Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

As Chicago business, shareholder rights and commercial law litigators, we frequently handle cases involving allegations of business fraud or financial mismanagement, often as part of complex business dispute, that require significant expertise in financial issues. When handling a divorce involving a family business or other closely held company, we also sometimes find we need an expert's help properly valuing the business, so we can help our clients get the most equitable possible distribution of marital property.

Our Chicago and Naperville business litigation attorneys have handled many complex business and commecial law litigation matters which have involved presenting or cross-examining accounting witnesses.

While we're confident in our legal skills, these situations call for specialized financial skills. To give our clients the best possible representation in business, shareholder and other commercial disputes, we sometimes retain a forensic accountant or fraud examiner. Both of these jobs are twofold: They help attorneys and their clients understand the complex financial aspects of their cases, and they may also be called to testify as expert witnesses. A forensic accountant's job is to examine a person or corporation's accounts "cold," from the outside; the subject isn’t generally expected to cooperate. Similarly, a fraud examiner delves deep into a company's finances, looking for the source of anything that seems inconsistent or suspicious. Both can serve as expert witnesses who help establish the value of a business or testify to the existence of fraud.

The goal for both forensic accountants and fraud examiners is to make sure the other side of the case is being completely truthful about its income and accounting practices. As you might imagine, this is a frequent concern in divorces involving a spouse who’s part of a small or closely held business, which may need to be properly valued for the divorce. The company may also need to be investigated when the owning spouse is believed to be hiding assets. However, this concern also comes up in business disputes, such as breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits. When minority shareholders believe the majority is withholding important financial information, using a forensic accountant or fraud examiner may be the most reliable way to discover and prove the truth.

This practice is relatively recent but growing; a simple Web search turns up many accountants and examiners who regularly serve as expert witnesses. Two legal journals serving our Midwestern neighbors, The Wisconsin Law Journal and Michigan Lawyers Weekly, offer online articles on the subject for lawyers who want to learn more.

In a shareholder derivative action related to 2004's merger between Bank One and J.P. Morgan Chase, the Illinois First District Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal with prejudice of a complaint filed by Bank One shareholders. Shaper v. Bryan, No. 1-05-3849 (March 8, 2007).

The dispute grew out of the high-profile merger of Bank One with J.P. Morgan Chase. As part of the deal, J.P. Morgan agreed to issue stock to each Bank One shareholder worth 14% more than the Bank One shares' closing price on the day of the merger. In other words, Bank One shareholders received extra value as part of the deal. Bank One CEO James Dimon would serve as president and COO of J.P. Morgan Chase for two years, after which he would take over for the existing CEO. These two men negotiated both the premium and the succession plan themselves.

Media reports soon appeared, suggesting that Bank One shareholders could have gotten a much larger premium from another company or through another negotiator. The media also reported that Dimon was eager to move to New York and take over as the leader of J.P. Morgan Chase, offering to do the deal for no premium at all if he could start as CEO without waiting the two years.

Shareholders for Bank One filed suit, alleging that officers and directors breached their fiduciary duty to shareholders by accepting a lower price than they would likely have gotten by opening bidding to other companies. They also alleged that Dimon had a conflict of interests during the negotiations because he stood to gain higher compensation and CEO status. Finally, they alleged that termination fees that were part of the deal created an insurmountable obstacle to any higher offer. The trial court dismissed their complaint, and the appeals court affirmed.

In its opinion, the justices wrote that Dimon didn't meet the classic examples of a self-interested officer director -- someone on both sides of the transaction or someone who stood to gain a personal benefit. Furthermore, they said, the courts of Delaware, which govern this transaction, have routinely rejected the argument that maintaining an officer position is a debilitating factor in negotiations. Similarly, the board in the transaction didn't breach its duty of care, they wrote, because it had no special obligation to inform itself of Dimon's no-premium offer, nor is there anything to suggest it didn't know about that offer.

Finally, the shareholders argued that termination fees built into the merger made it impossible to entertain another offer, which constituted a breach of the board's duty of care. Importantly for Illinois business litigators, the justices also wrote that the two-stage test required by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), and Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003) didn't apply. The court pointed out that the board retained a "fiduciary out," termination fees were reciprocal and the shareholders retained the right to vote against the merger. Thus, the appeals court upheld dismissal of the case with prejudice.

A minority shareholder may withdraw his complaint under the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983, because the majority shareholder failed to meet requirements of that law, the Illinois Third District Court of Appeal ruled in an Illinois shareholder dispute lawsuit. Lohr v. Havens, 3-06-0930 (Nov. 11, 2007).

Charles Lohr owned a large minority of the stock in Phoenix Paper Products, Inc., a closely held private corporation in Illinois. He and another shareholder, James Durham, became concerned about possible financial mismanagement by the majority shareholder and president, Terry Havens, and their accountant, Samuel Morris. In months of correspondence, they accused Havens and Morris of taking unspecified inappropriate actions without shareholder approval.

This culminated in a 2003 lawsuit by Lohr alleging that Havens and Morris were misusing the company’s resources and acting illegally. Count I of the suit asked the court to either order a buyout of all Lohr’s stock or dissolve the company. Havens filed a timely election to buy Lohr’s shares, but Lohr accused Havens of illegally doing this without shareholder approval. After two years of discovery, Lohr asked to withdraw Count I and its associated demands, but Havens objected. The trial court found that because Havens hadn’t notified shareholders about the election, it was invalid, allowing Lohr to dismiss Count I of his complaint. Havens appealed.

The Illinois Third District Court of Appeal ruled that because Havens did not notify other shareholders of the election, the election was invalid, leaving Lohr free to drop his claim. In its analysis, the court noted that a proper election would stop a shareholder in Lohr’s position from dismissing a petition -- but the plain language and the intent of the law both require notice of an election to shareholders within ten days. For the same reasons, the court also disagreed with Havens’s contention that the trial court was required to hold a hearing to assess equities before allowing Lohr to dismiss his petition.

As Chicago, Oak Brook and Naperville business and shareholder rights litigators with a substantial practice in business and shareholder disputes we’re always pleased to see clarifications of Illinois business law from the courts.

Only managers in manager-operated limited liability corporations have a fiduciary duty to the company or to other members, the First District Court of Appeal ruled in a usurpation of corporate opportunity lawsuit involving a closely held LLC. Katris v. Carroll, No. 1-04-3639 (Dec. 23, 2005).

Peter Katris was one of four members/officers and two managers of an Illinois limited liability corporation, Viper Execution Systems LLC. Viper LLC was formed to market a type of options-related software, also called Viper, written by LLC member Stephen Doherty for member Lester Szlendak. Its articles of organization specified that management was vested in Katris and the other manager, William Hamburg.

Defendant Patrick Carroll employed Doherty before and during the organization, and defendant Ernst & Company later hired Doherty to work with Carroll. Their work included the writing of another software program, WWOW, which Katris believed was functionally similar to Viper. Five years after the organization, Katris sued Carroll and Ernst for collusion and usurpation of corporate opportunity because of WWOW’s similarity to Viper. (He also sued Doherty for collusion and breach of fiduciary duty, claims they later settled.)

Carroll and Ernst moved for summary judgment, arguing that collusion didn’t exist because it depended on Doherty’s fiduciary duty to Viper LLC. As a non-manager of the manager-managed Viper LLC, they argued, he had no such duty. Katris argued that Doherty’s written agreement to form Viper LLC and officer role left him subject to a manager’s duties. The trial court disagreed, granting summary judgment, and the appeals court upheld that decision.

In its analysis, the court noted that Article 15 of the Illinois Limited Liability Company Act explicitly says that a member of a manager-managed LLC in Illinois "who is not also a manager owes no duties to the company or to the other members solely by reason of being a member." Katris agreed with the law, but asserted that different language in the law gave Doherty managerial status because he fulfilled some of the duties of a manager as director of technology:

In a manager‑managed company:
...
(3) a member who pursuant to the operating agreement exercises some or all of the authority of a manager in the management and conduct of the company's business is held to the standards of conduct in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this Section [manager’s duties of loyalty and care] to the extent that the member exercises the managerial authority vested in a manager by this Act...

The appeals court found that the plain language of the statute giving no liability to non-managers was clear and perfectly adequate for determining the intent of the Illinois legislature in enacting the law, so it declined to reverse the trial court. Furthermore, it said, Doherty’s position as director of technology didn’t elevate him to a manager because the two managers, Katris and Hamburg, didn’t have a majority vote when they gave Doherty that role, meaning they couldn’t amend the operating agreement to make Doherty a manager. And furthermore, the court argued, Katris and Hamburg signed that agreement as “all the managers” of Viper LLC, undermining Katris’s argument that Doherty was given a managerial role:

The undisputed facts of this case show that Doherty was a member of a manager-managed LLC and exercised no managerial authority pursuant to the LLC's operating agreement. Accordingly, the undisputed facts show that Doherty owed no fiduciary duties to Katris or the LLC pursuant to the Act and Katris' collusion claim against Carroll and Ernst fails as a matter of law.

Experienced Illinois business litigators probably recognize Professor Charles W. Murdock of the Loyola University Chicago School of Law as a former Illinois Deputy Attorney General, former Loyola Dean and expert on Illinois business law. Given his status, it was with great interest that we read some of his scholarship on the concept of fairness in conflicts between shareholders or other parties interested in a business, especially in situations where the majority is using its greater power against a minority. These papers are a few years old, but they directly address some of the issues that are important to our firm and our clients in corporate freeze-out or squeeze-out litigation, breach of fiduciary duty and other internal business disputes in closely held companies.

In Fairness and Good Faith as a Precept in the Law of Corporations and Other Business Organizations, 36 Loy.U.Chi. L.J. 551 (2005), Murdock addresses the fiduciary duty of good faith and fairness that controlling interests of a business owe to minority interests. Noting that this internal duty is a fairly recent legal phenomenon, he surveys caselaw on the subject from around the country that applies to closely held corporations, public corporations and LLCs. Noting that the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA), a model law adopted by several states, doesn't include language that gives members of an LLC fiduciary duties to one another, he praises Illinois for modifying that language to protect members in the updated Limited Liability Company Act.

Another of Murdock's articles that directly addresses issues important to us is 2004's Squeeze-outs, Freeze-outs and Discounts: Why Is Illinois in the Minority in Protecting Shareholder Interests?, 35 Loyola Chicago L.J.737 (2004). As you might expect from the title, Murdock argues in the article that Illinois business law, despite its "pro-shareholder" reputation, fails to protect minority shareholders in "fair value" proceedings. (Fair value proceedings are intended to resolve conflicts when majority shareholders want to do something that would harm the minority shareholders.) Until recently, those proceedings often led to marketability and liquidity discounts imposed on minorities, and the courts usually allowed it -- giving rise to Murdock's criticism. However, amendments to the Illinois Business Corporation Act in 2007 prohibited these discounts "absent extraordinary circumstances." While the article is now out of date, fortunately for minority shareholders in Illinois, it still provides good arguments for the change and a survey of common circumstances under which fair value proceedings might arise.

The doctrine of laches bars a plaintiff from bringing a stolen corporate opportunities lawsuit, the Illinois First District Court of Appeal has ruled. Lozman v. Putnam, No. 1- 06-0861 (February 18, 2008).

Plaintiff Fane Lozman and defendant Gerald Putnam met in 1986 as employees of the same Chicago securities firm. Eight years later, Lozman came up with an idea for a new type of software for traders, and hired another defendant, Townsend Analytics Inc., to program it. To market the software, Lozman and Putnam formed Blue Water Partners, Inc., an Illinois corporation, in 1994. Each was a 50% shareholder and a director. The plan was to barter the software for a share of a brokerage firm’s commissions on trades. Townsend Analytics and its owners, Stuart and Marrgwen Townsend, were offered 15% equity in Blue Water but no director or officer positions.

Later that year, Putnam formed Terra Nova Trading, LLC, with himself as 100% shareholder, to route profits from Blue Water. Another company, Analytic Services, LLC, was formed to sell the software, with Samuel Long as president. In April of 1995, Putnam and Lozman signed an agreement to share commissions generated through or paid by Townsend and its software. For a variety of personal and professional reasons, the relationship between Lozman and Putnam went sour, and they voluntarily dissolved the agreement six months later. A later termination agreement, back-dated to the day of the dissolution, preserved any legal claims. Putnam went on to form three more companies that used the same office and brokerage license as Blue Water, subcontracted with the Townsends and/or competed with Blue Water.

In 1999, Lozman sued for usurpation of corporate opportunity, breach of joint venture, unjust enrichment and fraudulent conveyance of assets. In court, the two men disagreed on the meanings of a variety of their agreements. After a tortuous procedural history including two previous appeals and a dual bench and advisory-only jury trial in the instant action, the court found for the remaining defendants. Among its findings was that the usurpation of corporate opportunities claims by Lozman and Blue Water were barred by laches -- they had waited four years to file their claims. They appealed on that and other grounds, but the appeals court affirmed.

In its opinion, the court noted that plaintiffs claimed Putnam fraudulently breached a fiduciary duty to disclose certain facts, so the running of the laches claim should have started only after Lozman discovered the alleged breach. Prueter v. Bork, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1007 (1981). However, the court wrote, plaintiffs failed to explain what facts Putnam failed to disclose or when they learned of them, nor did they cite cases that supported their position. Furthermore, the change of circumstances during Illinois’ five-year statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty precluded arguments that laches shouldn’t apply. Thus, the laches finding was upheld, as were the rest of the trial court’s findings.

A former shareholder, officer and director did not breach his fiduciary duty to a corporation when he started a competing company, and a former employee did not breach his duty of loyalty by joining, the First District Court of Appeal has ruled. Cooper Linse Hallman v. Hallman, No. 1-05-0597 (2006).

Plaintiff Cooper Linse Capital Management, a closely held financial services company, brought on Thomas Hallman in 1994 as a shareholder with 20% of stock shares. The remainder were divided evenly between Lori Cooper and Don Linse. Hallman served as vice president and CFO as well as an employee. Two years later, the company hired James McQuinn as an employee only. Neither man signed a written confidentiality agreement, and both disputed Cooper Linse's contention that they entered into an oral confidentiality agreement. All parties agreed that Linse and Cooper made all of the business decisions.

In 2000, the company that held Cooper Linse's clients' accounts in trust got into financial trouble and had its assets frozen, leaving clients unable to access their accounts and Cooper Linse unable to pay its employees. Linse began negotiations to take over that company's trust business; McQuinn and Hallman quietly began planning to start a business competing with Cooper Linse.

Five months after the assets were frozen, Hallman and McQuinn left for their new firm, taking client lists with them. They had used Cooper Linse computers to plan some aspects of the business, and negotiated to use a soliciting firm that Cooper Linse had previously used. Cooper Linse filed suit against Hallman and McQuinn for seven counts of corporate misconduct, including breach of fiduciary duty against Hallman and breach of duty of loyalty against McQuinn. The trial court found for Hallman and McQuinn on those two counts, and Cooper Linse appealed.

The appeals court affirmed, saying Hallman and McQuinn didn't breach even the strictest duties they had to Cooper Linse. Under Illinois caselaw, the court wrote, former employees like McQuinn may compete with their former employers and even plan their businesses while they're still employed, as long as they don't start competing until they have terminated their employment.

By contrast, the court pointed out that directors and officers like Hallman have a fiduciary duty not to exploit their positions for personal gain, including starting a competing business without telling other officers. But in this case, the justices found no evidence for the breaches alleged by Cooper Linse. One of its allegations was that the two men had asked the soliciting firm for business before leaving Cooper Linse, which indeed could have been a breach. But because Linse himself was involved in some of the meetings and the men testified that they never solicited the business, the trial court found there was no breach and the appeals court agreed. Other arguments fell similarly flat; in particular, the court noted that there was no written confidentiality agreement. Thus, "their conduct did not rise to the level of a breach of their fiduciary duties because they neither exploited their positions for their personal benefit and to the detriment of plaintiff nor impeded plaintiff’s ability to do business.... To hold that Hallman’s and McQuinn’s actions were a breach of their fiduciary duties would be to virtually prevent all officers and directors from seeking new employment prior to resigning from their current positions."

Are you a consumer with questions or concerns related to potential fraud and do not know what government agency to contact? The Chicago Federal Reserve Bank provides a web page that allows you to link to government agencies that may help you. The web page has links to federal and state banking agencies, federal and state securities agencies, and state insurance agencies located in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin. You can also link to various useful financial , insurance, and banking tools, and to lists of financial services regulators, and consumer complaint filing information. Click here to link to the Chicago Federal Reserve Fraud web page.

If you need legal assistance in pursuing a civil lawsuit because government regulators cannot help you in recovering money lost due to fraud, our private sector lawyers can assist you by clicking here to contact us.

In a mutual fund’s shareholder dispute, the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on May 19 that an investment advisor’s fiduciary duty to shareholders does not require that the advisor’s fees be “reasonable” by any legal definition. In Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., 07-1624 (7th Cir. 2008), the circuit affirmed a summary-judgment ruling in favor of the mutual fund manager by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

Three shareholders in the Oakmark complex of mutual funds sued the fund’s advisor, Harris Associates, contending that the fees they paid toward Harris’s compensation were too high. The bulk of the opinion (which the majority called “the main event”) concerned section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, an amendment to the 1940 act added in 1970. That law gives investment advisors at registered investment companies a fiduciary duty to shareholders with regard to any compensation they or their affiliates receive. However, said the Seventh Circuit, “a fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation.... Section 36(b) does not say that fees must be ‘reasonable’ in relation to a judicially created standard. It says instead that the adviser has a fiduciary duty.” The court goes on to note that fiduciary duty is well-defined in trust law and does not foreclose an advisor’s ability to negotiate for compensation.

In doing so, the court disapproved caselaw from Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). That case requires that “[t]o be guilty of a violation of §36(b) . . . the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”

In addition to the amendment, the plaintiffs’ case relied on multiple parts of the original Investment Company Act, all of which were deemed moot for various reasons by the majority.

In a business fraud lawsuit pitting a bank against its security vendor, the Illinois Appellate Court for the 1st District ruled May 1 that an attachment order must be voided under the Illinois Attachment Act if plaintiffs fail to file an attachment bond beforehand. In ABN Amro Services Company, Inc. v. Navarrete Industries, Inc., No. 1-07-0089 (Ill. App. 2008), the appeals court voided such an order and remanded it to the trial court.

The case arose from alleged fraud by INS, which provided security for multiple Chicago-area La Salle Bank branches. A fraud investigator discovered that Armando Navarrete of INS was fraudulently overbilling the banks by an alleged $15.9 million, then paying kickbacks to the banks’ vice president for security, George Konjuch. The bank filed a lawsuit in September of 2006 against INS, Konjuch, Navarrete and another INS employee, alleging fraud, civil conspiracy and constructive trust, plus breach of fiduciary duty against Konjuch. (Konjuch and Navarrete have since been indicted by a federal grand jury for the scheme.)

At the same time, plaintiffs asked for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction and an order of statutory prejudgment attachment, all of which were attempts to keep the alleged conspirators from absconding with the money. Upon receiving notice of these filings, defendants immediately filed motions to void the restraining order and the prejudgment attachment. After hearings, the trial court dissolved the restraining order and denied the preliminary injunction, but declined to vacate the attachment order. Both sides appealed.

On appeal, the First District considered only Konjuch’s motion to vacate the attachment order. Using the plain language of the Illinois Attachment Act, the court concluded that plaintiffs are absolutely required to file a bond before they may be granted an attachment order:

Unfortunately, the result of declaring the order void results in a waste of resources in this case. While plaintiffs clearly attempted to comply with the statute, they failed to do so. This issue could not be resolved by simple amendment because of the absolute mandatory command of the statute, therefore the mootness and aider by verdict doctrines do not apply. The order is simply void. A liberal construction of the Act cannot cure this defect and the order must be dismissed.

Thus, the three-judge majority reversed and remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Cook County.