Articles Posted in Illinois Appellate Courts

In a recent decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit revived a class action lawsuit filed against Avior Airlines accusing the airline of forcing passengers to pay undisclosed fees in order to board flights from Miami to Venezuela. In its decision, the appeals court ruled that the class action suit could proceed and that the district court erred when it found the claims preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act.

Plaintiffs Roberto Hung Cavalieri and Sergio Enrique Isea purchased tickets for flights operated by the defendant Avior Airlines. According to the plaintiffs’ compliant, the plaintiffs purchased tickets from Miami to Venezuela. The itineraries and receipts for the tickets indicated that the price “included taxes and fees.” However, on the day of their flights, the plaintiffs alleged that the airline forced passengers to pay an additional $80 “Exit Fee” before they were permitted to board their departing flights to Venezuela.

The plaintiffs filed suit against the airline alleging that the undisclosed fee constituted a breach of their contracts with the airline, formed when they purchased their tickets. The plaintiffs sought to represent a national class defined as “all persons that Avior charged an Exit Fee, from five years prior to the filing of the initial complaint through the earlier of: (i) the date, if any, Avior changes its contract to expressly include Exit Fees; and (ii) the date of class certification.”

The putative class action got off to a rough start, however. The district court dismissed the lawsuit finding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted the breach of contract claims. According to the district court, the Act preempts all claims related to related to prices, routes, and services and the plaintiffs’ claims fell into the purview of the Act because it related to pricing.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit, which disagreed with the district court on the issue of preemption. After examining the issue of jurisdiction and satisfying itself that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the Court recounted the history of the Act. As the Court explained, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978 to eliminate regulation of air carrier prices. The Act includes a preemption provision, providing that “a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.” Continue reading ›

Patrick Austermuehle of our firm filed an Amicus Brief on behalf of the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association and the National Association of Consumer Advocates on a important access to justice issue for consumers who have been defrauded including consumers who have been scammed by used car dealers.

Who Are ITLA and NACA?

The National Association of Consumer Advocates (“NACA”) is a nonprofit corporation whose members are lawyers, law professors, and students practicing or studying consumer-protection law. NACA’s mission is to promote justice for consumers through information sharing among consumer advocates and to serve as a voice for its members and consumers in the struggle to curb unfair and oppressive business practices.

The Illinois Trial Lawyers Association (“ITLA”) is a statewide organization whose members focus their practices in representing injured consumers and workers. Founded in 1952, the organization
has more than 2,000 members. ITLA’s principles and mission are simple: to achieve and maintain high standards of professional ethics, competency and demeanor in the bench and bar; to uphold the Constitutions of the United States of America and the State of Illinois; to secure and protect the rights of those injured in their persons or civil rights; to defend trial by jury and the
adversarial system of justice; to promote fair, prompt and efficient administration of justice; and to educate and train in the art of advocacy. Continue reading ›

Business partnerships sometimes come to an end. As we have written about previously, it is important going into a partnership to have an agreed-upon exit strategy in place. However, as a recent decision from an Indiana appeals court highlights, it is important for business partners to not only include exit provisions in their partnership agreements, operating agreements, or shareholder agreements but to carefully think through the wording of the provisions to avoid disputes and misunderstandings later.

In Hartman v. BigInch Fabricators & Construction Holding Company, Inc., the dispute considered by the court involved interpretation of a provision in the parties’ shareholder agreement that required the company to purchase the shares of any shareholder who was involuntarily terminated at “appraised market value on the last day of the year preceding the valuation, determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles by a third-party valuation company.”

The plaintiff in the case, Blake Hartman, was a co-founder and longtime president and director of the company called BigInch Fabricators & Construction Holding Company. Hartman was one ten shareholders, none of which owned a majority stake in the company. In 2006, the shareholders entered into a shareholder agreement.

The agreement included a buyback provision (also known as a repurchase agreement) requiring the company to purchase the shares of any shareholder who was involuntarily terminated as an officer or director of the company. The purchase was to be made at “appraised market value on the last day of the year preceding the valuation, determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles by a third-party valuation company.” The agreement did not define the term “appraised market value” or elaborate on the methodology to be used by a third party in performing the valuation.

In March 2018, Hartman was involuntarily terminated as a director and officer of BigInch. At the time of his termination, Hartman owned 8,884 shares in the company, representing a 17.77% interest. As required by the shareholder agreement, the company hired an appraiser to calculate the value of the company for the purposes of valuing Harman’s shares for repurchase. The appraiser calculated the fair market value of Hartman’s shares to be $2,398,000.00, which included discounts for the marketability of the shares and the lack of control represented by Hartman’s minority interest.

Hartman filed a declaratory judgment action contesting the valuation and requesting that the court declare the value of his shares. Hartman argued that the appraiser’s application of the “fair market value” standard to value his shares was not in accordance with the agreement because that standard presupposes an “open market” of willing sellers and willing buyers.

At the outset of its analysis, the Court began by explaining the utility of buyback provisions or repurchase agreements like those included in the BigInch shareholder agreement. Close corporations generally lack a market for their shares, the Court explained, because the only people interested in owning the business are the “incorporated partners” who are intimately involved with the entity. Because there is often no market for one’s shares, it is difficult and speculative to value a close corporation’s shares, which is why repurchase agreements frequently specify the valuation method to be used.

The Court turned its attention to two popular business valuation methods: the “fair value” method and the “fair market value” method. The Court next outlined the differences between the two methods. The “fair value” standard seeks to ensure that shareholders were fairly compensated. The “fair market value” standard, on the other hand, attempts to determine the amount that a willing seller and willing buyer would arrive at after negotiations. Because the fair market value standard attempts to approximate the results of a real-life negotiation, discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability are appropriate.

The question for the Court was which valuation method did the BigInch shareholder agreement require. The agreement did not specify but instead only required an “appraised market value.” The trial court held that this required application of the fair market value method which permitted discounts for lack of marketability and lack of control. On appeal, the Court disagreed and held that the proper valuation methodology in a forced sale is the fair value method.

The Court concluded that “minority and control discounts have no application in compelled transactions to a controlling party.” Applying such discounts in forced sales involving the company purchasing back shares from a minority shareholder would result in a windfall to the purchasing majority shareholder or shareholders. A windfall would result because “a sale of the minority shareholders’ shares to majority shareholders consolidates or increases the power of those already in control.” Given that the majority shareholders are already benefitting by increasing their power, it does not follow that the majority shareholders should be able to realize this benefit at a discount.

The Court’s full opinion is available online here. Continue reading ›

Divorce proceedings can be contentious but some can be more contentious than others. In the case of disbarred McHenry County lawyer, Mark McCombs, a contentious divorce led to his filing of a defamation and malicious prosecution lawsuit. The First District Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint in which McCombs alleged that his former wife defamed him and had him falsely charged with harassment. The Court also affirmed the denial of sanctions that McCombs sought against his ex-wife in the suit.

McCombs and his former wife, Kathryn Crivolio, started divorce proceedings in 2010. The proceedings soon became contentious. So contentious in fact that at one point in the proceedings, the judge entered an order prohibiting McCombs “from filing any pleadings in this matter without first seeking leave of court [ ] to do so.”

Shortly before the divorce proceedings began, McCombs, who had served as special counsel to the Village of Calumet Park from 2002 to 2010, was indicted for stealing between $600,000 to $800,000 from the Village. McCombs pled guilty and was sentenced to six years in prison. A few months later in January 2012, he was disbarred.

While McCombs was in prison, he conversed with his wife via email. In one of the email exchanges, Crivolio allegedly wrote to McCombs: “You have stolen from me, your employers, your client’s (sic) and your own mother.” McCombs alleged that Crivolio also published this statement to his children, family, and others, which he alleged “lowered [him] in the eyes of the community.” The complaint pled claims for both defamation per se and defamation per quod. Circuit Judge Kathy Flanagan dismissed the complaint with prejudice on the grounds that the allegations lacked substance. Continue reading ›

When a shipment of sand was tainted by excess moisture, the contract between the two companies involved in the transaction required that any suit be filed within four months of the delivery. As the plaintiff corporation’s suit was filed over two years later, it was untimely.

In 2014, Vesuvius Corporation and American Commercial Lines, LLC (“ACBL”), entered into a shipping contract to transport olivine sand from New Orleans, Louisiana to Vesuvius’ facility in Wurtland, Kentucky, by way of a river barge. The shipment arrived in January 2015, at which time Vesuvius’ employees inspected the cargo and found it damaged by excess moisture. The employees notified ACBL, and ACBL arranged for a surveyor to perform an inspection that same day. The surveyor found no structural defect in the barge, and instead concluded that the sand was wet when it was loaded and that some of that moisture had evaporated during transit, condensed on the overhead portion of the cargo space, and dripped back onto the sand. The surveyor filed his report with ACBL on Feb. 23, and ACBL promptly contacted Vesuvius to disclaim liability. Continue reading ›

A recent ruling in the Illinois Appellate Court decided a very tough decision about two very qualified parents and whether the one parent could move out of Illinois with their minor child, so she could pursue her dream job.

Two individuals were married and had one minor child, they decided to separate and had been granted joint custody and decision making for their child. While married the couple lived in the City of Chicago and then later moved to Downers Grove in their marital home. During the divorce proceedings the marital home was sold, and the father moved to a rental home a few doors down from the marital home and the mother moved to an apartment nearby. The minor child’s mother had the life long dream of getting her Ph.D. from a school in North Carolina. The mother petitioned the circuit court to relocate to North Carolina because she was successful in being admitted to the Ph.D. program that she wanted to attend and would work in her dream job while studying for her degree. Experts for both parents determined that both parents had a successful and nurturing relationship with their minor child and that she would succeed with either parent in Illinois or North Carolina. The father objected to his minor child moving away to North Carolina as, among other things, he would not see her as often and would not have as many in-person interactions with his daughter. Continue reading ›

Summer Zervos, who was a contestant on The Apprentice back in 2007 is attempting to sue President Trump for defamation claims which he denies yet claims her suit cannot proceed until his Presidency ends. Zervos alleges that, while she was in meetings with Trump that were supposed to be about business, Trump allegedly kissed her on the mouth multiple times and touched her breasts without her consent.

Trump denied the accusations, publicly calling them “lies” and “nonsense,” but Zervos is not letting this go. She and 18 other women have accused Trump of sexual misconduct and Zervos is currently suing Trump for defamation. The lawsuit asks Trump to take back the statements he made about her, apologize to her, and provide financial compensation.

Trump’s attorneys have filed a motion to have the case dismissed, but if Justice Jennifer Schecter refuses, Trump’s presidential campaign might be required to release any and all documents they have relating to all the women who have accused him of sexual misconduct – not just Zervos.

Trump’s attorneys argued that a state court does not have jurisdiction over a sitting president. They have also asked to delay the case with a stay if the judge does decide to allow the case to proceed. That would put off the trial until after Trump is no longer president.

Zervos’s attorney cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Clinton v. Jones to allow a sexual harassment case against President Clinton to continue in the federal courts while Clinton was still president. Trump’s attorneys argued that decision does not apply to the current case because that lawsuit was filed in federal court, rather than state court. Continue reading ›

Stock options exercised by railroad employees are a form of monetary compensation taxable to the employer and employee under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, according to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Wisconsin Central Ltd., et al. v. United States, No. 16‐3300 (7th Cir. 2017)).

In 1996, three Midwestern railroad subsidiaries of the Canadian National Railway Company began including stock options in their employees’ compensation plans. In its appeal from a district court ruling, the railway argued that income from the exercise of stock options that a railroad gives its employees is not a form of “money remuneration” to them and is therefore not taxable to the railway under the Act, which defines “compensation” as “any form of money remuneration paid to an individual for services rendered as an employee… .”

The Railroad Retirement Tax Act of 1937 is the railroad industry’s version of the Social Security Act; it imposes a payroll tax on both employer and employee to pay for pensions and other benefits.

The question before the Seventh Circuit was whether the tax should be levied on the value of stock options exercised by employees when the market price reaches a certain level. The Internal Revenue Service argued that it should, and in a 2-1 decision, the court agreed.

Writing for the majority, Judge Richard Posner stated: “Stock has so well‐defined a monetary value in our society that there is no significant economic difference between receiving a $1,000 salary bonus and a share or shares of stock having a market value of $1,000.” Continue reading ›

Class action and collective action lawsuits are both important tools for plaintiffs with common complaints against the same defendant. Both types of lawsuits allow plaintiffs to do essentially the same thing in terms of the rights they can win for plaintiffs, but with one distinct difference.

In class actions, all the potential plaintiffs that can be identified are automatically included in the class unless they opt out. By contrast, collective actions require potential class members to submit a valid claim in order for them to be included in the lawsuit. Each type of lawsuit has its own procedural rules but, according to the Eleventh Circuit Court, the filing of one type of lawsuit does not invalidate a lawsuit of the other kind, even if both were filed by the same plaintiffs.

Four sheriff’s deputies in Lee County, Florida filed a collective action against their sheriff, Michael Scott, for allegedly requiring them to work overtime without properly compensating them for the extra hours they worked. The collective action alleges Scott violated the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by refusing to pay the proper overtime compensation of one and one-half times their normal hourly rate when they worked more than 40 hours a week. Continue reading ›

In the court system of the United States, it is possible for plaintiffs who have not suffered a measurable injury but have suffered an intangible injury such as invasion of privacy or loss to reputation or humiliation to file a lawsuit against another party. This means even if the plaintiff has not been physically injured or suffered any financial loss, they might still have an opportunity to make someone pay up for violating the law.

Most laws come with statutory provisions in which the statutory penalty for breaking the law is often written into the legislature itself. Sometimes it’s a defined number and other times it’s a range. Either way, they provide an opportunity for plaintiffs who have not lost anything tangible to file claims.

Businesses lately have been complaining about a slew of consumer class action lawsuits that focus on what they claim are mere technical violations of the law. One such case is that of Thomas Robins against Spokeo Inc., a people search engine. Robins alleged Spokeo had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by posting that he was employed, wealthy, and married, when in fact he was single and struggling to find work. Continue reading ›

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