Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

DiTommaso-Lubin represents clients from many industries who operate all kinds of businesses, including both franchisors and franchisees. Our Aurora business attorneys came across an appellate decision from the Fourth District here in Illinois that involves a dispute that arose out of a franchise agreement between a heavy-duty truck manufacturer and a truck dealer.

Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp. is a disagreement that came about after the two parties entered into a sales and service agreement where Plaintiff Crossroads had the right to purchase Sterling Trucks and vehicle parts from Defendants and Defendants “reserved the right to discontinue at any time the manufacture or sale” of their parts or change the design or specs of any products without prior notice to Plaintiff. Several years after entering the agreement, Defendants allegedly announced that they were discontinuing the production of Sterling trucks and that Detroit Diesel Corporation (the truck's engine manufacturer) would cease accepting orders as well. Defendant sent written notice of these decisions to Plaintiffs. Defendants decided to discontinue manufacture of the Sterling vehicles allegedly because they were duplicative of other vehicles manufactured by Sterling's parent company.

In response to this notice, Plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, fraud, and tortious interference with contract. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on all counts, which was granted in part by the trial court because Defendants' discontinuance and re-branding of the Sterling brand constituted good cause for terminating the contract. Plaintiff then filed an interlocutory appeal for the trial court's partial dismissal.

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the violations of sections 4(d)(1) of the Franchise Act because Plaintiffs failed to allege specific facts supporting each element of violation under the Act and instead merely made conclusory allegations for each violation. The Court also found that the allegations under section 9 of the Act were improperly plead, as Plaintiff's allegations contained only conclusions without the specific facts required by the Act. The Court then upheld the lower court's ruling as to the allegations under section 9.5 of the Act because the sales and service agreement remained in effect and had not been terminated. Next the Court found the dismissal of the fraud claims to be proper because Plaintiff failed to allege a misrepresentation of a present fact and dismissed the claims under section 4(b) of the act because Defendant's conduct was neither arbitrary nor in bad faith. Finally, the Court did not address the alleged 4(d)(6) violations due to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as such violations are within the purview of the Review Board under section 12(d) of the Act.

Continue reading "Illinois Appellate Court Dismisses Lawsuit Between Truck Manufacturer and Franchisee" »

Workers' compensation insurance is a necessary part of doing business for many companies, so the attorneys at DiTommaso-Lubin are always on the lookout for emerging legal issues in that area. Our Naperville business attorneys recently discovered a decision rendered by the Appellate Court of Illinois that is significant for current and potential clients who have workers' compensation insurance agreements that contain an arbitration clause.

All-American Roofing, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Company pits Plaintiff All-American Roofing against its Defendant insurer, Zurich American in a lawsuit that arose from alleged unpaid deductibles and retrospective insurance premiums. The five-year insurance agreement was based upon retrospectively rated premiums that required Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant after the end of a policy year for claims that arose during that year. After the fourth year, the policy exchanged the retrospectively rated premiums for a larger deductible. The dispute began when Defendant summoned Plaintiff to arbitration regarding the aforementioned unpaid sums pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause contained within the parties' agreement. In response to the arbitration summons, All-American Roofing filed for declaratory judgment along with claims for breach of contract, fraud, and related causes of action. Plaintiff requested that the trial court declare that the mandatory arbitration clause was unenforceable and sought damages for their other claims. The trial court stayed the arbitration, dismissed most of Plaintiffs claims through summary judgment and ordered the parties to arbitrate the remaining issues. Plaintiff then appealed the trial court's rulings regarding the arbitration clause, contract, and fraud claims.

On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the arbitration clause was added to their policy after the first year of coverage and that the clause constituted a material alteration to the policy's coverage. Furthermore, Plaintiff argued that the Illinois Insurance Code required Defendant to give notice that it was not renewing the original coverage. Because Defendant failed to give such notice, the arbitration clause did not legally take effect. The Appellate Court disagreed, stating that the addition of an arbitration clause did not constitute a change in coverage, and cited the plain language of the statute for their reasoning. The Court went on to hold that the agreements and subsequent addenda to it for the first two years were valid because the parties lawfully entered into the agreements and there was sufficient consideration on both sides. The Court also upheld the trial courts granting of Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's fraud claim because there was not sufficient evidence in the record of fraud nor had Plaintiffs identified any material issue regarding Defendant's alleged violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The Court held that the arbitration clause was not operative for the final two year of the agreement because Plaintiffs never signed the amended policy documents for those years. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court on this issue because they disagreed with the trial court's ruling that Plaintiff's payment and acceptance of coverage signified acceptance of the new terms.

All-American Roofing, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Company provides a valuable lesson to business owners who utilize arbitration clauses in their contracts. Namely, this case tells us to read the fine print in any contract before signing it, as you may be getting more (or less, depending on your point of view) than you originally bargained for.

Continue reading "Appellate Court Rules that Adding an Arbitration Clause to an Insurance Agreement Does Not Constitute a Change in Coverage under Illinois Law" »

As a Chicago law firm that focuses on business litigation, DiTommaso-Lubin pays close attention to shareholder lawsuits filed in Illinois' courts. Our Elmhurst business attorneys discovered a case filed in the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division that answers questions regarding the appropriate statute of limitations to apply in a shareholder action for common law damages.

Carpenter v. Exelon Enterprises Co. is a case filed by multiple minority shareholders against the majority shareholder, Exelon, for breach of fiduciary duty and civil conspiracy. Defendant Exelon owned 97% of InfraSource, and Plaintiffs owned a portion of the remaining 3% of the company. Defendant then allegedly decided to divest its interest in the company through a series of complex merger transactions. The alleged end result of these transactions was to grant all shareholders in InfraSource would receive a pro rata share of the net proceeds. Using its majority stake in InfraSource, Defendant allegedly voted its shares in favor of the merger transactions, which was subsequently executed according to Defendant's plan. After the merger, Plaintiffs filed suit against Exelon alleging breach of fiduciary duty and civil conspiracy that caused the minority shareholders to be inadequately compensated for their shares in InfraSource. Defendant then moved to dismiss the action because Plaintiffs' claims were barred under the three year statute of limitations in the Illinois Securities Law of 1953. The trial court denied Defendant's motion, stated that the applicable statute of limitations was the five year period contained in section 13-205 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court then stayed the matter and certified the statute of limitations issue for an interlocutory appeal to the Appellate Court.

On appeal, the Court examined Defendant's argument that, despite the fact that Plaintiffs did not allege specific statutory violations, Plaintiffs' claims fell within the scope of the Illinois Securities Law and its three year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs argued that, because of the similarities between Illinois and federal securities law, federal case law should be utilized by the Court. Plaintiffs' cited federal cases holding that securities fraud does not include the oppression of minority shareholders nor does it include oppressive corporate reorganizations, and thus the case did not fall within the purview of the Illinois statute. The Court performed a statutory analysis and determined that subsection 13(A) of the Law did not apply to Plaintiffs because their claims did not arise out of Plaintiffs' role as purchasers of securities. The Court went on to explain that Defendant's argument based upon subsection 13(G), which provides a remedy to any party in interest in the unlawful sale of securities, was unpersuasive. Instead, the Court held that subsection 13 of the Illinois Securities Law of 1953 does not “concern retroactive common law damages claims for breach of fiduciary duty brought by sellers of securities in general, or minority shareholders in particular.” By so holding, the Court declared that the three year statute of limitations did not apply and remanded the case back to the trial court.

Carpenter v. Exelon Enterprises Co. provides potential shareholder litigants with a ruling that gives them an additional two years to bring their claims. Conversely, those facing liability in a common law action surrounding a securities transaction should be aware that such claims are viable for a longer period of time than they may have previously thought.

Continue reading "The Illinois Securities Act of 1953 Does not Apply to Common Law Damages Claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Sellers of Securities" »

There are hundreds of new cases filed in Illinois courts every day, and many of those cases involve business disputes. At DiTommaso-Lubin, we pride ourselves on staying on top of new court filings so that we know of changes in the law as they happen. Our Waukegan business attorneys just found a decision rendered by the Appellate Court of Illinois that provides some useful information for our business clients.

Zahl v. Krupa is a dispute between investors in a fund allegedly run by a company and the directors of that company. Plaintiffs alleged that they were approached by Defendant Krupa, President of Jones & Brown Company, Inc., who solicited money to be invested in a fund only available to the officers and directors (and their family members) of the company. There were two agreements allegedly written on company letterhead that set out the terms of the investments, whereupon Plaintiffs would invest between $100,000 and $160,000 each and receive an 11.1% return guaranteed by Jones & Brown. Plaintiffs each allegedly signed an agreement with Defendant Krupa and gave him the funds requested. There was no other written documentation regarding the investments or the agreements. Plaintiffs allegedly never got the return on their investment nor did they get their money back.

Plaintiffs then filed suit against Krupa, the other officers of Jones & Brown, and the directors of the business. Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, fraud, and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. The breach of contract and fraud causes of action were reliant upon the alleged assertion that Defendant Krupa, in soliciting Plaintiffs, was acting as an agent or apparent agent of Jones & Brown. The remaining causes of action sought to hold Defendants liable for Defendant Krupa's deception because they knew or should have known that he was untrustworthy.

Through discovery, the depositions of several parties allegedly showed that Defendant Krupa never had actual authority to enter into the investment agreements because the directors neither signed nor authorize the agreements. Testimony also revealed that the investment agreements were allegedly outside the scope of Jones & Brown's normal business as a construction company, which showed that Krupa did not have apparent authority. As a result of these facts, Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim based upon lack of actual and apparent authority. In moving for summary judgment on the fraud claim, Defendants cited Illinois case law holding that directors cannot be held personally liable for fraud unless they personally participated in perpetrating the fraud. As the directors did not sign the agreements or participate in their creation, the court granted summary judgment. Finally, Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on the negligence claims because they did not know that Krupa had the potential for fraud.

Plaintiffs then appealed the trial court's ruling against them, and the Appellate Court conducted a de novo review of Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court agreed with the trial court's findings and held that Defendants were not negligent with respect to Krupa and did not know about his dealings with Plaintiffs. The Court went on to say that there was no reason for Defendants to suspect Krupa of wrongdoing.

In reviewing Zahl v. Krupa, the case serves as a reminder for business investors to carefully examine any investment opportunities and accompanying paperwork to ensure the legitimacy of the investment. Additionally, business owners and directors should keep an eye on their officers and employees to ensure that they do not find themselves defending a lawsuit for their employees' allegedly objectionable actions.

Continue reading "Directors Are Not Liable for the Torts of Employees Unless Personally Involved, but Should Still Keep a Close Watch Over What Corporate Officers are Doing" »

Most companies encourage their employees to innovate and come up with ways to improve the processes, products, and service of the business. Such improvements may be patentable inventions, and it is important for business owners to establish who owns that intellectual property and protect any IP that accrues to the company. In the absence of an explicit employment agreement, the ownership of such inventions can come into dispute, and our Joliet business attorneys discovered one such case in the Central District of Illinois federal court.

Shoup v. Shoup Manufacturing is a dispute between a company and its former president over the ownership of several patents. Ken Shoup, Plaintiff, was the president of Defendant Shoup Manufacturing for over twenty years, and during his time as president he conceived of several inventions that were patented on behalf of Defendant. Defendant used those patents and sold products based upon them. However, Plaintiff did not have an express or written employment contract that required assignment of the inventions to Defendant. Eventually, Plaintiff terminated his relationship with Defendant, began a similar business to compete with Defendant, and filed suit alleging patent infringement for Defendant’s continued use of his inventions. Plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent that continued use and monetary damages under 35 USC §271.

Defendant responded to Plaintiffs lawsuit by denying that Plaintiff owned the patents in question, and alleged that Plaintiff was obligated to assign the patents to Defendant, and that it had a valid license to the inventions. Defendant also filed a counterclaim alleging that Plaintiff developed the patents using company resources while he was an employee and officer of Defendant, and that Defendant was the rightful owner of the patents. Defendant sought a compulsory written assignment of the patents and an accounting of Plaintiff’s unauthorized exploitation of them. Plaintiff then filed a motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to dismiss Defendant's counterclaims.

Plaintiff argued that the Court had no jurisdiction over the claims because ownership of the patent was determined by Illinois State law. The Court agreed that it did not have original jurisdiction over the dispute, but because the counterclaims for ownership of the patents arose out of a common nucleus of operative facts regarding Plaintiff's original patent infringement suit (which was a federal claim), supplemental jurisdiction was proper. The Court therefore denied Plaintiffs motion, finding Defendant had satisfied the requirements for supplemental jurisdiction under 28 USC §1367(a), and allowed the counterclaim to proceed.

Continue reading "Federal District Court Exercises Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Counterclaims Regarding Ownership of Employee-Created Farm Equipment Patents" »

Every day there are hard working people who are denied the overtime wages that they have rightfully earned. At DiTommaso-Lubin, we have much experience representing those with unpaid overtime claims in class-action litigation. As such, we track the changes in the wage laws and are always looking out for new court decisions in the field.

Alvarez v. City of Chicago is a recent class-action case brought by paramedics in the city of Chicago for the systematic miscalculation of their overtime wages. In so doing, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) when it failed to properly compensate the Plaintiffs. The parties each filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court ruled in favor of Defendant. In making the ruling, the trial court found that the Plaintiffs were not similarly situated and they could not be “readily divided into homogenous subgroups.” The lower court then dismissed the claims and directed the parties to arbitrate the dispute.

On appeal, the Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court's decision, and held that the case could proceed by using sub-claims if the Plaintiffs were similarly situated and common questions predominated. The Court also held that the case should not have been dismissed; instead the Plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed individually if class certification is inappropriate. The Court then remanded the case with instructions for the district court to consider which form of judicial resolution would be most efficient.

Continue reading "Appellate Court Overturns Dismissal of Chicago Paramedics Unpaid Overtime Class-Action" »

DiTommaso-Lubin has clients that operate a variety of businesses all across the state of Illinois. While there are common laws and legal principles that apply to all companies and corporations, there are other Illinois statutes that apply to specific types of businesses. Our Elgin business attorneys came across Clark Investments, Inc. v. Airstream , Inc., which is an Appellate Court of Illinois case involving laws that govern motor vehicle dealerships.

Clark Investments, Inc. v. Airstream , Inc. is a dispute between a Recreational Vehicle (RV) manufacturer and an RV dealer over a contractual agreement between the two companies. Initially, the Plaintiff car dealer contracted with Defendant manufacturer to have exclusive rights to sell Defendant's RV's in the state of Illinois. The initial contract was for a period of approximately two years, and shortly before the end of that contract Defendant proposed to renew the agreement with different terms. Defendant's new contract contained no expiration date and gave Plaintiff no exclusive sales territory. Plaintiff rejected this contract and proposed the same exclusivity terms as the first contract, but Defendant rejected Plaintiff's proposed changes. Shortly after these negotiations, the initial contract expired, but Defendant continued to supply Plaintiff with merchandise and service and Plaintiff continued to operate its business for almost nine months. The parties then entered into a new contract that contained no exclusive sales region for Plaintiff but allowed Plaintiff to sell more types of Defendant's RV's. After this new contract was signed, Defendant entered into an agreement with another RV dealership located ninety miles from Plaintiff's business. This agreement authorized that dealership to sell some, but not all of the same products contained in Plaintiff's agreement with Defendant.

Upon learning of this new agreement, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant alleging violations of the Franchise Act and the Franchise Disclosure Act. Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment on both causes of action, and the trial court granted the motion as to both claims. Plaintiff appealed the court's ruling as to the Franchise Act claim only, alleging that Defendant's had violated section 4(e)(8) of the Act by granting an additional franchise within Plaintiff's relevant market area and refusing to extend the first contract that granted Plaintiff all of Illinois as its exclusive sales territory. The Appellate Court rejected this argument by citing language from the Act that defines the relevant market area as the fifteen mile radius around Plaintiff's principle location. Because the other franchise was located further than fifteen miles away, there was no violation of the Act.

Plaintiff also argued that Defendant violated section 4(d)(6) of the Act by refusing to extend the first contract that granted Plaintiff an exclusive sales territory of the whole state. The pertinent part of the Act makes it unlawful for a manufacturer

"1) to cancel or terminate the franchise or selling agreement of a motor vehicle dealer,
2) to fail or refuse to extend the franchise or selling agreement of a motor vehicle dealer upon its expiration, or
3) to offer a renewal, replacement or succeeding franchise or selling agreement containing terms and provisions the effect of which is to substantially change or modify the sales and service obligations or capital requirements of the motor vehicle dealer."

The Court disagreed with Plaintiff's claim that Defendant's actions fell within the first category of conduct. The Court explained that Defendant's conduct fell under the third category because Defendant offered Plaintiff a new contract with different terms before the initial contract expired. They held that the changes in the new contract did not substantially change the sales and service obligations or capital requirements of the Plaintiff, and upheld the lower court's ruling.

Continue reading "Illinois' Franchise Act Does Not Require Manufacturers to Extend Contractual Agreements that Grant Exclusive Sales Territory" »

Many of us have had work done to our homes at some point, and sometimes difficulties arise during the course of such projects. DiTommaso-Lubin is familiar with the legal issues that arise in such cases, and our lawyers are always concerned about protecting the rights of consumers. Universal Structures LTD v. Buchman is a case about a home improvement construction deal gone bad.

In Universal Structures LTD v. Buchman, Defendants contracted with Plaintiff to perform a series of demolition and remodeling projects at their home in Northfield, Illinois. The work was eventually completed and Defendants paid most of the amount billed by Plaintiff, but the payment left an outstanding balance of over $100,000. Plaintiff then recorded a mechanic's lien for the unpaid amount and eventually filed a lawsuit to foreclose on the lien. Defendants successfully moved to dismiss the lawsuit because Plaintiff failed to present them with a written contract or work order to be signed and also did not present Defendants with a consumer rights brochure. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's suit because each of those failures constituted a violation of the Home Repair and Remodeling Act.

On appeal, the Court reviewed whether Plaintiff was “precluded from asserting a mechanic's lien upon defendant's property . . . when there was no signed contract or work orders and no delivery by plaintiff of the consumer rights brochure” as required by the Act. The Court found that Plaintiff had entered into a valid oral contract with Defendants and had tendered written, itemized work orders for approval before performing any work, which created a right to a mechanic's lien. Furthermore, there is no language in the Act that that invalidates an oral agreement in the absence of a signed contract or failure to provide the consumer rights brochure. The Court pointed out that a contract is unenforceable under that Act only when the subject matter or purpose of the contract violated the law. As such, the Court reversed the lower court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Continue reading "Appellate Court Holds Mechanics Lien Pursuant to an Oral Contract Valid Under Home Repair and Remodeling Act" »

Members of the board of directors of a corporation have the responsibility to orchestrate the business in such a way that is advantageous to the shareholders and the continued growth and prosperity of the company. However, there are times when those directors may act in a way that serves their own interests, and the only way to protect the business is for shareholders to file a derivative suit on behalf of the company. DiTommaso-Lubin is always researching new developments in this field of law, and our Chicago shareholder derivative action attorneys recently came across one such case filed here in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District federal court.

Reiniche v. Martin is a double derivative suit brought by individual plaintiffs who are shareholders of a corporation, Health Alliance Holdings (HAH), that itself is a primary shareholder of HA Holdings (Holdings), another corporation. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants sought to freeze them and other HAH shareholders out through a series of illegal and wasteful acts that resulted in an insider transaction to sell Holdings for $10 and debt relief to another company in which Defendants had an interest. That transaction was approved by Holdings’ board of directors in spite of the fact that there was no quorum present to do so, and HAH was denied its right to sit on the board. In doing so, Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant directors and other shareholders of Holdings breached their fiduciary duties to the company. Defendants then moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing, their claim was untimely, and the claims are insufficient under the law and barred by the business judgment rule.

The Court held that Plaintiffs did not have double derivative standing because such standing is only granted in the context of a parent/subsidiary relationship, and HAH was only a shareholder in Holdings – it was not a parent or holding company of Holdings. The Court went on to say that because the individual Defendant shareholders were each minority owners, none of them had a controlling interest in Holdings, and therefore did not owe a fiduciary duty to the Plaintiffs. As such, the Court found no policy reason for invoking a double derivative action and granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Continue reading "Northern District of Illinois Federal Court Dismisses Double Derivative Shareholder Action Due to Lack of Parent / Subsidiary Corporate Relationship" »

No matter what kind of business you own and operate, an unfortunate part of running a company is the inevitable employment disputes with employees. Whether it is an action over wages, job duties, or other issues, many business owners will find themselves in court opposite a current or former employee at some point. DiTommaso-Lubin's Naperville business attorneys know the legal challenges that business owners face, and are always mindful of new case law that affects our clients.

Enterprise Recovery Systems, Inc. v. Salmeron is a decision handed down by the Appellate Court of Illinois earlier this year regarding an employer/employee dispute filed in the circuit court of Cook County. Plaintiff Enterprise Recovery Systems hired Defendant Salmeron as general manager and director of operations for their recovery and resolution of delinquent student loans business. Defendant worked for Plaintiff for four years before being terminated, and she sued Plaintiff for sexual harassment. This case settled, and Defendant signed a broadly worded release containing language that discharged Plaintiff from any other claims arising out of Defendant's employment with Plaintiff in exchange for $300,000. After this settlement, Defendant Salmeron filed a qui tam action against Plaintiff Enterprise on behalf of the federal government alleging that Enterprise had defrauded the government. The federal government declined to intervene in the qui tam action, and the lawsuit was eventually dismissed with prejudice due to the misconduct of Salmeron's lawyer, according to the court. Because of issues brought to light in the qui tam action, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant alleging fraud in the inducement and breach of Defendant's duty of loyalty to Plaintiff. After the court found repeated misconduct by Defendant's attorney (which included multiple violations of court orders), the trial court banned Defendant from presenting evidence in her defense of the fraud and breach of fiduciary duty action. Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment on both claims.

Plaintiff's motion showed that Defendant produced company log reports in the qui tam suit and those reports were stolen from the Plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to alert Plaintiff about the supposed illegal conduct of Plaintiff's employees prior to notifying the government and filing the qui tam lawsuit. Additionally, Plaintiffs contended that Defendant planned to file the qui tam action before signing the release that was a part of the sexual harassment suit settlement. Defendant failed to file a response to the motion for summary judgment, so the court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed, and the matter was reviewed de novo by the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to the fraud in the inducement claim because the court found that Defendant knew she had information for the qui tam case against Plaintiff at the time she negotiated the sexual harassment claim's settlement and release. Furthermore, the court found that Defendant waited until she had received her last settlement payment before filing the qui tam lawsuit and signed the settlement agreement with no intention of honoring it. The Court upheld summary judgment as to Plaintiff's breach of the duty of loyalty cause of action because Defendant was a high-level member of Plaintiff's management team and owed a duty of loyalty to the company. This duty was breached when Defendant sought to profit from information harmful to the company that was obtained through her position of trust within the company. The Court also explained that it was reasonable for Plaintiffs to expect Defendant to neither exploit her position for personal gain nor hinder the business operations of the company

Continue reading "Settlement Agreements With Former Employees Containing Broad Release Language May Prevent Subsequent Qui Tam Actions" »

After hiring someone, businesses expect not only that their new employee will perform his job adequately, but also that he will do no harm to the company or its ability to do business. Employers know that their expectations are not always met by those employees, which is why the use of employment contracts with non-compete clauses are quite common these days. Our Chicago restrictive covenant attorneys just discovered a recent court decision that details a dispute between an employer and an ex-employee regarding one such employment agreement.

In Zep Inc. v. First Aid Corp., Plaintiff Zep employed the individual Defendants as sales representatives for its industrial cleaning products business pursuant to an employment agreement that contained non-disclosure, non-solicitation, and non-compete provisions. During their employment, Defendants had access to Plaintiff's customer lists, supplier lists, pricing information, and other proprietary information. Eventually, a competitor, Defendant First Aid, hired the other named Defendants away from Plaintiff and subsequently solicited Plaintiffs clients and other employees.

As a result, Plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract, trade secret misappropriation under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (ITSA), and tortious interference with contract. Plaintiff contends that First Aid induced the other Defendants to breach the employment agreements they signed with Plaintiff and that the other Defendants used and disclosed Plaintiffs trade secrets. In response, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the claims, which were granted as to three of the individual defendants due to a lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court found that because three of the individual Defendants were residents of Michigan and Ohio, Plaintiff is located in Georgia, and the employment agreements were signed outside of Illinois, they did not have the requisite minimum contacts to give an Illinois court jurisdiction over the matter. Furthermore, Plaintiff had not alleged that any of Defendants' actions were aimed at Illinois, and neither had their actions caused harm to Plaintiff in Illinois, so specific personal jurisdiction was also improper. The Court denied the remaining motions to dismiss – finding that the non-compete provisions were enforceable because the geographic limitations were reasonable and the non-solicitation clause was limited in scope to Plaintiff's competitors for a span of one year. Plaintiff's allegations were also found to be sufficient to support a claim under the ITSA because it had identified a list of confidential information and trade secrets in its pleadings.

Continue reading "Northern District of Illinois Grants Motion to Dismiss in Trade Secrets Case Due to Lack of Personal Jurisdiction" »

DiTommaso-Lubin prosecutes consumer protection class-action lawsuits on a regular basis, and in order to best serve our present and future clients, we are always mindful of new Illinois cases in the field. Howard v. Chicago Transit Authority is a consumer rights decision from the Appellate Court of Illinois that our attorneys found in the course of their research.

Howard v. Chicago Transit Authority is a case between those who ride public transportation in Chicago and the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA). Initially, the named Plaintiff started the litigation because of Defendant CTA's policy of allowing the transit cards needed to ride on Defendant's transit system to expire one year after the cards are issued. The named Plaintiff had purchased such a card, and when that card expired, he lost the remaining balance on his card. After discovering that he had lost the money on the card, Plaintiff filed a putative class-action lawsuit, alleging violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the trial court. Plaintiffs then appealed the lower court's dismissal.

The Appellate Court reviewed the trial court's dismissal de novo and examined the reasoning used by the lower court's decision. The case was dismissed by the trial court because Defendant successfully argued that Plaintiff's claims could not stand due to the terms and conditions of the card. These terms and conditions clearly stated that the transit card had an expiration date and could not be redeemed for cash, replaced, or refunded. Additionally, upon purchase of the transit card, the Court held that Plaintiff had entered into a valid contract of carriage and therefore Defendant had committed no wrongful conduct. Plaintiff claimed that the terms and conditions of the card referred only to the use of the card itself and not the use of money placed on the card. The Court disagreed and upheld the trial court's ruling that use of the card was part and parcel of using the money on the card. The Court went on to state that “the terms on a fare pass are incorporated into the carrier's contract for carriage and are enforceable as written.” Thus, because the contract for carriage contained the expiration clause and Plaintiffs accepted those terms, the contract was valid and the suit was properly dismissed.

Continue reading "Court Rules that Expiration of Public Transit Passes is Legal" »

Most employers at some point will face the prospect of an employee failing to perform their job adequately. Additionally, some employees breach fiduciary duties owed the company or commit fraud and other harmful acts during the course of their employment. Hytel Group, Inc. v. Butler is a recent case out of the Appellate Court of Illinois that is just such a dispute between a Plaintiff employer and its Defendant ex-employee. Our Schaumburg business litigation attorneys discovered this decision and want to pass along the information to our readers.

In Hytel Group, Inc. v. Butler, Plaintiff Hytel Group initially hired Defendant Butler as comptroller for the company in February of 2008 and fired Butler four months later in June of that year. During Butler's employment, Hytel's lender, GBC Funding, filed suit in response to Hytel allegedly defaulting on several obligations under their loan agreement and Hytel's failure to respond to the notices of default sent to them by GBC. Furthermore, GBC alleged that Hytel failed to cooperate with a restructuring officer approved by GBC pursuant to another agreement. This agreement was for GBC to refrain from exercising their rights under the loan agreement in exchange for Hytel's cooperation with the restructuring officer. Hytel then filed the action in question in December 2008 against Defendant Butler alleging that she breached her fiduciary duty of loyalty and committed fraud when she failed to perform certain job duties because of a relationship she developed with GBC.

After Butler was fired by Hytel, but before Hytel filed suit, she filed a claim with the Illinois Department of Labor for unpaid final wages, and she moved to dismiss Hytel's lawsuit under the Citizen Participation Act. The motion was based upon the allegation that Hytel was suing her in retaliation for filing the wage claim. Butler also moved to dismiss Hytel's suit on procedural grounds because Hytel failed to properly state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty or for fraud. In dismissing Hytel's claims, the trial court found that the Citizen Participation Act did apply to Butler's wage claim, that she did not have a fiduciary relationship with Hytel, and that Hytel did not sufficiently allege all the elements of fraud. Plaintiff Hytel appealed the trial court's ruling on the basis that Butler's wage claim was a private dispute and the Citizen Participation Act is concerned with protecting free speech and citizen participation in government.

The Appellate Court reviewed the legislative intent behind the Citizen Participation Act and found that the state of Illinois intended the law to be construed broadly. As such, the Court found that Butler's wage claim was an exercise of her right to petition for redress of grievances and therefore fell within the express language of the Act that protects actions taken in furtherance of a citizen's right to petition. The Court went on to hold that the Act contains no public concern requirement and the fact that the wage claim was a private dispute did not matter. Finally, the Court found that Hytel's suit was retaliatory in nature and upheld the trial court's dismissal of the action and the award of attorneys fees under the Act.

This case provides a warning for business owners who file suit against former employees for a breach of duty, particularly if there is an existing wage or other employment dispute between the parties. Hytel Group, Inc. v. Butler shows that Illinois courts will dismiss such claims pursuant to the Citizen Participation Act if there evidence that the suit filed by the employer is retaliatory in nature. As such, employers should ensure that they have ample evidence to show the legitimacy of their claims before filing, as they may be on the hook for the opposing party's attorneys fees should the court find a retaliatory impetus for the action.

Continue reading "Employers Should Ensure They Have Adequate Evidence Before Filing Suit Against Former Employees" »

DiTommaso-Lubin has successfully litigated many business disputes, and in our many years of experience we have found that contract claims are among the most contentious conflicts. Because so many of our clients deal with breach of contract issues, our Elmhurst business attorneys are always mindful of new court decisions issued in this area of the law. In fact, our lawyers just discovered one such case, Jumpfly Inc. v. Torling, in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

Jumpfly Inc. v. Torling pits a Plaintiff employer against two former employees who allegedly violated the non-compete agreements signed when they were hired by Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Torling started a competing pay-per-click internet advertising side-business while in Defendant's employ, and upon discovering its employee's side-business, fired him and sent a cease and desist letter demanding that he stop violating the non-compete. The parties eventually negotiated a settlement allowing Torling to continue his business, but the agreement prohibited him from soliciting any of Plaintiff's employees. Torling allegedly solicited Defendant Burke -- who was working for Plaintiff at the time under a similar non-compete agreement -- and got him to quit his position with Plaintiff to work for Defendant Torling.

Plaintiff then filed suit against the two individuals and the new company (Windy City) that they worked for -- alleging rescission of a settlement agreement, breach of contract, violations of the Lanham Act and Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and intentional interference with contract based upon non-compete agreements between the parties. Plaintiff's requested the Court to enjoin Defendants' competitive business conduct and for monetary damages. In response, Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief and filed a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6).

The Court granted the motion to strike as to the breach of contract claim because the two year term of the non-compete agreement had already expired and an injunction would result in an unreasonable restraint of trade. The Court also noted that Plaintiff's seven-month delay -- after discovery of the illicit conduct -- in asking for an injunction also weighed in favor of Defendants. The Court denied the motion to strike as to the statutory claims, however, because injunctive relief is provided by both laws which rendered the motion premature.

Next, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the breach of contract and intentional interference with contract claims due to pleading insufficient facts that Defendant Windy City induced either of the individual Defendants to breach their contracts with Plaintiff. In dismissing Plaintiffs conspiracy to interfere with contract, the Court applied the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine and declined to agree with Plaintiff's argument that Defendants' conduct fell with in an exception to the rule. Finally, the Court denied the motion to dismiss the settlement agreement breach claim as the effect of Defendants' breaches had yet to be determined.

Continue reading "Northern District of Illinois Federal Court Grants Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Request for Injunctive Relief in Breach of Contract Case" »

When dealing with class-action wage and hour disputes, defendants will try to get the court to dismiss claims by any means that they can, and there are a variety of legal defenses that allow them to do so. At DiTommaso-Lubin, our overtime lawyers are familiar with all of the tricks of the trade, so to speak, so they were interested to discover a case that illuminates just one of these many tools that is utilized by defendants to escape liability.

In Anyere v. Wells Fargo Co. Inc, Plaintiffs were current and former employees of Defendant and worked as credit managers who provided customers primarily with loan consolidation services. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging overtime violations under Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) because they were required to work during lunch, on weekends, and late into the night on a regular basis. Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendant “verbally disciplined employees for logging more than forty hours per week” and would adjust employees' time records to stay under the overtime threshold. In response to these allegations, Defendant moved to dismiss the action on the basis of collateral estoppel due to a previous lawsuit filed against Defendant in California for the same overtime violations.

The Court dismissed the FLSA claims for nationwide relief based upon issue preclusion -- the California-filed class-action was dismissed because the members of the proposed class were not similarly situated. However, the Court maintained the statewide action because the prior case did not contemplate an Illinois-only class-action and therefore could not have been litigated previously.

Continue reading "Northern District of Illinois Rules that State Law Overtime Claims Not Precluded by Prior Dismissal of FLSA Class-Action" »

A motions to dismiss is a weapon that is frequently used in large scale wage claim litigation, as it is an easy and expedient way for defendants to eliminate many lawsuits. DiTommaso-Lubin is an experienced class-action law firm whose Chicago wage and hour attorneys frequently handle overtime disputes, and we deal with such motions on a regular basis, which is why our lawyers were interested in a case out of the Southern District of Illinois that discusses the federal standard for dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6).

FRCP 12(b)(6) allows litigants to dismiss an action for a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by a federal court. Nicholson v. UTI Worldwide, Inc. is an action brought by forklift operators who worked for Defendant Uti in its warehouses in Illinois. Plaintiffs claimed that they were forced to work without pay prior to the start of their shifts performing inspections, logging into computer systems, “donning special clothing and protective gear,” and other activities. Because they were not paid for this work, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendant had violated the Fairl Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL). In their complaint, Plaintiffs failed to plead how frequently the pre-shift activities occurred and also included no estimates of the applicable wage rates that applied during the times that Plaintiff's performed such work. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for the lack of pleading specificity in response to Plaintiff's complaint.

In making its decision, the Court held that Defendants had been sufficiently notified of the overtime claims because Plaintiffs plead enough facts to show that their employment was covered by FLSA and the IMWL. Despite the fact that the complaint did not include allegations that Plaintiffs worked over forty hours a week, Plaintiffs did allege that they worked “overtime,” which was enough to give Defendant notice of the claim. However, the Court dismissed the minimum wage claims because Plaintiffs failed to plead facts suggesting that their actual wages fell beneath the applicable minimum wage. Thus, the Court allowed the overtime claims to proceed, but dismissed the minimum wage claim under the IMWL.

Continue reading "Southern District of Illinois Federal Court Dismisses Minimum Wage Claim for Failure to Plead Sufficient Facts" »

A First District Court of Appeal ruling had an interesting lesson for our Chicago noncompete clause attorneys. In Baird and Warner Residential Sales Inc. v. Mazzone, No. 1-07-2179 (Aug. 15, 2008), the First ruled that a trial court needed more evidence in a dispute about a covenant not to compete before it could correctly grant a motion to dismiss. The case arose when Baird & Warner Residential Sales sued former employee Patricia Mazzone and her new employer, Midwest Realty Ventures (doing business as Prudential Preferred Properties). Both real estate companies have multiple branches and more than 1,000 employees in the Chicagoland area.

Mazzone was office manager for B&W’s Lincoln Park office for about 11 years before leaving for Prudential. During that time, she signed a contract that included a covenant not to solicit services from any B&W employees or independent contractors, or people who had left those jobs within the last six months, for up to a year after leaving. This contract contained a severability clause, and the “preface” to the contract specified that it applied “regarding the Lincoln Park office,” although the restrictive covenant referred to “Company.” In 2007, Mazzone resigned from her job and took another running Prudential’s Michigan Avenue office. About a month later, B&W sued for a temporary restraining order and injunction seeking to enforce the covenant and keep Mazzone and Prudential from soliciting B&W employees, alleging breach of contract by Mazzone, tortious interference with contract by Prudential, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage by both parties.

After an injunction and expedited discovery, defendants moved to dismiss because the covenant was overly broad, alleging that it would keep any Prudential employee from soliciting any B&W employee or contractor from any office. B&W contended that the preface restricted the covenant to the Lincoln Park office and affirmatively stated that it did not seek to enforce it beyond that office. In the alternative, they argued that the severability clause should allow that portion to be separated from the rest of the agreement. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, saying the contract’s plain language related to all of B&W’s offices. Plaintiffs appealed this ruling.

The appeals court started its opinion by considering B&W’s claim that the nonsolicitation contract was not improper under the law. It noted that motions to dismiss are not necessarily appropriate in fact-intensive situations like this one, since the rules limit courts to consideration of facts in the complaint. It then turned to the controversy over whether the contract applied to all offices or just the Lincoln Park office and found that there was insufficient evidence. The record does not show enough evidence to determine whether the contract, as written, is overly broad and poses an undue hardship on Mazzone, the court wrote, or negative effects on the public from the restraint of trade. It also disagreed that enforcing the contract would “render Mazzone unemployable,” since she would be free to solicit employees of non-B&W brokers, even within the limited one-year period specified. Thus, the trial court should not have dismissed it without hearing more evidence, the court wrote. It reversed and remanded the case for more proceedings.

Continue reading "Hardship to Former Employee Should Be Considered Outside Motion to Dismiss, First District Rules" »

As Chicago business trial attorneys with substantial experience in disputes involving shopping centers, our firm was interested to see a recent Fourth District Court of Appeal decision allowing a shopping center to go through with its lease despite a restrictive covenant in a land sale by its predecessor. In Regency Commercial Associates v. Lopax, 4-06-0332 (May 4, 2007), the appeals court upheld the trial court's ruling that the business at issue was not covered by the covenant, and that starting the lease while the case was still pending did not bar it from requesting a declaratory judgment.

Regency Commercial Associates, LLC and Lopax, Inc. are companies that own neighboring parcels of land in Savoy, Ill. The prior owner of Regency's land, Arbours Development Limited Partnership, sold Lopax its land, which Lopax then leased to a Kentucky Fried Chicken franchisee. The sales contract between Lopax and Arbours restricted Arbours from allowing another "fast-food restaurant ... or restaurant facility whose principal food product is chicken[.]" It also lists the types of businesses allowed, which include "casual dining." Regency later purchased Arbours' rights under the contract.

When Regency wanted to lease to a Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant, it negotiated with Lopax, arguing that the restaurant is "casual dining" and not fast food. Lopax disagreed, saying it believed the contract restricts any restaurant that primarily serves chicken. Regency filed for declaratory judgment, asking the court to find that Buffalo Wild Wings is not fast food and that the covenant restricts only fast-food restaurants that primarily sell chicken. Finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact to try, the court denied Lopax's motion to dismiss.

During this phase, Lopax discovered that Buffalo Wild Wings franchisee had already signed a lease with Regency, contingent on the lawsuit's success, before Regency's filing. Lopax then filed for summary judgment based on nonliability for past conduct -- the legal theory that a plaintiff may not seek declaratory judgment after already taking a contract-breaching action. Regency contended that because the lease didn't take effect until the case was over, there was no lease. Lopax also moved to compel discovery of the lease. The court denied both that and the summary judgment motion. Lopax appealed both denials, as well as the denial of its motion to dismiss.

In its analysis, the Fourth District noted that the language of the restrictive covenant was ambiguous as to whether all chicken restaurants are banned, or just fast food restaurants. Using documents that illuminated the parties' reasoning at the time the contract was written, it decided that the covenant restricted only fast-food restaurants primarily serving chicken. On the issue of nonliability for past conduct, the appeals court pointed out that the lease is not effective until this case is over and none of the actions adverse to Lopax -- opening the buffalo wings restaurant -- have taken place, so Regency is not seeking to avoid liability for past conduct. Finally, the court upheld the trial court's decision that the lease was irrelevant and therefore should not be discoverable. It is worth noting that Justice Cook dissented from this decision.

As Chicago, Wheaton, Oak Brook and Naperville business trial lawyers with substantial experience with shopping center tenants disputes and shopping center tenants' rights issues, we welcome clarifications to real estate contract law, especially on restrictive covenants. If you are involved in a similar dispute over a shopping center or other commercial real estate and you would like to speak with us about your options, please contact DiTommaso-Lubin for a confidential consultation.

A federal breach of warranty case of ours IWOI v. Monaco Couch recently survived a motion to dismiss in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Our client, a limited liability company formed in Montana, bought a motor home in Illinois and allegedly discovered that it had a twisted frame causing it to list to one side, requiring constant steering corrections. On discovering this alleged defect, the individual owning the LLC brought it back to the dealership the very next day for the first of three unsuccessful repair attempts. Per the manufacturer's warranty, he submitted his complaints in writing to the manufacturer, Monaco Coach after these three repair attempts. The alleged defects remain, and we alleged in our filings that neither the manufacturer nor the dealer has agreed to accept the motor home for return or fixed the problems.

Our client sued both the manufacturer and the dealer under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and other state claims. In defense, the defendants argued that our client was not a "consumer" within the meaning of federal law; this claim was flatly denied by the Court, which found no allegations in the Complaint to support it. On the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act issues, the Court also identified several alleged facts suggesting that Monaco Coach may well have known of the problems before the RV was sold, as we alleged. Thus, those claims also survived.

Furthermore, the trial court decided that our client could revoke its acceptance of the dealer's "AS IS" condition and the dealer's disclaimer of all implied warranties, a claim under the Illinois Commercial Code. The Seventh Circuit has addressed this issue in Priebe v. Autobarn, Ltd., 240 F.3d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 2001), in which it adopted an earlier ruling stating that consumers may revoke their acceptance even when the dealer has properly disclaimed implied warranties, if the evidence is clear that the vehicle's substantial defects clearly impair its value to the plaintiff. This allowed our client's Magnuson-Moss Act and state conversion claims to survive as well.

Although this case is at the trial court level, we believe the judge's interpretation of Seventh Circuit and Illinois precedent on Magnuson-Moss and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act is good news for consumers. As auto and RV dealer fraud lawyers in Chicago, Naperville and Oak Brook, Ill., we believe automotive dealers take advantage of consumers' lack of education about their rights far more often than they are caught. When they are caught, they should not be allowed to wiggle out of liability for their actions with an unfair, high-pressure contract that the consumer has little room to renegotiate. Both the Magnuson-Moss Act (which governs how warranties may be offered) and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act were specifically intended to help consumers fight this behavior.

If you believe you may be a victim of automotive dealer fraud or another type of consumer fraud and you're ready to fight back, please contact DiTommaso-Lubin online, via telephone or at our offices near or in Naperville, Wheaton, Oak Brook or Chicago.

To see more about our firm and the consumer rights, consumer fraud, lemon law and class action cases we have handled click here.

The Illinois Appellate Court for the 1st District ruled May 7 that a legal malpractice class action against the law firm DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary could not go on because it was filed well after a tolling agreement ended. In Joyce v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary LLP, 1-07-1966 (Ill.App. May 7, 2008), the court upheld the dismissal of a purported class action by stockholders of 21st Century Telecom Group, a Chicago telephone company, pursuant to a tolling agreement between 21st Century and DLA Piper.

The underlying dispute started in 1999, when 21st Century agreed to merge with competitor RCN. DLA Piper attorneys drafted a merger agreement with a mistake that lowered the price of the stock 21st Century shareholders were to receive by $19 million. In response, Edward Joyce, the stockholders’ representative, made a tolling agreement with DLA Piper, in which the statute of limitations was tolled unless a stockholder lawsuit was filed against the firm on or before December 31, 2002. The firm agreed not to avail itself of any statute of limitations defense until after that day. This agreement was amended four times, each time altering only the date. The last agreement set that date at August 21, 2005.

Joyce filed a legal malpractice class action in Cook County against DLA Piper on August 30, 2006. After some procedural disputes, including a finding by the trial court that the filing was timely, the firm won a motion to dismiss based on plaintiff’s lack of standing as a non-client. The plaintiffs appealed and the defendant cross-appealed on the trial court’s decision that the suit was timely.

The appeals court upheld that cross-appeal, finding that the plaintiffs were barred because they filed nearly a year after the last agreement expired. The court rejected the defendants’ contention that it was timely because each amended tolling agreement constituted a new contract that extended the statute of limitations.

Writing for the three-judge majority, Justice Grieman found the tolling agreement unambiguous in setting an end date of August 31, 2005. “Indeed, to accept plaintiff’s argument would require this court to allow plaintiff the benefits of the first four amendments without fulfilling the requirement of filing suit by the specified dates imposed by any of the amendments.”

The majority declined to take up the issue of whether the 21st Century shareholders could be considered clients of DLA Piper.