Chicago Business Litigation Lawyer Blog

In a business trademark dispute, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that large auto parts retailer AutoZone may proceed with its trademark infringement lawsuit against a two-store automotive services business in Naperville and Wheaton, Illinois, called Oil Zone and Wash Zone. AutoZone, Inc. v. Michael Strick, No. 07-2136 (7th. Cir. Sept. 11, 2008).

AutoZone sells auto parts and products, and has been well-known in the Chicago area since the early 1990s, according to the opinion. In that decade, defendant Michael Strick opened his Oil Zone stores outside Chicago, in Wheaton and Naperville. These stores sold automotive services such as oil changes, not parts or products; the Naperville location also offered car washes under the name "Wash Zone."

AutoZone learned of Strick's businesses in 1998, but did not contact him until sending a letter in February of 2003. It filed a lawsuit against Strick and his businesses near the end of that year, alleging service mark, trademark and trade name infringement and trademark dilution under the federal Lanham Act, federal unfair competition law, the Illinois Trademark Registration and Protection Act and Illinois common law. Both sides sought summary judgment, which was granted to Strick only, on his claim that there was no reasonable likelihood of confusion between his trademark and AutoZone's. Strick's defense of laches -- that AutoZone had waited too long to sue -- was not addressed. AutoZone appealed on the likelihood of confusion issue.

In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit noted that summary judgment in trademark cases is only appropriate when "the evidence is so one-sided that there can be no doubt about how the question should be answered." Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 642 (7th Cir. 2001). That case also laid down a series of seven factors courts must analyze to decide whether to grant summary judgment, which include questions of similarity, geography, consumer confusion and the intent of the parties. The court in this case concluded that six of those factors applied, including the similarity of the marks, the similarity of the products and their geographic proximity.

There was enough likelihood of confusion in this case for the case to survive summary judgment, the court concluded. It also left the issue of latches -- the time between AutoZone noticing Oil Zone and when it filed suit -- up to the district court. Thus, the district court's decision was reversed and remanded to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

DiTommaso-Lubin's Chicago, Naperville and Oak Brook business litigation attorneys handle trademark disputes, franchise disputes and other Illinois business litigation from their Oak Brook and Chicago law offices. To speak one of our commercial litigation lawyers about representing your business, please contact us through our Web site or via telephone.

To learn more about our firm and the cases we have handled click here.

Posted by Peter S. Lubin and Vincent L. DiTommaso | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Closely Held Businesses , Seventh Circuit , U.S. District Courts in Illinois

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A federal breach of warranty case of ours IWOI v. Monaco Couch recently survived a motion to dismiss in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Our client, a limited liability company formed in Montana, bought a motor home in Illinois and allegedly discovered that it had a twisted frame causing it to list to one side, requiring constant steering corrections. On discovering this alleged defect, the individual owning the LLC brought it back to the dealership the very next day for the first of three unsuccessful repair attempts. Per the manufacturer's warranty, he submitted his complaints in writing to the manufacturer, Monaco Coach after these three repair attempts. The alleged defects remain, and we alleged in our filings that neither the manufacturer nor the dealer has agreed to accept the motor home for return or fixed the problems.

Our client sued both the manufacturer and the dealer under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and other state claims. In defense, the defendants argued that our client was not a "consumer" within the meaning of federal law; this claim was flatly denied by the Court, which found no allegations in the Complaint to support it. On the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act issues, the Court also identified several alleged facts suggesting that Monaco Coach may well have known of the problems before the RV was sold, as we alleged. Thus, those claims also survived.

Furthermore, the trial court decided that our client could revoke its acceptance of the dealer's "AS IS" condition and the dealer's disclaimer of all implied warranties, a claim under the Illinois Commercial Code. The Seventh Circuit has addressed this issue in Priebe v. Autobarn, Ltd., 240 F.3d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 2001), in which it adopted an earlier ruling stating that consumers may revoke their acceptance even when the dealer has properly disclaimed implied warranties, if the evidence is clear that the vehicle's substantial defects clearly impair its value to the plaintiff. This allowed our client's Magnuson-Moss Act and state conversion claims to survive as well.

Although this case is at the trial court level, we believe the judge's interpretation of Seventh Circuit and Illinois precedent on Magnuson-Moss and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act is good news for consumers. As auto and RV dealer fraud lawyers in Chicago, Naperville and Oak Brook, Ill., we believe automotive dealers take advantage of consumers' lack of education about their rights far more often than they are caught. When they are caught, they should not be allowed to wiggle out of liability for their actions with an unfair, high-pressure contract that the consumer has little room to renegotiate. Both the Magnuson-Moss Act (which governs how warranties may be offered) and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act were specifically intended to help consumers fight this behavior.

If you believe you may be a victim of automotive dealer fraud or another type of consumer fraud and you're ready to fight back, please contact DiTommaso-Lubin online, via telephone or at our offices near or in Naperville, Wheaton, Oak Brook or Chicago.

To see more about our firm and the consumer rights, consumer fraud, lemon law and class action cases we have handled click here.

Posted by Peter S. Lubin and Vincent L. DiTommaso | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Auto Fraud , Breach of Contract , Consumer Fraud/Consumer Protection , Lemon Law , Motions to Dismiss , RV Fraud , U.S. District Courts in Illinois

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Judge Dow of the Federal Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed without prejudice a bona fide error defense in a putative Fair Debt Collection Act class-action for failure to plead facts akin to the "first paragraph in any newspaper story." The Court ruled that a bona fide error defense raises a claim of mistake, and therefore must be pled with factual particularity under Rule 9.

The Court held:

Notwithstanding the "disfavored" status of motions to strike and the "liberal pleading standard" in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, the Court concludes that the motion is well taken. Because the defense at issue deals with an alleged "mistake" -- a "bona fide error" in the statutory parlance -- Defendant is obligated to comply with both Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 9(b). The standard under Rule 9(b) requires parties to state the circumstances of a mistake with "particularity." As the Seventh Circuit has explained, Rule 9(b) mandates that parties allege at the pleading stage "the who, what, when, where, and how of the mistake." GE Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1078 (7th Cir. 1997). Defendant correctly points out that Rule 9(b) permits pleaders to allege matters such as intent and knowledge in a more general manner. However, the remaining factual details of an alleged mistake -- for example, who made the mistake and when and how it occurred -- must be set out with "particularity" in the pleading. Although Defendant has added some detail to its original effort to plead its affirmative defense, there still is work to do before the Court reasonably can conclude that Defendant has complied with its obligation to provide "the first paragraph of any newspaper story" (GE Capital Corp., 128 F.3d at 1078) setting forth with particularity Defendant's version of the circumstances supporting the defense, as Rule 9(b) and the Seventh Circuit case law require.

To read the full opinion click here Konewko vs. Dickler, Kahn, Slowikowski & Zavell, Ltd.

To learn more about our Chicago and Oak Brook based class action attorneys click here.

Posted by Peter S. Lubin and Vincent L. DiTommaso | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Class-Action , FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) , Motions to Dismiss , U.S. District Courts in Illinois

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