Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

In a hard-fought Illinois consumer fraud lawsuit over deception by a condominium developer, the Second District Court of Appeal has upheld an award involving both nominal damages and punitive damages. In Kirkpatrick v. Strosberg, Nos. 2-06-0724 and 2-06-0731 (Ill. 2nd Aug. 8, 2008), four plaintiffs, led by John Kirkpatrick, sued a real estate developer over misrepresentations about the square footage and ceiling height of the luxury condominiums they purchased in Glen Ellyn, Ill.

Defendant Morningside Development Group is general partner of defendant Glen Astor Condominium Investors LP, a residential real estate developer. Defendant David Strosberg is Morningside’s president. Glen Astor entered into contracts with the plaintiffs for their purchase of luxury condos on the top floor of a development. Before purchasing the condos, the plaintiffs allege, they read sales materials promising nine-foot ceilings and specific amounts of square footage in the units. In three cases, floor plans specifying square footage were incorporated into their contracts. A rider to the contracts specified that dimensions are approximate and subject to adjustments due to the location of building components. During construction, the builder had to lower the ceilings by six inches because of the size of roof components. After buying the condos, the plaintiffs realized that both the square footage and the ceiling heights were smaller than promised.

At trial for the subsequent lawsuit, the court determined that the difference in square footage resulted from differences between how LeNoble and the plaintiffs’ own appraiser measured the square footage, but that LeNoble’s smaller measurements were appropriate and proper. Thus, the court struck down the square footage claims. Finally, it found for the plaintiffs on the breach of contract claims regarding the lowered ceiling. It found that there were actual damages, but that the plaintiffs’ expert appraiser had not given adequate information about damages. The breach of contract took place in 1997, the court said, but Philips gave a diminished value as of 2004 that was “nothing more than a guess without proper basis.” Thus, the court awarded nominal damages of $100 each on the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act claims regarding the ceilings. It also awarded $300,000 in punitive damages and $83,000 in attorney fees.

Both the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed, raising a total of 13 issues. The appeals court started with the square footage claims; the plaintiffs argued that the trial court was wrong to find against their common-law fraud and Consumer Fraud Act claims. The trial court heard conflicting evidence on how square footage was measured, and the appeals court saw no reason to question the trial court’s judgment in favor of LeNoble’s method. Thus, there was no false statement or deceptive act. Further, because of the contract rider specifying that dimensions were approximate, there was no breach of contract. Thus, it upheld the trial court’s decision on square footage.

The Second next considered the issue of damages for the lowered ceilings. The plaintiffs argued that the trial court should have used Phillips’ measurement of diminished value. In this case, the appeals court wrote, damages should be the difference between the actual sales price and the fair market value of the properties on the day of the breach. Philips offered an estimation of fair market value seven years after the breach, the court wrote, which the trial court found was speculative. This was not unreasonable or against the evidence, the appeals court wrote.

Meanwhile, the defendants argued that the trial court’s finding was wrong because the contracts didn’t specify a ceiling height. Nonetheless, the appeals court wrote, they used deceptive marketing materials to induce the plaintiffs to sign contracts, so the ruling on the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act claims stands. The defendants also argued that the contract rider barred the breach of contract claim as to the ceilings, as well as the square footage. The trial court found that this was an unreasonable alteration and not covered by the rider, the appeals court said, and it had no reason to think this was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The defendants next argued that nominal damages were incorrect because the plaintiffs did not prove actual damages, an argument the Second District pointed out was expressly refuted by the trial court’s finding that damages had been proven. They also argued that punitive damages were incorrectly awarded because they were accompanied only by nominal damages. The appeals court looked to caselaw saying punitive damages supported by nominal damages are only appropriate under the Consumer Fraud Act when the defendant’s conduct is intentional. That was clearly established at trial, the court wrote, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion. It also ruled that the punitive damages award was not so grossly excessive as to be unconstitutional, noting that it passes all three tests set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).

Finally, the court considered the defendants’ challenge to both the rewarding and amount of attorney fees. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the fees because they were not the “prevailing party,” but the appeals court disagreed, noting that plaintiffs were awarded damages. Furthermore, the trial court found that the defendants repeatedly acted in bad faith. And in order to overturn the amount of attorney fees, the appeals court wrote, it would have to find that the trial court did not use sufficient evidence to determine the fees. It saw no reason to so find, so it upheld the attorney fees decision along with all of the trial court’s other decisions.

The Chicago and Oak Brook, Ill., law firm of DiTommaso-Lubin concentrates in protecting the legal rights of consumers, real-estate, home and condomimium purchasers who have been misled or taken advantage of in financial and real-estate transactions. In addition to Chicago consumer fraud lawsuits over real estate contracts, our Illinois consumer fraud litigation attorneys handle lawsuits over real-estate fraud, billing fraud, fraud by auto dealers, deceptive advertising and many other common consumer pitfalls. Based in Illinois, our consumer fraud and real-estate and condomium fraud and breach of contract trial lawyers represent clients involving consumer frauds and real-estate disputes in the Chicago area including Wheaton, Naperville, Aurora, Rockford and Waikegan and in different parts of the United States. To set up a free, confidential consultation on your case, please contact us online or call us toll-free at 1-877-990-4990.

As Naperville, Oak Brook, Wheaton, and Chicago business trial lawyers with substantial experience in shopping center claims, we were interested to see a recent decision by the First District Court of Appeal on the obligations of people who guarantee a lease. A change in the lease and a directed verdict at trial do not relieve a couple of their liability as guarantors of a commercial lease, the court has ruled. In Chicago Exhibitors Corporation v. Jeepers! Of Illinois and Swento, 1-06-3313 (Aug. 30, 2007), the court ruled that a guaranty agreement written to survive changes to the lease is enforceable even if the lease is assigned to a new tenant who changes it without the guarantor's approval.

Harvey and Cherry Swento owned a business that leased space from a predecessor landlord to Chicago Exhibitors Corporation (CEC). To sweeten that lease, the Swentos in 1991 personally guaranteed their lease payments and all of their other obligations as tenants, with a clause specifying that the guaranty would survive changes to or assignment of the lease. In 1997, they sold their business to Jeepers! of Illinois, Inc. and executed an agreement in which Jeepers! indemnified them from losses stemming from their personal guaranty. Jeepers! then failed to pay its rent, causing CEC to demand an amendment to the lease that reaffirmed the Swentos' personal guaranty. CEC declined to recognize the transfer of lease obligations from the Swentos' company to Jeepers! until rent was paid in full and Jeepers! executed its own guaranty.

Jeepers! never did take on the guaranty, but it failed to pay its rent again several times. In an effort to avoid eviction, it agreed to several changes to the lease in January of 2001. The Swentos did not sign this amendment, even though it called for the ratification of all guarantors. When CEC eventually sued Jeepers! for unpaid rent and repairs, it included the Swentos as guarantors. In the trial, the Swentos asserted that the January 2001 amendment was a material change that discharged them from their obligations as guarantors; CEC successfully moved in limine for a ruling that it was not. The parties then agreed to move straight to the damages phase of the trial, so the judge granted a directed verdict on liability. The Swentos were eventually found liable for unpaid rent and damages as well as attorney fees. They appealed the in limine motion, the directed verdict and the award of attorney fees.

In its decision, the appeals court found that the January amendment to the lease was not material enough to release the Swentos from their obligations. In Illinois, changes to a contract must make the guarantor's obligations materially different from what they originally signed, including a substantial increase in risk. None of the changes in the amendment changed the Swentos' financial obligations, the court said, so it was not a material enough change to release them from their guaranty. Nor was the Swentos' lack of control over Jeepers! enough to constitute an increase in risk, especially since their original guaranty was written to endure despite changes in the lease.

The Swentos also argued that a directed verdict denying them a chance to defend themselves was inappropriate because they never signed the January 2001 amendment, which they argued superseded the lease and thus waived CEC's rights against them. The court found those arguments unconvincing, but more importantly, pointed out that they are waived on appeal because the Swentos failed to raise them at trial. Finally, the appeals court rejected the Swentos' argument that they shouldn't be held responsible for an agreement they didn't sign, again saying that the January 2001 changes to the lease were not material enough to release them from their obligations. Thus, the trial court's decision was unanimously affirmed.

With offices in Chicago and Oak Brook, Ill., DiTommaso-Lubin handles commercial real estate litigation of all kinds, including a variety of contractual disputes and shopping center tenant matters. If you have a legal problem regarding a shopping center or another real estate matter, we would like to help. To set up a confidential consultation with our Chicago business and real-estate trial attorneys, please contact our Oak Brook business and real-estate trial attorneys today.

As Chicago business trial attorneys with substantial experience in disputes involving shopping centers, our firm was interested to see a recent Fourth District Court of Appeal decision allowing a shopping center to go through with its lease despite a restrictive covenant in a land sale by its predecessor. In Regency Commercial Associates v. Lopax, 4-06-0332 (May 4, 2007), the appeals court upheld the trial court's ruling that the business at issue was not covered by the covenant, and that starting the lease while the case was still pending did not bar it from requesting a declaratory judgment.

Regency Commercial Associates, LLC and Lopax, Inc. are companies that own neighboring parcels of land in Savoy, Ill. The prior owner of Regency's land, Arbours Development Limited Partnership, sold Lopax its land, which Lopax then leased to a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchisee. The sales contract between Lopax and Arbours restricted Arbours from allowing another "fast-food restaurant ... or restaurant facility whose principal food product is chicken[.]" It also lists the types of businesses allowed, which include "casual dining." Regency later purchased Arbours' rights under the contract.

When Regency wanted to lease to a Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant, it negotiated with Lopax, arguing that the restaurant is "casual dining" and not fast food. Lopax disagreed, saying it believed the contract restricts any restaurant that primarily serves chicken. Regency filed for declaratory judgment, asking the court to find that Buffalo Wild Wings is not fast food and that the covenant restricts only fast-food restaurants that primarily sell chicken. Finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact to try, the court denied Lopax's motion to dismiss.

During this phase, Lopax discovered that Buffalo Wild Wings franchisee had already signed a lease with Regency, contingent on the lawsuit's success, before Regency's filing. Lopax then filed for summary judgment based on nonliability for past conduct -- the legal theory that a plaintiff may not seek declaratory judgment after already taking a contract-breaching action. Regency contended that because the lease didn't take effect until the case was over, there was no lease. Lopax also moved to compel discovery of the lease. The court denied both that and the summary judgment motion. Lopax appealed both denials, as well as the denial of its motion to dismiss.

In its analysis, the Fourth District noted that the language of the restrictive covenant was ambiguous as to whether all chicken restaurants are banned, or just fast food restaurants. Using documents that illuminated the parties' reasoning at the time the contract was written, it decided that the covenant restricted only fast-food restaurants primarily serving chicken. On the issue of nonliability for past conduct, the appeals court pointed out that the lease is not effective until this case is over and none of the actions adverse to Lopax -- opening the buffalo wings restaurant -- have taken place, so Regency is not seeking to avoid liability for past conduct. Finally, the court upheld the trial court's decision that the lease was irrelevant and therefore should not be discoverable. It is worth noting that Justice Cook dissented from this decision.

As Chicago, Wheaton, Oak Brook and Naperville business trial lawyers with substantial experience with shopping center tenants disputes and shopping center tenants' rights issues, we welcome clarifications to real estate contract law, especially on restrictive covenants. If you are involved in a similar dispute over a shopping center or other commercial real estate and you would like to speak with us about your options, please contact DiTommaso-Lubin for a confidential consultation.

As Chicago class action attorneys with a focus on consumer rights and consumer protection law, we know that renters in Chicago are fortunate to be protected by a law requiring landlords to pay interest on the renters' own security deposits once a year, as long as the tenant stays for more than six months. Section 080 of the Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (PDF) also specifies that landlords must return security deposits, minus unpaid rent or reasonable costs of repairs, within 45 days of the tenant's departure. Unlike with the corresponding state law, this is true regardless of the number of units the landlord owns. If a landlord fails to comply, the tenant has the right to sue for twice the amount of the deposit, plus interest and attorneys' fees.

The ordinance also applies even if the landlord did not willfully (that is, intentionally) withhold the payment. That provision was established by the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, 307 Ill.App.3d 155, 717 N.E.2d 443, 240 Ill.Dec. 350 (1999). In that case, Aurelia Lawrence sued her landlord for withholding interest on a pet deposit. At trial, the court decided that a pet deposit is a security deposit for the purposes of the law (rather than a fee or charge). But because the landlord didn't willfully refuse to pay interest on that pet deposit, it declined to impose the penalty of twice the deposit plus interest and attorney fees. Lawrence moved for a new trial, which was denied, and appealed to the First District.

In its analysis, the appeals court noted that it did not need to decide whether the landlord actually did willfully fail to pay; what mattered was whether the ordinance required willfulness in the first place. In order to require willfulness, the court wrote, a law must be penal (intended to punish) rather than remedial (intended to make the victim whole). Both sides agreed that the case turned on the issue of penal versus remedial. The court first decided that its decision should not be controlled by Szpila v. Burke, 279 Ill. App. 3d 964, 665 N.E.2d 357 (1996), in which the appeals court decided that a tenant was entitled to damages once rather than for each separate violation of the ordinance. In that case, the First District said, it found willfulness because to do otherwise would give a result that was out of proportion to the violation and unjust. A similar case, Namur v. Habitat Co., 294 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 691 N.E.2d 782 (1998), was dismissed because it did not address the question at issue here.

In this case, the court looked to legislative intent to guide it as to whether the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance is remedial or penal. The plain language of Chicago Municipal Code sec. 5-12-010 states that the ordinance "shall be liberally construed ... to promote its purposes and policies," it noted. The court then cited an entire paragraph from Friedman v. Krupp Corp., 282 Ill. App. 3d 436, 668 N.E.2d 142 (1996), in which it had previously written that the ordinance is remedial, because the law itself says its purpose is to establish rights and obligations in the landlord-tenant relationship and to promote the public welfare. Viewing it as penal would undermine the goals of the ordinance, wrote the court. Thus, the appeals court remanded the case to trial court, with instructions to enter judgment for "double damages" plus interest for Lawrence, and to hold a hearing on attorneys' fees.

This decision established that tenants do not need to prove that a landlord willfully withheld the security deposit interest they're owed -- only that the landlord did so. This is an important tool for us as Chicago tenants' rights lawyers, because it allows us to pursue valid cases that might otherwise have been actiionable. From offices in Chicago and Oak Brook, DiTommaso-Lubin handles tenants' rights cases like this, both for individuals like Lawrence and as class actions that bring together neighbors harmed by the same landlord's illegal practices. If you believe your landlord has illegally withheld your security deposit or its interest and you'd like to pursue a claim, please contact our Oak Brook and Chicago class action lawyers for a free consultation outlining your legal options.