U.S. District Courts in Illinois

Class Certification Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a)

December 29, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

We here at Lubin Austermuehle often represent our clients in federal court, and our practice includes handling wage and hour disputes so we keep an eye on such cases filed in Illinois. In re AON Corp. is the consolidation of a New York case with an action filed in Illinois District Court to certify a wage and hour class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). Plaintiffs allege violations of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL) and Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for unpaid overtime. In its opinion, the Court discussed whether the purported class met the four standards required for certification as set forth in FRCP 23(a). The Court analyzed the numerosity of class members, commonality of the issues between class members, typicality of the class representatives, and adequacy of representation proffered by the named Plaintiffs and their attorneys.

The Plaintiffs in this case are former employees of Defendant AON who worked as Associate Specialists, Client Specialists, and Senior Client Specialists in the Client Services Units and Policy Maintenance Units located at AON’s facilities in Illinois and New York. Plaintiffs argue that AON improperly classified the purported class members as administrative employees, thereby violating the IMWL and the FLSA and entitling them to overtime compensation.

The Court found that the Illinois Plaintiffs satisfied the Rule 23(a) numerosity requirement because there were 515 members of the proposed class and joinder of that many actions would be impracticable. The commonality requirement was met because there is a common question of law as to whether the class members were properly classified as administrative workers. The Rule 23(a) typicality requirement was met because all of the claims arise out of the same act of classification and assert the same violation of the law. The adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a) was met because the named Illinois Plaintiffs suffered the same injury as the class and have pursued the case for over 2 years. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ counsel has the requisite resources and experience in both class action and wage & hour litigation to adequately protect the interests of the class. Finally, the Court found that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) were met despite the fact that the class members have different clients and peripheral duties. The Court concluded that the class members’ essential job functions were similar enough that the central legal issue regarding classification of each class member as an administrative employee under the IMWL predominated and that a class action was a superior method of resolving the case.

To conditionally certify a class under 216(b), Plaintiffs must make a modest factual showing to demonstrate that they and potential plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law. Secondly, after all or a significant portion of discovery is completed, the Court must perform a stricter examination of whether the class members are similarly situated. The Plaintiffs sought to apply the first stage of 216(b) analysis, while the Defendant asked the Court to perform the second stage inquiry. The Court held that the second stage analysis was improper due to a relative lack of discovery in the case thus far. A second stage 216(b) analysis would prejudice the New York Plaintiffs by failing to give them adequate opportunity to present a more complete evidentiary picture. Additionally, performing the second phase analysis was premature because potential plaintiffs had not yet received notice and the opportunity to opt into the suit.

The Court conditionally certified the class because there was uniformity between the class representative and the class members due to: the similar type of work they performed, the uniform Defendant-produced processes used to perform their jobs, and the common legal issue of misclassification.

In Re AON Corp. provides guidance for future wage and hour litigants by explaining the requirements for class certification under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This case also provides clarification regarding class certification under the Federal Labor Standards Act. Plaintiffs who seek to certify a class must have some evidence for conditional certification, but also should be mindful that they must acquire more substantial evidence through discovery to fully certify the class under the FLSA.

Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements is Tricky Business

December 8, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Any business owner should keep abreast of laws and court rulings that can affect the way they conduct their operation and interact with employees. The law constantly evolves, and that is why our lawyers are vigilant in tracking changes that affect our clients. Citadel Investment Group v Teza Technologies is one such ruling that provides clarity regarding noncompetition agreements between employees and employers.

In this case, Defendants Malyshev and Kohlmeier worked for Plaintiff Citadel Investment Group until February of 2009, when they resigned. When Malyshev and Kohlmeier were initially hired by Citadel, they each signed a nondisclosure agreement and an employment agreement containing a noncompetition clause. The noncompetition clauses contained language giving Citadel the discretion to set the length of the restrictive period at zero, three, six, or nine months. Citadel elected for a nine month restricted period for both Malyshev and Kohlmeier upon their resignation.

Malyshev and Kohlmeier formed Defendant Teza Technologies two months after leaving Plaintiff Citadel in April of 2009. When Citadel discovered the existence of Teza and its status as an entity performing similar high frequency trading in July of 2009, the present legal proceedings began. Plaintiffs initially sought a preliminary injunction against Defendants based upon the noncompetition agreements signed by Malyshev and Kohlmeier. This injunction was granted in October 2009 for relief through November of 2009. The trial court made its decision based upon the agreed upon nine month period contained in the noncompete and calculated the time from February of 2009 when Malyshev and Kohlmeier resigned.

Citadel appealed the decision, and asked the appellate court to grant the injunction for nine months from October until July of 2010. Citadel argued that they had not received the benefit of the restricted period prior to the preliminary injunction being entered, and the Court should adjust the start date of the restricted period accordingly. The Court did not find the Plaintiff’s argument persuasive and denied the appeal because the plain language of the agreements signed by Malyshev and Kohlmeier contained no provision allowing for an extension of time or modification of the commencement date. Thus, the restrictive covenant properly ended in November as was required by the agreement signed by both parties.

Citadel Investment Group v. Teza Technologies serves as a warning to business owners who utilize noncompetition agreements and a potential boon to employees who sign them. Whether you are a business already in a dispute over a noncompetition agreement or a former employee seeking employment with a new company in the same field, you should contact a Chicago business litigation attorney to be apprised of your rights.

Class Certification Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Section 216(b)

November 17, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

As a firm that focuses on class-action litigation, and wage and hour class-actions in particular, our attorneys are always mindful of judicial rulings that may affect our clients. Early this year, a case in Federal Court in the Northern District of Illinois’ Eastern Division addressed a couple of issues that are important to both employers and employees. The opinion from Collazo v. Forefront Education, addressed questions surrounding a motion to certify a class action under under 29 USC 216(b) for violations of Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) flowing from the Defendant’s failure to pay overtime wages to the Plaintiff class members. The Court also commented on the effect of employee-signed releases on an employee’s rights under FLSA.

Plaintiffs are former Illinois admissions representatives of Defendant Forefront Education, a for-profit educational institution with campuses in Illinois and Florida. Plaintiffs sought to certify a class including all current and former admission reps at both locations who did not receive overtime pay from October 20, 2005 – present. Defendants argued that:

1) Plaintiffs provided no basis for sending notice to Florida employees;
2) Plaintiffs failed to show that notice was warranted for the Illinois class members;
3) Plaintiffs failed to identify an adequate class representative; and
4) the language in the class notice was deficient.

To conditionally certify a class under 216(b), Plaintiffs must make a “modest factual showing sufficient to demonstrate that they and potential plaintiffs together were victims of a common policy or plan that violated the law.” The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to make the required showing as to the Florida employees. The only evidence provided by the Plaintiffs was copies of job descriptions pulled from the Florida location’s website, which the Court deemed insufficient. The judge also noted that Plaintiffs had no affiant with personal knowledge of the work schedules or conditions of admissions reps at the Florida locations in ruling against certifying the Florida employees as class-members.

The Court granted the motion as to the Illinois admissions reps due to the less stringent standard under 216(b) as compared to the requirements for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The Court found that the class representatives were able to make 216(b)’s “modest factual showing” because: the named Plaintiffs were all employed at the Illinois campus, they each submitted a declaration to the court detailing their respective work schedules and the schedules of coworkers, and they provided documentary evidence that employees were required to work Saturdays.

The Court found one Plaintiff to be an adequate class representative despite the Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff had signed a post-employment release of all claims, including any claims under the FLSA. The Court found that “rights under the FLSA cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived,” and the release in question was impermissibly broad as it purported to waive rights under the FLSA. Lastly, the Court required that the class definition be amended to include only those admissions reps who actually worked more than forty hours per week and were not paid overtime.

The ruling in Collazo has something for everyone. The Court makes it clear to potential Plaintiffs that they will not rubber-stamp class certifications under the FLSA, despite the fact that certification requirements under the Act are less burdensome than in other federal class-action lawsuits. For business owners, the ruling means that while a release may effectively remove the threat of some legal claims, they cannot contract away an FLSA wage and hour lawsuit in the same manner.

Bloomberg Reports: Tougher Standards for Filing Lawsuits Makes it Harder to Bring Employee and Investor Lawsuits

September 11, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Wall Street Banks Benefit From Tougher Suit Standards in U.S.
By Thom Weidlich – Sep 8, 2010
This Bloomberg article should be read in full at the above link. It describes how all knids of lawsuits will be tougher to pursue in federal court with stricter standards for setting forth facts in order to even proceed with a lawsuit. The article states in part:

Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions making it tougher to pursue lawsuits may have begun to bear fruit for corporations fighting investor claims or employee litigation.

Where once it was enough to give a defendant “fair notice” of a claim and the grounds on which it rested, the high court’s 2007 holding in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly required an antitrust complaint to contain enough facts to show a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the court applied Twombly to all federal civil suits.

The Supreme Court rulings mean that someone who wants to sue in federal court “should not subject a defendant to the costs and burdens of litigation when there is no plausible basis for their claims,” Lisa Rickard, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform, said in an e-mail.

Motorola Sues Former Executive for Moving to Competitor Nokia — Our Chicago Covenant Not to Compete Lawyers Defend and Prosecute Non-Compete and Trade Secret Lawsuits Throughout Illinois

March 4, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Our Oak Brook covenant not to compete attorneys were interested to see a major non-compete lawsuit happening right here in Chicago. FierceWireless.com reported Jan. 19 that wireless telephone giant Motorola sued former executive David Hartsfield in federal court, claiming he will inevitably disclose Motorola’s confidential business information if he is allowed to take a new job at Finnish wireless phone company Nokia. Motorola is seeking a restraining order to prevent Hartsfield from taking the job.

Hartsfield resigned in December from a job developing CDMA technology at Motorola to take the position of vice president of CDMA at Nokia. In its lawsuit, Motorola claims that the non-disclosure agreement in Hartsfield’s employment contract will be violated if he takes the job. In particular, Motorola claims that it needs to protect product and pricing strategies. Hartsfield has filed a motion to dismiss the suit, arguing that it unreasonably interferes with his ability to make a living, and that Motorola has not identified any wrongdoing on his part. He also plans to argue that the non-disclosure agreements common in the wireless industry are not legitimate. Motorola has aggressively pursued non-compete and non-disclosure lawsuits in the past, including a 2008 non-compete lawsuit against an executive who left for Apple’s iPhone sales business. That case was dismissed in 2009.

Lubin Austermuehle is not involved in this case. However, our Northbrook, Evanston, Waukegan, Joliet, Lisle, Downers Grove, Wheaton, Naperville, Aurora, Elgin, and Chicago non-compete contract attorneys believe Hartsfield could build a strong defense, if his claims are true. Although the federal court has diversity jurisdiction, it must apply Illinois law, which requires it to identify a legitimate business interest behind non-disclosure and non-compete agreements. If there is none, the law says Motorola may not restrain the otherwise legal business activity of Hartsfield moving to a competitor. Hartsfield claims CDMA is an industry-wide standard, not a technology proprietary to Motorola. Similarly, at least some of Motorola’s pricing information must be public knowledge. That means the company may have an uphill battle proving that this knowledge, at least, is a trade secret worthy of protection.

Lawsuit Alleges Illinois Restaurant Shaved Hours From Servers’ Timecards

February 27, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

As Chicago employee rights attorneys, we were interested to see what may have been the first unpaid overtime filing of 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Harris v. Cheddar’s Casual Café, No. 20-cv-0045 (N.D. Ill.) was filed Jan. 5 by three former servers and bartenders who seek to certify a class of current and former employees denied overtime and tips by the Cheddar’s Casual Café chain of restaurants. Plaintiffs Donny Harris, Keith McKinstery and Shaniqua Bell allege that managers at a Cheddar’s in Boilingbrook, Ill shaved time off their timecards and required them to work off the clock in order to avoid paying overtime. They also allege that their tips were diverted to a tip pool that illegally included non-tipped workers.

The complaint in the case says plaintiffs, and other similarly situated workers, were required to clock in and out for their shifts using the chain’s computerized system. They allege that the restaurant, and manager Solomon Tristan, illegally manipulated the timesheets created by that system to remove hours. They also allege that they were encouraged to work before clocking in and after clocking out, further denying them overtime. Furthermore, the plaintiffs say, they were compelled to participate in a tip pool that included the restaurant’s “quality assurance” workers, who they say are not tipped employees. Under federal law, employers may not pay tipped employees less than minimum wage unless they are allowed to keep all their tips, or contribute only to a legal tip pool. Thus, the complaint said, Cheddar’s policies violate the Fair Labor Standards Act.

At Nationwide Consumer Rights, our Wheaton, Ill. overtime attorneys see cases like this frequently. Hourly employees such as waiters and bartenders are regular targets for employers who prefer not to pay all of the wages they owe, and even sometimes to skim their earned tips to pay other employees. This behavior relies on employees to stay quiet, either because they don’t know they have rights or because they’re afraid of punishment for speaking up. However, federal and state law is very clear employees must be compensated for all of their time at work, and paid time and a half for any time over 40 hours in a week. Failure to follow these basic requirements exposes companies to lawsuits seeking all of the back pay owed, attorney fees and any other costs incurred. In cases of egregious law-breaking, courts may also require employers to pay punitive damages — money intended to penalize willful law-breaking.

Court Rules Claim for Negligent Online Security Against Bank May Go Forward

February 24, 2010 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

As Illinois consumer protection attorneys, we were pleased to see that an Illinois federal court has allowed a couple to continue a claim against their bank over a complex billing dispute. David Johnson’s Digital Media Lawyer Blog reported Sept. 2 on the case brought by Marsha and Michael Shames-Yeakel, a couple from Indiana who had $26,500 stolen from their home equity line of credit. Citizens Financial Bank held them liable for the loss, but they refused to pay. In response, the bank reported the “bad debt” to credit bureaus and threatened to repossess their home. The Shames-Yeakels sued Citizens. Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Financial Bank, U.S.D.C., Northern District of Illinois, Case No. 07-c-5387.

According to a ruling posted by Wired (PDF), the Shames-Yeakels run an accounting and computer programming business out of their home. They had a business checking account as well as personal accounts and a home equity line of credit with Citizens, where they were customers for nearly 30 years. The HELOC was connected to their business checking account, but the four advances they took paid for personal expenses or expenses that mixed personal and business use, such as a new roof for their home, which includes their home office. In early 2007, an unknown person gained access to the HELOC and transferred the $26,500 to their business checking account, then eventually to a bank in Austria. They were unable to have the money returned, and Citizens held the Shames-Yeakels liable for the loss.

The Shames-Yeakels complained to Citizens, but to no avail; the bank pointed to language releasing it from liability in their online banking agreement. They also complained to the federal Office of Thrift Supervision, which said Citizens’ actions were legal. The Electronic Funds Transfer Act doesn’t protect HELOCs, it said, and the Truth in Lending Act covers only personal, not business, accounts. It found that the HELOC was a business account because it was linked to a business checking account. The Shames-Yeakels sued Citizens for violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, the Indiana Uniform Consumer Credit Code and common-law negligence and breach of contract.

Citizens then moved for summary judgment, the basis for the ruling at hand. U.S. District Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer granted summary judgment on the count relying on the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and restricted plaintiffs’ use of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. However, she denied it as to negligence and the Truth in Lending Act. The Digital Media Lawyer Blog, and Wired, focused on the negligence claim, which argued that the bank provided inadequate online security. Citizens employed a widely used contractor named Fiserv to protect its accounts with a simple username and password. The Shames-Yeakels argued that Citizens should have used a multi-layered security system using a “token” that provides additional verification. They also cited security experts suggesting such a system as early as 2005 and said Citizens failed to warn them of known security risks.

In her analysis, the judge started by reminding readers that summary judgment seeks only to decide whether there’s a genuine issue of material facts at hand. In the case of the negligence claim, she found that there was. In Indiana and many other states, courts have found that banks have a duty to protect customers’ confidential information. “If this duty … is to have any weight in the age of online banking,” she wrote, “then banks must certainly employ sufficient security measures to protect their customers’ online accounts.” She found the evidence presented about multi-layered security measures, and reports warning Citizens to use these measures, sufficient to require a trial, but warned the plaintiffs not to make arguments relying on the discarded causes of action.

The judge also rejected Citizens’ arguments for summary judgment on the TILA claim, which was based on their claim that the HELOC was for business purposes. Noting that caselaw requires judges to look at the substance rather than the form of transactions, she found that “Plaintiffs’ use of their home equity line of credit appears overwhelmingly personal in nature.” This is enough to survive summary judgment and require a proper trial, she found. She also found partially for the Shames-Yeakes on their Fair Credit Reporting Act claim. Because Citizens reported the debt as delinquent but failed to note that the debt was disputed, it may have violated the FCRA. However, she rejected the couple’s argument that Citizens failed to make reasonable investigations of their credit reporting disputes, and granted summary judgment on that claim only.

Dealer Implied Warranty Applies to Manufacturer When They Have an Agency Relationship, U.S. District Court Rules

January 1, 2009 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

As Illinois and Chicago area consumer rights attorneys with a substantial auto dealer fraud and lemon law practice, we were pleased that a federal district court ruled in October that a manufacturer can be sued for a dealer’s alleged implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Semitekol v. Monaco Coach Corporation, No. 06 C 6424 (Oct. 21, 2008), is an RV warranty case pending in the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs, a married couple, purchased a Monaco motor home from an RV dealer. The motor home turned out to have the following alleged problems: electrical problems, a malfunctioning air-conditioner and heating problems. Numerous attempts to fix it were allegedly unsuccessful, and the motor home allegedly spent 180 of the 341 days the couple owned it in repair shops before the couple allegedly revoked acceptance of the motor home.

The couple sued Monaco, among others, alleging that it breached its own written warranty, the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the implied warranty of merchantability created by Illinois law. Monaco moved to dismiss the implied warranty allegation, arguing that Illinois law requires direct contact between a buyer and seller to create an implied warranty. In this case, the manufacturer pointed out, the dealer was the actual seller of the Monaco motor home. The plaintiffs responded by arguing that direct contact in this case was established by BMS’s advertising and actual status as an “authorized Beaver Monaco dealership”; the fact that Monaco allegedly referred customers to the dealer to deal with problems and customer service concerns; consumers’ ability to find and contact the dealer through Monaco’s Web site; BMS’s authorization to distribute Monaco publications; and the fact that plaintiffs had the option of picking up their new motor home at either company.

In its analysis, the district court agreed for purposes of a motion to dismiss that the dealer was acting as Monaco’s agent. It dismissed arguments that past caselaw does not support such a finding, pointing out that unlike the current plaintiffs, none of the plaintiffs in the cases the defense cited showed any evidence for an agency relationship. The court did not agree that there actually was an agency relationship, or even that an agency relationship is enough to establish the direct contact necessary to prove an implied warranty under Illinois law. Rather, it pointed out that these are questions of fact that are improper to resolve with a motion to dismiss. Thus, the motion was denied. Dismissal motions by the dealer and two parts manufacturers also failed.

Federal District Court Certifies Class in Overtime Class Action Lawsuit

December 25, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

Our Chicago class action attorneys recently noted that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has conditionally certified a wage and hour class action alleging that Illinois Bell Telephone failed to pay overtime to its hourly employees. In Russell v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 08 C 1871 (filed April 1, 2008), Constemecka Russell alleges that Illinois Bell regularly required her and other hourly employees to work off the clock, and sought to conditionally certify these employees as a class and notify them of the action. Several of her colleagues have joined and submitted affidavits supporting her allegations. The case is pending, but the judge granted those motions Sept. 15 over most of Illinois Bell’s objections.

U.S. District Judge Matthew Kennelly’s opinion granting certification and notice repeats many of Russell’s allegations about the unpaid overtime. Russell worked in sales for the company at a call center, and she alleges that she was paid only for time she spent logged into the call center’s computer system. However, there were certain work tasks that she had to perform without being logged in, during lunch and rest breaks, including tasks like filling orders as well as time spent logging onto the computers and opening software programs. She estimated that she spent between 15 minutes and an hour per day doing this unpaid work, which sometimes would have entitled her to overtime.

In response to Russell’s request for class certification and notice, Illinois Bell argued that class certification is inappropriate because it doesn’t use the phone system to keep time, and thus there is no common policy or practice linking the proposed plaintiffs. The court was unimpressed by this argument. It pointed to multiple assertions by Russell that company practice was to require unpaid work before and after time on the phone, as well as affidavits by joining plaintiffs stating that managers explicitly instructed them to work off the clock. It also dismissed arguments that written policies were evidence that Illinois Bell complied with the law.

Trademark Dispute Between Naperville Small Business and National Corporation Can Proceed

October 16, 2008 | Peter S. Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle

In a business trademark dispute, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that large auto parts retailer AutoZone may proceed with its trademark infringement lawsuit against a two-store automotive services business in Naperville and Wheaton, Illinois, called Oil Zone and Wash Zone. AutoZone, Inc. v. Michael Strick, No. 07-2136 (7th. Cir. Sept. 11, 2008).

AutoZone sells auto parts and products, and has been well-known in the Chicago area since the early 1990s, according to the opinion. In that decade, defendant Michael Strick opened his Oil Zone stores outside Chicago, in Wheaton and Naperville. These stores sold automotive services such as oil changes, not parts or products; the Naperville location also offered car washes under the name “Wash Zone.”

AutoZone learned of Strick’s businesses in 1998, but did not contact him until sending a letter in February of 2003. It filed a lawsuit against Strick and his businesses near the end of that year, alleging service mark, trademark and trade name infringement and trademark dilution under the federal Lanham Act, federal unfair competition law, the Illinois Trademark Registration and Protection Act and Illinois common law. Both sides sought summary judgment, which was granted to Strick only, on his claim that there was no reasonable likelihood of confusion between his trademark and AutoZone’s. Strick’s defense of laches — that AutoZone had waited too long to sue — was not addressed. AutoZone appealed on the likelihood of confusion issue.