Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

7th Circuit Overturns and Remands Denial of Class Certification in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Case

January 2, 2014 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

When class actions are filed, courts need to consider all aspects of the class before determining whether or not it can be certified. This includes whether class members from other states have claims similar enough to the class members of one state, particularly in cases where the lawsuit is filed under a state law. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently handled a case in which the status of the class was disputed for this reason.

Gwendolyn Phillips was sued by Asset Acceptance, LLC for some outstanding debt that she still had with the company. However, Phillips argued that the lawsuit was invalid because the statute of limitations on the debt had already passed.

Few debtors are aware that a statute of limitations on their debt exists. Even those who do know frequently find that it is cheaper and easier to simply settle the debt rather than try to fight it in court. To try and mitigate these effects, Phillips moved to certify a class action of plaintiffs consisting of debtors who have been sued by Asset Acceptance for debts resulting from the sale of natural gas who have been sued after the statute of limitations has expired. According to the records currently available, the class that Phillips is proposing can consist of as many as 793 members if they all choose to participate. 343 of which are eligible to file claims in the state of Illinois.

Which Illinois statute of limitations applies to this was case disputed between the parties. One statute gives four years as the limitation while the other statute gives five. Phillips claims that the applicable statute is the one that lasts for four years while Asset insists that the five-year statute is the proper one. Regardless, Asset sued Phillips more than five years after her debt had accrued.

The district court ruled that, because Phillips had been sued by Asset after five years, she was an inadequate representative for members of the class who had been sued after only four years. The court therefore shrunk the eligible class members down to less than thirty members, which the judge ruled was too small to justify the numerosity requirement of a class action. The judge therefore dismissed Phillips’s motion for class certification.

Phillips appealed the decision and the case went to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The appellate court rejected the lower court’s reasoning that the difference of one year was sufficient to disqualify Phillips as an adequate representative. Rather, the appellate court found that Phillips had no ulterior motive for insisting that the relevant statute lasted for only four years, as she had been sued after five. Therefore, the court found no reason that she should not be an adequate representative for the class.

Further, even if the court had found a significant difference between class members who had been sued after four years as opposed to members who had been sued after five, the court found that certifying a subclass with a second representative made more sense than decertifying the entire class.

In examining the case, the appellate court found that the relevant statute was for only four years, and as a result, Phillips is eligible to represent the entire class of 343 Illinois plaintiffs. Whether or not plaintiffs in other states can be included in the class or subclasses will need further evidence to determine. In the mean time, the appellate court remanded the case back to the district court.

You can view the entire decision here.

Indiana Car Dealer Gets Off the Hook for Most Claims in Consumer Fraud Case

December 27, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Most states have local statutes which have been put in place to protect consumers from deceptive and unfair business practices. However, courts must be careful to balance the needs of protecting consumers with the needs of sellers to market their wares. Just such a balance was considered in a recent case in Indiana in which Heather Kesling bought a used car from Hubler Nissan, Inc. The car was allegedly advertised as being a “Sporty Car at a Great Value Price,” but after buying it, Kesler discovered that the car had extensive mechanical problems which rendered the vehicle unusable. As a result, Kesler sued Hubler Nissan for fraud and violation of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act.

Hubler Nissan moved for summary judgment which the trial court granted. Kesling appealed the decision and the appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling. According to the appellate court, the statement that the car was a “Sporty Car at a Great Value Price” could implicitly represent that “it is a good car for the price and that, at a minimum, it is safe to operate.” The appellate court therefore ruled in Kesling’s favor, after which the case then moved to the Indiana Supreme court which reversed part of the ruling and remanded part of the ruling.

Hubler Nissan responded by petitioning to have the case moved to the Indiana Supreme Court. The Indiana Legal Foundation and Barnes & Thornburg LLP filed an amicus brief with the court in support of the petition for transfer. In the amicus brief, they argued that the assertion that the car was a “Sporty Car at a Great Value Price” was nothing more than puffery, meaning that it was an expression of the seller’s opinion and was not meant to be construed as fact. To punish Hubler Nissan for making such a statement, the amicus brief argued, would be to impose undue hardship on Indiana businesses in the future, as it would inhibit all forms of advertising.
The Supreme Court agreed that to rule in Kesling’s favor would be to force sellers to list only a product’s “name, rank, and serial number” in order to avoid a similar lawsuit. The Court concluded that sales puffery is not actionable as fraud, stating that, “[w]hile advertisements may not be deceptive, they need not refrain from any expression of the seller’s opinion.”

In its ruling, the Indiana Supreme Court further noted that Hubler Nissan’s advertisement “was puffing and not any representation of fact, and thus the advertisement was not ‘deceptive’ under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (IDCSA); whether a car is ‘sporty’ was a subjective assertion of opinion and could not reasonably be ascribed any significance as a representative of a car’s state of repair or drivability, and ‘great value price’ could not reasonably be understood to have any greater significance than the comparable terms ‘great price’ or ‘priced to sell’.”

The Indiana Supreme Court also pointed out that, under the Indiana Consumer Sales Act, the failure to disclose information does not constitute a representation of fact. As a result, the Court could not find Hubler Nissan guilty of fraud under that Act. This is not the case in most states such as Illinois where if a car dealer knowlingly fails to disclose or conceals material facts it can be liable under the Illinois consumer fraud act.

You can view the Court’s opinion here.

Facebook Posts Get Government Worker Fired

December 17, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Courts recognize that the government has an interest in regulating certain forms of speech. However, that interest does not cancel out each citizen’s right to free speech as granted under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. When faced with a lawsuit brought under the First Amendment, the courts will therefore consider the interest of the government in regulating speech against the constitutional rights of the person who made the speech.

In a recent lawsuit which was filed under the First Amendment, a government worker filed a lawsuit against her former employer, the Oregon Department of Health Services (DHS) for alleged wrongful termination as a result of posts which she uploaded onto her Facebook page. The plaintiff, Jennifer Shepherd, worked in child protective services and determined child custody cases. As part of her job, she was regularly called in to court to testify in custody cases.
On more than one occasion, Shepherd posted to her Facebook page derogatory remarks about individuals on public assistance. These included a suggestion that those on public assistance be forbidden from owning a flat screen television, banning people who are on public assistance from having any more children, and sterilizing people who have previously had their parental rights terminated. The DHS conducted an investigation into these posts, after which it terminated Shepherd’s employment.

Firing an employee in retaliation for exercising their right to freedom of speech is against the law. To determine whether or not an employee was wrongfully terminated under the First Amendment, the courts are provided with a test consisting of five elements. The court used this test in deciding whether the DHS violated the law in terminating the plaintiff’ employment as a child protective services worker. Specifically, the court focused on the fourth element of the test, “whether the state had adequate justification for treating the employee differently from other members of the general public.”

Despite having made these negative comments, Shepherd admitted to the court that, as part of her role in child protective services, she was “to be a neutral appraiser of the settings in which the children live.” She was not supposed to consider the employment status, religious or political beliefs of the adults in the home, or concern herself with how they chose to spend money or furnish their home. Shepherd also affirmed that she was aware that the majority of the parents being assessed by the DHS were on Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, food stamps, and/or the Oregon Health Plan.

The DHS argued that, as a result of the derogatory comments that Shepherd posted onto her Facebook page, she would immediately be impeached by the defense attorney every time she was called to testify in court. This prevented her from performing an important part of her job. Another result of the Facebook posts was the fact that two coworkers expressed doubt as to Shepherd’s ability to effectively perform her job. As such, the DHS argued that the Facebook posts caused “substantial disruption” in the workplace and the court agreed.

The First Amendment provides greater freedom of speech if the speech in question is “intended to help the public actually evaluate the performance of a public agency” or if it is spread to a wider audience. The court ruled that the Facebook posts that Shepherd uploaded did not fulfill either of these requirements. Shepherd stated that the posts were meant to be humorous and ironic rather than informative. As such, the court ruled that they are not qualified for special protection under the First Amendment. As far as spreading the information, the plaintiff had customized her Facebook settings such that only her designated Facebook friends could view her posts. Therefore, the posts did not meet the second requirement for protection under the First Amendment. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case.

You can view the Court’s full opinion here.

TCPA Texting Class Action Alleges Insurance Carriers Violate Privacy Rights Through Illegal Text Message Campaign

December 15, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

In 1991, Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) which specifically prohibits the use of auto-dialers in making calls to a wireless number without the prior express consent of the person being called. The only exception to this rule is in the case of an emergency. One of the main reasons for this Act is the fact that owners of wireless phones are often charged for their incoming calls as well as the calls that they make. This means that, aside from being annoying and potentially time consuming, the telemarketing calls are also costing their targets money out of pocket.

Despite the institution of this Act, companies appear to be unwilling to cooperate, as evidenced by the fact that companies which use auto-dialers to contact potential customers are still thriving. One of these companies is Variable Marketing, LLC and it has recently been hit with a class action lawsuit alleging violations of the TCPA.

Filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the lawsuit names American Automobile Association, Inc.; Farmers Group, Inc.; Government Employees Insurance Company; Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; and Variable Marketing, LLC as defendants. All of these defendants allegedly used a lead-generator marketing company (Variable Marketing), to market their services in violation of the TCPA.

The plaintiffs are five consumers who received calls from Variable on their cell phones. When they answered or returned the calls, a pre-recorded message played before they were able to reach a live operator. According to the lawsuit, only one of the five plaintiffs had ever had any business dealings with any of these insurance companies prior to receiving the call and none of them had expressed their consent to receive these calls. The plaintiffs are seeking statutory damages and injunctive relief under the TCPA.

The proposed class is defined as “All persons within the United States who received a non-emergency telephone call from Variable, placed while Variable was acting on behalf of the Insurance Company Defendants, to a cellular telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.”
This proposed class could end up consisting of tens of thousands of members. Under the law, each of those members is entitled to up to $1,500 for each call that they received from Variable. This brings the total award sought by the plaintiffs to over $5,000,000, not including interest and attorneys’ fees.

Despite the fact that Variable is the company which actually placed the calls using an auto-dialer, all of the companies for which Variable did this are responsible for having violated the TCPA. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the agency which Congress put in charge of regulating and implementing the TCPA, determined that “a company on whose behalf a telephone solicitation is made bears the responsibility of any violations.” According to the FCC, the seller and the telemarketer do not need a contract in order for the seller to be liable. All that the FCC requires is that the telemarketer have “the apparent (if not actual) authority” to make the calls.

A representative of Variable told one of the plaintiffs that he was calling on behalf of “lots of the big [insurance companies], including Geico and AAA.” This suggests that Variable was given authority to use the Insurance Company Defendants’ trade name, trademark and service marks. This fulfills the requirement of “apparent (if not actual) authority” for holding the insurance companies accountable for the damages incurred as a result of their violation of the TCPA.

Court Rejects Claims that Compaq Violated Confidentiality Agreement

December 12, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Non-disclosure agreements exist so that companies can safely have discussions about developing ideas of technology without worrying about one company stealing the trade secrets of another. However, the language involved in the non-disclosure agreement is crucial. The line between what information is confidential and what information is not confidential must be clearly defined. When a company lays out the parameters for confidential information in their non-disclosure agreement, it is advisable that the company then be sure to work within the parameters which they have set.

One company that ran into trouble with the definition of confidential information as laid out in their own non-disclosure agreement is Convolve. Beginning in the late 1990’s, Convolve and Compaq Computers began doing business together using non-disclosure agreements. Those agreements specified that confidential information was to be defined as any information which was marked as confidential at the time that it was disclosed. If it was unmarked, or if the information was disclosed in a presentation, then it had to be designated as confidential in a written memorandum following the disclosure.

In late 1999, Convolve made certain presentations to Compaq regarding computer hard-drive technology, but the two companies never reached a licensing agreement for the technology. When Company then went on to use some of the information which they had gleaned from those presentations, Convolve sued Compaq for breach of contract. However, the presentations at issue were never followed by written memos to confirm that the information presented was confidential. The lower court ruled that, without the necessary memos, as laid out in the non-disclosure agreement, the agreement did not apply to any information which was disclosed in those presentations. The court decided that the non-disclosure agreements “do not appear reasonably susceptible to the interpretation Convolve urges.”

Convolve appealed the decision, arguing that, despite the lack of written memos, Compaq had understood that all of their disclosures were confidential. The appellate court rejected this argument, pointing out that it contradicted the terms of the non-disclosure agreement.
Convolve then tried to argue that, regardless of the non-disclosure agreement, state confidentiality law still applied. The appellate court also rejected that argument, stating that a non-disclosure agreement replaced any implied duty of confidentiality which might have existed between the two companies under the law. According to the Court, Convolve could not force their business partners to abide by one set of rules as laid out in their non-disclosure agreement while simultaneously forcing them to abide by a different set of rules under the law. The Court stated that “One party should not be able to circumvent its contractual obligations or impose new ones over the other via some implied duty of confidentiality.”

The Court therefore ruled in favor of Compaq, having decided that “Convolve did not follow the procedures set forth in the NDA to protect the shared information, so no duty ever arose to maintain secrecy of that information.”

The lesson learned here is that, if you are going to specifically define confidential information in your non-disclosure agreement, you should be careful to abide by all the terms of your own contract if you wish for your information to remain safe.

Alternatives to Non-Compete Agreements Become Popular With Employers

December 11, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

As this blog has discussed, non-compete agreements have become increasingly prevalent in recent years. However, they have also grown in severity in some companies, such that they frequently impose undue hardship on an employee’s search for future employment. As a result, courts in some states have grown increasingly unfavorable towards non-compete agreements. California courts, for example, are hard pressed to enforce any non-compete agreements.

If an employee breaches a non-compete agreement, the former employer can take the employee to court for breach of contract, but these lawsuits can be long and costly. While employees often rely on the allegation that the non-compete agreement imposed undue hardship, many courts rely on a three-pronged system to determine the validity of a non-compete agreement, of which undue hardship is only one consideration.

Completing the test of validity therefore requires the court to consider all the facts of the case. This can lead to very lengthy discovery, making the lawsuit even more costly. After all that, there is never a guarantee that a court will rule in the company’s favor, and even if they do, a customer lost is unlikely to come back.

For these reasons, alternatives to non-compete agreements have been proposed, although they still have yet to achieve the same popularity in American businesses. The first alternative is garden leave contracts. In these agreements, the employee agrees to give the employer notice of a certain amount of time before leaving the company. This is what is known as the garden leave period, but the employer continues the pay the employee a salary during this period. Garden leave contracts have two advantages over non-compete agreements:

1) If an employee fails to abide by the agreement it would not only prove breach of contract but also break the common law of duty of loyalty. In this case, an employer would not only be able to collect on salary paid during this period, but might be able to recover punitive damages as well.

2) It undercuts one of the main defenses that employees use when they breach their non-compete agreements: undue hardship. When an employee is still receiving a salary, undue hardship becomes significantly more difficult to prove.

As with non-compete agreements, the length of the garden leave period must be reasonable. Also, while it might be tempting for employers to reduce garden leave pay to a percentage of the employee’s normal salary, such a reduction risks inviting a court to apply higher scrutiny to the clause, which leads to the possibility of the court dismissing the agreement as invalid.

Another option is to replace the non-compete agreement with a safety net payment. Safety net payments are similar to garden leave agreements with the main difference of applying after the employee and employer have broken off all relations with one another. Once payment is made, the employee agrees to refrain from certain competitive actions, such as contacting specified customers. In this case, the safety net payment does the same thing as the garden leave payment does as far as ensuring that an employee cannot claim that the contract imposes undue hardship in their search for new employment.

Some companies have chosen to make payments like this staggered over a certain period of time, such as six months or one year. If the employee breaches the contract, the employer can then stop future installments of the safety net pay. However, employers must be careful to specify in the contract that a breach on the part of the employee will result in termination of all future payments. Otherwise, the cessation of installments could result in the employer getting taken to court for breach of contract.

The third and final alternative to non-compete agreements is client purchase agreements. These agreements do not expressly prohibit competition, but they do enact punishment in the event that the competition happens. In these arrangements, an employee agrees to pay the employer if she chooses to participate in certain competitive behaviors, such as by working with specified customers.

Settlement in Miley Cyrus Jewelry Class Action Alleging Jewelry Has Dangerous Levels of Cadmium

December 5, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Many consumers frequently rely on important information provided by the manufacturer of a product in order to determine whether or not to buy that product. If a product does not list a particular ingredient, such as gluten, which is a protein found in many processed foods, consumers will frequently assume that the protein is not present in that product. Only recently have food producers begun to label their products as specifically gluten-free.
Walmart has recently encountered a lawsuit by consumers who purchased jewelry from their stores with Miley Cyrus’s brand. The jewelry, which is made by BCBG Max Azria Group Inc., and sold in Walmart stores, allegedly contained cadmium.

Cadmium is a soft metal which is frequently used to stabilize plastics and to prevent corrosion. However, cadmium has been found to have toxic properties and it is included on the European Restriction of Hazardous Substances. This Restriction bans certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment, although it does allow for certain exemptions and exclusions. Some studies have linked cadmium with lung cancer and prostrate cancer and some people have theorized that the soft metal imitates estrogen and causes breast cancer.

In the past few years, jewelry sold at Walmart and collectible drinking glasses sold at McDonald’s have been recalled when it was discovered that these products contained cadmium. In 2010, reports of high levels of cadmium in children’s jewelry led to an investigation by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. Despite the fact that there appears to be little hard evidence available that cadmium is dangerous, there have been enough scares and warnings to make consumers wary of the metal.

The plaintiffs of the current lawsuit against Walmart regarding the Miley Cyrus-brand jewelry say that they never would have purchased the jewelry if they had known that the product contained cadmium. A settlement has been reached in the case, but the defendants continue to deny having done anything wrong and any liability. Anyone who purchased Miley Cyrus-branded jewelry from a Walmart retail store after July 1, 2005 is eligible to participate in the class. Class members have four options:

TO REMAIN IN THE SETTLEMENT: In order to remain in the settlement, purchasers of the jewelry must submit a claim form in order to receive a payment from the settlement. They must also agree to the terms of the settlement which include forfeiting their right to sue the defendants in the future.

TO GET OUT OF THE SETTLEMENT: If class members do not wish to
remain as part of the settlement, they can choose to exclude themselves from the class.

TO REMAIN IN THE SETTLEMENT AND OBJECT: Those who decide to remain in the settlement will have the opportunity to object to the settlement.

APPEAR AND SPEAK AT THE FINAL APPROVAL HEARING: Just because a settlement has been reached between the two parties does not mean that it has yet been finalized. A judge must first grant the settlement court approval. If members of the class choose to do so, they can appear at the approval hearing and speak, or they can have an attorney appear and speak on their behalf. Should they chose one or both of these options, it would be entirely at their own expense.

Overly Broad Non-Compete Agreements are Not Enforceable

December 4, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

As the popularity of covenants not to compete increases, the competitive practices which are prohibited by those agreements also seem to grow. However, there are laws in place which ensure that covenants not to compete that are deemed too stringent cannot be upheld in a court of law. One of the most common limitations on covenants not to compete is the one which states that the agreement must be broad enough only to cover the company’s legitimate business interests and no more.

Another very common limitation that courts consider is whether or not the agreement poses undue hardship on an employee. When cases of disputed covenants not to compete reach a court, it is the court’s duty to balance the needs of the business to protect their legitimate business interests with the needs of the employee to find work. If a covenant not to compete is too broad, it may make it inordinately difficult for an employee to find any work at all after her employment with the company comes to an end.

One such case in which a court found that the covenant not to compete was overly broad is the case of Orca Communications Unlimited LLC v. Ann J. Noder et al. In this case, Orca Communications, a public relations firm located in Arizona, hired Noder to be its President. Prior to taking this job, Noder had had no experience with public relations. She learned everything about the business while working for Orca.

Noder signed a Confidentiality, Customer and Employee Non-Solicitation, and Non-Competition Agreement which prevented her from advertising, or soliciting or providing conflicting services for any company which competes with Orca. After Noder left Orca to start her own public relations firm, Orca sued her for breach of contract.

The Agreement further prevented Noder from convincing any former or current or prospective customer of Orca to end its relationship with Orca. This was one of the main areas of Agreement with which the court took issue. To prevent Noder from enticing away from Orca a current Orca customer is to protect Orca’s legitimate business interests. However, to prevent Noder from doing so with companies which have never had any business dealings with Orca, the court found to be overly broad and imposed undue hardship on Noder in her efforts to find gainful employment after her time at Orca.
The Agreement also contained a confidentiality provision which prohibited Noder from using or disclosing any of Orca’s confidential information without Orca’s consent. “Confidential Information” was defined as knowledge or information which is not generally known to the public or to the public relations industry or was “readily accessible to the public in a written publication.” However, the Agreement did cover information which was only available through “substantial searching of published literature” or that had been “pieced together” from a number of different publications and sources.

This provision of the Agreement the court also found to be too broad. To protect company trade secrets is well within the limitations of protecting a company’s legitimate business interests. However, even if one has to conduct substantial research to gain knowledge, that knowledge is still considered to be in the public domain and therefore cannot be covered under a confidentiality agreement.

The trial court found that the Agreement was overly broad and dismissed the case. Orca appealed and the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the lower court and dismissed the case.

Consumers Beware — Don’t Contract Away First Amendment Rights to Give Negative Reviews of Businesses

December 2, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Our Chicago defamation, slander, libel, cyberbullying and First Amendment attorneys concentrate in this area of the law. We have defended or prosecuted a number of defamation and libel cases, including cases representing a consumer sued by a large luxury used car dealer in federal court for hundreds of negative internet reviews and videos which resulted in substantial media coverage of the suit; one of Loyola University’s largest contributors when the head basketball coach sued him for libel after he was fired; and a lawyer who was falsely accused of committing fraud with the false allegation published to the Dean of the University of Illinois School of Law, where the lawyer attended law school and the President of the University of Illinois. One of our partners also participated in representing a high profile athlete against a well-known radio shock jock.

Our Chicago defamation lawyers defend individuals’ First Amendment and free speech rights to post on Facebook, Yelp and other websites information that criticizes businesses and addresses matters of public concern. Our Chicago Cybersquatting attorneys also represent and prosecute claims on behalf of businesses throughout the Chicago area including in Lake Forest and Vernon Hills, who have been unfairly and falsely criticized by consumers and competitors in defamatory publications in the online and offline media. We have successfully represented businesses who have been the victim of competitors setting up false rating sites and pretend consumer rating sites that are simply forums to falsely bash or business clients. We have also represented and defended consumers First Amendment and free speech rights to criticize businesses who are guilty of consumer fraud and false advertising.

Super Lawyers named Chicago and Oak Brook business trial attorney Peter Lubin a Super Lawyer in the Categories of Class Action, Business Litigation, and Consumer Rights Litigation. DiTommaso Lubin’s Oak Brook and Chicago business trial lawyers have over a quarter of century of experience in litigating complex class action, consumer rights and business and commercial litigation disputes. We handle emergency business law suits involving injunctions, and TROS, defamation, libel and covenant not to compete, franchise, distributor and dealer wrongful termination and trade secret lawsuits and many different kinds of business disputes involving shareholders, partnerships, closely held businesses and employee breaches of fiduciary duty. We also assist businesses and business owners who are victims of fraud or defamatory attacks on their business and reputations.

US Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Securities Fraud Class Action and to Consider Fraud on the Market Damage Theory

December 2, 2013 | Peter S. Lubin and James V. DiTommaso

Class action status is an important tool for plaintiffs in many different types of lawsuits. It gives plaintiffs strength in numbers when filing lawsuits against large corporations. It also allows plaintiffs to collect claims which would normally be too small to justify filing a lawsuit if the plaintiff were left to do so on her own. It is the number of plaintiffs and the subsequently larger claim against the defendant which makes it possible for these plaintiffs to seek redress against defendants.

Many companies utilize illegal business practices and rely on people determining that the small claims are not worth a lawsuit in order to continue those practices. Even if a customer or investor loses a small amount of money, a company that uses the same practice with hundreds of thousands of similarly situated people could potentially rake in millions of dollars illegally.

Despite the fact that class action status is a necessary tool which is provided to plaintiffs in the laws of the United States, the Supreme Court has recently displayed a pattern of ruling against class actions. Such rulings are making it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to file class action lawsuits which can be upheld in court. As a result of the Supreme Court’s recent rulings, lower courts have had to consistently deny plaintiffs class action status in cases which would normally have been allowed to move forward as class action lawsuits.

The Supreme Court has agreed to hear another case in which the parties are disputing whether or not the case can continue as a class action lawsuit. The lawsuit was brought against Halliburton, a publicly traded energy company, by a class action of the company’s share holders. The shareholders allege that Halliburton misrepresented its potential liability in asbestos litigation, revenue from construction contracts, and benefits from a merger. According to the lawsuit, shareholders allegedly lost money after the company’s stock prices dropped after news about one or more of these factors was revealed.

The plaintiffs in the case are relying on a landmark decision which was made in 1988 in the case of Basic v. Levinson. In that case, the court determined that shareholders have the right to know about a potential merger, even before it happens. The ruling also determined that shareholders don’t have to prove that they made investment decisions based on a company’s misstatement of facts. Instead, the ruling upheld the concept of “fraud on the market,” which assumes that misleading corporate assertions are reflected in a company’s stock price.

Halliburton is hoping that the court will overturn the 1988 ruling in their favor, arguing that “Real-world experience has crippled the theoretical underpinnings of Basic”. The shareholders, on the other hand, argue that “A reversal of Basic v. Levinson would represent the most radical change in the private enforcement of the federal securities law in a generation and would be a severe blow to investors’ rights.”

According to Halliburton, even in a well-developed securities market, “stock prices do not efficiently incorporate all types of information at all times.” Because of this, the energy company argues, shareholders should not be able to sue a company based on price fluctuations alone.