Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

In an insurance contract dispute, the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled April 23 that a liability insurer has no duty to defend a village from litigation alleging intentional misconduct, but not negligence. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Village of Franklin Park, No. 06-2924 (7th Cir. 4/23/2008) is a contract dispute between an insurer and an Illinois township accused in separate litigation of severely underfunding its mandatory firefighters’ pension fund.

Under Illinois state law, municipalities must establish and administer pension funds for their firefighters. Firefighters in Franklin Park sued under that law, alleging that the village had intentionally underfunded their pension fund for more than 30 years. After the suit was filed in state court in January of 2002, the village asked its liability insurer, St. Paul, to defend it under a policy that covered disputes over employee benefits plans. The insurer declined, and the village disputed this, but did not sue. In late 2004, St. Paul filed in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend the village. In March of 2006, the district court granted that judgment, ruling that St. Paul’s contract created a duty to defend against negligence, not the intentional wrongdoing alleged by the firefighters. The village appealed both the judgment and the denial of a motion to reconsider. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In its opinion, the three-judge panel agreed with St. Paul that the firefighters’ allegations were not a “loss” under the meaning of the policy, pointing to caselaw that distinguishes between loss and money that was illegally or unethically withheld from its rightful owner.

Even if the outcome of the firefighters’ suit required the Village to move amounts earmarked for other uses or collect more taxes, the Village would not suffer a “loss” under the policy because it would still only be paying an amount offset by a benefit it had already received—either having the use of extra tax money or having the ability to collect fewer taxes. See Level 3, 272 F.3d at 911. Were the rule otherwise, Franklin Park could avoid its pension fund obligations entirely by levying no taxes and making no contributions. It would be absurd to think that in such a situation, the effect of a court finally requiring the Village to make the contributions would be a covered “loss” that St. Paul was required to cover.

The Illinois Supreme Court handed a victory to plaintiffs throughout Illinois with its 2006 ruling in an insurance dispute over whether insurers must cover the costs of a junk fax class action lawsuit for an insured covered for an “advertising injury.” In Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Swiderski Electronics, Inc., 2006 Ill. LEXIS 1655, the state Supreme Court ruled that business insurers have a duty to defend “junk fax” class action lawsuits.

The underlying dispute in the Illinois Supreme Court case started when private investigator Ernie Rizzo filed a proposed class action lawsuit against Swiderski Electronics for sending him “junk faxes.” Unsolicited advertisements sent via fax violate both the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Swiderski had an insurance policy from Valley Forge Insurance Company, which insured Swiderski against a personal or advertising injury that arises out of “Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person’s right of privacy[.]” The insurer claimed that because the faxes had not revealed Rizzo’s own personal information, they did not invade his privacy and thus were not covered. They also claimed that sending information via fax does not constitute publication.

The insurer asked a trial court for a declaratory judgment stating it was not obligated to cover Swiderski; all parties filed cross-motions seeking summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of Swiderski, as did the appellate court and, eventually, the Illinois Supreme Court. That court rejected Valley Forge’s arguments, rejecting the claim that faxing is not “publication,” using the plain meaning of the word. It also ruled that privacy under the federal TCPA and caselaw includes the right to be left alone:

The receipt of an unsolicited fax advertisement implicates a person’s right of privacy insofar as it violates a person’s seclusion, and such a violation is one of the injuries that a TCPA faxad claim is intended to vindicate.

That contradicts the a 2004 decision by the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in American States Insurance Co. v. Capital Associates of Jackson County Inc., 392 F.3d 939, which found no duty to defend under very similar circumstances. The Seventh Circuit’s earlier ruling said privacy rights may include the right to seclusion in some cases, but “advertising injury” clauses do not, so insurers have no duty to defend in junk fax cases. Because the Seventh is bound by Illinois Supreme Court precedent in cases involving Illinois law, the more recent ruling overturns American States, handing a victory to plaintiffs and businesses who are plagued by unwanted junk faxes.

The Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion limiting class-action lawsuits regarding “firm offers of credit” under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. In Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Services, 2008 WL 1701839 (7th Cir. April 16, 2008), the Seventh Circuit also limited the scope of its 2004 decision in Cole v. U.S. Capital, Inc., 389 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2004). In that decision, the court said that when companies offer “a token line of credit” along with consumer goods, that credit offer must have value to the customer.

Among the issues addressed by the court are:
* Under Cole, an offer of credit entangled with an offer of merchandise must be valuable. However, Cole does not apply to “pure offers of credit” not entangled with another offer. The FCRA requires only that an offer of credit be firm, not that it be valuable to most or all of its recipients.
* An offer of “free” merchandise may be an offer of credit under some circumstances. In Murray, consumers complained that Cingular obtained their credit information in order to offer a “free phone.” However, since the free telephone was contingent on signing up for a service plan, it was not truly free. Thus, the offer of free merchandise was an offer of credit under the FCRA’s meaning.
* Advertisements need not contain all the terms of the credit under the FCRA; nothing in that law requires it. Indeed, wrote the majority, an initial offer containing the full terms of credit would be “turgid,” cumbersome and uninformative.
* Creditors may reserve the right to vary the terms of an offer and still extend an offer considered “firm” under the FCRA -- under some circumstances. The issue requires discovery, said the court.
* Small type cannot be considered “conspicuous,” at least in the offer at issue in Murray. In that instance, disclosures were printed in six-point type under advertising copy printed at more than twice the point size. However, the violation was not willful in this case because the law was not settled when the offer was made.

The decision is being hailed as a victory for defendants in FCRA class actions, but plaintiffs should note that several important issues are still open to litigation, especially with regard to varying terms of credit and disclosures made in very small type.

Murray combines three appeals from lower courts in the Midwest, all of which were putative class actions alleging violations of the FCRA. Murray v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 432 F.Supp.2d 788 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Bruce v. KeyBank N.A., 2006 WL 3743749 (N.D. Ind. December 15, 2006); Price v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 2007 WL 1521525 (E.D. Wis. May 22, 2007).

The Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling May 13 in United Stars Industries, Inc. v. Plastech Engineered Products, Inc., 07-2919 (7th Cir. 2008), a business contract dispute in which Plastech alleged that its tubing supplier, United Stars, overcharged it by about $1.6 million. The case is also notable because the appellate court upheld $30,000 in sanctions against the law firm Jones Day for “frivolous claims.”

The underlying dispute started when United Stars notified Plastech, its customer, that it had been charging Plastech surcharges for the cost of raw materials, even though about 9% of those materials were lost during processing. Plastech contends that it did not agree to pay the full amount of those surcharges; thus, it believed United Stars owed it about $900,000, and Plastech refused to pay another $700,000 bill, for a total of $1.6 million in dispute. Plastech stopped paying United Stars, even after reaching a purported compromise in 2005, then found another vendor. In the ensuing lawsuit, in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the judge awarded $1.3 million to United Stars, sending Plastech into bankruptcy.

On appeal, Plastech contended that the trial judge erred in deciding that the companies reached a compromise in 2005. However, the Seventh said, Plastech’s claim fails regardless of whether there was a compromise, because it did not present “a scrap of evidence” to support its interpretation of the companies’ contract. Furthermore, the language of the contract itself favored United Stars.

Plastech’s interpretation of the contract formed the basis of a counterclaim for the alleged $900,000 overcharge, which the Seventh said would have failed if it had been tried. For that reason, the court upheld $30,000 in sanctions against Plastech’s law firm, Jones Day, for violating Rule 11(3)(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which prohibits frivolous claims. The opinion quoted U.S. District Judge Barbara B. Crabb, who said Plastech and its lawyers failed to produce any credible evidence for their costly-to-defend counterclaim, but did use it as a basis for discovery requests. According to the National Law Journal, Jones Day maintains that its actions were appropriate.