Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

Our Illinois overtime rights lawyers were interested to see a recent ruling on unpaid overtime from the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. In Musch v. Domtar Industries, No. 08-4305 (7th Cir. Nov. 25, 2009), Alan Musch and his colleagues were maintenance workers at two Wisconsin paper mills owned by Domtar Industries. In their lawsuit, they say their job routinely exposes them to dangerous chemicals, requiring them to put on special protective gear before shifts and to shower and change after. They are not paid for the time it takes to do those things, however. They sued for unpaid overtime pay for the showering and changing time, as well as for time spent shaving, a requirement under Domtar company policy.

After the case was filed, Domtar moved for summary judgment dismissing the case. It argued that company policy says workers should shower and change immediately after exposure to a hazardous chemical, even if that means the employee goes into overtime. Because it has that policy, the company argued, overtime compensation was inappropriate. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment for Domtar. After the court declined to reconsider, the plaintiffs appealed both rulings. They argued that the district court missed or ignored evidence showing that chemicals actually were on workers’ skin; that is, they do not shower because they merely think they might have the chemicals. Thus, changing and showering time is appropriate for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit started by noting that the FLSA and Wisconsin law both require employers to pay for all of the work employees do. However, federal law makes a distinction between work and preliminary or postliminary activities. Changing and washing is ordinarily considered preliminary or postliminary, the court wrote, but may sometimes be considered part of the job if it’s “integral” and “indispensable” to the job. The plaintiffs argued evidence showed that they didn’t always realize there were chemicals on their skin until the end of shifts, meaning showering after shifts would be following the company’s stated policy.

The Seventh Circuit disagreed. The plaintiffs’ evidence showed that showers were sometimes necessary, it wrote, but not that the Domtar policy of showering after any exposure was insufficient. Furthermore, the court said, employees admitted to bringing work clothes home to wash them, suggesting that they don’t believe the chemical exposure is that serious. Finally, employees are free to seek overtime under the existing company policy when they are required to shower and change, the Seventh said. Because these are all “normal conditions” under the meaning of the FLSA, the post-shift changing and showering is postliminary activity, not an essential job requirement, the court wrote. Thus, it upheld the trial court’s orders.

Continue reading "Employees Not Entitled to Compensation for Showering Time After Shift" »

In a case based on the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that a victim of a bait-and-switch scheme for title insurance may sue his lender. Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., No. 07-2400 (7th Cir. Dec. 24, 2008). Charles Doss refinanced his mortgage in 2004, using a company called The Loan Arranger that did indeed arrange a loan for Doss with Franklin Financial Company. Franklin asked Doss to get title insurance, which he did through Clearwater Title Company.

Clearwater turned out to be an unlicensed company with a secret affiliation with The Loan Arranger. Doss was told via closing documents that the title insurance cost was $500, but was actually charged $1,470. In late 2006, Doss sued all three companies plus JP Morgan Chase, which held his mortgage, and Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc., which serviced it. However, Chase and Saxon had filed for foreclosure against Doss earlier in that year, and in response to the lawsuit, filed papers claiming that Doss had no claim because he had already sold his home. Doss replied that their quitclaim deed was a forgery and that indeed, he had filed documents showing he was still the owner. The trial court sided with Chase and Saxon and dismissed the homeowner's claims.

Doss appealed; while the appeal was pending, an Illinois trial court found that the property had not changed hands. The Seventh Circuit first examined the claim by Chase and Saxon that the trial court had no jurisdiction under the TILA because Doss had sold the property. That was irrelevant, the court said, because the question was whether Doss had actually sold the property. On the dismissal itself, the Seventh found that the trial court should have treated the sale allegations by Chase and Saxon as a motion for summary judgment, which would have given Doss a chance to present and support his own assertions. This would have led the trial court to conclude that there was indeed a genuine issue of material fact in the case and continued the litigation, the opinion said.

Thus, both the TILA claim and the state claims that were dismissed alongside should be reinstated, the appeals court concluded. The court reversed and remanded the decision. Along the way, it noted that defendant Franklin was in a state of ambiguity. Clearwater and The Loan Arranger had settled with Doss, but the court had entered default judgment against Franklin. Franklin moved to set it aside, but that motion was mooted when the trial court dismissed the case. The appeals court, expressing no opinion on the motion's merits, pointed out that the default judgment was still in place.

Violations of the Truth in Lending Act are a type of billing fraud -- one that may go unnoticed because of the complexity of loan documents. Federal TILA claims are on the rise, due in part to the financial crisis in the mortgage industry. Consumer protection law firm DiTommaso-Lubin represents consumers who have been harmed by violations of the TILA or other types of billing fraud, including unauthorized charges on bills from hotels, health clubs and more. Based in Oak Brook, Illinois and Chicago, our Oak Brook and Chicago civil litigation lawyers represent clients from all over the Chicago area including Naperville, Aurora, Highland Park, Northbrook, Wilmette, Wheaton, Joliet and Waukegan and throughout Illinois and nationally. To speak with us about a possible violation of your own rights as a consumer, you can contact us through our Web site for a free consultation.

In a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act class action, the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that a bill collector’s failure to correctly break down a bill into principal and interest does not violate that Act. Wahl v. Midland Credit Management, No. 08-1517 (7th Cir. Feb. 23, 2009) was a class action lawsuit alleging that debt collectors violate the FDCPA when they send out bills that state the correct total amount but break down the charges incorrectly.

Plaintiff Barbara Wahl had just $66.98 on a credit card when she sustained a stroke and racked up much larger medical bills during a time when she couldn’t work. The credit card went unpaid and eventually, the balance was $1,149.09, mostly in interest and late fees. Midland purchased the debt in January of 2005 and started sending demand letters to Wahl. The letter at issue arrived April 15, 2005, listing both the “current balance” and “amount due” at $1,160.57. On the back side, it listed the “principal” as $1,149.09 and the “accrued interest” as $11.48. This was followed by a similar letter listing a higher interest. The letters construed the “principal” as the total value of the debt Midland had bought, including interest accrued with the original creditor.

Wahl filed a proposed class-action lawsuit in federal court for the Northern District of Illinois. One of her two claims was that Midland had violated the FDCPA by incorrectly stating that the principal on her account was $1,149.09 rather than breaking down the original principal, the original interest and the new interest. Debt collectors are not required by law to break down charges, it said -- but when they do, the law requires that the breakdown not contain false or misleading information. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of Midland. Wahl appealed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed. Wahl relied on language from the FDCPA prohibiting “[t]he false representation of... the character, amount, or legal status of any debt,” they said, and argued that this meant she need only show that the breakdown of charges was outright false. The court disagreed, saying it has consistently tested for violations of the act on whether the disputed action would mislead an unsophisticated consumer. If it would not, the court said, it cannot find a violation. Furthermore, the judges argued, Wahl’s argument that the statement was outright false is not correct because Midland’s breakdown of charges was perfectly correct in Midland’s eyes -- it had paid for $1,149.09 in debt and the interest it added was its own interest, not the original creditor’s.

The Seventh Circuit also said Wahl could not overcome the precedent it set in Barnes v. Advanced Call Center Technologies, LLC, 493 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2007). In that case, the court rejected an argument that a bill collector had violated the FDCPA by failing to state the total balance due, listing only the amount in collections. There, the court ruled that the correct amount of debt to list was the amount that the debt collector was seeking -- not that amount plus the amount owned by the original creditor. In both cases, the original creditor is irrelevant to the transaction at hand. “Wahl’s argument rests on empty semantics and conflicts with Barnes,” the Seventh wrote, and thus the summary judgment order was upheld.

DiTommaso-Lubin has an active practice in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act litigation, specializing in protecting consumers from illegal, misleading and harassing behavior by debt collectors. Our debt collection abuse lawyers are based in Chicago and Oak Brook, Illinois, but we help clients throughout the United States, in both individual lawsuits and class actions. If you’re being harassed by bill collectors or they are using fraud and deception to charge fees you don't owe, you don’t have to put up with it. For a free, confidential consultation, please contact us online or call us toll-free at 1-877-990-4990.

In a long-running consumer privacy violation case, the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has denied damages to a group of homeowners whose mortgage company sold their information to telemarketers. In Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage , No. 07-3402 (7th Cir. Dec. 30, 2008), Fleet Mortgage Company sold information on 1.6 million clients to telemarketers, without those clients' permission. Two nationwide classes were certified: a class of people who bought products from the telemarketers (who used deceptive practices in their sales) and a class of people who merely had their information shared. This appeal comes from the latter group, some of whose members objected to a proposed settlement that gave them no damages.

In its analysis, written by Judge Posner, the court started by agreeing with the appellants that their claims may have some value under state consumer protection laws, despite the trial court's conclusion that they did not. Many state statutes allow statutory damages even when no actual harm is present. However, the majority wrote, the information-sharing class had no claim in a class action -- only in individual actions. And no individual plaintiff has demonstrated a willingness to sue for the "modest statutory damages" available under state laws, despite eight years of litigation and two prior appeals to the Seventh Circuit, the judge wrote.

The court turned next to the objectors' claims under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which allows statutory damages of $100 to $1,000 per willful violation, even if no actual harm resulted from the violations. This claim also failed, because class members had not brought it up until their second round in trial court. Furthermore, the majority wrote, the FCRA claim is frivolous because Fleet is not a consumer reporting agency, as the law requires; agencies that merely pass on information about debts owed to it are not covered by the law. And under the FCRA, a report on transactions only between the customer and the agency making the report is specifically excluded from the definition of a "consumer report."

Thus, the court concluded, the claims of the information-sharing class actually are worthless, although defendants are still free to settle if they believe doing so is in their best interests. The opinion then goes on to strongly criticize the worth of the claim itself, the prolonged litigation, the objectors' request for attorney fees and the class action system in general. The decision of the trial court to award nothing to the objectors was affirmed.

The Chicago and Wheaton, Ill., law firm of DiTommaso-Lubin works often with the FCRA, as part of our privacy violations and consumer protection practice. We have handled FCRA "firm offer of credit" cases in our home state of Illinois and states around the country, in tandem with local counsel. If you think you may be a victim of improper and illegal credit reporting violations and you’d like to know more about your options, please contact us today to speak with an experienced consumer protection attorney.

In a breach of implied contract lawsuit, a Wisconsin auto dealership must have a new trial because the original trial judge misconstrued Wisconsin law on quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled. Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., Nos. 08-1067 & 08-1689 (7th Cir. February 25, 2009).

Middleton Motors, a Ford dealership near Madison, Wis., was a struggling business when it asked the more successful Lindquist Ford of Iowa for financial and management help. In their initial negotiations in 2003, they agreed that Lindquist’s manager, Craig Miller, would manage both dealerships and be compensated by Middleton with a percentage of the profits once he made the dealership profitable again. No deal was struck at that time, but nonetheless, Miller started managing Middleton.

In subsequent months, negotiations ran aground when Lindquist repeatedly did not offer a cash infusion, proposed as an investment in the business, that Middleton wanted. During this time, Middleton repeated several times that Miller’s compensation would be a percentage of Middleton’s profits when the dealership was profitable again. About a year into this situation, Middleton fired Miller, frustrated that the dealership was still unprofitable and no deal had been reached on a cash infusion. Two months after the firing, Miller sent Middleton a letter demanding a salary for 2003, and half of profits for the next two years. Middleton disagreed that it owed Miller anything.

Lindquist and Miller sued for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. The trial court granted summary judgment on the first two counts, but held a bench trial on the latter two. At trial, it excluded a large amount of evidence about the dealerships’ negotiations, the percentage-based compensation to Miller and the risk to Middleton, because it believed that the only important issues were damages and whether Lindquist could prove that there was a quasi-contract by showing a mutual agreement through words and actions. It found for Lindquist and Miller. Middleton appealed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the trial judge had profoundly misinterpreted Wisconsin law on quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, possibly because the laws are confusingly phrased. Both concepts are quasi-contractural theories, the judges wrote, but quantum meruit is a contract implied by law and unjust enrichment requires no finding of any features of a contract. This contradicted the trial judge’s heavy reliance on Theuerkauf v. Sutton, 306 N.W.2d 651, 658 (Wis. 1981), which was a contract implied by fact case that mentioned quantum meruit only in passing. Applying a test from Theuerkauf, they wrote, was inappropriate to decide quantum meruit claims and excluded large amounts of evidence that was necessary to determine whether there was a contract implied by law. Thus, a new trial was necessary.

The Seventh also ordered a new trial on the unjust enrichment claim, but not because the trial court had misconstrued that principle. Rather, they wrote, it’s not clear that this case meets the third element of an unjust enrichment test in Wisconsin: that it would be inequitable for Middleton to retain the benefits of Miller’s work without paying him. Again, the judges wrote, a substantial amount of evidence on this question was excluded by the trial court, making it necessary to retry the claim. If the trial court determines on remand that Miller did not reasonably expect to be paid unless he made Middleton profitable, and that he could not after a fair attempt, the Seventh ordered the trial court to enter judgment for Middleton.

Based in Chicago and Oakbrook Terrace, Ill., near Wheaton and Naperville DiTommaso-Lubin represents clients in Illinois and throughout the Midwest in complex business litigation matters, including federal and Illinois breach of contract lawsuits. Our Chicago breach of contract lawyers represent parties to all kinds of contracts, including contracts implied by law or by fact. If you need help from an experienced business litigation attorney and you’d like to learn more about how we can help, please contact us by email or call 1-877-990-4990 to set up a confidential consultation.

In a consumer protection and debt collection case, the Seventh Circuit has decided that a Wisconsin trial court was correct to grant summary judgment to a class of Cingular Wireless customers. Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., No. 07-4083 (7th Cir. December 8, 2008). The Cingular (now AT&T) customers had sued AFNI, Inc., a debt collector for Cingular, alleging it was charging a collection fee that consumers hadn't agreed to and that was not permissible under Wisconsin law. Responding to a summary judgment motion by a certified class of consumers, the trial court found that AFNI violated both the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Wisconsin Consumer Act.

The plaintiffs were Cingular customers in Wisconsin. Each had signed a contract agreeing to pay the fees of a collection agency. They fell behind in their payments and eventually received letters from debt collector AFNI, which had bought their debt from Cingular, saying they owed a collection fee of 15% of the original debt. A second letter included the 15% fee in its total balance due. The plaintiffs sued, saying neither the contracts nor Wisconsin law allowed a separate collection fee for the owner of the debt (as opposed to a third-party debt collector). The trial court granted summary judgment to AFNI on one state claim and to the plaintiffs on another state claim, as well as the FDCPA. AFNI appealed.

The appeals court first rejected AFNI's argument that its debt collection practices fall under Wisconsin laws allowing wronged parties to collect damages for breach of contract. If it could prove this, the court wrote, it would also need to prove that the 15% fee reflected its actual costs. However, the court pointed out that AFNI presented no evidence that would prove this, and general debt collection industry practices don't support any such assumption.

AFNI next argued that it is entitled to collect fees as Cingular's assignee, since customers signed contracts with Cingular agreeing to pay fees charged by a third party. The district court found that the contracts authorize a collection fee only when Cingular uses a third party, not when Cingular does the collection work itself. AFNI argued that it could collect the fee as a reimbursement if it had paid that fee to Cingular. But as the appeals court pointed out, it did not pay such a fee, and no evidence in the record shows that AFNI's fee could be considered a referral fee authorized by the contract.

Finally, the court considered whether AFNI's violation of the law could be considered a bona fide error under the FDCPA, which removes liability when a debt collector broke the law unintentionally. One requirement of the bona fide error defense, the Seventh wrote, is that the debt collector have reasonable procedures in place to avoid a violation. It concluded that AFNI had no such procedures, pointing out that AFNI an employee's own deposition shows it wasn't aware of the distinction between collecting its own debt and collecting on behalf of a client. In fact, the court wrote, "applying the bona fide error defense here would essentially reward a business's ignorance of the law." Thus, it upheld the trial court's summary judgment decision on both the FDCPA and the Wisconsin claim.

DiTommaso-Lubin has an active practice defending individuals who are victims of abusive, illegal or unfair practices by debt collectors, including violations of Illinois and other state consumer protection statutes as well as violations of the FDCPA. Based near Wheaton, Illinois, and Chicago, we have successfully represented consumers in Illinois and throughout the nation. To speak with us about a potential case against an abusive debt collector, you can

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Posted In: Billing Fraud , FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) , Seventh Circuit