In Illinois, there are several defenses that can be utilized in response to a libel suit. One such defense is the doctrine of “innocent construction”, where a potentially defamatory statement is innocently construed, and therefore not actionable. Expressions of opinion are another type of defense, as they are not considered statements of fact and are therefore protected from defamation claims.

Another key defense to defamation in Illinois is the defense of truth. Under Illinois law, if the defendant can show the “substantial truth” of the alleged defamatory statement, this is considered a complete defense to defamation. The defendant need only show the truth of the “gist” or “sting” of the defamatory material.

Additionally, the establishment of a qualified privilege can also serve as a defense. If a qualified privilege is established, the communication becomes actionable only if the privilege was abused. The plaintiff must present evidence of a reckless act which shows disregard for the defamed party’s rights, such as failure to properly investigate the truth of the matter, limit the scope of the material, or send the material to only proper parties .

In some cases, the defendant can maintain a suit for defamation without proof of special damages only if the defamatory statement falls into one of four “per se” categories: commission of a crime; infection with a communicable disease leading to the infected person being shunned; malfeasance or misfeasance in the performance of office or job; and unfitness for their profession or trade.

Lastly, under Illinois statutory and constitutional provisions, when truth is published with good motives and for justifiable ends, it can be used as a defense to prosecution for criminal libel. However, both elements are necessary for the defense to prevail. Continue reading ›

Choosing Lubin Austermuehle to defend you in a libel case can be a strong option due to their extensive experience and strategic approach to defamation law. Here are some reasons based on their record and legal capabilities:

  1. Experienced Legal Team: Lubin Austermuehle has a dedicated team of attorneys with significant experience in defending and prosecuting defamation cases. This includes complex scenarios involving cyber defamation and First Amendment rights, ensuring that clients receive knowledgeable representation tailored to the nuances of each case​ (Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog)​​ (Chicago Business Law Firm)​.
  2. Comprehensive Legal Strategies: They are well-versed in deploying a range of defamation defenses, such as the innocent construction rule, which can dismiss a complaint if the statements can be interpreted innocently, and understanding the nuances between statements of opinion and fact as they relate to defamation claims​ (Chicago Business Law Firm)​​ (Chicago Business Law Firm)​.

Yes, taking excessive compensation can indeed violate a managing member or majority shareholder’s fiduciary duties. Case law supports this assertion. In Fleming v. Louvers International, Inc., the court found that a majority shareholder violated his fiduciary duties by taking excessive compensation, depriving a minority shareholder of his rightful distributions. This conduct was seen as a breach of both his common-law fiduciary duty and his duty under section 12.56(a)(3) of the Act, and also constituted constructive fraud.

The case of Kovac v. Barron highlighted the defendant shareholder who had the corporations pay him and his wife millions in excessive compensation, which was then concealed by disguising the payments as “contract labor” on the corporations’ tax returns.

Similarly, in Halperin v. Halperin, it was held that the payment of excessive compensation and the concealment of the amount of compensation received by the officers were breaches of fiduciary duty. Concealing compensation amounts from shareholders could still constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, even if the compensation was not found to be excessive. Continue reading ›

Choosing Lubin Austermuehle for business litigation comes with several advantages, particularly due to their experience and client-focused approach. Here are some key reasons why they are a compelling choice:
  1. Experience Across Business Litigation Domains: Lubin Austermuehle handles a wide range of business litigation matters, including disputes related to shareholders, LLC members, and partnerships, as well as issues involving trade secret theft, copyright and trademark infringement, and non-compete agreements. They are also experienced in emergency injunctive relief and a variety of other complex litigation areas such as consumer fraud and employment disputes​ (Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog)​.
  2. Dedicated Legal Team: The firm’s attorneys, including noted lawyers like Peter Lubin and Patrick Austermuehle, are recognized for their legal acumen. Both have received accolades such as “Super Lawyer” and “Rising Star,” underscoring their professional excellence​ (Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog)​​ (Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog)​.

In Illinois, the concept of LLC member or shareholder oppression is generally conceived as actions that are “illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent”. For shareholders of a corpo”ration that has no shares listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more members of a national or affiliated securities association, the Illinois Business Corporation Act (IBCA) states that the Circuit Court may intervene if it is established that the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent with respect to the petitioning shareholder.

In the context of LLC members, the Illinois Limited Liability Company Act (805 ILCS 180/35-1) provides for the dissolution of the company upon the application by a member or transferee of a distributional interest, upon entry of a judicial decree that the managers or those members in control of the company have acted or are acting in a manner that is oppressive and was, is, or will be directly harmful to the applican].

However, it’s important to note that in a manager-managed LLC, a member who is not also a manager does not violate a duty or obligation under the Act or under the operating agreement merely because the member’s conduct furthers the member’s own interest.

The specific conduct that courts have found to be oppressive varies. Some cases have found that conduct is oppressive if it is “arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-handed”. Other cases have found that even where corporate formalities are observed, the payment of a high amount of compensation to corporate officers, while refusing to pay dividends to benefit minority shareholders, can be considered oppressive conduct, depending on the corporation’s overall financial picture. Continue reading ›

In the complex and often contentious world of business, minority shareholders and LLC members can sometimes find themselves sidelined, oppressed, or unfairly treated. In such situations, securing legal representation that is not only skilled in business law but also deeply understands the nuances of minority shareholder and LLC member rights is critical. Lubin Austermuehle, a firm with a robust practice in Illinois, stands out as a prime choice for minority owners seeking justice and equitable treatment. Here’s why:

Extensive Experience in Business and Shareholder Law

Lubin Austermuehle has spent decades navigating the intricacies of business and shareholder litigation, making them seasoned veterans in the field. Their deep experience extends to handling cases of shareholder and LLC member oppression—a niche that requires a detailed understanding of both state laws and the delicate dynamics of business operations and fiduciary duty law. Their track record of successfully resolving disputes, both in and out of court, reassures potential clients of their capability and strategic expertise.

It is well settled that “Illinois courts abhor restraints on trade” and therefore “postemployment restrictive covenants are carefully scrutinized . . . because they operate as partial restrictions on trade.” McInnis v. OAG Motorcycle Ventures, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 142644 at ¶26; see also Medix Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Dumrauf, 17 C 6648, 2018 WL 1859039, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2018) (granting motion to dismiss and noting that “[u]nder Illinois law, covenants not to compete are disfavored and held to a high standard”); Grand Vehicle Works Holdings Corp. v. Frey, 03 C 7948, 2005 WL 1139312, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2005) (“Illinois courts disfavor and closely scrutinize restrictive covenants because they are repugnant to the public policy encouraging an open and competitive marketplace”); Cambridge Eng’g., Inc. v. Mercury Partners 90 BI, Inc., 378 Ill.App.3d 437, 447 (1st Dist 2007) (refusing to enforce restrictive covenant).

For a restrictive covenant to be enforceable, the terms must be “reasonable and necessary to protect a legitimate business interest of the employer.”  Medix Staffing Sols., Inc. 2018 WL 1859039, at *2. Thus, a restrictive covenant is reasonable only if it: “(1) is no greater than is required for the protection of a legitimate business interest of the employer-promisee; (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee-promisor, and (3) is not injurious to the public.” Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 2011 IL 111871, ¶ 17. “The employer seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant bears the burden of demonstrating that the full extent of the restraint is necessary for protecting its interests.” Cambridge Eng’g., Inc., 378 Ill.App.3d at 447. The employer must also establish a protectable interest in its customers by showing for example that it has near-permanent relationships with certain customers based upon the employer’s relationship with the customers. Giffney Perret, Inc, 2009 WL 792484, at *11. Here, the non-solicitation agreement fails to meet that standard and ITsavvy will not be able to meet its steep burden of proof.

A restrictive covenant that precludes an employee from solicting or selling to any of his former employer’s customers anywhere, with no geographic scope and no limitation based upon whether the customer did business with an employee or was a long-term customer of the employee before he or she began working for the employer is generally unenforceable in Illinois, unless the employee had contact with and/or worked with all or nearly all the employer’s customers.

An employer cannot demonstrate any valid basis for preventing an employee from soliciting customers with whom he or she never worked.  See AssuredPartners, Inc. v. Schmitt, 2015 IL App (1st) 141863, ¶ 42 (non-solicitation provision invalid where it went beyond protecting those customer relationships that employee developed while working for an employer); Cambridge Eng’g., Inc., 378 Ill.App.3d at 455 (same); Lawrence & Allen v. Cambridge Human Resources Group, 292 Ill.App.3d 131, 138 (2d Dist. 1997) (“[c]ourts are hesitant to enforce prohibitions against employees servicing not only customers with whom they had direct contact, but also customers they never solicited or had contact with while employed by plaintiff”); Trailer Leasing Co. v. Associates Commercial Corp., 96 C 2305, 1996 WL 392135, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 1996)) (holding customer non-solicitation provision unenforceable where it includes customers with whom employee had no contact). Continue reading ›

Yes, punitive damages can be awarded in derivative actions, but these awards often come with certain conditions. Punitive damages are typically awarded when the tort committed involves fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, or when the defendant displays willful or grossly negligent behavior that shows a wanton disregard for the rights of others. This means that the defendant’s conduct must show a high degree of moral culpability for such damages to be awarded.

There are specific cases in which courts have allowed for punitive damages in derivative actions. For instance, in Caparos v. Morton, punitive damages were awarded in a derivative action for a breach of fiduciary duty against general partners.

It’s important to note that punitive damages are generally only awarded in the presence of compensatory damages. As established in Groshek v. Trewin and reaffirmed in Epic Systems Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd., punitive damages cannot be awarded when the recovery of compensatory damages is not justified. This suggests that the availability of punitive damages is governed by whether compensatory damages are recoverable, not by whether an “actual injury” has been inflicted.

The case of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker also suggests that a punitive award should be limited to an amount equal to compensatory damages.

In Illinois, punitive damages have certain restrictions. For instance, they may not be recovered in cases of medical or legal malpractice.
Continue reading ›

In the world of franchising, the termination of a franchise agreement can be a complex and contentious issue. Franchisees facing termination must understand their rights and the defenses available to them. Equally important is choosing the right legal representation to navigate these challenging waters.

Defenses to Franchise Termination

  1. Breach of Contract by Franchisor: If the franchisor has failed to uphold their end of the franchise agreement, this can be a strong defense. Examples include not providing agreed-upon support or infringing on the territory rights of the franchisee.
  2. Lack of Proper Notice: Franchise agreements typically require the franchisor to provide notice before termination. If this procedure is not followed, it can be a valid defense.
  3. Unreasonable or Unjust Termination: Franchisees can argue that the termination is unreasonable or unjust. This might be the case if the franchisor terminates the agreement without a valid reason or for a minor infraction that could have been resolved.
  4. Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Franchisees can contend that the franchisor did not act in good faith or deal fairly. This is a broader defense that encompasses various actions by the franchisor that might be deemed unfair or oppressive.
  5. Discrimination: If the termination is based on discriminatory reasons, this can be a legal defense, especially if it violates state or federal laws.
  6. Retaliation: If the termination is in retaliation for the franchisee exercising a legal right, such as reporting violations, it can be contested legally.

Continue reading ›

Under Illinois law, various defenses are recognized for libel actions. The first defense is the innocent construction doctrine. This doctrine posits that if a statement could be construed in a non-defamatory way, it cannot be considered defamatory.

Another defense is the expression of opinion. Statements of opinion, even if they are defamatory, do not result in a defamation claim if the statement cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts. The statement must have a precise and readily understood meaning, be verifiable, and its literary or social context should signal that it has factual content.

The defense of truth is also recognized. A defamatory statement can be defended if it is substantially true and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. This is reflected in the Illinois Constitution which states: “In trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense”. It is enough to show that the publication is “substantially true”, or that the “gist”, the “sting”, or the “substantial truth” of the defamation can be justified.

The defense of ‘fair comment’ is another possible defense. In addition, there is a defense of privilege as a means for redressing grievances. Continue reading ›

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