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Non-compete agreements are a common tool used by employers to protect their business interests. However, these agreements must strike a balance between safeguarding legitimate business concerns and respecting an employee’s right to pursue their career. Over the years, Illinois courts have issued several crucial decisions that provide guidance on the enforceability of non-compete agreements. In this blog post, we’ll explore some of these key Illinois court decisions and their implications for both employers and employees.

Recent Illinois decisions on non-compete agreements have clarified several important points:

1) Non-compete agreements under Illinois law are only enforceable if they protect a party’s legitimate business interests, as determined from the totality of the circumstances. This includes the near-permanence of customer relationships, the employee’s acquisition of confidential information through their employment, and time and place restrictions. Illinois law requires that in order be enforceable, a covenant not to compete must secure a “protectable interest” of the employer. Illinois courts recognize at least two such protectable interests: (1) where the customer relationships are near-permanent and but for the employee’s association with the employer the employee would not have had contact with the customers; and (2) where the former employee acquired trade secrets or other confidential information through his employment and subsequently tried to use it for his own benefit.

2) Non-compete provisions in employment agreements, which restricted distributor’s employees from engaging in post-employment activities of soliciting or inducing other employees to leave distributor’s employment, were found invalid restraints on trade, in that, provisions did not serve to protect any legitimate business interest recognized under Illinois law.

3) Non-compete clauses in employment agreements are unenforceable when they (1) impose restrictions greater than those necessary to protect legitimate interests of the protected party, (2) are oppressive to the restricted party, or (3) are harmful to the general public. Such was the case in Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer where Illinois decisions supported modifying a non-solicitation provision to cover only those customers for which the former employee had responsibility, and that the severability provision in Fischer’s Employment Agreement makes that result particularly appropriate.

4) In Unisource Worldwide, Inc. v. Carrara, the court ruled that where an employment contract is ambiguous and unintelligible, the non-compete clause in the agreement is unenforceable because there is no definite agreement on the essential terms of the restrictive covenant.

5) Lastly, in Vencor, Inc. v. Webb, the court found that a non-competition agreement is not contrary to the fundamental public policy of the state of Illinois, and thus Illinois law must govern this dispute. Here, both parties elected to have the agreement governed by Kentucky law, and the court discerned no reason why an Illinois court would find the agreement to be contrary to Illinois public policy.

Conclusion

Illinois court decisions on non-compete agreements have evolved to strike a balance between safeguarding legitimate business interests and protecting the rights of employees. Employers must carefully craft non-compete agreements that are reasonable in terms of duration, geographic scope, and the scope of activities restricted. Adequate consideration is a crucial factor, especially when entering into non-compete agreements with at-will employees.

For employees, understanding the enforceability of non-compete agreements and their rights is essential. Consulting with legal counsel is advisable when faced with the prospect of signing a non-compete agreement or when challenging the enforceability of an existing agreement.

These court decisions have helped shape the landscape of non-compete agreements in Illinois, emphasizing the importance of fairness and reasonableness in these contractual arrangements. It’s crucial for both employers and employees to stay informed about these legal developments to ensure that their rights and interests are protected. Continue reading ›

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Consumer protection is a cornerstone of the legal system, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA) plays a pivotal role in safeguarding consumers from deceptive practices. Recent opinions from the Illinois Supreme Court and various state and federal courts in Illinois have provided crucial guidance on the interpretation and application of the ICFA. In this blog post, we will explore some of these significant opinions and their implications for consumers and businesses.

“Here are some recent Illinois consumer fraud decisions and their key holdings:

1. “Cellular Dynamics, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.” (Decided on April 12, 1995). The court held that under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, a single deceptive act is sufficient to support recovery and the plaintiff’s failure to allege a public wrong is not fatal to its claim [2].

2. “Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp.” (Decided on November 29, 2007). The court determined that the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act applies only to fraudulent transactions which take place primarily and substantially in Illinois [3, 4].

3. “Costa v. Mauro Chevrolet, Inc.” (Decided on July 18, 2005). The court ruled that assignee of retail installment contract for car sale had no derivative liability under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act . The court also noted that the FTC Holder Notice has been largely superseded by subsequent federal legislation, namely, section 1641(a) of TILA.

4. “Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc.” (Decided on August 1, 2014). The court found that to state a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, a plaintiff must show: a deceptive or unfair act or promise by the defendant; the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the deceptive or unfair practice; and that the unfair or deceptive practice occurred during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce. In a private action under this act, the element of actual damages requires that the plaintiff suffer actual pecuniary loss.

5. “Rudy v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.” (Decided on February 4, 2022. The court emphasized that the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act is designed to protect consumers, borrowers, and business persons against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and other unfair and deceptive business practices.

6. “Landau v. CNA Financial Corp.” (Decided on March 26, 2008). This case reiterated that the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act does not have extraterritorial effect and does not apply to fraudulent transactions that take place outside Illinois.

7. “Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.” (Decided on August 18, 2005). The court held that the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act could be applied to consumers residing out-of-state if the deceptive acts and practices were perpetrated in Illinois.

8. “Freeman v. MAM USA Corporation” (Decided on March 23, 2021). The court provided a refined explanation of what a plaintiff must allege in order to state a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.

9. “Dwyer v. American Exp. Co.” (Decided on June 30, 1995). This case added that in order to successfully claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, plaintiffs must also show how they were damaged.

10. “Troutt v. Mondelēz Global LLC” (Decided on October 31, 2022). This case reiterated the broad prohibitions of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act against unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce.

11. “Sneed v. Ferrero U.S.A., Inc.” (Decided on February 15, 2023). The court stated that an accurate ingredient list does not immunize a defendant from a deceptive front label under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, but it is relevant to determining whether reasonable consumers would be misled

Implications for Consumers and Businesses

These opinions from Illinois courts highlight the continued significance of the ICFA in protecting consumers from deceptive and fraudulent business practices. For consumers, these opinions underscore their rights to pursue legal action when they believe they have been victims of consumer fraud.

For businesses, these opinions serve as a reminder of the importance of conducting business practices in a transparent and ethical manner. Adhering to the ICFA and avoiding deceptive practices is not only legally required but also crucial for maintaining a positive reputation and avoiding costly legal battles.

In conclusion, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act remains a critical tool for consumer protection in Illinois. Recent opinions from both state and federal courts in Illinois reinforce the Act’s role in safeguarding consumers and promoting fair and honest business practices. It is essential for both consumers and businesses to stay informed about these developments and seek legal guidance when necessary to ensure compliance with the ICFA.

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The Illinois Supreme Court plays a crucial role in shaping the legal landscape of the state. June 2021 saw the release of several significant decisions that have far-reaching implications for Illinois residents, businesses, and the legal community. In this blog post, we will explore some of the notable recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions.

1. People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116: The court addressed the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and found a statute, which prohibits the possession and use of an operable firearm for self-defense outside the home, unconstitutional, thus reversing the defendant’s aggravated unlawful use of weapons conviction.

2. People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387: This case also addressed a similar Second Amendment issue.

3. People v. Chairez, 2018 IL 121417: This decision pertained to a different statute, but the specific ruling is not mentioned.

4. Yakich v. Aulds, 2019 IL 123667: The court clarified that the circuit and appellate courts of the State of Illinois must apply binding precedent from the Illinois Supreme Court.

5. People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Sys. Corp., 585 N.E.2d 51 (Ill. 1991): The court agreed that “only the Department (of Financial and Professional Regulation) had standing to pursue civil violations of the Collection Agency Act”.

6. Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill.2d 511: The court clarified that preemption by the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) is limited to situations where the claim made is dependent on a legal duty imposed by the IHRA. If the claim exists independent of any legal duty of the IHRA, the claim is not preempted.

7. Hale v. Committee on Character and Fitness for State of Illinois: The court allowed to stand a decision by the state bar character and fitness committee’s rejection of a bar applicant’s application. The court affirmed that the proceedings were “judicial proceedings,” and that the decision was an “adjudication” in which the applicant was able to litigate his constitutional challenges.

8. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016: In this case, the court affirmed that the appellate court does not have the authority to overrule a decision by the Illinois Supreme Court and discussed the implications of such an attempt

Conclusion

The Illinois Supreme Court decisions issued in June 2021 reflect the court’s commitment to upholding constitutional rights, clarifying legal principles, and ensuring fairness in various areas of law, from criminal procedures to civil litigation and attorney discipline. These rulings have a lasting impact on the legal landscape in Illinois and serve as important precedents for future cases. It is essential for legal professionals, scholars, and anyone with an interest in the law to stay informed about these decisions and their implications.

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You’ve probably already heard of Alex Jones, but if you haven’t, or you need a refresher, he’s the right-wing conspiracy theorist who has used his media company, InfoWars, to promote the idea that the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting was a giant hoax created and promoted by anti-gun activists. Among other things, Jones claimed the grieving families and survivors of the massacre were “crisis actors” who were paid to lie about the mass shooting.

Jones has built a huge following, and many of them believe his lies. Many of his listeners even reached the point of actively seeking out Sandy Hook survivors and the families of those slaughtered, threatening and harassing them for their alleged lies.

The families sued Alex Jones for defamation and were collectively awarded $1.1 billion in damages.

Soon after that ruling, Jones filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which would have allowed him to restructure his business and potentially avoid paying the money he owes those families.

A judge recently ruled that Jones could not use bankruptcy as a means to avoid paying the $1.1 billion payments. The families took this as a victory, but Jones says he isn’t done fighting.

Jones’s net worth was valued at $14 million, yet he claims he has no money. He says he is $1 million in debt, and that the millions of dollars generated by his media company go to pay the bills, making the $1.1 billion ruling hypothetical. He also says he will continue to appeal the decision.

Meanwhile, he is asking his listeners to make donations to help him pay his legal bills. But those bills and the huge ruling against him have not stopped him from spending close to six figures in one month, much of it on lavish meals and entertainment. Continue reading ›

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Efforts by an alleged perpetrator and his legal team to unmask a Jane Doe plaintiff (by revealing her name) were held dead on arrival by the Illinois Appellate Court today. Our firm assisted lead counsel Tamara Holder with the appellate briefs. In these types of matters, our firm concentrates on defending alleged sexual assault victims who are allegedly revictimized by being subject to what we advocate, on our client’s behalf, in court papers, are strike suits for defamation or libel. This practice of suing the alleged victim for libel or defamation is, unfortunately, becoming an all too common tactic to, we contend, try to bully them into silence or to retract their claims.

The forceful and well-reasoned concurring opinion by Justice Hyman explains why efforts to expose the names of alleged victims of sexual misconduct or assault is a pernicious practice. The opinion provides guide posts for courts in Illinois and across the country to encourage alleged sexual misconduct or assault victims to seek justice, without having to suffer more trauma due to their names being spread all over the internet. It also notes that the alleged perpetrator should have similar privacy rights prior to a judgment on guilt or innocence.

The concurring opinion states:

In a world where the Internet already has created privacy, confidentiality, and security issues, we now enter the age of artificial intelligence, exacerbating these issues and making secrecy vital. No longer, in famous observation of Justice Brandeis almost 100 years ago, is “right to be let alone” enough. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In the 21st century, the right to be left unknown will join the right to be let alone as a vexing subject of intense legal debate. Indeed, the question of anonymity has taken on increased significance as court records have become readily available to the general public through even casual Internet searches. As the appellant notes in his brief, a Google search of a litigant’s name can produce an untold number of articles describing the lawsuit. Those articles may be available online for a lifetime, unless kept confidential. Although Illinois case law offers slight guidance on petitions to proceed anonymously, an alleged victim deserves anonymity whether or not their identity has been divulged elsewhere, including in a case not brought by them. …

Although no reported Illinois cases address whether a claim of sexual violence constitutes an “exceptional” situation warranting the use of a pseudonym, federal courts in Illinois have recognized that allegations of sexual assault are “highly sensitive, personal matters that involve the disclosure of information of the utmost intimacy.” Doe v. Cook County, Illinois, 542 F. Supp. 3d 779, 786 (N.D. Ill. 2021); accord Doe No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (while the Seventh Circuit disfavors fictitious names, it has “recognized that sexual assault victims are a paradigmatic example of those entitled to a grant of anonymity” (citing Doe, 112 F.3d at 872)). Even so, a sexual violence allegation alone has been considered not dispositive. See Cook County, Illinois, 542 F. Supp. 3d at 786 (“allegation of sexual assault alone does not end the inquiry”); Doe v. Skyline Automobiles, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 401, 405-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“other factors must be taken into consideration and analyzed in comparison to the public’s interest and the interests of the opposing parties”).

Illinois has taken steps to protect individuals’ private information. Examples include the Personal Information Protection Act (815 ILCS 530/1 et seq. (West 2022)), and the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (West 2022)), and two laws regulating data obtained by artificial intelligence, the Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act (820 ILCS 42/5 (West 2022)) and the Illinois Health Statistics Act (410 ILCS 520/1 et seq. (West 2022)). Nonetheless, the law cannot keep pace with the speed of innovations, compromising privacy. Corinne Moini, Protecting Privacy in the Era of Smart Toys: Does Hello Barbie Have A Duty to Report?, 25 Cath. U.J.L. & Tech. 281, 299 (2017) (asserting that privacy torts do not provide adequate protection for privacy implications of artificial intelligence and data collection). When methods of intruding into private lives and stripping anonymity outpace lawmakers’ ability to address them, courts have a duty under existing rules of procedure to protect sexual assault and abuse victims.

Plaintiff, a minor when the alleged sexual assault occurred, undeniably constitutes an “exceptional” situation. The lawsuit involves matters of a highly personal nature warranting anonymity. Indeed, Illinois Supreme Court rules acknowledge the need for anonymity in cases involving minors. For instance, the Illinois Supreme Court rules provide that minors shall be identified by first name and last initial or by initials in adoption cases (Ill. S. Ct. R. 663 (eff. Oct. 1, 2001) and appeals involving the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 2022)). Ill. S. Ct. R. 660(c) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001). Moreover, the Style Manual for the Supreme and Appellate Courts of Illinois (5th ed. rev. 2017) provides for using the minor’s initials in cases involving the Department of Children and Family Services. These rules reflect the need to protect the identity of a minor in matters of a personal nature that involve potentially stigmatizing issues such as termination of parental rights or juvenile criminal conduct.  An alleged victim of sexual violence has similar reasons for protecting their identity when filing a lawsuit under the Gender Act. The alleged conduct involves highly personal conduct likely to embarrass and stigmatize, regardless of its availability on the Internet. Thus, I would find that an alleged victim has a compelling reason to proceed anonymously when filing a complaint. Similarly, an accused perpetrator should be able to seek anonymity on petition….

The appellant contends that Doe waived her right to proceed anonymously because she filed an affidavit supporting a motion to dismiss the defamation lawsuit the appellant filed against his other accusers. (The appellant added Doe as a defendant in the defamation litigation after she filed her complaint.) I must disagree that she waived her right. When Doe filed the affidavit in the defamation case, she had yet to file her complaint against defendant. The decision to help another litigant should not bar an individual from proceeding anonymously in their own lawsuit, regardless of an affidavit in another proceeding. Filing suit creates a different level of exposure than filing an affidavit in support of others.

You can read the entire opinion here. Continue reading ›

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Here are some important Illinois libel law decisions.

1. “Continental Nut Co. v. Robert L. Berner Co.” (Decided April 15, 1965): A corporation’s libel action complaint, which specifically alleged figures of gross sales before and after publication and that the decrease was the result of the publication, sufficiently alleged special damages, even without naming customers lost.

2. “Fried v. Jacobson” (Decided June 23, 1982, but note that the judgment was vacated on December 1, 1983): It was held that broadcasts which stated that the Internal Revenue Service was considering legal action against an attorney and that 32 suits were filed by the state’s attorney against the attorney and his company were not libel per se. The same case on its later date confirmed that an action for defamation based on libel per se requires that the words used are in and of themselves so obviously and naturally harmful that proof of special damages is unnecessary.

3. “Cantrell v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.” (Decided October 1, 1981): This case clarified the four categories of words which constitute libel per se under Illinois law.

4. “Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson” (Decided July 14, 1983): To allow a corporation to recover on a theory of libel per se under Illinois law, it must show that it has been accused of fraud, mismanagement, or financial instability.

5. “Paul v. Premier Elec. Const. Co.” (Decided March 22, 1984): This case established that under Illinois law, four categories of speech define libel per se.

6. “BASF AG v. Great American Assur. Co.” (Decided April 14, 2008): While not a libel case per se, it discusses the interpretation of an insurance policy that defined an advertising injury as a violation of a person’s right of privacy, which could be relevant in the context of libel .

7. “Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc.” (Decided December 15, 1988): This case involved a libel action filed against Capital Cities Media, Inc. and the editor of a newspaper’s editorial page. The complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action].

Conclusion

These decisions underscore the need to carefully consider the nature of the speech, the status of the individuals involved, and the role of online platforms in defamation cases. While free speech is a cherished right, it must be balanced with protection against false and harmful statements. As libel law continues to adapt to the digital age, these decisions provide valuable insights into the evolving landscape of defamation in Illinois. It is essential for individuals, media outlets, and online platforms to stay informed about these developments to navigate the complexities of libel law successfully. Continue reading ›

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The First Amendment protects the freedom of speech and press, but it’s not an absolute right. In the realm of journalism and public discourse, the threat of libel claims looms large. However, Illinois courts have recognized a robust defense known as the “substantial truth doctrine” that provides a shield against libel claims. In this blog post, we will delve into what the substantial truth doctrine means, how it has been applied in Illinois court decisions, and its significance in upholding free speech while balancing the right to protect one’s reputation.

What is the Substantial Truth Doctrine?

The substantial truth doctrine is a legal defense that recognizes that minor inaccuracies or errors in a statement do not make it defamatory if the “gist” or “sting” of the statement is true. In other words, a statement may be protected if the essential truth or core message it conveys is accurate, even if some details are incorrect.

Illinois Court Decisions and the Substantial Truth Doctrine

Illinois courts have consistently upheld the substantial truth doctrine as an essential defense against libel claims. Several key Illinois court decisions have helped establish and refine this doctrine:

Several cases in Illinois have dealt with the substantial truth defense in libel suits. In “Vachet v. Central Newspapers, Inc.”, the newspaper used the defense of substantial truth when they were sued for reporting that the plaintiff was arrested and charged with a criminal offense. The courts affirmed that the reports were substantially true. Similarly, “Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. New York Times Co.” highlighted that truth is a defense to defamation and that a statement that is not technically true in every respect can still be substantially true. The “Republic Tobacco Co. v. North Atlantic Trading Co., Inc.” case and “Sullivan v. Conway” reiterated that under Illinois law, substantial truth is a complete defense to defamation.

The courts in “Rivera v. Allstate Insurance Company” and “Rivera v. Lake County” clarified that a defendant only needs to prove the truth of the “gist” or “sting” of the defamatory material to establish the defense of substantial truth.

Other cases that further explicate the substantial truth defense include “Pope v. Chronicle Pub. Co .”, “All Star Championship Racing, Inc. v. O’Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc.”, “Ludlow v. Northwestern University”, “Rupcich v. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union Local 881”, “Kapotas v. Better Government Ass’n”, “Phillips v. Quality Terminal Services, LLC”, “Hollymatic Corp. v. Daniels Food Equipment, Inc.”, “Levin v. Abramson”, “Hoth v. American States Ins. Co.”, and “Pope v. The Chronicle Pub. Co.”. These cases underscore that substantial truth is a complete defense to defamation under Illinois law and that the burden of proving falsity lies with the plaintiff

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Introduction

Consumer protection laws play a vital role in safeguarding consumers from deceptive and unfair business practices. In the state of Illinois, the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA) serves as a robust framework for addressing such issues. One essential aspect of the ICFA is the “unfairness doctrine,” which empowers consumers by offering recourse against businesses engaging in unfair practices. In this blog post, we’ll delve into the details of the unfairness doctrine under the ICFA, exploring its significance and how it benefits consumers.

Understanding the ICFA

The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, codified at 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq., provides comprehensive protection to consumers against deceptive and unfair business practices. It encompasses a wide range of activities, from false advertising to fraudulent sales tactics, and it allows consumers to seek remedies for damages and injunctive relief.

The Unfairness Doctrine Explained

The unfairness doctrine within the ICFA prohibits businesses from engaging in practices that are “unfair or deceptive.” While the term “deceptive” generally refers to fraudulent or misleading actions, “unfair” practices may not be as immediately evident. The unfairness doctrine serves as a crucial tool for addressing business practices that, while not necessarily deceptive, harm consumers in an unjust or unreasonable manner.

Key Components of Unfairness

To determine whether a business practice is unfair under the ICFA, Illinois courts consider the following factors:

  1. Substantial Injury: The practice must cause substantial harm to consumers, either financially or otherwise. Minor inconveniences or trivial harms typically do not meet this criterion.
  2. Lack of Countervailing Benefits: Courts assess whether the harm to consumers outweighs any potential benefits or justifications offered by the business. If the practice provides significant advantages, it may be considered less unfair.
  3. Consumer Knowledge: The ICFA recognizes that some practices may be considered unfair if consumers lack sufficient knowledge or understanding of the implications. If a practice takes advantage of consumers’ lack of information, it may be deemed unfair.
  4. Public Policy: Courts consider whether the practice violates established public policy. Practices that contravene societal norms and values are more likely to be deemed unfair.

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Introduction

Shareholder derivative lawsuits are legal actions brought by individual shareholders on behalf of a corporation against its officers, directors, or other insiders. These lawsuits typically allege misconduct, mismanagement, or breaches of fiduciary duties by those in control of the corporation. Defending against a shareholder derivative lawsuit can be complex and challenging, but with the right strategies and considerations, it is possible to protect the interests of both the corporation and its shareholders. In this blog post, we’ll explore the key steps and considerations involved in defending against a shareholder derivative lawsuit.

1. Understand the Basics of Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits

Before diving into defense strategies, it’s crucial to have a clear understanding of what a shareholder derivative lawsuit entails. These lawsuits are filed on behalf of the corporation, not individual shareholders, and seek to hold company insiders accountable for alleged wrongdoing. Understanding the legal framework is the first step in formulating an effective defense.

2. Evaluate the Merits of the Lawsuit

The first line of defense in any shareholder derivative lawsuit is a thorough evaluation of the merits of the claims. Engage experienced legal counsel to assess the allegations and evidence. Determine whether the allegations have a factual basis and whether they meet the legal requirements for pursuing a derivative action. If the claims lack merit, you may have grounds to seek dismissal. Continue reading ›

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Introduction

In an era marked by rapid technological advancements and the omnipresence of the internet, the boundaries of free speech have become more ambiguous than ever before. In the United States, the First Amendment safeguards the freedom of expression, including the freedom of the press. However, this freedom is not absolute, and there are instances where speech can cross the line into libel, damaging reputations and causing harm. To address this evolving landscape, the United States Supreme Court has issued several groundbreaking opinions on libel in recent years. In this blog post, we will explore some of these significant rulings and their implications for free speech in the digital age.

  1. New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) – Setting the Standard

Before delving into the recent opinions, it’s essential to understand the foundational case of New York Times v. Sullivan. This landmark decision established a higher standard for public figures to prove libel. To succeed in a libel lawsuit, public figures must demonstrate “actual malice,” which means that the defamatory statement was made with reckless disregard for the truth. This precedent has been pivotal in protecting freedom of speech, ensuring that robust public debate can take place without fear of crippling defamation suits.

  1. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990) – Opinions or Factual Statements?

In the case of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Supreme Court grappled with the distinction between opinions and factual statements. The ruling clarified that even statements of opinion can be considered libelous if they imply false facts. This decision underscored the importance of fact-checking and journalistic integrity in the world of media and journalism. Continue reading ›

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