Articles Posted in Auto Fraud

Car manufacturers provide warranties for their vehicles, promising to pay for most repairs and replacements that the vehicle requires within a certain number of years of purchase of the car or up to a certain mileage. However, if enough cars experience failures of a particular variety after the warranty expires, the manufacturer could still find themselves in trouble.

Audi has found itself in that situation when a class-action lawsuit was filed against it on behalf of U.S.A. consumers who leased or bought a 2002-6 A4 or A6 model with a continuously variable transmission (CVT). The lawsuit, which was filed in January 2011, alleges that the CVTs had manufacturing and design flaws that caused them to fail and left owners with thousands of dollars in repair bills. The lawsuit also alleges that Audi knew about these flaws and intentionally concealed them from consumers.

In the preliminarily approved settlement, Audi denied the allegation that the CVTs were defective and insisted that it had “acted properly and in compliance with applicable laws and rules.” However, they also said that the expense of extended litigation “may not be in the best interests of their consumers.” Hence Audi’s settlement offer.

The settlement includes reimbursement “for certain C.V.T. transmission repairs” that occurred or will occur within 10 years or 100,000 miles of the original sale or lease of the vehicle. The original warranty covered only four years or 50,000 miles. The owners will be reimbursed for the replacement of various parts, depending on which model year they had.
The transmission control module is covered for 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 model year A4s and A6s. The valve body is covered for 2003-4 model A4 and A6. Replacement of the transmission without the valve body and transmission control module “is covered for the 2002, 2003, or 2004 model year Audi A4 or A6.” The settlement does not say whether it includes reimbursement of another transmission part or replacement of the entire transmission.

Some of the 2002 and 2003 models are probably beyond even the extended warranty by now, but the settlement will still reimburse the owners if the specified repair occurred within 100,000 miles or 10 years. The settlement further provides a “trade-in reimbursement cost” to make up for lost value of a 2002, 2003, or 2004 A4 or A6 that needed “a complete replacement of a C.V.T. transmission” after the normal warranty expired but the vehicle was sold or traded without repair.

The settlement does not specify whether owners in that group who had a major component fail, but did not need to replace the entire transmission, are eligible for reimbursement. It also did not indicate why the 2005-6 model year was not included in this part of the settlement.
The settlement, which covers about 64,000 Audi vehicles, was preliminarily approved on March 11 by Judge A. Howard Matz of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The hearing for final approval has been scheduled for September.

Continue reading ›

 

Chrysler’s Dodge Division has suffered a number of class action lawsuits recently regarding the brakes in its vehicles. In December of 2012, one such case was dismissed. Most recently, a class action lawsuit in California against the major car company survived a motion to dismiss, but the judge said the plaintiffs have to amend their complaint if the case is to continue.
U.S. District Judge James V. Selna gave the plaintiffs 30 days to re-plead their claims that Chrysler violated California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act as well as its Unfair Competition Law and breach of express warranty.

The plaintiffs, Ronald Coleman and Giuliano Belle, sued Chrysler Group LLC for allegedly concealing a manufacturing or design error in their Dodge Journeys, which caused their brake pads or rotors to prematurely wear, requiring frequent and costly repairs. For obvious reasons, brake defects pose the greatest safety hazard in vehicles and the plaintiffs say they would never have bought the cars, had they known about the defects.

According to the lawsuit, Chrysler allegedly knew about the defects and, not only failed to disclose the information, but even went so far as to actively conceal it from consumers. Chrysler would have had this knowledge of the brake defect allegedly through pre-release testing data, consumer complaints, and data from authorized dealers and replacement part sales.
While Judge Selna determined that the plaintiffs adequately pled their cases that they suffered economic losses under the CLRA and UCL, he says that Coleman cannot bring his claims under those statutes because he bought his car in Texas. Belles express warranty claim, on the other hand, was denied because Belle did not allege that the brake repair he received under warranty was defective.

Continue reading ›

Under the First Amendment to the Constitution and lawyers’ ethics rules, the public and litigants have a right to know about about matters that are resolved in our court and litigation system. For instance a car dealer who repeatedly engages in consumer fraud, bait and switch and false advertising or who regularly sells lemon cars should not be able to hide litigation about its misconduct from the public though use of confidential settlement agreements. This is particularly true because the Supreme Court has allowed contracts of adhesion to force consumers to arbitrate claims in secret forums against big business such as car dealers and other businesses such as cell providers and cable television companies. The combination of secret arbitration proceedings and of defendants using confidentiality clauses in settlement agreements to hide misconduct that has been exposed through litigation is keeping misconduct by many businesses secret.

In a recent case our firm litigated a so called pro-consumer rights law firm that regularly litigates consumer fraud cases on behalf of consumer victims used such a confidentiality clause to refuse to cooperate and force us to go to court to uncover the details of repeated false advertising engaged in by a business whose pattern of misconduct had already been exposed through extensive litigation. This so called pro-consumer rights law firm had documents that were not publicly available which put the lie to false testimony provided by the owners of the deceptive business. These lawyers in this firm, who have a practice that should make them sympathetic to protecting consumer rights and freedom to obtain information about public lawsuits, participated in trying to hide the very misconduct that they had litigated to expose. This type of conduct according to a recent Chicago Bar Association ethics advisory opinion violates lawyer ethics rules.

At the request of DiTommaso Lubin’s long time co-counsel Dmitry Feofanov of ChicagoLemonLaw.com , the Chicago Bar Association just issued the below ethics advisory opinion concluding that use of certain confidentiality provisions in consumer rights, class action and other important litigation are unethical under Illinois attorney ethics rules. These same rules apply in many other states. There has been a recent trend among defendants to demand these confidentiality provisions.

You can click here for a copy of the opinion.

Below is the full text of this important advisory opinion in full:

Chicago Bar Association
Informal Ethics Opinion 2012-10
Committee on Professional Responsibility
Opinions Subcommittee

The Professional Responsibility Committee of the Chicago Bar Association has
issued the following informal legal ethics opinion as a public service to aid the inquiring
lawyer in interpreting the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. The opinion represents
the judgment of a member or members of the Committee and does not constitute an official
act of the Chicago Bar Association. The opinion is not binding upon the Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission or on any court and should not be relied upon
as substitute for legal advice.

The Committee has received the following inquiry:

(1) Is the confidentiality provision of the proposed settlement agreement attached
hereto as Exhibit A ethical under Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(f)?
(2) Is the confidentiality provision of the proposed settlement agreement attached
hereto as Exhibit A ethical under Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6(b)?
(3) May a defendant’s lawyer, as part of settlement discussions, demand that the
settlement agreement include a provision that prohibits plaintiffs counsel
from disclosing publicly available facts about the case on plaintiffs counsel’s
website or through a press release?

Opinion

Inquiry 1: Settlement Agreement Non-Cooperation Provisions and Rule 3.4(f)
Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(f) states that a “lawyer shall not. . . request a person
other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party” unless
that person is a relative or agent of the client and the lawyer reasonably believes that the person’s interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from disclosure. I I I . R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (2010). As the comments to Rule 3.4 explain, the rule is based on the belief that “[fjair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery
procedure, and the like.” Id. cmt. 1.

Settlement agreements are not exempt from Rule 3.4(f). S.C Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 93-20
(1993). Therefore, when negotiating a settlement agreement, a lawyer cannot ethically request
that the opposing party agree that it will not disclose potentially relevant information to another
party. Id. The Committee believes that “another party” in Rule 3.4(f) means more than just the
named parties to the present litigation. Rather, it should be interpreted more broadly to include
any person or entity with a current or potential claim against one of the parties to the settlement
agreement. A more narrow interpretation would undermine the purpose of the rule and the proper functioning of the justice system by allowing a party to a settlement agreement to conceal important information and thus obstruct meritorious lawsuits.

Here, the defendant has proposed a settlement provision that would prohibit the plaintiff from,
among other things, disclosing the “existence, substance and content of the claims” and “all
information produced or located in the discovery processes in the Action” unless “disclosure is
ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and only if the other party has been given prior
notice of the disclosure request and an opportunity to appear and defend against disclosure . . .”
That proposed settlement provision therefore precludes the plaintiff from voluntarily disclosing
relevant information to other parties. As a result, it violates Rule 3.4(f) and a lawyer cannot
propose or accept it. I I I . R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f); S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 93-20 (1993).

Inquiry 2: Settlement Agreement Confidentiality Provisions and Rule 5.6(b) llinois Rule of Professional Conduct 5.6(b) states that a “lawyer shall not participate in offering or making . . . an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.” I I I . R. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(b).There are three main public policy rationales for Rule 5.6(b): (i) to ensure the public will have broad access to legal representation; (ii) to prevent awards to plaintiffs that are based on the value of keeping plaintiffs’ counsel out of future litigation, rather than the merits of plaintiffs case; and (iii) to limit conflicts of interest.

By its own terms, Rule 5.6(b) plainly applies to direct restrictions on the right to practice law.
Moreover, certain indirect restrictions on the right to practice law violate Rule 5.6(b) as well,
namely, a lawyer agreeing not to bring future claims against a defendant, and a number of ethics
authorities have determined that some confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements violate
Rule 5.6(b).

According to the American Bar Association’s Ethics Opinion 00-417, a provision in a settlement
agreement that prohibits a lawyer’s future “use” of information learned during the litigation
violates Rule 5.6(b), because preventing a lawyer from using information is no different than
prohibiting a lawyer from representing certain persons. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics &
Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-417 (2000). That same opinion further determined that a
settlement provision that prohibits a lawyer’s future “disclosure” of such information generally is
permissible, because without client consent the lawyer already generally is foreclosed from
disclosing information about the representation. Id.

However, not all limitations on the disclosure of information are ethical. Rather, as several
authorities have stated, whether a settlement provision restricting a lawyer’s “disclosure” of
information violates Rule 5.6(b) depends on the nature of the information. Numerous ethics
authorities have determined that settlement provisions may prohibit a party’s lawyer from
disclosing the amount and terms of the settlement (provided that information is not otherwise
known to the public), because that information generally is a client confidence and consequently
is required by the rules of professional conduct to be kept confidential absent client consent.
D.C. Bar Ethics Op. 335 (2006); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics Op. 730 (2000);
N.D. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm Op. 97-05 (1997); Col. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm. Op. 92 (1993); N.M. Bar Ass’n Advisory Ops. Comm. Op. 1985-5 (1985). On the other hand, ethics
authorities have found that a settlement agreement may not prohibit a party’s lawyer from disclosing information that is publicly available or that would be available through discovery in
other cases. D.C. Bar Ethics Op. 335 (2006); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics Op.
730 (2000); N.D. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm. Op. 97-05 (1997).

Based on the foregoing authority, the Committee believes that under Rule 5.6(b), a settlement
agreement may not prohibit a party’s lawyer from using information learned during the instant
litigation in the future representation of clients. The Committee agrees with the American Bar
Association that prohibiting a lawyer from using such information essentially is no different than
prohibiting a lawyer from representing certain clients in the future, and thus such a settlement
provision is an impermissible restriction on the practice of law in violation of Rule 5.6(b).
In addition, the Committee believes that pursuant to Rule 5.6(b) a settlement agreement may not
prohibit a party’s lawyer from disclosing publicly available information or information that
would be obtainable through the course of discovery in future cases. The Committee agrees with
the District of Columbia Ethics Committee, and other ethics authorities cited above, that drawing
such a line strikes an appropriate balance between the genuine interests of parties who wish to
keep truly confidential information confidential and the important policy of preserving the
public’s access to, and ability to identify, lawyers whose background and experience may make
them the best available persons to represent future litigants in similar cases.

Applying those principles here, the Committee believes that the settlement provision as currently
drafted does not comply with Rule 5.6(b). While it is permissible for the settlement agreement to
prohibit the disclosure of the “substance, terms and content of the settlement agreement
(assuming that information is not otherwise publicly known), the settlement agreement violates
Rule 5.6(b) because it broadly forecloses the lawyer’s disclosure of information that appears to
be publicly available already, such as the fact that a lawsuit was filed and certain claims were
asserted, as well as other information that could be obtained (and in fact was obtained) in
discovery. The settlement agreement therefore should be re-written to permit the lawyer’s use of
information learned during the dispute and to permit the lawyer’s disclosure of publicly available
information and information that would be available through discovery in other litigation.
Inquiry 3: Settlement Agreement Restrictions on Attorney Advertising and Rule 5.6(b)
Based on the principles discussed above, the Committee believes that under Rule 5.6(b), a
settlement agreement may not prohibit a party’s lawyer from disclosing publicly available facts
about the case (such as the parties’ names and the allegations of the complaint) on the lawyer’s
website or through a press release. See, e.g., D.C. Bar Ethics Op. 335 (2006).

Dated: February 12,2013
CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY COMMITTEE
OPINIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

EXHIBIT A – Proposed Confidentiality Provision in Settlement Agreement
8. Plaintiff and his counsel agree that the existence, substance and content of the
claims of the Action, as well as all information produced or located in the discovery processes in
the Action shall be completely confidential from and after the date of this Agreement. Similarly,
the existence, substance, terms and content of this Agreement shall be and remain completely
confidential. Plaintiff shall not disclose to anyone any information described in this paragraph,
except: (a) if disclosure is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and only if the other
party has been given prior notice of the disclosure request and an opportunity to appear and
defend against disclosure and/or to arrange for a protective order; (b) Plaintiff may disclose the
contents of this Agreement to his attorneys, accounting and/or tax professionals as may be
necessary for tax or accounting purposes, subject to an express agreement to become obligated
under and abide by this confidential and non-disclosure restriction; and (c) Plaintiff may disclose
that the Action has been dismissed.

Continue reading ›

 

Mileage is a big issue these days. While some want higher mileage in their cars to try to protect the environment, others simply want to save some cash at the gas station. Whichever reason you use, it is enough for consumers to get testy when they discover the new car they bought does not get the mileage they were promised.

In November of 2012, the Environmental Protection Agency announced that Hyundai and Kia carmakers had exaggerated the mileage on the window stickers on nearly 1.1 million 2011-2013 model-year vehicles. Most vehicles were receiving an average of 1 mpg less than advertised but others, such as the Kia Soul, were getting as much as 6 mpg less than advertised.
Both automakers made public apologies, calling the discrepancies “procedural errors” but the class action lawsuits allege that Hyundai and Kia knowingly overstated the estimated mileage of their vehicles in order to get customers to buy them.

Recently, 12 class actions against the two car companies which are currently pending in Alabama, California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Ohio have been consolidated into one multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the Central District of California. An additional 22 class action lawsuits pending in 12 different districts may join the MDL.

The Espinosa case was the first filed and is the most advanced in litigation. For these reasons, they wished to abstain from the MDL but the panel on MDL did not deem their case advanced enough to warrant granting that request.

According to the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, consolidating the class actions into one “will eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with respect to class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary.”

Certain plaintiffs against Kia wanted a separate MDL for Kia-only classes. This motion was denied for three reasons: 1) Hyundai and Kia share a parent company, 2) the testing for both companies was done at the same facility in Korea, and 3) the announcement made on November 2, 2012 regarding the procedural errors in the mileage estimates and launch of the related mileage reimbursement programs were made on behalf of both Kia and Hyundai.
The case is being transferred to the Central District of California because that is where the defendants are based as well as where the majority of the lawsuits have been filed. Judge George H. Wu has been presiding over the Espinosa action for over a year and is therefore the most qualified to act as the transferee judge for the MDL.

Continue reading ›

 

Many of us are familiar with the stereotype of the dishonest used car salesman. They take advantage of those who know little about cars and the fact that we have no way of really knowing the history of the car we are purchasing. Websites such as CarFax makes us feel that these practices can be stopped but leave off a lot of information and can often be incomplete allowing used car salesmen to still find victims for their questionable merchandise.

The most recent scam is the reselling of vehicles that were damaged by Hurricane Sandy in New York. Saltwater is corrosive and can leave cars rusting and dangerous to drive. However, even though many of these cars have been deemed a total loss by insurance companies, they are being dried out and resold in other states.

In most states, cars that have been ruined by flooding are required to indicate that on their titles. However, in some states a car can be re-registered for another title without requiring the flood-brand carry-over. This is known as “title washing” and there’s no shortage of used car dealers who are eager to load up the damaged vehicles and pack them off to states without the required carry-over, such as Colorado and Vermont.

At one recent auction at Manheim, damaged cars had been dried out and scrubbed clean, but many of them showed tell tale signs of damage. For example, on some, the leather seating was puckered, while others had condensation beading their headlights. While this kept away some buyers, others were unhindered and some of the damaged cars went for more than $5,000.
Certain groups that keep a look-out for these issues say that insurance companies sometimes exacerbate the problem by underplaying the damage to a car at auction. In 2005, the State Farm insurance company reached an agreement with the attorneys general of 49 states and the District of Columbia for failing to properly title their cars. In the agreement, State Farm said the company is complying with all of the laws in each state affected by Hurricane Sandy.
However, once a car has been deemed a total loss, insurance companies hire special firms to collect the damaged vehicle, tow it away, spruce it up, and resell it. One such company, Insurance Auto Auctions, employs people to study weather forecasts and predict where the next disaster will be. Before Hurricane Sandy even hit the shore, Insurance Auto Auctions already had 400 tow trucks dispatched to the area and had leased huge holding facilities nearby. One of these holding facilities was an airport on Long Island where the runways were leased for $2.7 million for the year. After the hurricane, about 18,000 cars have packed the tarmac from end to end.

Now, consumers all over the country are being warned about the vehicles they are buying. Officials have warned used car shoppers in Georgia, North Carolina, and Illinois where the secretary of state’s office is scrutinizing new title applications for cars coming in from states affected by the hurricane. In addition to the state issue is the foreign market for these cars, entirely unhindered by U.S. regulations.

Continue reading ›

Contact Information