Arbitration provisions are appearing in more and more contracts lately, in everything from employment contracts to consumer contracts. With increasing frequency, companies are looking to block employees and consumers access to the courts, in the event that they have a complaint against the company.

In a recent class action lawsuit, Ganley Chevrolet and Ganley Automotive Stores, tried to force a consumer class action lawsuit against them into arbitration. The courts, on the other hand, have agreed that the dealership group’s sales agreement was “incomplete and misleading” and therefore unenforceable.

The dispute began in March 2001 when Jeffrey and Stacy Felix purchased a 2000 Chevy Blazer. Ganley allegedly told the Felixes that they were approved for 0.0% financing but that the offer would expire that evening. They agreed and traded in their van as part of the deal. Ganley allegedly insisted that they take the new car home with them. A few days later though. Ganley told the couple that the bank would approve only 1.9% financing, which they accepted. After having the car for more than a month, the Felixes were told that the bank had decided not to approve the 1.9% financing but that Ganley had found another bank which would give them a loan with a 9.44% financing rate. The Felixes refused to sign a new agreement at such a high rate. They kept the vehicle though, and have been putting money in escrow to purchase it.

Meanwhile, they filed a lawsuit against Ganley Chevrolet and Ganley Automotive Stores alleging “bait and switch tactics.” This is a practice in which a dealer will offer goods at one low price to get the customer interested, then suddenly raise the price at the last minute. It is also a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales and Practices Act. The lawsuit further alleges misrepresentation and emotional distress. It includes individual claims as well as class action claims and challenges the validity of the arbitration provision in the sales agreement.

The lower court judge found the arbitration provision to be “ambiguous and misleading” and therefore rejected Ganley’s request for arbitration and approved class action status on behalf of all consumers whose sales agreement with any Ganley store had the same provision from June 1999 until the company changed the provision in 2007. The judge also awarded $200 in damages to each of the “thousands of members” of the certified class.

Ganley appealed the decision and the case went to the Ohio Court of Appeals which upheld the class certification in a 2-1 decision. The court found that class action status in this case was appropriate under the consumer protection law. The one dissenting judge agreed that, Ganley’s use of the arbitration provision might be an “unfair or deceptive practice” that would justify individual lawsuits in court. However, he argued that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for class action status and such was his reason for dissent.

In order to qualify for class action status, the plaintiffs must meet certain criteria. These criteria include: 1) an identifiable class must exist, and its definition must be clear; 2) the named plaintiff representatives must be members of the class; 3) the class must be large enough to make joining all of the members practicable; 4) the class must have in common questions of law or fact; 5) the claims or defenses of the representatives must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 6) the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Ganley argues that the trial court should not have certified the class because the class definition and time period are too broad and ambiguous. Ganley also argued that the commonality, predominance, and typicality prerequisites to class certification had not been met. The Court of Appeals disagreed and upheld the lower court’s ruling.

Continue reading ›

The Seventh Circuit has affirmed most of a district court ruling involving an Illinois partnership dispute involving claims for fraud, excessive partnership distributions and fraud in a trademark application for a corporate logo. The cases highlights that partnership disputes can result in very time consumer and expensive litigation when there is no clear-cut written partnership agreement. In this case, the victorious defendants were awarded substantial attorneys fees.

The case arose out of the following facts. Three individuals Swift, Schaltenbrand, and Siddle joined together as partners to operate a mail-order pharmacy, divide the profits from that business, and eventually sell the book of customers to another pharmacy. After some initial success, the partners began taking profit distributions that far exceeded the partnership’s profits and according to the Seventh Circuit did not square with any formula. All of the partners according to the Seventh Circuit’s description of the facts seemed pleased to strip the enterprise of monies and to even take out loans to do that:

Soon after the partnership started gaining steam, however, the partners began exploiting their informal arrangement for personal gain. Swift, Siddle, and Schaltenbrand repeatedly requested andreceived) profit distributions that far exceeded the amounts to which they were entitled under the agreement.
Despite the fact that the partnership was a money‐losing  enterprise,  the  partners  continually found the funds for distributions. For example,
evidence presented to the court indicated that, from 2005 to 2009,
the partnership operated at a net loss of over$400,000. During this same period,
however, Swift, Schaltenbrand, and Siddle received  nearly  $4  million  in  combined distributions.

Swift even persuaded Schaltenbrand to take out loans to facilitate
these unjustified  payments  to  the  partners.  For  his part, Swift concealed his excessive demands (which he knew had
no  basis  in  the  actual  profitability  of  the  partnership) commingling them with DeliverMed’s requests for  cost reimbursements.
Swift and Schaltenbrand each became aware of  the  other’s  excessive
distributions, but neither of them cared. So long as each
partner was able to obtain his own unjustified share of
partnership funds, no one made a fuss.
However, when a dispute erupted between the partners
Swift sued Schaltenbrand and Siddle claiming that
they had taken more money than the allegedly
agreed upon percentages and that he was therefore
entitled to larger distributions and owed money.

The district court listened to 14 days of testimony before ruling in favor Schaltenbrand and Siddle holding that Swift never properly included fraud claims, wasn’t a credible witness and couldn’t support his damages claims for greater distributions with evidence of a contract setting the agreed upon percentages. The court also invalidated a copyright registration that Swift’s marketing company obtained for a logo used by the partnership, finding that Swift knowingly misrepresented a material fact in the application to register a copyright in the logo.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that Swift did not prove Schaltenbrand and Siddle breached any obligation to provide him with a certain percentage of the distributions or even that such an obligation or contract to provide set percentages existed. The Seventh Circuit also found Swift waived fraud claims by failing to include them in the final pretrial order. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred by invalidating the copyright registration without first consulting the Register of Copyrights as to the significance of the inaccurate information. The Copyright Act requires courts to perform this “curious procedure” before invalidating a registration based on a fraud on the Copyright Office. The Seventh Circuit remanded the case so that Register could be notified and the issue decided based on the requirements of the statute.

You can view the entire opinion here.

Continue reading ›

NPR reports:

An Australian record label may have picked a fight with the wrong guy. The label sent a standard takedown notice threatening to sue after YouTube computers spotted its music in a video. It turns out that video was posted by one of the most famous copyright attorneys in the world, and Lawrence Lessig is suing back. … Lessig is suing Liberation Music because he wants labels to stop relying on automated systems to send out takedown notices, he says.

Continue reading ›

Whenever consumers use credit cards, merchants pay swipe fees, which are typically passed along to all consumers in the form of higher prices. American consumers pay the highest swipe fees in the world—eight times those paid by Europeans. These fees, which amount to about $50 billion annually, are highly regressive: low-income and minority cash customers end up subsidizing high-income credit customers. Unfortunately, most consumers don’t know about the fees. And even those who do typically can’t do anything about them.

Merchants are, however, permitted to charge different prices to consumers who pay with credit versus cash, which would give consumers the option to choose a lower-cost payment method in exchange for lower prices. The credit-card lobby has long fought to stop merchants from being able to implement such dual pricing. Under state laws adopted at the industry’s behest, the price difference must be described as a “discount” for cash, not a “surcharge” for credit—even though they’re mathematically identical. In New York, a merchant who uses the wrong word could face criminal prosecution.

A number of New York businesses filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the New York state law forbidding merchants from imposing a “surcharge” on any customer who pays with a credit card. Along with the Friedman Law Group, we represent five New York merchants: a hair salon, an ice-cream parlor, a liquor store, a martial-arts academy, and an outdoor furniture store. The suit, filed in federal court in Manhattan, was assigned to U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff.

The main claim is that New York’s law violates businesses’ constitutional right to free speech and that New York state is thus seeking to enforce the credit-card industry’s preferred speech code. Merchants, we contend, should be able to use whatever words are most effective to inform their customers about the high cost of using credit cards, and consumers have a right to receive that communication.

United States District Judge Jed Rakoff issued a lengthy and well reasoned opinion agreeing with the challenge in all respects. The Court held that the law violates the First Amendment and is void for vagueness. The opinion provides a detailed analysis of not only the constitutional arguments, but also the behavioral economics of no-surcharge rules and their regressive economic effect that harms consumers and results in significantly higher prices.

The beginning of the opinion states:

Alice in Wonderland has nothing on section 518 of the New York General Business Law. Under the most plausible interpretation of that section, if a vendor is willing to sell a product for $100 cash but charges $102 when the purchaser pays with a credit card, the vendor risks prosecution if it tells the purchaser that the vendor is adding a 2% surcharge because the credit card companies charge the vendor a 2% “swipe fee.” But if, instead, the vendor tells the purchaser that its regular price for the product is $102, but that it is willing to give the purchaser a $2 discount if the purchaser pays cash, compliance with section 518 is achieved. As discussed below, this virtually incomprehensible distinction between what a vendor can and cannot tell its customers offends the First Amendment and renders section 518 unconstitutional.

You can view the opinion here.

Continue reading ›

 

Watch the latest video at video.foxbusiness.com

NY Attorney General sues Trump University for alleged consumer fraud. Our Chicago consumer fraud and class action lawyers have successfully pursued class actions against trade schools in Illinois that have misrepresented the percentage of graduates who have obtained jobs in the field or omitted to disclose that very few graduates obtain jobs in the field. Illinois requires trade schools to disclose the percentage of graduates who obtain jobs in the field.

Our law firm is pursuing class actions and putative class actions against for profit vocational schools in the Chicago area. We have interviewed many students of for profit universities, colleges and vocational schools who believe that various for profit colleges and Universities have cheated them along with the government in getting the students to borrow money with government backed loans for essentially a worthless education.

Continue reading ›

 

Ever since the Supreme Court’s rulings in Walmart and Comcast, denying class certification in those cases, courts have had to increasingly deny plaintiffs class certification. Recently, a rift has appeared between federal courts with different interpretations of what should be acceptable for a class action to proceed. Traditionally, all that plaintiffs have needed to secure class certification is a class with well-defined limits, proof that the members of the proposed class have a common complaint against the defendant, evidence that the named plaintiffs are sufficient representatives of the entire class, and proof that the plaintiffs’ counsel can adequately represent the class in a court of law. Only after the class has achieved certification do the plaintiffs worry about trying to include all potential class members.

On one side of the argument is the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, which has consistently made rulings on the belief that class actions are an efficient mode of determining the liability of a defendant, particularly when individual claims are small. This court has ruled in favor of class actions in such cases as the one against Sears and Whirlpool for moldy washing machines, as well as a case addressing lack of properly displaying warnings for ATM fees. Both of these cases have been discussed on this blog.

On the other side of the debate is the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals which has recently ruled that class actions may not be certified until individual class members can be ascertained. This decision comes in the case of Carrera v. Bayer in which consumers allege that they were deceived by Bayer’s claim that green tea extract in its One-A-Day WeightSmart supplements would boost consumers’ metabolism. The district judge, Jose Linares of Newark, New Jersey, denied class certification on a nationwide basis, but granted the plaintiff’s subsequent motion for certification of a class of Florida purchasers under that state’s trade practices suit.
On appeal at the 3rd Circuit Court, Bayer’s attorneys argued that the class should not have been certified because it is impossible to discern everyone who bought the product. Consumers purchasing a widely-distributed over-the-counter product are unlikely to have kept packages or receipts or any kind of record that they purchased the product. Bayer’s representatives therefore argued that membership of the class cannot be ascertained and, on these grounds, the class should not be certified.

The legal counsel for the plaintiffs argued that there are three methods by which they can determine class membership: pharmacy membership programs that track members’ purchases; and screening of affidavits from consumers who claim to have bought One-A-Day WeightSmart to eliminate fraudulent or duplicate claims. They also pointed out that Florida’s consumer law does not require proof of individual reliance. Therefore Bayer’s potential $14 million exposure should not be affected by how big the class is or how the class is defined.
In its decision, the three-judge panel of the 3rd Circuit Court ruled that, unless the plaintiffs could determine a real plan for determining buyers, certifying the class and allowing the case to proceed would be to violate Bayer’s rights of due process. This, according to the 3rd Circuit Court, gives the defendant the right “to raise individual challenges and defenses to claims”. They therefore remanded the case until the plaintiffs could provide sufficient evidence that the class is “ascertainable” despite the fact that the plaintiffs had already laid out a very clear plan for identifying and finding class members.

In the brief filed for the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, the controversial status of the 3rd Circuit Court’s decision is laid out. The brief points out that Rule 23 (for determining class certification) “does not require a roll call (nor, for that matter, does due process). The brief also states that, “In the half-century since the creation of the modern class action, the panel’s decision is the first by any federal circuit court to hold that class certification may be defeated on the basis of ‘ascertainability’ even when the existence of a well-defined class is not in doubt and the full extent of potential liability is known. … If allowed to stand, the panel’s decision will effectively wipe out most class actions involving small-dollar consumer products – cases for which class treatment has always been recognized as most essential.”

You can view the very well done motion for en banc rehearing before the 3rd Circuit here.

Continue reading ›

With various sites on the internet giving ratings to businesses in all sorts of professions, the line between what is protected by the Constitution’s First Amendment and what is not can often get blurry, particularly when the reviews are unfavorable. The trial courts have seen defamation lawsuits pertaining to this again and again.

Recently, the Sixth Circuit Court in Cincinnati rejected a $10 million defamation lawsuit which had been filed by Kenneth Seaton, owner of the Grand Resort, a hotel in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee. The resort was ranked No. 1 on TripAdvisor’s 2011 list of “dirtiest hotels”. Next to the hotel’s top position was a picture of a ripped bedsheet and a quote from a user, claiming that “There was dirt at least 1/2″ inch thick in the bathtub which was filled with dark hair.” The website also included a thumbsdown sign next to the quote as well as a claim that “87% of reviewers do not recommend this hotel.”

According to the Court’s decision, “Seaton filed suit in Tennessee state court, alleging claims for defamation and false-light invasion of privacy.” After TripAdvisor filed a motion to dismiss the case, Seaton amended his complaint to include “trade libel/injurious falsehood” and interference with prospective business relationships. TripAdvisor responded by saying that the list was a statement of opinion and, as such, could not be proven true or false because the rankings on the list as well as the concept of “dirtiest” hotel are inherently subjective. A federal district court in Tennessee dismissed the case and Seaton appealed, landing the case in the lap of the Sixth U.S. Court of Appeals in Cincinnati.

At this point, Digital Media Law Project, in connection with Cyberlaw Clinic, filed an amicus brief in the case in support of TripAdvisor “because of the potential impact of Seaton’s argument on journalistic and academic research.” This is because Seaton’s claims could be construed as “challenging the methodology by which TripAdvisor reached its conclusions based on data collected from its users.” However, TripAdvisor’s systematic method of analyzing crowd sourced data to reach conclusions “echoes important techniques for academic research and data journalism” according to Jeff Hermes of Digital Media Law Project.

According to the Court’s decision, “On the webpage in which the list appears, TripAdvisor states clearly ‘Dirtiest Hotels – United States as reported by travelers on TripAdvisor.’ The implication from this statement is equally clear: TripAdvisor’s rankings are based on the subjective views of its users, not on objectively verifiable facts. With this, readers would discern that TripAdvisor did not conduct a scientific study to determine which ten hotels were objectively the dirtiest in America. Readers would, instead, understand the list to be communicating subjective opinions of travelers who use TripAdvisor.”

However, instead of analyzing the list as an opinion based on disclosed data, the court stated instead that the list was “rhetorical hyperbole.” The court further compared TripAdvisor’s list to other online polls and lists such as “Reader’s Digest’s poll of “100 Most Trusted People in America”. Such a comparison implies that TripAdvisor’s list is not only subjective, but frivolous. Hermes fears that, in doing so, the Court “seems to have confused (1) statements not intended to be taken literally and (2) statements intended to be taken literally that nevertheless reflect a subjective judgment. Both fall within the doctrine of opinion as statements that cannot be proven true or false.”

The Grand Resort closed in 2012 and was bought by a holding company.

You can view the Sixth Circuit’s opinion here.

Continue reading ›

 

ESPN reports:

While current NCAA players fight for their right to make money, a large group of former college football players scored a major victory Thursday.

Shortly after Electronic Arts announced it would stop producing a college football game beginning next year, the video game company — together with Collegiate Licensing Company, which holds the licensing rights to the trademarks of the majority of colleges and universities — filed papers to the U.S. District Court in Northern California that it had settled its case brought by former players.

Continue reading ›

Contact Information