Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

A First District Court of Appeal ruling had an interesting lesson for our Chicago noncompete clause attorneys. In Baird and Warner Residential Sales Inc. v. Mazzone, No. 1-07-2179 (Aug. 15, 2008), the First ruled that a trial court needed more evidence in a dispute about a covenant not to compete before it could correctly grant a motion to dismiss. The case arose when Baird & Warner Residential Sales sued former employee Patricia Mazzone and her new employer, Midwest Realty Ventures (doing business as Prudential Preferred Properties). Both real estate companies have multiple branches and more than 1,000 employees in the Chicagoland area.

Mazzone was office manager for B&W’s Lincoln Park office for about 11 years before leaving for Prudential. During that time, she signed a contract that included a covenant not to solicit services from any B&W employees or independent contractors, or people who had left those jobs within the last six months, for up to a year after leaving. This contract contained a severability clause, and the “preface” to the contract specified that it applied “regarding the Lincoln Park office,” although the restrictive covenant referred to “Company.” In 2007, Mazzone resigned from her job and took another running Prudential’s Michigan Avenue office. About a month later, B&W sued for a temporary restraining order and injunction seeking to enforce the covenant and keep Mazzone and Prudential from soliciting B&W employees, alleging breach of contract by Mazzone, tortious interference with contract by Prudential, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage by both parties.

After an injunction and expedited discovery, defendants moved to dismiss because the covenant was overly broad, alleging that it would keep any Prudential employee from soliciting any B&W employee or contractor from any office. B&W contended that the preface restricted the covenant to the Lincoln Park office and affirmatively stated that it did not seek to enforce it beyond that office. In the alternative, they argued that the severability clause should allow that portion to be separated from the rest of the agreement. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, saying the contract’s plain language related to all of B&W’s offices. Plaintiffs appealed this ruling.

The appeals court started its opinion by considering B&W’s claim that the nonsolicitation contract was not improper under the law. It noted that motions to dismiss are not necessarily appropriate in fact-intensive situations like this one, since the rules limit courts to consideration of facts in the complaint. It then turned to the controversy over whether the contract applied to all offices or just the Lincoln Park office and found that there was insufficient evidence. The record does not show enough evidence to determine whether the contract, as written, is overly broad and poses an undue hardship on Mazzone, the court wrote, or negative effects on the public from the restraint of trade. It also disagreed that enforcing the contract would “render Mazzone unemployable,” since she would be free to solicit employees of non-B&W brokers, even within the limited one-year period specified. Thus, the trial court should not have dismissed it without hearing more evidence, the court wrote. It reversed and remanded the case for more proceedings.

Continue reading "Hardship to Former Employee Should Be Considered Outside Motion to Dismiss, First District Rules" »

As Chicago business trial attorneys with substantial experience in disputes involving shopping centers, our firm was interested to see a recent Fourth District Court of Appeal decision allowing a shopping center to go through with its lease despite a restrictive covenant in a land sale by its predecessor. In Regency Commercial Associates v. Lopax, 4-06-0332 (May 4, 2007), the appeals court upheld the trial court's ruling that the business at issue was not covered by the covenant, and that starting the lease while the case was still pending did not bar it from requesting a declaratory judgment.

Regency Commercial Associates, LLC and Lopax, Inc. are companies that own neighboring parcels of land in Savoy, Ill. The prior owner of Regency's land, Arbours Development Limited Partnership, sold Lopax its land, which Lopax then leased to a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchisee. The sales contract between Lopax and Arbours restricted Arbours from allowing another "fast-food restaurant ... or restaurant facility whose principal food product is chicken[.]" It also lists the types of businesses allowed, which include "casual dining." Regency later purchased Arbours' rights under the contract.

When Regency wanted to lease to a Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant, it negotiated with Lopax, arguing that the restaurant is "casual dining" and not fast food. Lopax disagreed, saying it believed the contract restricts any restaurant that primarily serves chicken. Regency filed for declaratory judgment, asking the court to find that Buffalo Wild Wings is not fast food and that the covenant restricts only fast-food restaurants that primarily sell chicken. Finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact to try, the court denied Lopax's motion to dismiss.

During this phase, Lopax discovered that Buffalo Wild Wings franchisee had already signed a lease with Regency, contingent on the lawsuit's success, before Regency's filing. Lopax then filed for summary judgment based on nonliability for past conduct -- the legal theory that a plaintiff may not seek declaratory judgment after already taking a contract-breaching action. Regency contended that because the lease didn't take effect until the case was over, there was no lease. Lopax also moved to compel discovery of the lease. The court denied both that and the summary judgment motion. Lopax appealed both denials, as well as the denial of its motion to dismiss.

In its analysis, the Fourth District noted that the language of the restrictive covenant was ambiguous as to whether all chicken restaurants are banned, or just fast food restaurants. Using documents that illuminated the parties' reasoning at the time the contract was written, it decided that the covenant restricted only fast-food restaurants primarily serving chicken. On the issue of nonliability for past conduct, the appeals court pointed out that the lease is not effective until this case is over and none of the actions adverse to Lopax -- opening the buffalo wings restaurant -- have taken place, so Regency is not seeking to avoid liability for past conduct. Finally, the court upheld the trial court's decision that the lease was irrelevant and therefore should not be discoverable. It is worth noting that Justice Cook dissented from this decision.

As Chicago, Wheaton, Oak Brook and Naperville business trial lawyers with substantial experience with shopping center tenants disputes and shopping center tenants' rights issues, we welcome clarifications to real estate contract law, especially on restrictive covenants. If you are involved in a similar dispute over a shopping center or other commercial real estate and you would like to speak with us about your options, please contact DiTommaso-Lubin for a confidential consultation.

A federal breach of warranty case of ours IWOI v. Monaco Couch recently survived a motion to dismiss in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Our client, a limited liability company formed in Montana, bought a motor home in Illinois and allegedly discovered that it had a twisted frame causing it to list to one side, requiring constant steering corrections. On discovering this alleged defect, the individual owning the LLC brought it back to the dealership the very next day for the first of three unsuccessful repair attempts. Per the manufacturer's warranty, he submitted his complaints in writing to the manufacturer, Monaco Coach after these three repair attempts. The alleged defects remain, and we alleged in our filings that neither the manufacturer nor the dealer has agreed to accept the motor home for return or fixed the problems.

Our client sued both the manufacturer and the dealer under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and other state claims. In defense, the defendants argued that our client was not a "consumer" within the meaning of federal law; this claim was flatly denied by the Court, which found no allegations in the Complaint to support it. On the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act issues, the Court also identified several alleged facts suggesting that Monaco Coach may well have known of the problems before the RV was sold, as we alleged. Thus, those claims also survived.

Furthermore, the trial court decided that our client could revoke its acceptance of the dealer's "AS IS" condition and the dealer's disclaimer of all implied warranties, a claim under the Illinois Commercial Code. The Seventh Circuit has addressed this issue in Priebe v. Autobarn, Ltd., 240 F.3d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 2001), in which it adopted an earlier ruling stating that consumers may revoke their acceptance even when the dealer has properly disclaimed implied warranties, if the evidence is clear that the vehicle's substantial defects clearly impair its value to the plaintiff. This allowed our client's Magnuson-Moss Act and state conversion claims to survive as well.

Although this case is at the trial court level, we believe the judge's interpretation of Seventh Circuit and Illinois precedent on Magnuson-Moss and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act is good news for consumers. As auto and RV dealer fraud lawyers in Chicago, Naperville and Oak Brook, Ill., we believe automotive dealers take advantage of consumers' lack of education about their rights far more often than they are caught. When they are caught, they should not be allowed to wiggle out of liability for their actions with an unfair, high-pressure contract that the consumer has little room to renegotiate. Both the Magnuson-Moss Act (which governs how warranties may be offered) and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act were specifically intended to help consumers fight this behavior.

If you believe you may be a victim of automotive dealer fraud or another type of consumer fraud and you're ready to fight back, please contact DiTommaso-Lubin online, via telephone or at our offices near or in Naperville, Wheaton, Oak Brook or Chicago.

To see more about our firm and the consumer rights, consumer fraud, lemon law and class action cases we have handled click here.

The Illinois Appellate Court for the 1st District ruled May 7 that a legal malpractice class action against the law firm DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary could not go on because it was filed well after a tolling agreement ended. In Joyce v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary LLP, 1-07-1966 (Ill.App. May 7, 2008), the court upheld the dismissal of a purported class action by stockholders of 21st Century Telecom Group, a Chicago telephone company, pursuant to a tolling agreement between 21st Century and DLA Piper.

The underlying dispute started in 1999, when 21st Century agreed to merge with competitor RCN. DLA Piper attorneys drafted a merger agreement with a mistake that lowered the price of the stock 21st Century shareholders were to receive by $19 million. In response, Edward Joyce, the stockholders’ representative, made a tolling agreement with DLA Piper, in which the statute of limitations was tolled unless a stockholder lawsuit was filed against the firm on or before December 31, 2002. The firm agreed not to avail itself of any statute of limitations defense until after that day. This agreement was amended four times, each time altering only the date. The last agreement set that date at August 21, 2005.

Joyce filed a legal malpractice class action in Cook County against DLA Piper on August 30, 2006. After some procedural disputes, including a finding by the trial court that the filing was timely, the firm won a motion to dismiss based on plaintiff’s lack of standing as a non-client. The plaintiffs appealed and the defendant cross-appealed on the trial court’s decision that the suit was timely.

The appeals court upheld that cross-appeal, finding that the plaintiffs were barred because they filed nearly a year after the last agreement expired. The court rejected the defendants’ contention that it was timely because each amended tolling agreement constituted a new contract that extended the statute of limitations.

Writing for the three-judge majority, Justice Grieman found the tolling agreement unambiguous in setting an end date of August 31, 2005. “Indeed, to accept plaintiff’s argument would require this court to allow plaintiff the benefits of the first four amendments without fulfilling the requirement of filing suit by the specified dates imposed by any of the amendments.”

The majority declined to take up the issue of whether the 21st Century shareholders could be considered clients of DLA Piper.

Judge Dow of the Federal Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed without prejudice a bona fide error defense in a putative Fair Debt Collection Act class-action for failure to plead facts akin to the "first paragraph in any newspaper story." The Court ruled that a bona fide error defense raises a claim of mistake, and therefore must be pled with factual particularity under Rule 9.

The Court held:

Notwithstanding the "disfavored" status of motions to strike and the "liberal pleading standard" in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, the Court concludes that the motion is well taken. Because the defense at issue deals with an alleged "mistake" -- a "bona fide error" in the statutory parlance -- Defendant is obligated to comply with both Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 9(b). The standard under Rule 9(b) requires parties to state the circumstances of a mistake with "particularity." As the Seventh Circuit has explained, Rule 9(b) mandates that parties allege at the pleading stage "the who, what, when, where, and how of the mistake." GE Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1078 (7th Cir. 1997). Defendant correctly points out that Rule 9(b) permits pleaders to allege matters such as intent and knowledge in a more general manner. However, the remaining factual details of an alleged mistake -- for example, who made the mistake and when and how it occurred -- must be set out with "particularity" in the pleading. Although Defendant has added some detail to its original effort to plead its affirmative defense, there still is work to do before the Court reasonably can conclude that Defendant has complied with its obligation to provide "the first paragraph of any newspaper story" (GE Capital Corp., 128 F.3d at 1078) setting forth with particularity Defendant's version of the circumstances supporting the defense, as Rule 9(b) and the Seventh Circuit case law require.

To read the full opinion click here Konewko vs. Dickler, Kahn, Slowikowski & Zavell, Ltd.

To learn more about our Chicago and Oak Brook based class action attorneys click here.