal has ruled that a shareholder agreement made by a decedent does not allow the remaining shareholder to execute the decedent’s will in bad faith. In re Estate of Talty, No. 3–06–0669 (Oct. 29, 2007).

Thomas Talty owned 50% of a closely held corporation (an auto dealership in Morris, Illinois), with his brother William Talty. They each also owned half of the land the dealership was built on, and had an interest in half of an adjoining parcel of land owned by a land trust. Thomas wrote a will in 2000 naming William as executor and naming Thomas’s wife, Helen Talty, as sole residual beneficiary of the estate.

The will gave William the right to purchase Thomas’s shares of the dealership from his estate, but required that the purchase price be determined by an independent appraiser appointed by the probate court. Similarly, it gave William the right to purchase Thomas’s half of the land, but at fair market value set by an independent appraiser approved by the probate court. Separately, in 2001, William and Thomas made a corporate agreement allowing their company to buy the shares of any deceased shareholder. It specified that the fair market value of the shares should be determined by an accountant agreed on by the company and the decedent’s representative, or, if they couldn’t agree, appointed by the probate court.

Shareholder May Withdraw Complaint, Appeals Court Rules in Corporate Dispute

July 18, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

A minority shareholder may withdraw his complaint under the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983, because the majority shareholder failed to meet requirements of that law, the Illinois Third District Court of Appeal ruled in an Illinois shareholder dispute lawsuit. Lohr v. Havens, 3-06-0930 (Nov. 11, 2007).

Charles Lohr owned a large minority of the stock in Phoenix Paper Products, Inc., a closely held private corporation in Illinois. He and another shareholder, James Durham, became concerned about possible financial mismanagement by the majority shareholder and president, Terry Havens, and their accountant, Samuel Morris. In months of correspondence, they accused Havens and Morris of taking unspecified inappropriate actions without shareholder approval.

This culminated in a 2003 lawsuit by Lohr alleging that Havens and Morris were misusing the company’s resources and acting illegally. Count I of the suit asked the court to either order a buyout of all Lohr’s stock or dissolve the company. Havens filed a timely election to buy Lohr’s shares, but Lohr accused Havens of illegally doing this without shareholder approval. After two years of discovery, Lohr asked to withdraw Count I and its associated demands, but Havens objected. The trial court found that because Havens hadn’t notified shareholders about the election, it was invalid, allowing Lohr to dismiss Count I of his complaint. Havens appealed.

LLC Members Owe Company, Manager No Fiduciary Duty, Appeals Court Rules

July 17, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Only managers in manager-operated limited liability corporations have a fiduciary duty to the company or to other members, the First District Court of Appeal ruled in a usurpation of corporate opportunity lawsuit involving a closely held LLC. Katris v. Carroll, No. 1-04-3639 (Dec. 23, 2005).

Peter Katris was one of four members/officers and two managers of an Illinois limited liability corporation, Viper Execution Systems LLC. Viper LLC was formed to market a type of options-related software, also called Viper, written by LLC member Stephen Doherty for member Lester Szlendak. Its articles of organization specified that management was vested in Katris and the other manager, William Hamburg.

Defendant Patrick Carroll employed Doherty before and during the organization, and defendant Ernst & Company later hired Doherty to work with Carroll. Their work included the writing of another software program, WWOW, which Katris believed was functionally similar to Viper. Five years after the organization, Katris sued Carroll and Ernst for collusion and usurpation of corporate opportunity because of WWOW’s similarity to Viper. (He also sued Doherty for collusion and breach of fiduciary duty, claims they later settled.)

Respected Law Professor’s Insights on Corporate Freeze-Out Litigation

July 16, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Experienced Illinois business litigators probably recognize Professor Charles W. Murdock of the Loyola University Chicago School of Law as a former Illinois Deputy Attorney General, former Loyola Dean and expert on Illinois business law. Given his status, it was with great interest that we read some of his scholarship on the concept of fairness in conflicts between shareholders or other parties interested in a business, especially in situations where the majority is using its greater power against a minority. These papers are a few years old, but they directly address some of the issues that are important to our firm and our clients in corporate freeze-out or squeeze-out litigation, breach of fiduciary duty and other internal business disputes in closely held companies.

In Fairness and Good Faith as a Precept in the Law of Corporations and Other Business Organizations, 36 Loy.U.Chi. L.J. 551 (2005), Murdock addresses the fiduciary duty of good faith and fairness that controlling interests of a business owe to minority interests. Noting that this internal duty is a fairly recent legal phenomenon, he surveys caselaw on the subject from around the country that applies to closely held corporations, public corporations and LLCs. Noting that the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA), a model law adopted by several states, doesn’t include language that gives members of an LLC fiduciary duties to one another, he praises Illinois for modifying that language to protect members in the updated Limited Liability Company Act.

Another of Murdock’s articles that directly addresses issues important to us is 2004’s Squeeze-outs, Freeze-outs and Discounts: Why Is Illinois in the Minority in Protecting Shareholder Interests?, 35 Loyola Chicago L.J.737 (2004). As you might expect from the title, Murdock argues in the article that Illinois business law, despite its “pro-shareholder” reputation, fails to protect minority shareholders in “fair value” proceedings. (Fair value proceedings are intended to resolve conflicts when majority shareholders want to do something that would harm the minority shareholders.) Until recently, those proceedings often led to marketability and liquidity discounts imposed on minorities, and the courts usually allowed it — giving rise to Murdock’s criticism. However, amendments to the Illinois Business Corporation Act in 2007 prohibited these discounts “absent extraordinary circumstances.” While the article is now out of date, fortunately for minority shareholders in Illinois, it still provides good arguments for the change and a survey of common circumstances under which fair value proceedings might arise.

Missed Deadline Bars Stolen Corporate Opportunities Claim, Appeals Court Rules

July 15, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

The doctrine of laches bars a plaintiff from bringing a stolen corporate opportunities lawsuit, the Illinois First District Court of Appeal has ruled. Lozman v. Putnam, No. 1- 06-0861 (February 18, 2008).

Plaintiff Fane Lozman and defendant Gerald Putnam met in 1986 as employees of the same Chicago securities firm. Eight years later, Lozman came up with an idea for a new type of software for traders, and hired another defendant, Townsend Analytics Inc., to program it. To market the software, Lozman and Putnam formed Blue Water Partners, Inc., an Illinois corporation, in 1994. Each was a 50% shareholder and a director. The plan was to barter the software for a share of a brokerage firm’s commissions on trades. Townsend Analytics and its owners, Stuart and Marrgwen Townsend, were offered 15% equity in Blue Water but no director or officer positions.

Later that year, Putnam formed Terra Nova Trading, LLC, with himself as 100% shareholder, to route profits from Blue Water. Another company, Analytic Services, LLC, was formed to sell the software, with Samuel Long as president. In April of 1995, Putnam and Lozman signed an agreement to share commissions generated through or paid by Townsend and its software. For a variety of personal and professional reasons, the relationship between Lozman and Putnam went sour, and they voluntarily dissolved the agreement six months later. A later termination agreement, back-dated to the day of the dissolution, preserved any legal claims. Putnam went on to form three more companies that used the same office and brokerage license as Blue Water, subcontracted with the Townsends and/or competed with Blue Water.

Court of Appeal Allows Retroactive Rule Change in Junk Fax Insurance Case

July 14, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Over at the Illinois Appellate Lawyer Blog, our colleague Steven R. Merican recently called our attention to an appeals court decision related to insurance coverage for “junk fax” class actions — an important practice for our firm. Eclipse Manufacturing v. United States Compliance, Nos. 2-06-0825, 2-06-0889 (11/30/07).

In the underlying case, Eclipse Manufacturing Co. filed a class-action lawsuit against United States Compliance for sending Eclipse unsolicited “blast faxes” in violation of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act. Compliance’s insurer, Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., declined to cover the defense. Compliance later settled with Eclipse by simply assigning its right to the full limits of its coverage under the policy. In order to collect this settlement, Eclipse then filed a third-party citation against Hartford.

In part because Hartford hadn’t sought a declaratory judgment on its obligation to defend Compliance, estopping it from raising policy defenses, the trial court sided with Eclipse. Hartford later filed for declaratory judgment in Minnesota, where Compliance is based, but its claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Hartford appealed, arguing that it was not estopped because the trial court should have applied Minnesota law, which it argued conflicts with Illinois law on estoppel. Furthermore, Hartford argued, its policy doesn’t cover the underlying lawsuit under either state’s law. The Illinois Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, saying there was no conflict in outcomes between Illinois and Minnesota laws of estoppel. Thus, Hartford was estopped from raising policy arguments — making them irrelevant.

Without Written Confidentiality Agreement, Competing Does Not Breach Fiduciary Duty, Court Rules

July 11, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

A former shareholder, officer and director did not breach his fiduciary duty to a corporation when he started a competing company, and a former employee did not breach his duty of loyalty by joining, the First District Court of Appeal has ruled. Cooper Linse Hallman v. Hallman, No. 1-05-0597 (2006).

Plaintiff Cooper Linse Capital Management, a closely held financial services company, brought on Thomas Hallman in 1994 as a shareholder with 20% of stock shares. The remainder were divided evenly between Lori Cooper and Don Linse. Hallman served as vice president and CFO as well as an employee. Two years later, the company hired James McQuinn as an employee only. Neither man signed a written confidentiality agreement, and both disputed Cooper Linse’s contention that they entered into an oral confidentiality agreement. All parties agreed that Linse and Cooper made all of the business decisions.

In 2000, the company that held Cooper Linse’s clients’ accounts in trust got into financial trouble and had its assets frozen, leaving clients unable to access their accounts and Cooper Linse unable to pay its employees. Linse began negotiations to take over that company’s trust business; McQuinn and Hallman quietly began planning to start a business competing with Cooper Linse.

Earnings of Closely Held Company Are Not Marital Property, Appeals Court Says

July 10, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

In an issue of first impression in Illinois, the Third District Court of Appeal ruled in a divorce business dispute that retained earnings from a closely held corporation are non-marital property. In re Marriage of Joynt, No. 3-06-0919 (Aug. 16, 2007).

Michael Joynt was president of Mississippi Valley Stihl, Inc. (MVS), a family-owned subchapter S corporation in Illinois, when his former wife, Theresa, filed for divorce. He also owned 33% of the stock; his father and sister were the remaining shareholders. During the divorce trial, both spouses stipulated that Michael’s stock was non-marital property. However, the company’s accountant testified that MVS had $3.75 million in retained earnings that year, which were set aside for future expenses and not paid as dividends to shareholders. If they had been paid during the trial, Michael would have had an additional $1.25 million in income. The trial court concluded that Michael’s interest in the retained earnings were non-marital property. Theresa appealed, contending that the retained earnings were income available to her former husband.

The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s decision, noting that the company, not the spouses, paid taxes on retained earnings. Noting that Illinois courts hadn’t addressed the issue before, the judges surveyed decisions from several other states ruling that retained earnings are non-marital property. However, they wrote, that’s not always true when the shareholder spouse has full power to decide whether to pay dividends, or substantial influence over that decision. Furthermore, Michael was fairly compensated for his role as president of MVS, and there was no evidence showing that Michael was using MVS to hide marital assets.

Chicago Consumer Attorneys From DiTommaso Lubin Win Precedent in Missouri Class Action

July 9, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Our firm is proud to announce that name partner Peter Lubin won a victory for class-action plaintiffs in Missouri with Dale v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 204 S.W.3d 151, 172 (Mo. App. 2006). Plaintiff Kevin Dale originally sued the auto manufacturer under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, (MMWA) over a breach of warranty for defective power window regulators (the mechanism that raises and lowers the window) on Dodge Durangos. Despite eight repair attempts, Dale contended, Dodge had failed to repair or replace the defective power window regulator in his truck.

Dale’s suit asked the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri to certify a class of Dodge Durango owners who’d had similar problems. The court certified two classes: One national class that relied on the MMWA, and one limited to Durango owners in the State of Missouri, which relied on the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA). DaimlerChrysler appealed the class certifications on multiple grounds under Missouri’s Rule 52.08, including numerosity and common-question-predominate requirements of the proposed class; typicality and adequacy of Dale as lead plaintiff; the implied definiteness of the class definition; and the superiority of a class action over other forms of adjudication.

The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District rejected all of these arguments, finding that the record was sufficient and DaimlerChrysler’s arguments insufficient to prove any of their claims. Two, however, were of interest to class-action attorneys. One had to do with Dale’s adequacy as a class plaintiff. Because Dale’s wife had worked for one of the law firms representing the class, defendants contended that he had an interest in maximizing attorney fees, a conflict of interests that should disqualify him. The judges disagreed, saying Dale’s wife didn’t necessarily stand to gain any extra pay from the case, and they declined to bar lead plaintiffs with such an indirect connection to the class attorneys. In fact, they wrote, “we believe that it should be a matter of discretion with the trial court, decided on a case-by-case basis.”