Business Disputes

Generic Drugs Not Misbranded Under Lanham Act, Seventh Circuit Rules

July 14, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

A recent decision by the Seventh Circuit caught the notice of our Illinois trademark infringement litigators. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. et al, Nos. 09-1438, 09-1462, 09-1601 (7th Cir. Oct. 29, 2009) is a dispute between the original maker of a laxative whose patent has expired and the companies that now manufacture a generic version. Schering, the original patent holder, sued four companies for claiming that the drug’s active ingredient is not available over the counter, when Schering does manufacture an over-the-counter version. The trial court in the case dismissed Schering’s complaint, a decision the Seventh Circuit upholds here.

The laxative in question was originally sold as the prescription drug MiraLAX. After its patent expired, the four defendants were authorized to sell generic prescription versions, either as GlycoLax or under the chemical name polyethylene glycol 3350. All four defendants’ drugs have labels stating that the active ingredients in their drugs are sold only by prescription. This is a requirement of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, but it is no longer entirely true. After the generic versions were approved, Schering won approval for an over-the-counter version of MiraLAX. It brought a trademark lawsuit against the defendants, claiming their labeling makes false and misleading statements that misrepresent the nature of their own and Schering’s products, and constitute misbranding under the FD&C Act.

Importantly, the FDA is conducting its own investigation into whether the generic drugs are now misbranded. Simultaneous sales of the same active ingredient in generic and over-the-counter versions violates federal law, which the FDA is also trying to resolve. The Seventh Circuit noted that the FDA may resolve Schering’s lawsuit by finding that the generic drugs may no longer be sold, or that their labels are not false and misleading under the FD&C Act. In either case, the court wrote, it would rather defer that decision to the FDA. This was also the decision of the trial court in the case, which dismissed Schering’s case without prejudice, suggesting that the company re-file after the FDA’s decision, if necessary. Schering appealed, asking for a judgment in its favor rather than a trial. The defendants cross-appealed, arguing that the case should have been dismissed with prejudice.

The Seventh started by noting that a dismissal without prejudice is appealable unless the defect leading to it is immediately curable. It then turned to the merits of Schering’s claim. Letters from FDA regulators the company cited are irrelevant, the court said, because they did not determine the final outcome of the agency’s review. It also dismissed Schering’s argument that the generic drugs were misbranded under the FD&C Act because their labels say “prescription only,” noting that prescription drugs are required to carry this warning. And it noted that federal courts have previously resolved conflicts between FDA labeling requirements and intellectual property law, including in SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2000).

Schering has been “coy” about what kind of labeling it would find sufficient on the generic drugs, the court wrote, leaving suggested wording out of its briefs entirely and agreeing with suggested wording only under pressure at oral arguments. That reticence, the court wrote, made it believe this is not a matter that “can be resolved intelligently without a decision by the FDA.” Because it has more experience with how consumers interact with drug labeling, the court said, the FDA should decide on proper labeling before a Lanham Act claim is filed. Thus, the Seventh Circuit upheld the trial court’s decision to dismiss Schering’s claim in anticipation of the FDA’s ruling. For the same reason, however, it also upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss without prejudice — so Schering can re-file its claim, if necessary, in the future.

How to Collect a Judgement — Our Chicago Business Lawyers Assist Our Clients in Enforcing and Collecting on Money Judgments

June 17, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Our Chicago business trial lawyers assist our clients in obtaining and collecting on money judgments. You can contact one of our Chicago business attorneys online by clicking here or call (888) 990-4990 for a free consultation. Our Oak Brook, Wheaton and Chicago commerical law attorneys have over 25 years of experience litigating claims on behalf of our business clients and have been featured in national and local media. Super Lawyers selected our Oak Brook and Chicago attorneys as among the top 5% in Illinois.

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Former Employee’s Stock Options Remain Valid Under Employment Contract

June 16, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

As Chicago employment contract litigation attorneys, we noted a favorable decision for employees from the Seventh Circuit in October. Lewitton v. ITA Software, Inc., No. 08-3725 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2009) upheld a former employee’s right to buy stock options that had vested during his employment, even though he tried to make the purchase after leaving. Derek Lewitton was hired in April of 2005 as vice-president of sales at ITA Software, which makes a software program that compares the prices of airplane flights. His contract said some of his stock options would be forfeited if ITA didn’t meet certain revenue goals, subject to a time delay to account for delays in the development of a new program called 1U.

Unfortunately, 1U was never widely adopted among ITA’s clients, and ITA scaled it back considerably. Lewitton left ITA in May of 2007. In August of the same year, he tried to buy 138,900 shares of ITA stock. ITA let him buy only 34,722, arguing that the remaining 104,178 were forfeited under his contract. Lewitton sued ITA for breach of his employment contract. ITA removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, after which Lewitton moved for summary judgment, arguing that his employment contract was clear on his right to purchase stock options. The judge granted summary judgment, agreeing that the contract “unambiguously” granted 5,660 options for each month he was at ITA, and that no forfeiting events had taken place. ITA appealed.

The Seventh Circuit started by examining whether the language of Lewitton’s employment contract was ambiguous under Illinois law, which both parties agreed applies. The principal question, the court wrote, is whether the contract unambiguously allows Lewitton to buy the 5,660 shares per month he claims. The contract specifies that those shares are forfeited if ITA didn’t meet certain goals in by the end of an assessment period, but that assessment period would be deferred it the development schedule for 1U was “materially deferred.” In trial court, both sides agreed that 1U’s development didn’t go the way it was expected to go. On that basis, the trial court found that the assessment period was never triggered, and thus the stock options were not forfeited. On appeal, ITA argued that “materially deferred” was ambiguous and not intended to apply when ITA put the program on indefinite hold.

The Seventh disagreed, finding the term unambiguous. The ordinary dictionary definitions of the words are clear, the court wrote. And in fact, the contract includes parts that explain a material deferral by using the words “defer” and “delay” interchangeably. That example clearly shows that the parties agreed to delay the assessment period until after 1U was launched. Because 1U was never launched, the assessment period was never started, the court wrote, and thus the stock option forfeiture provision does not apply. The court dismissed ITA’s argument that the contract was never intended to give Lewitton more shares than other ITA executives. That argument was supported by negotiations and internal ITA communications, the court wrote, and caselaw requires it to consider none of that extrinsic evidence. Furthermore, the contract had a clause specifying that it supersedes all prior “agreements, understandings or negotiations.”
ITA also argued that even if the contract is unambiguous, the case presented an issue of material fact inappropriate for summary judgment. The issue in question, ITA said, is whether ITA really did delay the 1U program rather than ending it altogether. However, the court found that this was “just another attempt to create ambiguity where none exists.” At the district court, the Seventh Circuit noted, ITA made several statements through affidavits and discovery conceding that work was still being done, although resources devoted to it were significantly reduced or nonexistent. Nothing in the record points to a genuine issue of material fact on this question, the court wrote, so the trial court was upheld in its summary judgment order. Finally, the Seventh dismissed ITA’s contention that the district court should determine whether the options are valid under Delaware law (it’s a Delaware corporation), because it had explicitly waived that argument in an agreed order. Thus, the Seventh upheld the district court on all issues.

Video Regarding Covenants Not to Compete in Dental Practice Purchase Agreements — Our Chicago Business Law Attorneys Handle Non-Compete Agreement Lawsuits

May 29, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

DiTommaso Lubin prosecutes and defends cases involving controversies over a covenant not to compete, or other restrictive covenants and other business law issues. Our Illinois restrictive covenant attorneys represent clients in active litigation over the validity and enforcement of these covenants, as well as helping to evaluate whether litigation may arise over such a contract. With more than 25 years of experience, we have handled these claims for businesses of every size, from large corporations to family-owned businesses, as well as individual employees. Based in downtown Chicago and in Oak Brook near Naperville, Hinsdale, Wheaton and Downers Grove, our Chicago business law lawyers represent clients throughout the state of Illinois, as well as in Indiana and Wisconsin. To learn more about how our Illinois covenant not to compete lawyers can help you, please do not hesitate to contact us through our Web site or call toll-free at 630-333-0333.

A Video Providing Some Tips From Attorneys on How to Fire an Employee — Our Chicago Business Law Attorneys Represent Employers and Employees in Wrongful Termination Suits

May 16, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

How to fire someone

Our Chicago business law lawyers at DiTommaso Lubin are dedicated to helping businesses and business people in pursuing and protecting their rights in business lawsuits. To see the the wide variety of business lawsuits our Chicago business trial attorneys have handled click here. You can contact one of our Oakbrook and Chicago business law attorneys through our website by clicking here.

Online Fraud Magazine is a Great Resource for Tips on How to Uncover Business Fraud — DiTommaso Lubin’s Chicago Business Law Lawyers Work With Certified Fraud Examiners to Help Businesses, Partners and Shareholders to Recover Monies Lost Through Frauds

April 20, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

The online magazine of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners is a great resouce for tips on uncovering the varying forms of business fraud. You can click here to view it.

A recent issue of the magazine had a very informative article about how certain types of documents are susceptible to employee forgies and other frauds . The article had this to say about fax invoices:

FACSIMILE DOCUMENTS

A Video of Harry Markopolos the Certified Fraud Examiner Who Uncovered the Madoff Fraud — Our Chicago Business Litigation Attorneys Engage Certified Fraud Examiners to Help Businesses, Partners and Shareholders to Recover Fraud Losses

April 19, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

DiTommaso Lubin’s Chicago business trial lawyers have more than two and half decades of experience helping business clients on unraveling complex business fraud and breach of fiduciary duty cases. We work with skilled forensic accountants and certified fraud examiners to help recover monies missappropriated from our clients. Our Chicago business, commercial, and class-action litigation lawyers represent individuals, family businesses and enterprises of all sizes in a variety of legal disputes, including disputes among partners and shareholders as well as lawsuits between businesses and and consumer rights, auto fraud, and wage claim individual and class action cases. In every case, our goal is to resolve disputes as quickly and sucessfully as possible, helping business clients protect their investements and get back to business as usual. From offices in Oak Brook, near Wuakegan, Aurora, Highland Park, Wilmette, Elmhurst, and Chicago, we serve clients throughout Illinois and the Midwest.

If you’re facing a business or class-action lawsuit, or the possibility of one, and you’d like to discuss how the experienced Illinois business dispute attorneys at DiTommaso Lubin can help, we would like to hear from you. To set up a consultation with one of our Chicago, Joliet, Waukegan, Wheaton, or Naperville business trial attorneys and class action and consumer trial lawyers, please call us toll-free at 630-333-0333 or contact us through the Internet.

Business Not Entitled to Injunctions for Alleged Trade Secrets Act and Fiduciary Duty Violations — Our Chicago Business Law Attorneys Have Substantial Experience in Emergency Business Litigation Involving TROs and Injunctions

March 24, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Our Illinois trade secrets attorneys were pleased to see an evenhanded ruling handed down by the Second District Court of Appeal. In Stenstrom Petroleum Services Group, Inc. v. Mesch, No. 2-07-0504 (Ill. 2nd Sept.7, 2007), Stenstrom sued former employee Robert Mesch for breach of a noncompete clause, breach of fiduciary duty and violations of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. The case arises out of Mesch’s decision to leave Stenstrom and join Precision Petroleum Installation Inc., a competitor with nearly the same name as a company that Stenstrom bought. The trial court granted Stenstrom a preliminary injunction on its breach of contract claim, but denied injunctions on the other claims.

Mesch had worked in the petroleum industry since 1974, eventually becoming a project manager and salesman. Stenstrom installs, maintains and repairs petroleum equipment, such as tanks, pumps and electronics. Mesch had been working for Precision Petroleum Inc. when Stenstrom bought it in 2003. Mesch was hired during the acquisition to do the same work, and signed noncompete and confidentiality agreements. The noncompete agreement restricted Mesch from working in excavation or equipment repair in Winnebago and Boone counties for six months after his employment ended. When estimating and making bids for Stenstrom, Mesch testified that he used a crude spreadsheet inherited from his old company, rather than the estimating software other project managers at Stenstrom used.

In December of 2006, Mesch left Stenstrom and joined Precision Petroleum Installation Inc., a new company at which he had the opportunity to earn a share of profits as well as a salary. He acknowledged that PPI has bid on and discussed jobs only for Stenstrom customers, and its one client as of the hearing was a Stenstrom customer. He testified that he uses the same Excel spreadsheet and other Stenstrom data to estimate bids for PPI, but said purchasing differences between the companies mean he uses different information to calculate the bids. He also said PPI does not do excavation or repair work, relying on subcontractors. He acknowledged copying Stenstrom’s files for PPI’s use while he was at Stenstrom, but destroyed some data and handed over other data as part of the case. It would not be difficult to recreate the spreadsheet from memory, he said, because he created it, had Stenstrom discounts committed to memory and could get manufacturer prices from public knowledge.

Stenstrom president David Sockness testified at trial that the Excel spreadsheet was acquired in the 2003 purchase, is full of valuable Stenstrom information and is being used by other project managers. He said PPI had bidded on work for some of its best clients, but acknowledged that there was no exclusive agreement with several of these clients and that some take competitive bids. Stenstrom IT manager Brian Cotti testified that records show Mesch tried unsuccessfully to print a bidding report to which he did not have access. Two clients testified that their lengthy relationships with Mesch influenced their bidding decisions. At the conclusion of all of this, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction to enforce the noncompete covenant Mesch had signed until the end of the six-month period, saying it was reasonable. However, it found on the other counts that Stenstrom had failed to show it was likely to win at trial or that there was no other legal remedy available. Stenstrom and Mesch both appealed.

The Second District started by rejecting Stenstrom’s argument that the six-month restrictive covenant should have been calculated from the date Mesch ceased breaching it. The court flatly rejected this, saying the contract’s language clearly pegged the period from the day Mesch left his job at Stenstrom. It also rejected Stenstrom’s claim that it should have received a preliminary injunction based on Trade Secrets Act violations. This is based on the Excel spreadsheet Mesch used to create bids at Stenstrom and later at PPI, which Stenstrom said were full of protectable information and the result of significant investment. However, the appeals court said, Stenstrom failed to rebut Mesch’s testimony that the spreadsheet was based on publicly available information and memory, so it failed to raise a fair question about whether the information was secret enough to qualify as a trade secret.

Next, Stenstrom argued that the trial court should have granted an injunction against Mesch based on his alleged breach of fiduciary duty, a claim it said it made to avoid Stenstrom’s solicitation of its customers. Mesch was working for PPI when he copied Stenstrom’s files, the company said, and used it for PPI’s benefit. However, the Second District wrote, much of Stenstrom’s argument on breach of fiduciary duty rests on its Trade Secrets Act claim. That issue was settled above, the court said. Furthermore, Stenstrom waived its breach of fiduciary duty claim by failing to argue it clearly, the court said.

Finally, the court rejected Mesch’s argument that the trial court should have entered no preliminary injunction at all on the breach of restrictive covenant claim. Mesch is wrong to argue that the enforcement of the restrictive covenant will affect the independent Trade Secrets Act and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the court wrote. But in any case, it said, the issue is moot because the preliminary injunction period ended before the case came to the Second District. And thanks to the court’s decision on Stenstrom’s argument to change the period when the restrictive covenant applies, there’s no need to consider it. Thus, all of the trial court’s decisions were affirmed.

Video By a Forensic Accountant and Certified Fraud Examiner Discussing Common Types of Business Fraud — Our Chicago Business Trial Attorneys Bring Suit to Recover Monies Lost by Businesses Due to Fraud and Breach of Fiduciary Duty

February 21, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Below is a video by a forensic accountant and certified fraud examiner discussing common forms of fraud that cause losses to businesses. The video provides solutions to protecting your business from fraud.

DiTommaso Lubin’s Chicago business trial lawyers have more than two and half decades of experience helping business clients on unraveling complex business fraud and breach of fiduciary duty cases. We work with skilled forensic accountants and certified fraud examiners to help recover monies missappropriated from our clients. Our Chicago business, commercial, and class-action litigation lawyers represent individuals, family businesses and enterprises of all sizes in a variety of legal disputes, including disputes among partners and shareholders as well as lawsuits between businesses and and consumer rights, auto fraud, and wage claim individual and class action cases. In every case, our goal is to resolve disputes as quickly and sucessfully as possible, helping business clients protect their investements and get back to business as usual. From offices in Oak Brook, near Wheaton, Naperville, Evanston, and Chicago, we serve clients throughout Illinois and the Midwest.

If you’re facing a business or class-action lawsuit, or the possibility of one, and you’d like to discuss how the experienced Illinois business dispute attorneys at DiTommaso Lubin can help, we would like to hear from you. To set up a consultation with one of our Chicago, Wheaton, Elmhurst, Geneva, Aurora, Elgin, Rockford or Naperville business trial attorneys and class action and consumer trial lawyers, please call us toll-free at 630-333-0333 or contact us through the Internet.

Scope of Injunctions Enforcing Restrictive Employment Covenants Must Be Clear, Fourth District Decides

November 13, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Our Illinois noncompete clause attorneys recently noted an important case addressing the standards for a preliminary injunction in Illinois lawsuits over covenants not to compete. In Lifetec, Inc. v. Edwards, No. 4-07-0300 (Ill. 4th Nov. 6, 2007), Lifetec sued former salesman Peter Edwards for breach of three restrictive covenants in his employment contract. It also sued his wife, Carol Edwards, and new employer, Patterson Medical Supply Inc., for tortious interference with the contract. Trial court granted Lifetec a preliminary injunction, and Edwards filed the instant appeal.

Lifetec sells medical devices and products. When Edwards began working there as a salesman, he signed a contract agreeing not to:

Compete with Lifetec, or sell or lease the products he had been assigned during the last 18 months of his employment, or competing products, within the territory assigned to him in the last 18 months of his employment.
Directly or indirectly solicit purchase or lease of the product or competing products within the same territory.
Work as a distributor or sales representative for any manufacturer that was a client of Lifetec, or for a competitor that also handles the client’s products, within the last 12 months.

The restrictive covenant applied for 24 months after the employment agreement was terminated.

Edwards left Lifetec for Patterson, a larger competitor, after 10 years. According to the opinion, he knew the move could cause Lifetec to sue and gave Patterson a copy of the agreement, but Patterson said it would take care of him in any lawsuit. Several months later, he admitted to a former colleague that he was working for Patterson. Months later, Lifetec sued him for breach of contract and requested a preliminary injunction. At an evidentiary hearing, evidence was introduced that Edwards had solicited Lifetec customers, but he said all Lifetec customers were also Patterson customers because the bulk of Patterson’s business was from national contracts. On the basis of the evidence at this hearing, the trial court granted a preliminary injunction stopping Edwards from violating the contract.

Edwards appealed, asking only for a decision on whether there was enough evidence to support the granting of the injunction. The appeals court said there was. The question, the court wrote, was whether Edwards had used protectable confidential information gained at Lifetec for his own gain. Lifetec contended that its “open quotes” to buyers constituted protectable information, although not all open quotes necessarily resulted in sales. The court took it one step further, saying the way those quotes were calculated was the real confidential information, as the quotes themselves were not secret once submitted to customers. Edwards’ knowledge of the reasoning behind the bids could give Patterson an advantage in the competitive medical supply industry. The defendants’ arguments that Lifetec should have alleged that Edwards misappropriated its trade secrets also fail, the court wrote, since Lifetec is making no such claim. All of this is sufficient to raise fair questions of fact, the court said, so an injunction was proper until the merits of the case could be decided.

A special concurrence filed by Presiding Justice Robert Steigmann agreed with the outcome, but said the court was incorrect to use the “legitimate business interests” test. This test is three decades old, the justice wrote, but the Illinois Supreme Court had never embraced it and in fact failed to use it at all in its 2006 decision in Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 225 Ill. 2d 52, 866 N.E.2d 85 (2006). Because of this, he wrote, the court should have stopped its analysis after finding that the time and territory restraints in the covenant were reasonable. The majority noted, however, that the parties made no argument on this basis.