Our Chicago non-compete contract litigators also practice in Wisconsin, so we were interested in a decision from that state’s Court of Appeals on the severability of a covenant not to compete. In Frank D. Gillitzer Electric Co., Ltd. v. Marco Anderson et. al., 2010 WI App. 31 (Jan. 20, 2010), the court reversed a grant of summary judgment for five former employees of an electrical contractor in Milwaukee. All of them had enrolled in a training program to become licensed electricians, and signed an agreement with Gillitzer that they would reimburse the company for the cost of schooling if they failed to finish it, or left Gillitzer within four years of completing it. The same contract said they also agreed not to join a competing business in the counties where Gillitzer does business within four years of leaving the company.

All five defendants dropped out or were kicked out of the apprenticeship program before finishing, but remained with Gillitzer until voluntarily resigning. After they left, Gillitzer sued them for the cost of the training. In trial court, the defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued that the non-compete portion of the agreement was unenforceably broad and inextricably linked to the repayment portion, making the entire agreement unenforceable. They also argued that the repayment provision was a restrictive covenant under Wisconsin law. The trial court granted the summary judgment and dismissed the case, triggering an appeal from Gillitzer.

On appeal, Gillitzer conceded that the non-compete part of the agreement was unenforceable. Wisconsin law favors former employees when examining the reasonableness of covenants not to compete. Streiff v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 118 Wis. 2d 602, 348 N.W.2d 505 (1984). Thus, the appeals court said, the issue was whether the training reimbursement part of the agreement was enforceable. The defendants argued that it was indivisible from the rest of the agreement, and thus, the entire agreement was indivisible under Wisconsin statutes sec. 103.465. Gillitzer argued that the two covenants are individual and divisible, and that the reimbursement portion is not a restrictive covenant under Wisconsin law.

The appeals court sided with Gillitzer. Using the divisibility test fashioned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Streiff, it looked at whether the reimbursement provision and the non-compete provision are interdependent and must be read together to be understood. In this case, they are not, the court said; they are “distinct, mutually exclusive [and] independent” under Streiff and can be separated with no loss of meaning. This would also be true under the more recent precedent set by Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra, 2009 WI 76, 319 Wis. 2d 274, 767 N.W.2d 898, the court said, although it declined to reach the issue of whether Star Direct set a new divisibility test. Thus, it reversed the Milwaukee circuit court’s summary judgment order.

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Mortgage News Daily has put together a list of resources for Illinois consumers who have been victims of mortgage fraud. You can link to the webpage here.

The webpage states:

The list of resources below has been compiled for anyone that suspects that they may be a victim of any type of fraud or scam. The list was originally designed as a resource to report mortgage fraud, predatory lending scams and identity theft in Illinois but may also serve those who are victims of many types of fraud in Illinois. Other types of fraud may include:

The National Association of Consumer Advocates is the premier lawyers organization for pursuit of consumer rights. Its website is one of the best resources for consumer law issues. You can view the website by clicking here.

The website has this to say about predatory lending practices:

Predatory Lending Practices

The Chicago Tribune Reports that Illinois is set to institute long needed additional legistlation to protect employees from wage theft. You can view the article here. The article discusses that wage theft has become a widespread problem that needs to be remedied. It states:

Ismael and Efren Sanchez, both bricklayers, said their boss did not pay them for three months. When the father and son asked for their salaries, the employer claimed to have the same problem.

I don’t have the money.

The National Consumers League’s webpage contains numerous tips for avoiding internet fraud. You can view the site by clicking here. Be on the watch for credit repair scams promising to clean your negative credit history. Below are tips fron the League’s website on how to avoid credit repair scams:

No one can erase negative information if it’s accurate. Only incorrect information can be removed. Accurate information stays on your record for 7 years from the time it’s reported (10 years for bankruptcy). Even information about bills you fell behind on but now are paid will remain on your report for these time periods.

Credit repair services can’t ask for payment until they’ve kept their promises. Federal law also requires credit repair services to give you a explanation of your legal rights, a detailed written contract, and three days to cancel (this applies to for-profit services, not to nonprofit organizations, banks and credit unions, or the creditors themselves).

 

Our Illinois insurance bad faith attorneys were pleased to see a recent decision from the Fifth District Court of Appeals that upheld a driver’s right to fair treatment from her auto insurance company. American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Stagg, Ill. 5th No. 5-08-0088 (Aug. 10, 2009) Diane Stagg had an insurance policy with American Family that included uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. That part of the policy had a provision stating that the parties could demand arbitration if they couldn’t agree on the existence or amount of coverage. It also said that arbitration awards would be binding and could be entered as judgments in court if they did not exceed the minimum limits set by the Illinois Safety Responsibility Law. If they did exceed that limit, either party has the right to a trial. The limit for bodily injury at the time was $20,000.

Stagg was later hit by an at-fault driver with a very small amount of insurance. She collected the $25,000 available in liability insurance from the at-fault driver, but requested more under her uninsured motorist coverage. She and American Family went to arbitration and she was awarded $36,340.75. However, the arbitrators set off $25,000 for the at-fault driver’s payment and $5,000 in expenses American Family had paid, leaving her with an award of just $6,340.75. Four months later, American Family filed a complaint to enforce that judgment, saying Stagg hadn’t objected to the award within time limits set by the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act. The next month, Stagg filed a separate action against American Family, seeking a new trial.

The parallel claims may have caused some conflicting decisions by the court, but it eventually clarified that it intended to grant Stagg’s motion to dismiss American Family’s complaint. American Family appealed, arguing that the arbitration award was $6,340.75, too low to meet the contract’s threshold for going to court. Stagg argued that the arbitration award was actually 36,340.75, making it larger than the minimum limit cited in the contract. In its analysis, the court found that the term “arbitration award” as used in the contract was subject to more than one interpretation. Under American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479 (1997), the court said, ambiguous language in an insurance policy should be construed against the drafter. Thus, Stagg is entitled to a new trial under the contract.

The court then addressed American Family’s contention that Stagg missed the deadline to appeal the arbitration award under the Uniform Arbitration Act. The Fifth agreed with Stagg, who argued that the limitation didn’t apply because she isn’t challenging the award through the Act, but instead requesting a new trial. The arbitration award was never binding under the contract’s language, the court said, meaning that Stagg had no obligation to state any grounds for overturning it. Thus, the court’s decision to dismiss American Family’s complaint was upheld.

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A little-noticed U.S. Supreme Court decision from this year will have an important effect on the work of our Illinois wage and hour class action lawyers. In Hertz Corp. v. Friend et al., No. 08-1107, __ S. Ct. __ (Feb. 23, 2010), the court ruled that the “principal place of business” test for a corporation’s citizenship refers to the place where the corporation’s high-level officers direct, control and coordinate its activities. This clarifies the law and resolves a number of discrepancies among lower courts around the country. It also overturns a Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision denying that federal courts have diversity jurisdiction in a proposed class-action wage-and-hour case brought by employees of Hertz Corporation.

Melinda Friend and John Nhieu sued Hertz Corp. for alleged violations of California state wage laws, and sought to certify a class of California plaintiffs with similar grievances. Hertz sought to remove the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, which allows cases to be moved when they have diverse citizenship and a dispute of more than $5 million. The plaintiffs argued that Hertz was a California citizen under Ninth Circuit precedent, which held that corporations’ “principal place of business” is where their business activity is “significantly larger” or “substantially predominates.” For Hertz, they argued, that was California because the company had the most offices and business there.

Hertz, which is incorporated in Delaware, argued that its “principal place of business” was New Jersey, where its corporate headquarters is found. It conceded that it had more offices in California than in any other state, but pointed out that California is just one of 44 states where it operates and accounts for far less than 50% of its revenue, rentals, employees or locations. Nonetheless, the district court followed Ninth Circuit precedent and sent the case back to state court. Hertz appealed, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer started by dismissing a jurisdictional argument raised by the plaintiffs, who claimed that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was improper because the law allowing Hertz to appeal a remand order mentions only courts of appeal. However, other federal statutes give the court authority, the opinion said, and “We normally do not read statutory silence as implicitly modifying or limiting Supreme Court jurisdiction that another statute specifically grants.”
Turning to the meat of the case, the justices noted that the “principal place of business” language arose in response to an overload of diversity cases in federal court, as well as concerns about abuses of diversity jurisdiction. To resolve that, Congress allowed corporations to claim citizenship where they are incorporated, “and of the State where it has its principal place of business.” But this has been difficult to apply, the opinion said, resulting in splits across the circuits. To resolve it, the justices reviewed the appeals courts’ interpretations and chose a popular “nerve center” test that assigns citizenship according to where the corporation’s business is directed and controlled, as applied in cases like Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F. 2d 1280, 1282 (CA7 1986).

The justices wrote that the “nerve center” will typically but not always be a headquarters, where officers and directors do business and where the public recognizes the company to be based. This helps avoid some of the flaws of approaches like the Ninth Circuit’s, they wrote, which sometimes confuse the company’s presence in a state with the state itself. For example, a rule that measures the amount of business activity in the state could grant California citizenship to many corporations, simply because California is the largest state by population. It is also a simple rule, which benefits the courts as well as corporations. This may occasionally produce odd situations, the opinion noted, as when directors and officers are housed in a different state from that where the bulk of actual business takes place. But this is a price of simplicity. Given that rule, the justices wrote, Hertz is entitled to diversity jurisdiction because it is uncontested that its “nerve center” is in New Jersey, not California. It vacated the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and returned the case to trial court.

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The online magazine of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners is a great resouce for tips on uncovering the varying forms of business fraud. You can click here to view it.

A recent issue of the magazine had a very informative article about how certain types of documents are susceptible to employee forgies and other frauds . The article had this to say about fax invoices:

FACSIMILE DOCUMENTS

DiTommaso Lubin’s Chicago business trial lawyers have more than two and half decades of experience helping business clients on unraveling complex business fraud and breach of fiduciary duty cases. We work with skilled forensic accountants and certified fraud examiners to help recover monies missappropriated from our clients. Our Chicago business, commercial, and class-action litigation lawyers represent individuals, family businesses and enterprises of all sizes in a variety of legal disputes, including disputes among partners and shareholders as well as lawsuits between businesses and and consumer rights, auto fraud, and wage claim individual and class action cases. In every case, our goal is to resolve disputes as quickly and sucessfully as possible, helping business clients protect their investements and get back to business as usual. From offices in Oak Brook, near Wuakegan, Aurora, Highland Park, Wilmette, Elmhurst, and Chicago, we serve clients throughout Illinois and the Midwest.

If you’re facing a business or class-action lawsuit, or the possibility of one, and you’d like to discuss how the experienced Illinois business dispute attorneys at DiTommaso Lubin can help, we would like to hear from you. To set up a consultation with one of our Chicago, Joliet, Waukegan, Wheaton, or Naperville business trial attorneys and class action and consumer trial lawyers, please call us toll-free at 630-333-0333 or contact us through the Internet.

A very informative video prepared by Canadian accountants describing issues relating to business fraud and the types of fraud businesses face and how such frauds can be prevented.

DiTommaso Lubin’s Chicago business trial lawyers have more than two and half decades of experience helping business clients on unraveling complex business fraud and breach of fiduciary duty cases. We work with skilled forensic accountants and certified fraud examiners to help recover monies missappropriated from our clients. Our Chicago business, commercial, and class-action litigation lawyers represent individuals, family businesses and enterprises of all sizes in a variety of legal disputes, including disputes among partners and shareholders as well as lawsuits between businesses and and consumer rights, auto fraud, and wage claim individual and class action cases. In every case, our goal is to resolve disputes as quickly and sucessfully as possible, helping business clients protect their investements and get back to business as usual. From offices in Oak Brook, near Wheaton, Naperville, Evanston, and Chicago, we serve clients throughout Illinois and the Midwest.

If you’re facing a business or class-action lawsuit, or the possibility of one, and you’d like to discuss how the experienced Illinois business dispute attorneys at DiTommaso Lubin can help, we would like to hear from you. To set up a consultation with one of our Chicago, Joliet, Waukegan, Wheaton, or Naperville business trial attorneys and class action and consumer trial lawyers, please call us toll-free at 630-333-0333 or contact us through the Internet.

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