Articles Posted in Class-Action

 

Our Oak Brook, Ill. employee rights attorneys were very interested to see a recent labor lawsuit against telecom giant AT&T. Bloomberg News reported Dec. 17 that two separate units of the company were hit with simultaneous lawsuits Dec. 16 over unpaid overtime. The plaintiffs seek to represent more than 5,000 current and former workers who they say were misclassified as low-level managers, so AT&T would not have to pay them overtime. Each of the two lawsuits seeks $500 million in unpaid overtime, as well as compensation for rest and meal breaks that were allegedly not granted.

According to the article, the employees were classified as “Level One” managers, even though their job duties didn’t meet the federal definition of management positions. They say they worked as many as 60 hours a week, or 10 to 14 hours a day, and were expected to be available on weekends, all without overtime pay. In fact, the Atlanta plaintiffs claim that they were eligible for overtime when they worked for BellSouth, before its acquisition by AT&T. Joe Luque, a lead plaintiff in the San Francisco litigation, said in a press release that he was chewed out when he tried to exercise managerial duties by firing a poor-performing employee. The suits come shortly after a Connecticut federal court certified a class of AT&T workers with similar complaints, in a suit filed by the same law firm.

As Chicago overtime rights lawyers, we’re pleased to see workers standing up for themselves against such a large employer. The right to overtime pay is provided by a federal law called the Fair Labor Standards Act, which requires time and a half for any work above 40 hours a week. This can be very expensive — so some companies, instead of hiring extra personnel to handle the work, look for ways to break the law. Mis-classifying employees as “managers” with no real management duties is one way to end-run around workers’ rights. Other employers may pressure their employees to work off the clock; work through legally required rest and meal breaks; or shift the extra hours to another week. Unfortunately, far too many workers don’t understand their rights, or are afraid of losing their jobs if they stand up for themselves.

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Our Illinois overtime rights lawyers were interested to see a recent ruling on unpaid overtime from the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. In Musch v. Domtar Industries, No. 08-4305 (7th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009), Alan Musch and his colleagues were maintenance workers at two Wisconsin paper mills owned by Domtar Industries. In their lawsuit, they say their job routinely exposes them to dangerous chemicals, requiring them to put on special protective gear before shifts and to shower and change after. They are not paid for the time it takes to do those things, however. They sued for unpaid overtime pay for the showering and changing time, as well as for time spent shaving, a requirement under Domtar company policy.

After the case was filed, Domtar moved for summary judgment dismissing the case. It argued that company policy says workers should shower and change immediately after exposure to a hazardous chemical, even if that means the employee goes into overtime. Because it has that policy, the company argued, overtime compensation was inappropriate. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment for Domtar. After the court declined to reconsider, the plaintiffs appealed both rulings. They argued that the district court missed or ignored evidence showing that chemicals actually were on workers’ skin; that is, they do not shower because they merely think they might have the chemicals. Thus, changing and showering time is appropriate for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit started by noting that the FLSA and Wisconsin law both require employers to pay for all of the work employees do. However, federal law makes a distinction between work and preliminary or postliminary activities. Changing and washing is ordinarily considered preliminary or postliminary, the court wrote, but may sometimes be considered part of the job if it’s “integral” and “indispensable” to the job. The plaintiffs argued evidence showed that they didn’t always realize there were chemicals on their skin until the end of shifts, meaning showering after shifts would be following the company’s stated policy.

The Seventh Circuit disagreed. The plaintiffs’ evidence showed that showers were sometimes necessary, it wrote, but not that the Domtar policy of showering after any exposure was insufficient. Furthermore, the court said, employees admitted to bringing work clothes home to wash them, suggesting that they don’t believe the chemical exposure is that serious. Finally, employees are free to seek overtime under the existing company policy when they are required to shower and change, the Seventh said. Because these are all “normal conditions” under the meaning of the FLSA, the post-shift changing and showering is postliminary activity, not an essential job requirement, the court wrote. Thus, it upheld the trial court’s orders.

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Our Chicago overtime rights lawyers were interested in a recent wage and hour decision out of the Second Circuit. In Whalen v. J. P. Morgan Chase Co., No. 08-4092 (2nd. Cir. Nov. 20, 2009), a group of loan underwriters sued J.P. Morgan Chase, their employer, for unpaid overtime in a proposed class action. The plaintiffs contended that they were misclassified as administrative employees, because their duties did not meet the federal Department of Labor’s definition of administrative duties. The district court in New York disagreed and granted summary judgment for Chase. But the Second Circuit reversed that judgment, saying loan underwriters cannot be exempt administrative employees because their work furthered Chase’s core business of making loans, rather than helping to run or direct the company.

For four years, plaintiff Andrew Whalen worked for Chase as an underwriter. His job was to evaluate whether to grant loans to individuals, using detailed guidelines provided by Chase. Some underwriters were sometimes permitted to deviate from these standards. Whalen contended that he frequently worked more than 40 hours a week, but Chase classified him as an administrative employee exempt from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Whalen eventually sued for a declaratory judgment that Chase violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime, but Chase prevailed on cross-motions for summary judgment. Whalen appealed.

The Second started by looking at the definition of administrative employees. The federal Department of Labor says administrative work is “directly related to management policies or general business operations” and “customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment.” Using a variety of documents from the Department on the financial services industry, the court drew a distinction between exempt employees with advisory duties and non-exempt employees who carry out the employer’s day-to-day operations.

Whalen’s job was to sell loans according to Chase’s detailed standards, the court wrote, not to advise customers on which loans to get. This puts the job firmly on the “production” side of Chase’s business, the court wrote, as distinct from management duties or “general business operations” such as human resources. Furthermore, the Second wrote, Chase itself referred to underwriters’ duties as “production” work. In doing so, the court drew a distinction between “production” and “administrative” work supported by its own past decision in Reich v. State of New York, 3 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1993) as well as by precedents in the Ninth, Third and First Circuits. Whalen’s job did not met the management/general business operations test set forth by the Department of Labor, the court wrote, which is enough to conclude that he was not a bona fide administrative employee. Thus, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court’s summary judgment decision.

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This video describes how senior citizens and disabled persons are often targeted for consumer scams and rip-offs.

Based in Chicago, Wilmette and Oak Brook, Ill., DiTommaso Lubin handles informercial, stock broker, auto dealer and RV dealer fraud and other consumer fraud and lemon law litigation for clients in Wheaton, Naperville,Wheaton, Waukegan, Evanston, Joliet, Aurora, Elgin, Lisle and in other parts of Illinois, the Midwest and throughout the United States. In addition to helping individuals and families, our Chicago class action attorneys have successfully handled numerous consumer rights class actions. If you believe you’re a victim of fraud and misrepresentations or a deceptive business practice, please contact us as soon as possible to learn about your rights at a free consultation.

The Illinois Department of Labor has a great website which provides alot of useful information on fair labor laws including the requirement that employers pay time and half for overtime work for non-exempt employees.

You can find the website here. With regard to federal and Illinois overtime laws, the website provides answers to various questions and links to other areas of the site for answers:

When is overtime pay legally due?

The United States Department of Labor has an excellent website which provides detailed information on fair labor laws including the requirement that employers pay time and half for overtime work for non-exempt employees.

The website is located here. With regard to federal overtime laws, the website states:

Overtime Pay

In a proposed class action insurance fraud lawsuit, the Illinois First District Court of Appeal has ruled that a former client may sue an insurance broker for inflating the cost of its insurance policies with “kickbacks.” DOD Technologies v. Mesirow Insurance Services Inc., No. 1-06-3300 (Ill. 1st Feb. 14, 2008). Plaintiff DOD Technologies sued Mesirow Insurance Services Inc., its insurance broker, after learning that Mesirow took contingency fees from insurance companies for steering clients toward those companies.

In its complaint, DOD said it provided confidential information to Mesirow, expecting the broker to get DOD the best price it could for insurance. But in addition to its commission from DOD, Mesirow also received “contingent commissions” from insurance companies, which were payments based on the amount of business it directed to the insurer, the number of renewals and how many losses the insurer had suffered from those clients. The payments were not disclosed to customers, DOD alleged, and created a conflict of interests for Mesirow. They also violated a part of the Illinois Insurance Code that require insurance brokers to disclose fees not directly related to premiums.

DOD sued Mesirow for breach of fiduciary duty, consumer fraud, fraudulent concealment, unjust enrichment and accounting. The complaint alleged that Mesirow steered customers to insurers who paid kickbacks, regardless of whether those insurers offered the best price, inflating the cost of insurance. The trial court dismissed three of DOD’s counts because the Insurance Code precludes breach of fiduciary duty claims and two others because it found no proof that DOD suffered damages or relied on the fraudulent concealment. DOD appealed.

In a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act class action, the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that a bill collector’s failure to correctly break down a bill into principal and interest does not violate that Act. Wahl v. Midland Credit Management, No. 08-1517 (7th Cir. Feb. 23, 2009) was a class action lawsuit alleging that debt collectors violate the FDCPA when they send out bills that state the correct total amount but break down the charges incorrectly.

Plaintiff Barbara Wahl had just $66.98 on a credit card when she sustained a stroke and racked up much larger medical bills during a time when she couldn’t work. The credit card went unpaid and eventually, the balance was $1,149.09, mostly in interest and late fees. Midland purchased the debt in January of 2005 and started sending demand letters to Wahl. The letter at issue arrived April 15, 2005, listing both the “current balance” and “amount due” at $1,160.57. On the back side, it listed the “principal” as $1,149.09 and the “accrued interest” as $11.48. This was followed by a similar letter listing a higher interest. The letters construed the “principal” as the total value of the debt Midland had bought, including interest accrued with the original creditor.

Wahl filed a proposed class-action lawsuit in federal court for the Northern District of Illinois. One of her two claims was that Midland had violated the FDCPA by incorrectly stating that the principal on her account was $1,149.09 rather than breaking down the original principal, the original interest and the new interest. Debt collectors are not required by law to break down charges, it said — but when they do, the law requires that the breakdown not contain false or misleading information. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of Midland. Wahl appealed.

A very informative brochure just published by the Federal Trade Commission contains the following very useful questions and answers regarding the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act:

What debts are covered?

Personal, family, and household debts are covered under the Act. This includes money owed for the purchase of an automobile, for medical care, or for charge accounts.

DiTommaso Lubin is pleased to announce that we are part of a large auto dealer fraud class action lawsuit that recently survived a dismissal motion in the Eastern District of Michigan. In Re: OnStar Contract Litigation is a proposed class action consolidating lawsuits from around the nation against OnStar Corporation and four automakers that include the company’s technology in their new vehicles.

Along with other attorneys, our auto dealer fraud lawyers represent consumers who purchased vehicles with a version of OnStar that relies on analog cellular phone technology. The FCC voted in 2002 to phase out that technology and replace it with digital by Feb. 18, 2008. The “sunset period” was intended to allow companies time to phase out products based on analog technology and replace them with digital products. Nonetheless, our consolidated suit alleges, OnStar and the car manufacturers continued to sell analog OnStar to consumers allegedly without notifying them of the phase-out. When allegedly it did belatedly inform analog customers that their product would no longer work, it offered them a chance to pay for an upgrade to digital technology.

The case was consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. On Feb. 19, 2009, the court considered the defendants’ motions to dismiss. In its opinion and order, the court started by rejecting the defendants’ request for a choice-of-law determination, saying it is inappropriate to make a choice this early. Thus, it declined to consider motions related to choice of law. However, it did order limited discovery on the choice of law to allow the court to determine class certification.

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